by Trevor Royle
While the crews had accurate information from aerial reconnaissance about the ships’ whereabouts, they also know that they faced formidable obstacles in the shape of submarine and anti-torpedo nets. For the attacking force there were also the perils of the actual crossing. The operational crews sailed in the relative comfort of the six ‘mother’ submarines but for the passage crews it was rather different as they had to endure the cramped conditions of the midgets which were towed 40 feet below the waves and needed constant trimming. Nevertheless morale was high as Rear-Admiral C. B. Fry, the senior submarine commander discovered when he visited Loch Cairnbawn on the eve of their departure on 11 and 12 September 1943: ‘It was in this spirit that they went out into the night in their tiny craft to face a thousand miles of rough seas before they reached their objective, which itself to their knowledge, was protected by every conceivable device which could ensure their destruction.’3
Problems began even before the Norwegian coast was sighted. Two of the craft broke their tows and one of them, X9, was lost. Then the weather worsened as the boats entered the Arctic Circle, and it was not until 20 September that the four remaining craft, X5 (Henty-Creer), X6 (Cameron), X7 (Place) and X10 (Hudspeth) were ready to begin their attack on Altenfjord. All passed through the mine belt guarding the approaches but X10 experienced technical problems and had to withdraw. Superb seamanship plus a little luck allowed X6 and X7 to get through the protective boom and position themselves beneath Tirpitz in the early hours of 22 September. Although both craft had to be abandoned, the resulting explosions did substantial damage to the battleship, which was out of commission for six months. Both crews escaped and were captured but Henty-Creer’s X5 was sighted, attacked by gunfire and was presumed sunk as nothing was heard of her crew again. Cameron and Place were deservedly awarded the Victoria Cross. As for Hudspeth, he called off his attack and made his way back to the mother submarine but X10 had to be scuttled on the return voyage to Loch Cairnbawn.4
Further attempts to disable the German capital ships were made by the RAF using specially adapted Lancaster bombers equipped with 12,000-pound Tallboy ‘earthquake’ bombs. On 11 September 1944 Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons left RAF Lossiemouth to attack Tirpitz and, after refuelling in Russia, pressed home their attack, disabling the battleship with a direct hit. A second raid followed on 29 October, and the coup-de-grâce was delivered on 12 November when Tirpitz was hit, and capsized in shallow waters near Tromsø. The day after the raid the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, visited the squadrons at Lossiemouth and congratulated them on sinking ‘one of the toughest ships in the world’. At long last the threat had been neutralised and the Royal Navy was free to move its capital ships from Scapa for service in the Far East.
Norway and the North Sea also provided the focus for the RAF’s presence in Scotland in the latter stages of the war. In addition to the main fighter airfields, the war was carried on from the north-east of the country through the Banff Strike Wing from its bases at Banff and Dallachy. Originally built for training purposes, the fields came into their own in the autumn of 1944 when RAF Coastal Command moved the bulk of its squadrons from the west of England to counter the threat posed by U-boats operating from Germany and Scandinavia. By then the Battle of the Atlantic had been won, and following the fall of France the German Navy had withdrawn most of its boats from its ports on the Bay of Biscay; this redeployment gave added impetus for the creation of a force to deal with all enemy shipping in the North Sea. The result was the Banff Strike Wing which originally consisted of 144 and 404 Squadrons flying Beaufighters, and 248 and 333 (Norwegian) Squadrons flying Mosquitoes. In October 143 Squadron arrived and converted from Beaufighters to Mosquitoes, a change which necessitated a redeployment of resources, with the Beaufighters transferring to nearby Dallachy while the Mosquitoes took up residence at Banff, also known as Boyndie. Command of the wing was in the hands of Group Captain Max Aitken, son of Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper tycoon and wartime Minister of Aircraft Production, and amongst the crews were pilots and navigators from Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and Norway.5 Fighter escorts were provided by North American P-51 Mustangs of 19 Squadron based at RAF Peterhead.
Air Ministry photographic records show the extent and variety of the operations undertaken by the Banff Strike Wing in the short interval between its inception in September 1944 and the end of the war eight months later.6 This was one of the least heralded RAF units of the war, yet its impact was enormous at a time when the Luftwaffe had all but stopped offensive operations against Scotland. Equipped with Mosquito Mark VI and Beaufighter Mark XI strike aircraft, the primary targets for the Banff Strike Wing were German surface ships and submarines operating in the North Sea, especially in Scandinavian waters. Their armament included RP-3 rockets which were devastating against shipping. Between 14 September 1944 and 4 May 1945 the Banff Strike Wing carried out regular sorties or ‘Rover Patrols’ against enemy shipping, and in so doing encountered difficult and heavily defended targets. Most German merchant ships travelled in convoys, and were heavily defended both by their own anti-aircraft guns and by flakships, heavily armed former whalers. Both types of aircraft also used cannon and machine-guns for aerial combat. On 21 April 1945, during one of the last sorties of the war, Mosquitoes from the strike wing encountered a force of eighteen enemy aircraft from Stavanger while flying over the North Sea. In the subsequent engagement at least ten raiders were shot down with no losses to the Mosquito force.7
In few other parts of the armed forces was the process of renewal more keenly felt than in the regiments which made up the reconstituted 51st (Highland) Division. Following its forced surrender at St Valéry-en-Caux the survivors made their way back to Britain as best they could, and almost immediately steps were taken to reform the division on the duplicate 9th (Scottish) Division whose forbears had fought so gallantly on the Western Front during the First World War. For Brigadier Douglas Wimberley, who had taken 1st Cameron Highlanders across to France in 1940, this was best possible outcome: ‘After Dunkirk came the tragedy of St Valéry and naturally that surrender affected me much the most (like I’m sure all Highlanders). In my nightly prayers I petitioned, whatever else happened to me, the Almighty would save me from that particular fate. Some of the remnants of the 51st were sent to an Artillery depot near Devizes. I went over with two or three Highland regiment officers, telling them the Division would come into its own again.’8
The process turned out to be remarkably smooth. All three regular battalions in the division were re-raised by their regiments – 1st Black Watch, 1st Gordons, 2nd Seaforth – and steps were taken to re-form the Territorial battalions and make good the losses from within the regimental system. In The Gordon Highlanders the 5th Battalion was renewed from the 7th Battalion, and joined the new division as 5/7th Gordons, while in The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders the 7th Battalion amalgamated with the 10th Battalion. Within a short time the 9th (Scottish) Division was renumbered as the 51st (Highland) Division, with a new and instantly recognisable HD divisional badge, and quickly started building up its own sense of morale. Its headquarters was at Rothes, Banffshire, and it was commanded by Major-General Neil Ritchie who had been adjutant of 2nd Black Watch in Mesopotamia in 1915. Other battalions started arriving to bring the new formation up to strength; these included 5th Black Watch from Angus and 7th Black Watch from Fife, both of which had spent the first part of the war training up and carrying out coastal defence duties. All the battalions were spread across the north and the north-east where they were in the home defence role, but from the outset the emphasis within the division was centred on rebuilding and then maintaining esprit de corps. As John McGregor put it in the war history of 5th Black Watch: ‘To the Highland soldier, the 51st was the Division and next only to the Regiment, it commanded the same pride and loyalty.’9
In May 1941 Ritchie was moved to the Middle East where he eventually commanded the British Eighth Army, and his place was taken by
Wimberley who immediately put his stamp on the division. Nicknamed ‘Tartan Tam’, he insisted that as far as was possible the soldiers within the division should be Highlanders, failing that Lowlanders, and that men should always try to return to the division if they ever got separated from it. In due course he was not above poaching Scottish soldiers from other divisions, and insisted on the creation and maintenance of a fiercely Scottish (especially Highland) sense of patriotism. The battalion pipes and drums were expected to practice hard to reach high standards of perfection, and all junior officers were ordered to assemble after reveille so that they could dance reels under the direction of the pipe-major. Wimberley also insisted on high standards of discipline and keenness during training, and encouraged a competitive spirit amongst the battalions and their brigades. Only one of the units within 51st (Highland) Division escaped Wimberley’s nationality strictures – 1/7th Middlesex Regiment, which served as the machine-gun battalion – but as their historian recorded, ‘soon the cockneys made themselves appreciated and became friends for life with the Highlanders, civilian and military alike.’10
As the training continued the division was joined by a reconnaissance regiment operating armoured cars which was part of the newly formed Reconnaissance Corps; it was numbered 51st and wore the tam-o’-shanter, a Hunting Stewart flash on the right shoulder and the HD badge on the right. Three Royal Artillery field regiments were added (126, 127 and 128), and the intensity of training reached a new tempo during the winter of 1941–2. In March 1942 the division moved to Aldershot where it came under the South-East Command whose GOC was General Bernard Law Montgomery, a commander with whom the Highlanders were to be associated for the rest of the war.
The next step for the division was embarkation on board a large convoy of twenty-two ships, many of them well-known liners such as Empress of Australia, Strathmore and Arundel Castle, which was bound for an unknown destination, sailing from Glasgow, Liverpool and Southampton. The issue of pith helmets suggested that the destination was India, but for everyone it involved a long and tiring voyage round the Cape of Good Hope which lasted fifty-nine days and for most of the men felt even longer. Had it not been for a stop at Cape Town it could have been a depressing experience, but as the historian of 5th Black Watch remembered, the experience of a day’s leave came as a time out of life after almost three years of war: ‘As they came down the gangways they were greeted by lines of cars waiting to take the Jocks out for the rest of the day and night. No-one was overlooked, parties were given, wine flowed, dances had been organised with pretty partners in plenty, and all given free and with the sincere desire to ensure that the visit to Cape Town would be memorable.’11
During the stay in Cape Town the division’s final destination became clearer when Wimberley left the convoy on 20 July to travel by flying boat to Cairo. Three weeks later the 51st (Highland) Division began arriving in Egypt where it joined the British Eighth Army as much-needed reinforcements for the fighting against the Axis forces. Immediately after arrival the division started training for desert warfare, getting used to the heat and dust, and hardening themselves for the shock of battle.
This was a difficult period for the British forces in the country. As we have seen, in June the British Eighth Army had retreated from Tobruk, which had fallen into enemy hands following a German and Italian offensive led by the charismatic Rommel; Cairo was under threat, and it seemed inevitable that another enemy assault would lead to the collapse of British power in North Africa. Morale was low, and defeat seemed inevitable. At that point Churchill decided to change the command structure by appointing Montgomery to take over the Eighth Army on 12 August. It proved to be an inspired choice, and Montgomery got to work straight away. Not only was he desperate to impose his personality and his ideology on a demoralised army, but he also wanted to get rid of the idea that there would be any withdrawal. Orders for retreat were torn up, and he immediately set about planning to take the offensive back to Rommel. His first order was brief and to the point: ‘Here we will stand and fight; there will be no further withdrawal. I have ordered that all plans and instructions dealing with a further withdrawal are to be burnt, and at once. We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.’12
In the time that was left to him, little more than two weeks, Montgomery had to work hard to raise morale and to restore the confidence that had been lost during the earlier reverses. He also had to produce a plan which would counter Rommel’s expected offensive, and the result was a stunning defensive battle at Alam Halfa which produced a much-needed victory for the Eighth Army. It also prepared the way for a fresh offensive in the third week of October during the full moon, by which time his army would have been reinforced by 8th (Armoured) Division and 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Divisions. In the run-up to the attack Montgomery took time and trouble to make sure that the men of the Eighth Army, especially the newly arrived reinforcements, knew exactly what was happening and what was expected of them. He also continued his policy of inspecting units right down to battalion level and talking to the men. Mostly such visits were a fillip to morale, but there were occasional glitches: while spending time with 154 Brigade in the 51st (Highland) Division he acknowledged the presence of the regular 1st Black Watch but he appeared to be dumbfounded when told that the 7th Black Watch was a Territorial battalion from the county of Fife. According to the brigade commander, Brigadier H. W. Houldsworth, Black Watch officers ‘stood gaping with their mouths open’ when Montgomery admitted that he did not know where Fife was as he had ‘never been to Scotland’.13
Fortunately Montgomery showed a surer touch in directing his next battle – the Battle of El Alamein, which began on 23 October, and which turned out to be the first decisive British land victory of the war. To the operation Montgomery brought scrupulous planning, and instilled a belief in the Eighth Army that they had the training and the equipment to defeat an enemy which was not unbeatable. It was also a set-piece battle similar to the kind that had been fought in the latter stages of the First World War, with soldiers advancing under a heavy barrage and battalions leap-frogging forward to take their objectives. As Private Roy Green, 1st Black Watch, put it, ‘Alamein was First World War tactics with Second World War weapons, creeping barrages, walking through minefields ahead of armour, each man five yards apart to save casualties.’14
For the attack of the 51st (Highland) Division the intention was to secure 7,000 yards of desert fighting across minefields and barbed wire, with the division advancing in six channels towards their objectives. Thus 1st Gordons and 5th Black Watch advanced on the right towards Montrose, Arbroath and Forfar (Green Line) before pushing on to Turiff (red line), then on to Kintore, Dufftown and Braemar (Black Line) with Aberdeen (Blue Line) being the final objective. For 5/7th Gordons in the next channel the objectives were Elgin and Cruden (Green Line), Inch (Red Line), Strichen and Stanley (Black Line) and Ballater (Blue Line) At 9.40 p.m. a huge artillery barrage opened up as hundreds of guns fired towards the German lines. As remembered by Lieutenant Felix Barker in his war history of 5/7th Gordons it was a moment that none would forget.
Each man could see the white St Andrew’s Cross on the back of the man in front of him. And as they moved forward they could not help feeling that the whole thing was rather fantastic. It was like no battle they had ever heard of, or could have imagined, in the wildest flight of imagination. Magazines were filled because it seemed out of the question to go into a major attack without rounds in the rifles, but many a man never fired a shot all that terrible night. Bayonets gleamed in the moonlight, but they were fixed as a token gesture, not so much to be used as to give confidence.15
The attacking force moved off shortly after 10 p.m., each battalion being guided by a navigation officer watching his compass and counting his paces to ensure accuracy. All the first objectives were quickly taken, with the follow-up forces passing through the first wave, although there were problems for 1st Black Watch w
hen it pushed on too quickly and had to halt to wait for the artillery bombardment to pass over the enemy. By dawn the following day the second objectives had been taken and the battle moved into its next phase which Montgomery promised would be a ‘dog-fight’.
All the time shelling continued on either side, and tank battles raged as British Shermans engaged the enemy lines. In some parts of the line the fighting was fiercer than others, but as Alastair Borthwick, 5th Seaforth, recorded in his autobiography, the experience of battle almost defied description.
The noise is unbelievable. If one shell be fired from one 25-pounder gun at night, the Infantryman first sees a flash far behind him and a few seconds later hears the sound of the gun. Again there is a slight pause; and far overhead a shrill sound, somewhere between a whine and a sigh and small wind blowing across the strings of a harp, grows in volume and deepens in tone until the shell roars into the ground ahead of him. There is a red flash, and an explosion which has a distinct metallic clang in it.16
This was the common lot of every soldier who fought at Alamein – of being under constant mortar and shell fire, and of being pinned down by artillery as the forward formations attempted to make the final breakthrough.
However, it could not last, as the speed and aggression of the Allied assault had broken the enemy’s will to resist. In some parts of the line the fighting was fiercer than others, and there were a few surprises. When 5th Black Watch prepared to attack its final objective it appeared to be a tough nut to crack, as the German defenders had successfully repelled an armoured assault on their position. However, when the battalion went into the attack the following night, they found that the Germans had withdrawn, leaving behind a number of vehicles and artillery pieces. There were similar experiences for all the battalions, although 7th Black Watch found itself pinned down with New Zealand troops by heavy fire on a feature known as ‘The Ben’ on the Miteiriya Ridge. During the fighting the battalion lost six officers and eighty soldiers killed, and almost twice that number wounded.
