by Trevor Royle
The initial planning called for an invasion force of three assault divisions plus airborne forces which would create a bridgehead through which reinforcements could be landed quickly to break out into Normandy and Brittany. Success would depend on the ability of the Allies to build up forces more rapidly than the Germans, and with that in mind it would be essential to deny the enemy the chance to reinforce the landing grounds by destroying road and rail communications in northern France. Although Montgomery, by then the Allied ground-forces commander, agreed with the main principles of the plan, he put forward an alternative proposal to attack in greater weight and along a broader front, and with a larger airborne contribution. This was backed by the supreme Allied commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who activated his headquarters – Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) – in February 1944. It was agreed that the initial assault should be made by five divisions – two US, two British and one Canadian – with one British and two US airborne divisions operating on the flanks.
The D-Day invasion began on 6 June, with the airborne forces securing the flanks overnight while the main assault went in at dawn, preceded by a mighty bombardment from 2,000 warships in the Channel. By the end of the day the assault divisions were ashore and the five landing areas – Utah, Omaha, Gold, Sword and Juno – had been secured with the loss of less than 10,000 casualties (killed, wounded or missing), fewer than expected. The only Scottish infantry battalion in the first phase of the invasion was 1st KOSB as part of 3rd Infantry Division, which landed with 50th (Northumbrian) Division and 3rd Canadian Division. Despite fears that 3rd Division would suffer heavy casualties as the spearhead at Sword beach, the landing was relatively trouble-free, and by nightfall 1st KOSB was ashore and had assembled between Beauville and Benouville.
The next phase of the operation required the capture of the city of Caen. In Montgomery’s appreciation of the post-invasion operations the battle would require three phases lasting up to eighty days in total. The first would run for twenty days, and would see the US First Army capture its objectives in the Cotentin peninsula, while the British Second Army (commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey) assaulted west of the River Orne, pivoting on Caen, to shield the US offensive. The second phase would be the beginning of the breakout, with the British forces pushing south through Falaise towards Argentan while the Americans moved towards the Loire and Quiberon Bay. Phase Three would take the Allies to the Seine, with the US First Army heading towards Paris while the British and Canadians would operate to the north between Rouen and the Channel. At the same time Patton’s US Third Army would move through the US First Army’s front to clear Brittany, and would then operate on the southern flank.
Following the creation of a bridgehead on the Normandy beaches, the follow-up forces began arriving in France almost immediately. Amongst them was 51st (Highland) Division, which started its deployment on the evening of 6 June, and 15th (Scottish) Division which followed a week later. During this phase it fell to 5/7th Gordons to be the first Highland battalion to come ashore, its task being to secure the bridgehead on the River Orne which had been captured by airborne forces and which the Germans desperately wanted to retake.
Almost immediately casualties began to mount, as the Germans fought desperately to prevent the Allies from moving inland. To begin with, the numbers killed in action were not particularly high, but they occurred on a daily basis – on 16 June the losses in 5/7th Gordons were 7 killed and 24 wounded – and it soon became clear that it would be no easy matter to push inland. When 5th Black Watch moved into the attack at Douvre la Deliverande they too soon discovered that the German defenders were determined to hold their ground in an attempt to push the invading Allied forces back towards the coast. By the end of the first week the battalion had lost 6 officers and 92 soldiers killed and 11 officers and 198 soldiers wounded. The relatively high figures were put into perspective by Captain John McGregor of A Company: ‘When compared to the 529 casualties for the whole of the North African campaign and the 11 casualties for the Sicilian campaign it gave a clear picture of the heavy price paid.’1 At the same time 7th Black Watch fared little better while moving up to Ranville, losing 42 casualties, mainly to heavy enemy machine-gun fire.
A divisional attack on the suburb of Colombelles to the north-east of Caen on 11 July also ran into difficulties, as the defences were stronger than had been anticipated. As casualties increased there was no option for the battalions in 153 Brigade but withdrawal. This was a particularly nasty battle as the Germans had placed observation posts on the chimneys of the factory at Colombelles, and were able to direct heavy and accurate fire onto the infantrymen as they went into the attack. The plan was for 1st Gordons to attack on the right with 5th Black Watch on the left, but despite some encouraging initial reports the assault faltered and soon became unsustainable. During the fighting 5th Black Watch suffered a further 128 casualties, including 71 killed or missing.
After the failure of this attack it became clear that 51st (Highland) Division had lost much of its fighting spirit due to exhaustion and the strain of being constantly in action and under heavy fire. Before the advance on Colombelles Major Alexander Brodie, commanding A Company, 5th Black Watch, made his feelings clear when he told his men that he ‘would not hesitate to shoot anyone who ran away’, and that he ‘expected them to shoot me or any officer or NCO who ordered them to pack in’.2 There were also a number of desertions, including two from 1st Black Watch which ended in tragedy – the men were apprehended and handcuffed but during the night a tank reversed into the platoon position and both men were crushed to death. ‘A kind of claustrophobia affected the troops,’ noted the divisional historian, ‘and the continual shelling and mortaring from an unseen enemy in relatively great strength were certainly very trying.’3
So serious was the fall in morale that on 15 July Montgomery reported in secret to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that the 51st (Highland) Division was no longer ‘battleworthy’ and ‘does not fight with determination’.4 Some idea of the collapse of fighting spirit and the widespread unrest can be found in the recollections of Captain Ian Cameron, 7th Argylls: ‘Not a day passed without the battalion area being subjected to heavy shelling and mortaring and although our casualties were not heavy, there was a continual drain on personnel. In former campaigns the 51st Division had always been used aggressively and wherever there was an attack Highland Division always took part in it. This was the first time that the battalion had to sit for lengthy periods in a defensive position without launching an attack and this became very monotonous.’5
Another officer in the same battalion admitted that ‘any orders that involved life-threatening activity were ignored or watered down, especially if given by young officers without battle training’. When Lieutenant-Colonel (later Lieutenant-General Sir) Derek Lang took over command of 5th Camerons at the end of July, he was their fifth commanding officer in seven weeks, and Captain Fraser Burrows, an officer in the same battalion, could see morale seeping away from the men as they faced a constant diet of enemy fire: ‘Nothing was easier in a night attack, but to stop, tie a bootlace and disappear. In Normandy this became more and more prevalent. We dealt with this in a number of ways; no breakfast for a start; no NAAFI [Navy, Army, Air Force Institute] rations [i.e. no cigarettes] for a week; a threat to inform their next of kin of their behaviour. The scorn of their peers was also a very effective deterrent. I had one Jock in Normandy who was marched into battle with a bayonet up his backside.’6
As a result of this disastrous slump in morale and fighting spirit, on 26 July, Montgomery was forced to sack the divisional commander Major-General Charles Bullen-Smith on the grounds that ‘the men won’t fight for you’. It was a drastic move to make in the middle of a battle that had not yet been won, but although Montgomery was loath to make it he had no option. Bullen-Smith was replaced by Major-General T. G. Rennie, a former commanding officer of 5th Black Watch who had previously been in com
mand of 3rd Infantry Division.
At the end of July the 51st (Highland) Division was taken out of the line for a short period of rest and recuperation at Cazelle, north-west of Caen, and some of the under-strength battalions were reinforced with fresh soldiers, many of them from English regiments. For example 5/7th Gordons received forty-six reinforcements from The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, but they were quickly assimilated and soon became proud of the fact that they were ‘Jocks’ fighting with a distinguished Highland regiment. Ample rest and recreation and a new commander quickly helped the division to regain its old self-confidence, leaving Major Martin Lindsay, an experienced soldier temporarily in command of 1st Gordons, to comment that ‘the confidence we all feel in the future is wonderful’.7
By then another Scottish infantry division had also been in action. Within days of arriving, the 15th (Scottish) Division made its first contact with the enemy when it was involved in the opening phase of Operation Epsom, which was intended to outflank Caen by attacking towards the River Odon with the first objectives being the villages of Saint Manvieu and Cheux. The initial attack was in the hands of the 15th (Scottish) Division, and the ground that they fought over came to be known as the ‘Scottish Corridor’. It was aptly named because it was very much a Scottish battlefield which was fought over by regiments whose histories stretched back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In his study of the Normandy campaign John Keegan makes the point that although this was the division’s first experience of war ‘in actuality’, the Territorial battalions all had great traditions which ‘encapsulated the whole of Scottish military history’. For example, 8th Royal Scots belonged ‘by association to Hepburn’s Regiment which had tramped the campaigning fields of Germany in the service of France during the Thirty Years War’, while the men of the two HLI battalions took pride in the example provided by their antecedent regiments, the 71st and 74th Highlanders.
On the day of the attack, 26 June, the division’s pipers played as the leading battalions moved up to the start line, and the men were in good spirits as they waited to go into battle. However, the day had dawned with heavy rain which meant that there could only be limited air cover. Attacking with 9th Cameronians, the men of 2nd Glasgow Highlanders (HLI) took their objectives, but the follow-up, which included 10th HLI, resulted in heavy casualties as the division advanced under ‘rain and a lowering sky’. An officer in the latter battalion later recalled the ferocity of the fighting as the division forced its way forward towards Cheux: ‘Machine-guns opened up at the leading companies which, shocked by the suddenness of it, went to ground. Our supporting tanks replied, the tracer ricocheting in all directions, a source of fear to all. Each time the leading companies tried to advance, they were met by heavy fire, and the advance petered out.’8
Armoured support was provided by 11th Armoured Division and 31st Tank Brigade, but the presence of the tanks was often a mixed blessing as they attracted heavy German defensive fire and added to the confusion. One watching staff officer noted that ‘what little space was left in the lanes seemed to be filled by our own tanks, closed down and deaf to all appeals. None who was in Cheux that morning is likely to forget the confusion.’9 In the next few days 2nd Glasgow Highlanders and 10th HLI were both involved in the fighting to the south of the River Odon where they continued to meet determined German resistance. During the operation the 15th (Scottish) Division sustained 2,331 casualties while the losses in the 11th Armoured Division were 1,236, but Epsom was not all disaster. Although the fighting in the Scottish Corridor had not been a signal success, the Scottish battalions had lost none of their enthusiasm for the fight. As John Keegan put it, the battling performance of 2nd Argylls at Gavrus exemplified the tenacity of the resistance offered by the men and ‘stood fit to rank with those other small epics of Argyll and Scottish stubbornness, the destruction of the 93rd at the battle of New Orleans and the stand of the “thin red line” at Balaclava.’10
This was followed on 30 July by Operation Bluecoat, which saw some of the fiercest fighting of the Normandy campaign. Its success allowed the Allies to complete the breakout from Normandy and to begin the advance on the River Seine, which was crossed on 28 August. Ahead lay the Belgian frontier and such well-known names as Amiens, Abbeville, La Bassée, Béthune and Lille, all of which were known to the Scottish Territorial battalions from the First World War. For The Royal Scots Greys there was some light relief as they crossed the Belgian border near Basly where an elderly lady emerged from her house clutching the regiment’s distinctive eagle cap badge emblazoned ‘Waterloo’. It had been given to her by her boyfriend in the last war, she explained, but then she looked at the men and their Sherman tanks and said sadly, ‘of course, you had horses then.’11
Hard fighting returned in the middle of September when 8th Royal Scots was involved in the operations to secure bridgeheads over the Escaut Canal near the village of Aart. This meant advancing towards the objective during the night of 13 September and beginning the attack at dawn. The Germans put up fierce resistance, and the fighting continued for three days leaving the battalion with 163 casualties: the action was referred to later as the Battle of the Gheel Bridgehead. Despite the losses and their own exhaustion, the advance had to continue, and by 22 September 8th Royal Scots reached Eindhoven in Holland. At Fratershoef the fighting was stopped for an hour on 28 September when the Royals’ commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. Lane-Joynt agreed to a local truce with his German opposite number to allow the wounded to be brought in under a white flag. The fighting began again the next day but an officer in the battalion never forgot such a rare occurrence in warfare: ‘It was a blessed relief to have an hour of peace after some most unpleasant shelling. At the end of the hour punctually to the second, one shell was fired from the German side. Clearly it was not meant to hit anything and not another shot was fired by either side for the remainder of that Thursday night. The whole episode impressed me as an odd little bit of chivalry, and we appreciated it.’12
The next problem for the Allies was overstretch – as the attacking forces moved away from the beachheads their supply lines became longer, and that had an impact on the speed of their advance into north-west Europe. It also meant that the war would not end in 1944 but, even so, there were some compensations for the soldiers in the Highland regiments. In September the 51st (Highland) Division took part in the operations to capture the ports of Le Havre and Dunkirk, and this was preceded by a highly emotional moment when St Valéry-en-Caux was retaken amidst scenes of great local jubilation. Each brigade in the division was placed in roughly the same positions that had been occupied by their predecessors in 1940, and that evening (3 September) the massed pipes and drums played Retreat outside the divisional headquarters at Cailleville.
From there the advance took the division into Flanders and on into Holland where the flat ‘polder’ low lands had been flooded, causing inevitable problems. This included a period of intensive fighting as both the 15th (Scottish) Division and the 51st (Highland) Division fought their way over a succession of formidable water obstacles towards the River Maas. During the crossing of the Schelde-Maas Canal west of Donck on 15 September, C Company of 2nd Gordons made the initial assault, with the men wearing empty sandbags over their boots and carrying the minimum of equipment in order to maintain silence and create maximum surprise.
The one port capable of giving the Allies everything they needed was Antwerp, with its huge docks, but it was still in German control and its seaward approaches were heavily mined. With winter approaching, the need to capture Antwerp and to open up the Scheldt estuary was imperative, and so it was that the men of the 52nd (Lowland) Division, which had been trained for mountain warfare and then for airborne operations, found themselves crossing the English Channel in the middle of October to support Canadian forces in a part of Europe which was below sea level. First ashore was 4/5th Royal Scots Fusiliers which landed at Ostend and regrouped in the nearby town of Deinze, near Ghent. Together wit
h 6th Cameronians they were equipped with amphibious vehicles known as ‘buffaloes’, and the two-battalion force went into action on 26 October, landing in South Beveland where they soon found themselves caught up in the difficult and dangerous business of fighting in a built-up area. Faced by the onslaught, the Germans put up determined resistance and defended stubbornly to protect their positions.
To 5th KOSB fell the task of clearing the eastern part of the town as far as the Middleburg canal, and during the operation the men were under continuous German mortar fire. At the same time 4th KOSB supported 7/9th Royal Scots during the battle to capture the German headquarters in the Hotel Britannia. All the while, as the Royals’ regimental war historian made clear, both battalions had to contend with atrocious conditions:
Battle situations are frequently described as ‘fluid’. Flushing literally was a fluid battle; it was aquatic in more senses than one. It began with an amphibious assault and, as it developed, the infantry often had to go into action waist deep in icy water. The waters of the Scheldt, pouring through the gaps in the sea wall, converted some of the roads into fast flowing rivers with treacherous currents at high tide and the men of the rifle companies had to hold on to each other in a human chain at some of the whirlpool spots.13
In spite of the difficult conditions, Flushing was in Allied hands by 3 November, allowing the Scheldt estuary to re-open to Allied shipping, and the first transport ships were able to enter Antwerp by the end of November. During the operation 4th KOSB sustained seventy-five casualties, including three killed and seven died of wounds, while 5th KOSB’s losses were sixty-two, nine of whom were killed. Walcheren fell on 8 November, and 52nd (Lowland) Division’s next operation was the advance towards the Rhine which took them through Holland and into Germany under the operational command of the Second British Army.
