by Peter Church
British colonial rule introduced a strong bureaucracy supported in its maintenance of social control by an efficient police and army. The British distrusted the Burmese. The police and the army were largely composed of ethnic minorities who would have few qualms about quashing Burmese dissent. The bureaucracy was supervised by the British but staffed largely by Anglo‐Burmese and Indians. The new bureaucratic elite created by Britain was dominated by Anglo‐Burmese, whose cultural models were influenced more by Britain than by Myanmar. This was to pose considerable problems after independence.
British rule increased the ethnic diversity of Myanmar. The administrative link with India meant that Indians were free to migrate. By 1931, about 7 percent of the population of Myanmar was Indian, predominantly from Bengal and Madras. Yangon was an immigrant city. Two‐thirds of its population in 1931 were immigrants, including 53 percent Indians. Much of the capital for the agricultural expansion in the Myanmar Delta came from Indian moneylenders. Chinese immigrants were recruited from British Malaya and Singapore. In 1931, they comprised about two percent of the total population of Myanmar. They worked in the mines in the Shan states, provided much of the urban labour force, operated small businesses, and built rice mills in central Myanmar. On the eve of British conquest, the Myanmar lowlands were populated predominantly by ethnic Burmese. By 1941, this ethnic homogeneity had given way to a multiethnic and multi‐religious society.
The British transformed Myanmar's economy. They encouraged the settlement of the Myanmar Delta, which, in the 1850s, was largely malarial infested jungle and swamps. Roads and bridges were built, land was opened up at cheap prices with significant tax concessions, and the infrastructure of ports and communications was greatly improved to enable crops to be exported to world markets. The result was a dramatic southward migration of Burmese from the dry northern zone to the fertile delta. The Myanmar Delta became a major producer of rice and little else, commercialised and dependent on the vagaries of international markets. The extent of the transformation can be gauged by the raw economic statistics. In 1855, lower Myanmar exported 162,000 tons of rice: in 1905–06, it exported two million tons, with the price of rice increasing threefold in that time. The area under rice cultivation expanded from around 800,000 acres to around six million acres and the population grew from one million in 1852 to four million in 1901.
Land was plentiful until the 1920s, when the limits of cultivation were reached. Until then, the Myanmar Delta was generally prosperous, for those who tilled the land as well as for those who financed the development and traded rice and teak on world markets. From the 1920s population pressure on the land became a major problem, as did farmers' indebtedness. Tensions between Burmese and immigrant Chinese and Indians then became more open and at times more violent.
Britain transformed the economy but was content for Myanmar to be a rice, teak, and mineral exporter. There was no attempt to industrialise the country. In 1941, Myanmar was still a relatively prosperous agrarian society, though serious indebtedness and population pressure had expressed themselves in peasant protests and violence in the 1930s. What capitalism existed was in foreign hands: European companies controlled the export trade; the petty traders and small‐scale capitalists were Chinese; and the financiers and rural moneylenders were Indians. Myanmar was a pluralistic society in which economic position was coterminous with ethnicity.
Economic development under colonial rule was accompanied by the spread of Western education. A new Western‐educated urban elite emerged in the 20th century, out of which a nationalist movement was to emerge. As part of the Indian empire, until its separation into an independent colony in 1937, Myanmar's political development closely parallelled that of India. The political reforms introduced in India from the beginning of the 20th century were extended to Myanmar. In 1935, a new Constitution was introduced into Myanmar under which limited self‐government was permitted. The first elections for a Burmese Parliament were held in 1936 and a Westminster‐style parliamentary government operated until the Japanese occupation in 1942.
The nationalist movement in Myanmar had a number of distinctive characteristics. First, it was dominated by the ethnic Burmese. Their promotion of Burmese language, literature, and cultural symbols as “national” led to an ambiguous relationship with the ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities were suspicious of the nationalist movement. They feared Burmese domination of an independent Myanmar and their assimilation into Burmese majority culture. Second, the nationalist movement was strongly anti‐Chinese and anti‐Indian, in reaction to the domination of the Myanmar economy by these groups. Third, the domination of the Myanmar economy by foreign capital stimulated the development of socialist ideology among all strands of Burmese nationalism. Fourth, the stress on Buddhism as being at the core of cultural, religious, and personal identity further alienated the non‐Burmese minorities, especially those who were Christians.
On the eve of World War II, there was a strong urban‐based, Western‐educated nationalist elite which had developed no single or widely accepted view of what independent Myanmar would look like, apart from an emphasis on the unity of Myanmar, the “Burmeseness” of Myanmar, and the need to take control of the economy out of the hands of foreigners. Two of the most prominent nationalists in the 1930s were U (meaning “Mr”) Aung San and U Nu, the latter of whom was to be the first prime minister. Another was U Ne Win, who in 1962 led the coup that placed the military in power, where they remain today. Japan became a magnet for many nationalists in the 1930s. They were impressed by its propaganda support of anticolonial movements in South‐East Asia. When World War II broke out, Aung San was one of a group known as the Thirty Comrades who accepted Japanese‐sponsored military training in Hainan. The Thirty Comrades returned to Myanmar in 1942 along with the invading Japanese army as leaders of the Myanmar Independence Army. From the Thirty Comrades came many of the political and military leaders of post‐independence Myanmar.
JAPANESE OCCUPATION
The Japanese occupation was welcomed by many Burmese, including, of course, the Thirty Comrades. The attraction of Japan in the 1930s was shared by most South‐East Asian nationalists. Not only did the Japanese decisively end European colonialism but their slogans of “Asia for the Asians” and building a “Co‐Prosperity Sphere” were seductive. The destruction of white rule was itself a major fillip to South‐East Asian nationalists. The introduction of military training, the promotion of locals to administrative positions far higher than they could achieve under colonial rule, and the promotion of indigenous languages all contributed to a growing self‐confidence among nationalists throughout the region.
The realities of the Japanese exercise of power were far different from the promises held out by the propaganda, however. South‐East Asians quickly found Japanese rule to be no less exploitative and far more brutal than that of their former European colonial masters. In 1944, Aung San and fellow members of the Thirty Comrades group established the Anti‐Fascist People's Freedom League, which opposed the Japanese and worked to develop a vision of an independent Myanmar.
INDEPENDENCE
The activities of the Anti‐Fascist People's Freedom League against the Japanese made its leader, Aung San, a Burmese hero and ensured that at the end of the war Britain would have to negotiate with the League. In May 1945, just two weeks after Yangon had been recaptured, Britain announced its plans for postwar Myanmar. Its stated intention was to move Myanmar toward full self‐government within the British Commonwealth but in the meantime to suspend the political reforms of the 1930s and rule directly in order to reconstruct the economy. The plan had no timetable for independence.
Britain's position was unrealistic. It took no account of the political and psychological impact of the Japanese occupation of South‐East Asia, whose people were no longer prepared to acquiesce in colonial rule. In Myanmar, the Anti‐Fascist People's Freedom League, the Burmese Communist Party and parties based on ethnic minorities campaigned for independence
and struggled with each other for dominance. In January 1947 Aung San led an Anti‐Fascist People's Freedom League delegation to London and negotiated the election of a constituent assembly to prepare a constitution for an independent Myanmar. In April 1947, the Anti‐Fascist People's Freedom League won the election handsomely but, in July, Aung San and six of his Cabinet were assassinated by political rivals. The assassinations created a national martyr but made it even more difficult for Myanmar to create a consensus on the structure of the independent state.
Aung San was replaced by his deputy, U Nu, and the League led Myanmar into independence on January 4, 1948. The Union of Burma was constituted as a federal state composed of the large Burmese area and four upland states, home to the ethnic minorities. Though these states were promised a great deal of autonomy, power was quickly concentrated in the central government. The failure of the federal system and the concentration of power in Yangon have been a major cause of the instability Myanmar has suffered since 1948. Shortly after independence was declared, the Burmese Communist Party and the Karen nationalist movement launched insurrections which continue through today—though in recent years there have been some conciliatory moves by Yangon to accommodate the rebels and the scale of the fighting has, temporarily at least, been reduced. The cause of the insurrections remains. Many of the minorities see independent Myanmar as a Burmese state. The army, the police, and the apparatus of government are controlled by Burmese. The substantial ethnic minorities fear absorption and the consequent disappearance of their separate and distinct cultural identities.
Myanmar was a democratic state between 1948 and 1962. Governments were elected, accepted the need to operate within the limits of the Constitution, held national elections, and abided by the results and accepted decisions of the Supreme Court when it ruled against the government. Power was in the hands of the Anti‐Fascist People's Freedom League, which drew on the name of Aung San to bolster its support. There was a 16‐month period of military rule between 1958 and 1960, but General Ne Win abided by the Constitution and fulfilled an undertaking to hold elections in 1960. Though the political party favoured by the military did not win the elections, the military accepted the decision and returned to barracks.
The failings of the democratic period were critical. The declining economy and the emphasis on the Burmeseness of Myanmar were the prime causes of regional insurrections and social unrest in both urban and rural areas. All efforts to create a social consensus on the kind of society that should be created failed. Corruption became rampant as inflation ate away remorselessly at civil servants' salaries, forcing them to resort to illegal impositions in order to survive.
In March 1962, a military coup led by General Ne Win overthrew the elected government of U Nu, ushering in a period of military rule that has lasted more than 40 years. The ostensible reason for the coup was the military's fear that U Nu's government would allow the Shan and other ethnic minorities to secede from Myanmar. Many Burmese cautiously welcomed the coup because it promised to put an end to the corruption, instability, inflation, and social unrest of the previous decade and a half.
The coup leaders arrested political and ethnic minority leaders, closed down the parliament, and demolished the federal structure. Opposition from Yangon students and from Burmese monks was ruthlessly suppressed. The country was ruled by a Revolutionary Council composed entirely of military officials loyal to General Ne Win. The military created its own political party, the Burma Socialist Program Party, as the only legal party in the country and described its ideology as the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” In 1974, a new Constitution was put into effect, creating the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. An elected parliament was formed, but only one candidate was allowed to stand for each constituency and that candidate had to be approved by the Burma Socialist Program Party.
The leaders of the coup argued that the army was the only cohesive and disciplined organisation capable of providing the strong leadership needed to overcome the social chaos that prevailed. They were fiercely anti‐foreign and determined to rid Myanmar of all vestiges of colonialism by refocusing on Burmese culture, language, tradition, and religion. Like the royal elite that had ruled Myanmar in the 1800s, they were, and to a certain extent remain, an inward‐looking elite, suspicious of its immediate neighbours and determined to keep outside political, cultural, and economic influences to a minimum. The new regime moved quickly to eliminate the predominantly Indian and Chinese business class, seeing state socialism as the only way to deliver economic independence to the country. The Westernised, often Anglo‐Burmese, elite that had run the country under colonial rule and through the 1950s fled the country, along with the Indian and Chinese communities. In the 1990s, they were followed by the Muslim minority known as the Rohingya on the western border with Bangladesh, who, too, became a target for a government intent on removing all non‐Burmese elements from society.
Ne Win's military government was even less successful in developing the economy than the democratically elected governments before it. Indeed, the economy worsened acutely under military rule, with the expulsion of Indians and Pakistanis, the prohibition on foreign investment, and the efforts of the one‐party State to impose a command economy. In 1987, the United Nations gave Myanmar “Least Developed Nation” status, recognising it as one of the world's ten poorest countries. Estimates of per‐capita income vary and even official statistics are difficult to obtain, as the government has released few figures pertaining to the country's financial and social conditions since 1999. There are, however, two economies: the legal, largely state‐controlled economy (now in the process of being liberalised under the new NLD government installed early in 2016) and the black‐market economy. It is estimated that illegal trade in Myanmar is three times the official trade, and that the total, nondrug, illegal trade makes up about 40 percent of GNP.
The illegal trade filters through Myanmar's porous borders with China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. The illegal drug trade would add considerably to the black market figures as the Golden Triangle, centred on Myanmar, is the world's major opium producer. The military elite, which on assuming power in 1962 spoke much of the need to combat corruption, is one of the main beneficiaries of the black market. It is directly involved as broker and rentier, raking off a percentage of the money made from the trade. In 2006 the global organisation that monitors corruption, Transparency International, listed Myanmar as the world's second most corrupt country after Haiti.
There were sporadic student protests and riots in the 1970s, but these were ruthlessly quelled by the military. A new series of protests began early in 1988, led by students and Buddhist monks. The usual violent reaction from the military this time failed to stop the riots growing in intensity. In August and September 1988, they culminated in widespread strikes and massive demonstrations in the urban areas, coalescing into a demand for an end to military rule. The army reacted, killing thousands of protesters. The horrors of these acts were relayed daily to the television screens of the Western world, eliciting widespread protests from Western governments. A new organisation, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), took over government under the control of the army chief of staff, General Saw Maung. However, Ne Win, who had resigned as chairman of the Burmese Socialist Program Party in August 1988, retained an important behind‐the‐scenes role during the 1990s. By the turn of the century, though, his star has waned. In a dramatic move in March 2002, Ne Win's son‐in‐law and three grandsons were charged with plotting a coup to restore him to power and sentenced to death in August, though this was later commuted to life imprisonment and from which they have all since been released. Ne Win himself died under house arrest in December 2002 and was buried in a private ceremony ignored by the country's military rulers.
SLORC decided to hold elections in 1990, presumably because it was concerned at the strong international reaction to the repression of August and September 1988. It also thought that it could control the r
esults of the election through its powerful intelligence service. The election campaign did not go as planned. Daw (meaning “Mrs”) Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Myanmar's revered national martyr, Aung San, returned from London and quickly became the major spokeswoman for the National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD campaigned vigorously in 1989, drawing large crowds to its meetings despite the restrictions placed by the military and the fear campaign waged by the intelligence service. Aung San Suu Kyi was a powerful orator and magnetic public figure and was able to draw on the aura surrounding her father's name. In July 1989, she was placed under house arrest and thousands of NLD supporters, students, and other political activists were arrested.
Despite the tough military line, the NLD won over three quarters of the seats when the elections were eventually held in May 1990. The renamed Myanmar Socialist Program Party—now the National Union Party—won only ten seats. SLORC responded by arresting NLD leaders and declaring the election null and void. The military subsequently stated that they would retain power. Although Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995, between September 2000 and May 2002 she was again subject to house arrest and imprisoned in May 2003 and subsequently finally released in 2010.
The military government (which changed its name from SLORC to the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, in 1997) has shown no sign that it is prepared to relinquish political power or lessen its repression of the NLD and popular dissent generally. In 1999, Suu Kyi's British husband, Michael Aris, died of cancer in London. The Myanmar authorities refused him permission for a last visit to see his wife in Yangon. She in turn refused to leave the country, fearing the Myanmar government would deny her a reentry permit when it came time to return home.
