A Guide for the Aspiring Spy (The Anonymous Spy Series)

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A Guide for the Aspiring Spy (The Anonymous Spy Series) Page 5

by Spy, Anonymous


  It took some time working with him to really understand his motivation and vulnerabilities and the relationship between them. He was a compassionate person with a highly developed sense of responsibility toward his mother and his obligation to care for her during the last years of her life. He was also a loyal family man who wanted to provide the best life he could for his wife and children. His motivation was clear: to meet his obligations as a husband, father, and son to provide financial security for all. His vulnerability was also clear: a sense of responsibility and duty that he could not forsake.

  What happens when circumstances of the motivation change? Motivations are not static. They are ever evolving. In the case of the above agent, when his mother passed away, he no longer needed the additional income provided by the Company to achieve his obligations as a husband and father. His income from normal employment was sufficient. The case officer then faced the possibility that the agent would cease the clandestine relationship with the Company.

  Knowing this day may come, the case officer began to plant the seeds of a replacement motivation long before the agent’s mother passed away. Knowing the agent to be a father concerned for the education and welfare of his children, the case officer’s objective was to convince the agent to send his children to the US for advanced education. This would obviously require considerable financial resources and perhaps some covert assistance from the Company. Finally, when the agent’s mother died, this replacement motivation had been firmly established and the agent continued his clandestine relationship with the CIA. Eventually, two of his children did go to the US for advanced degrees and became US citizens.

  Communication Tools

  To be a successful case officer, you must develop your interrogative skills—the ability to ask questions in a logical manner that easily elicits information from the target. Your success as a CIA case officer will depend on your ability to communicate effectively through the use of the basic interrogatives—who, what, when, where, why, and how. These basic interrogatives are the heart of elicitations, debriefings, and interrogations—all separate and different tools that the case officer uses to obtain intelligence and operational information.

  Elicitation

  By far, the tool you will use most often is elicitation. Elicitations are used to obtain information from a yet-to-be recruited developmental asset or a target of interest. The target of elicitation does not know of the intelligence connection of the case officer and thus does not comprehend the true nature of the questions being posed by the case officer. Elicitations normally take place in a relaxed social setting—such as cocktail parties, dinners, golf games, card games, etc. —where the target feels a high level of comfort to respond to the seemingly innocuous questions being casually posed by the case officer.

  The best use of elicitation is to obtain personal information about the target. Such personal details elicited over a period of time provide good insight into “what makes the target tick,” i.e., their motivation and vulnerability. However, in some cases elicitation may be used to obtain intelligence information that the case officer may draft into intelligence disseminations or at least ops-intel cables.

  Elicitations are usually a give-and-take process where each party responds to the other. While the case officer is developing information on the target that responds to motivation and vulnerability requirements as well as to determine the targets access to information of interest to the CIA, the case officer is responding to questions by the target that tend to enhance a personal relationship of friendship between the two. Elicitations in social settings usually take place during one- to two-hour sessions over a period of months.

  It is always helpful in elicitations to have some prior knowledge of the target before going for the contact, but often this doesn’t happen as in the case of cold contacts. So you must make some basic assumptions based on the age, sex, occupation, ethnicity, social customs, etc., and start from ground zero. By far, the cold contact offers to the NOC officer the most challenge in terms of elicitation. For example as a NOC officer in a technical field of expertise, I used to frequent technical conferences, symposia, educational forums, etc., to “troll” for targets of interest. It is good initially just to listen to groups in conversation to pick out your initial target, then develop an occasion to isolate him or her one-on-one, at which time you may have only two or three minutes to impress on the target that you are someone of interest to them as well. Here use some basic tried and true “assumptions” based on the above or some other criteria combined with the views you may have heard the target express while listening to the group conversation. I found it useful to introduce a bit of humor to help keep the interaction relaxed. After some interaction at the technical level, which is the reason we are at the technical conference, I then would turn to eliciting personal information about the target to develop a personal basis for future contact.

  Double-teaming is also a useful approach to targeting a cold target. In such cases, two NOC officers not known by the target to be associated isolate the target on two-on-one conversation. One NOC takes the lead while the other acts as reinforcement on the goals of the first NOC. Remember, elicitation only has value so long as the target does not realize what the true goals of the NOC officer are. The NOC must take care not to raise any suspicion in the target. So questioning must proceed in an order perceived by the target as a natural progression of the conversation.

  Assets who have been under development for a period of time are easier elicitation targets than cold contacts. You already have good rapport with the developmental contact and he orshe has become accustomed to your interest in them, though they are not aware of the real goals of your contact. You can be more aggressive in your elicitation questions in such cases. I once had a target with whom I maintained an elicitation rapport for five years who never had any idea of my intelligence affiliation. He was a prolific producer of intelligence information in his field. He and I had a genuine fondness and respect for each other throughout our association. The Company never felt a need to “recruit” him since he was providing information freely and his motivations and vulnerabilities did not appear to be sufficiently deep to make him want to accept recruitment as an agent. So rather than trying to recruit him and possibly having him turn down the attempt and refuse further contact, we just continued the elicitation contact.

  On another occasion, a CIA “inside” case officer who worked at the US mission in the host country and I, a NOC officer not associated with the US government, double-teamed a target we both had met separately at the same symposium. We both developed a decent rapport with the target that resulted in several follow-up “social” meetings. Comparing our “take” from the elicitations, it was clear that the target was holding back information from the inside officer, known as a US government official, while he was more forthcoming with me. A decision was made at the Station for me to take the lead in the development of the target while allowing the inside officer to maintain the contact on a less frequent basis as a back-up to possibly make a recruitment pitch if our development of the case warranted recruitment.

  I could go on with hundreds of such elicitation cases and find something new and unique to each case. But you are probably interested in commonalities that are transferable to your unique situation. First, keep the target in the dark on your real intentions. Be careful your questioning does not raise suspicion. Find a basis for rapport based on your knowledge of the target, or if lacking such knowledge, based on assumptions you can safely make about him or her. If possible, watch the target in a group setting first, then isolate in one-on-one contact. Establish the basis for a follow-up meeting based on shared objectives and interests.

  Going back to cold contacts, there can be risks to making them, especially for a NOC officer; such contacts are usually made in alias with a throw-away cover though there are exceptions. The nature of the cold contact will drive the extension and degree of cover. If the reason for the cold contact is to make a
“cold recruitment pitch,” then, of course, more layers of security are provided. If the reason for cold contact is to elicit information, either intelligence, biographical, or operational information, then there is less reason for concern. Case officers, both inside officers and NOCs, make cold contacts frequently. Such contacts at diplomatic functions are done by official cover officers in true name virtually all the time. NOCs may also make cold contacts in true name and true cover at social, commercial, and scientific forums all the time.

  After the initial cold contact, the case officer usually prepares an operational cable on the person if he believes there may be further interest in the contact as a “target.” The cable will usually request name traces from headquarters to see if the target has been previously contacted or has otherwise previously come to the attention to the agency.

  There are times when the Company may determine that the contact should be further assessed by a second officer but does not want any association to be given to the initial contacting officer, who may have made the initial contact in true name. Thus an unattributable spin-off or turnover is made to a second Case Officer perhaps in alias. This then becomes a Cold Contact for the second case officer who has an agenda in contacting the “target.”

  There are a wide range of options available to making cold contacts and sustaining the contact as a development contact with a view toward future recruitment. Contact with the target could be continuous or intermittent, over a period of months or years. On each occasion of contact, the case officer should prepare operational cables that will go into the target’s 201 file, which maintains a historical record on the target.

  During my career, I made about a dozen cold-pitch recruitment attempts in alias, but unfortunately only one of these turned into a bona fide agent. The recruitment attempt was made in commercial alias to “hire” the target as a “confidential commercial consultant” for my devised facility cover. After some time, another case officer turned the asset into a witting asset, meaning he then knew he was reporting to the CIA. Another cold-pitch target that turned down commercial recruitment later was contacted by an official cover officer and recruited as a witting agent. I guess as cold pitches go, two out of about twelve isn’t bad. Several other cold-pitch commercial recruitments were accepted by the target but since they later did not provide information of intelligence interest, they were amicably terminated without ever knowing they had been reporting to the CIA.

  Of course, the more you know about the target the more likely will be the success of a cold contact. You may be so fortunate to have information about the target from public sources or from other agents or friendly contacts. If, however, you have zero information on the target, you may have to make social and professional assumptions about the target and make your initial approach somewhat generic as you elicit information about him or her to able to develop a tailored approach.

  Role-playing is an important tool for the CIA case officer. Operating under cover and in alias, the CIA officer is given the freedom to completely change his persona, to alter his personality to fit the situation at hand. This is an arena where acting skills are so important. The case officer in alias can break away from the confines of his true character to become someone completely different. Operating in alias and perhaps light disguise, the case officer might find himself doing things that he would never do ordinarily. I am a fairly traditional person with fairly high moral standards, a sense of fair play, and I like to think I am fairly intelligent with a quick grasp of any subject matter that comes up in discussion. I found role-playing to be fun.

  On one occasion, however, while developing a contact in alias and a light disguise, I found myself compelled to play the role of an idiot to feed the ego of a contact who felt that all Americans were dumb and that it was his job to educate us. In fact, he felt that everyone, even his own countrymen, were well beneath his intellectual level, and he was probably right.

  The agent was an expert in the field of sub-micron lithography, one of only a few such experts in his country at the time. It seemed the dumber I acted the more he would divulge information about his research. I managed to use this dumber than dumb technique over a period of almost a year to elicit information about his research in this high-technology field. Clearly, his vulnerability was his superiority complex and vast ego, which were easily manipulated to obtain not only his verbal elicitation but also numerous documents on his research. Through this mechanism, we were able to assess the level of this technology without recruiting the contact and at very little expense to the US taxpayers. All that was required was a bit of acting and a shift in personality on my part and a few meals a month with the contact.

  Of course each situation varies, but there are key ingredients common to all relationships where you are trying to elicit information on value. True rapport is necessary to place both parties at ease. Rapport implies a level of trust between the two parties. This rapport also implies some give and take by each party where both parties feel they are getting something from the relationship. What each party may be getting from the relationship does not have to be stated, implied, or even understood by the other parties. The CIA case officer in the relationship must develop over a period of time an understanding of the motivations and vulnerabilities of the contact and use these to encourage the contact to talk about the information that is desired. Of course, the contact knows that he is divulging information, but he has no idea, if the CIA officer’s cover is good, that he is divulging information to US intelligence. This is what makes it elicitation information and thus why the contact is called an elicitation contact.

  Debriefings

  Debriefings are used to obtain information from a cooperative agent, either witting or unwitting of any CIA affiliation. Debriefings may be defined as a structured, planned meeting between two parties to talk about certain specific requirements. Debriefings usually take place in an environment under control of the case officer that provides an atmosphere of security and confidentiality. Agent debriefings are pre-organized by the case officer to respond to specific collection requirements from CIA headquarters. From these debriefings the case officer then prepares intelligence reports and operational cables. Normally, an agent debriefing will last from two to six hours. The longer the meeting the less productive it becomes as both agent and case officer become exhausted. Debriefings are the bread and butter of agent operations to collect information of intelligence and operational value. During their basic operations training, case officers practice the technique of ascertaining the who, what, when, where, why, and how of an issue that are so necessary for the art of debriefing. However, it is in the field actually handling an agent that the case officer really hones the proper skills.

  Interrogations

  The last and most extreme communication tool is interrogation. Case officers seldom use direct interrogation unless the agent is under a tightly controlled environment. In interrogations the agent may be suspected of being a double agent or perhaps of fabricating information. Surreptitious interrogations, where the target is unaware that he is under suspicion, may take place in a normal debriefing setting but that is rare. Surreptitious interrogations may be initially employed to avoid the agent becoming aware that he is under investigation. If such interrogation techniques fail to resolve the issues under investigation, then hostile interrogation may be employed.

  Interrogations by the CIA of agents suspected of wrongdoing, fabrication, or worse or interrogations of captives such as possible terrorists suspects are not at all like interrogations by law enforcement of suspects under criminal investigations. Unlike law enforcement, the CIA is not interested in developing information to document criminality. Also unlike law enforcement, the CIA does not have to be much concerned about a foreign agent’s or suspect’s legal rights.

  Interrogations might have different objectives. Some interrogations have the objective to resolve unresolved issues. An agent suspected of fabricating information may, for example, be dir
ectly or surreptitiously interrogated to resolve details of his fabrication. Other interrogations are used to obtain actionable operational intelligence. Captured terrorists, for example, may be interrogated to obtain information upon which countermeasures may be developed. Also, terrorists may be interrogated to obtain operational details of their terrorist cell and its interconnections with other terrorist cells.

  Developing Your Skills

  During your training at the Farm, you will receive only cursory training in the communication tools of elicitation, debriefing, and interrogation that are so valuable to your CIA career. Once in the field, you will be expected to develop these skills through trial and error. Elicitation is the first skill you should take pains to develop. As an OC case officer, you will be given many opportunities to develop these skills at official receptions and functions where Foreign Service officers from other countries congregate. As a NOC officer, you will have to improvise by joining fraternal and social clubs or work-related professional organizations to develop these skills.

  As you develop your pool of recruited agents, you will naturally and gradually develop your debriefing skills. It is pretty much a trial and error process, but your training at the Farm will fortunately concentrate more on debriefing than on elicitation or interrogation. The collection requirements provided by CIA headquarters will provide basis guidance for the debriefing process and greatly enhance the ability of the case officer to rapidly develop debriefing skills.

 

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