by Gerald Astor
“On the third day my platoon was leading when we hit a nicely developed hiking trail. It was about eight feet wide with a curb on both sides and covered with pulverized stone. Presently, the hill fell away from the trail on the west side, and we got the longest view we had in a week. At the bottom of the hill was a road lined on the other side with buildings. People were going about their normal business without bothering to look up. We made no attempt to hide. As we proceeded along the trail, I saw a couple of boys walking along the sidewalk below in animated conversation. One was carrying a skinned carcass that he swung to illustrate his points. I said, ‘My God, Sheldon. They are eating cats!’ He reassured me that it was a rabbit. One of the buildings below had an ESSO gas pump but no customers. In fact, there were no vehicles standing or moving in our view. Even more important, there were no Kraut soldiers visible.
“Shortly, we came to a point where our ridge was cut by an intersecting road. The path turned east, so we had to leave its comfort. There were park benches on the path and an apple orchard, so it looked like a good place to take a break. We stacked our guns by the bench and filled our helmets with apples. This combination of getting out of the woods for a change, a pretty day and a chance to see it, vicarious peeping, and good apples gave our stop the atmosphere of a family picnic.
“It was cut too damn short by a soldier exclaiming, ‘God damn, look at that!’ On the road below us walked a German officer completely engrossed in a map he held in both hands. None of us had ever heard of a Kraut officer going anywhere alone, so we expected the shit to fly at any minute. We grabbed guns and ran or fell down the steep slope. It was a German colonel, who was not only surprised but pissed off something terrible. We de-souvenired him and sent him back. I learned later he was from the German 47th Division (same number as our regiment) and was reconnoitering for positions to place his outfit. He got his dander up in the rear because they weren’t showing proper respect. They forced him to walk in front of the escorting tank like the peons.
“We crossed the road and went up the hill to the next ridge; the hiking path reappeared. The buildings below were now on both sides of the road, and a swift mountain brook ran between us and the backs of the buildings. Sergeant Myers was the last of my platoon to cross the road, and as he did, he heard a motorcycle coming down the road from the east. Obviously, a courier chasing after the colonel. Myers knelt next to a tree and fired. He blew the rider into the ditch, and the bike continued to the Schevenhutte road. When the entire platoon was lined up along the path above the village, I called a halt and radioed for instructions. They said, ‘Take the village.’
“We did a left face and raced down the hill to the village. Our speed was the product of the steep hill rather than combat zeal. As we ran through the backyards, I looked for the handiest back door. The one I opened led into a small commercial kitchen and then directly into the taproom of a small hotel. The only inhabitant was a dignified old man with a large mustache who was wearing a frock-tailed coat and a shirt with a winged collar. I motioned him behind the bar and had him draw beer for the three of us in the room. I was getting ready for the second round when I heard rifle fire outside. I went to check.
“As I emerged from the bar I could see the machine gun section standing by the church on the Gressenich road, and I walked over to inquire about the shooting. The section had been going down the road to set up the MG when a Volkswagen jeep with four Kraut soldiers came barreling by. The Germans waved and our men reciprocated, and both realized at the same time that they were fraternizing with the enemy. They had managed a few rifle shots, but the car had turned left at the church and headed for Düren. By the time our men had gotten back to the corner, the Germans had abandoned their jeep at the creek and disappeared into the woods. I walked down to the creek and found that the small bridge had been blown, which occasioned their abandoning their transportation. As I walked back to the village, a P51 pinned me against the church wall and dumped its .50-caliber clips on me as it fired at the rest of the company.”
Jordan and his platoon briefly explored Schevenhutte, a Y-shaped town that sat in a valley surrounded by hills. The base of the Y pointed southeast to Kleinhau, a hamlet deep in the Huertgen zone. The right arm of the Y led northeast to Merberich, some four miles from Düren, while the left limb headed toward Gressenich. As an integral part of the defenses, Schevenhutte housed a massive concrete bunker with accommodations to suit a company of soldiers. Within that structure was a telephone, still connected to other German units, including some that were stationed in the Westwall.
Jordan remembers, “The German jeep evidently did not share their information with anyone, because for three days German soldiers on leave wandered into the village looking for a brew or what have you. Battalion sent a German-speaking sergeant to man the bunker phone. He would hear about the Krauts gathering at a particular spot, and as soon as they had assembled would saturate the area with artillery fire. The Germans would then call for ambulances, and they would shell the access roads. The Germans would get into arguments on who was responsible for the fuckup, and he [the German-speaking sergeant] would exacerbate the mess. He was able to maintain this for several days before they tumbled to the party line.”
The platoon led by Jordan, occupying Schevenhutte along the fringe of the Huertgen, had advanced to only about seven miles from where the Roer bellied out to pass through the strategic city of Düren. Jordan’s description of what his small group experienced, their relatively easy and uncontested hike for three days, is not only in marked contrast to what happened to other 9th Division GIs, but also suggests that the enemy was often as confused and uninformed as the Americans.
Elsewhere, the 9th Division’s initial attacks produced less satisfactory results. Southwest of the 47th, GIs from the 60th Regiment captured Camp Elsenborn, an installation that prior to 1940 housed a Belgian garrison and that would become a focal point during the Battle of the Bulge three months later. From there the Americans sought to advance on a ridge between Hoefen and Alzen, a pair of hamlets astride the Westwall, southeast of Monschau. There, however, pillboxes spewed concentrations of small-arms and machine gun bullets, obliging General Craig to bring up reinforcements. For nearly five days the defenders stalled the attackers, and it was not until tanks arrived to provide support that the Germans were driven out of their positions and the ridge between Alzen and Hoefen secured.
Northeast of Monschau, the 39th Infantry butted against a strong point in the Scharnhorst Line. The start of what would develop into a bloody ordeal is suggested by the log of experiences reported by the 39th Regiment’s 3d Battalion commander, Lt. Col. R. H. Stumpf, and Capt. A. V. Danna, commanding officer of Company I. Incidentally, a note by the interviewers who interrogated Stumpf and Danna two months after the September offensive stated, “Officers and ranking noncoms of this battalion who were there at the time of this action have almost all been killed or evacuated.”
On 14 September, the statement of two officers declared, “The battalion moved with two companies on tanks and TDs and shuttled the third, while the heavy weapons and headquarters units were on trucks. Three trucks had been stuck the night before and the column was short on gasoline.
“As they advanced through the woods of the Kozener Wald, a few snipers and one machine gun were encountered, but these were dusted off when the tanks fired into the trees along the road. At [Road Junction 942234] the 1st and 2d Battalions had turned sharply northwest in the direction of Roetgen, but the 3d bn continued east 800 yards before hitting another road which led directly north and which would connect with the forward elements of the regiment as they moved east from Roetgen. This section of the road had not yet been cleared of the enemy.
“As the 3d Bn approached the highway … it encountered the first enemy roadblock, consisting of a locked iron gate across the railroad and a number of mines. A platoon of the 15th Engineers attached to the battalion came up and removed the mines, and the tanks crashed through the gate. Stum
pf had put out a security squad on the flank of the column in the direction of Konzen, and it engaged the enemy at a distance of 500 yards in a firefight. The skirmish did not develop into anything serious, however. At 1000, having been held up by the roadblock about an hour, the column continued north.
“Before the tail of the column could pass the point of the first roadblock, the leading elements hit another obstacle. This consisted of trees felled across the road, but it was neither mined nor covered with fire. The tanks moved up and looped cables around the trees, since they furnished both the strength to move the logs and protection [against] any mines under the logs.
“Five hundred yards farther north a third roadblock was hit, of trees and mines. The large crater in the middle of the road at this tree block was made passable by a tank dozer. Stumpf radioed for engineers to make the road suitable for heavy traffic, while the engineers pulled the mines, and the tanks dragged off the logs.”
Early in the afternoon, the column passed through three more sets of obstacles, and it reached the road junction at Fringhaus. Its companion battalions, coming from different directions, marched through Fringhaus about the same time of day. Stumpf now received another mission, to follow the 1st Battalion toward Lammersdorf and, from that town, to push farther east toward Rollesbroich, on the other side of the Scharnhorst Line.
On the heels of a company from the 1st Battalion, which veered north, the 3d Battalion’s K Company, supported by tanks, advanced through the center of Lammersdorf. Stumpf remarked that the Americans did not realize the Germans retained control of a knoll north of the town, and his narrative reported that Company K “received no enemy opposition through the center of the town, but as it reached the end of the heavily built up part and turned the bend in the road, it came under enemy mortar and 75mm AT [antitank] fire. The tanks fired at the AT gun and probably knocked it out.”
The battalion commander committed I Company to the battle. “K Company moved forward along the scattered houses, as the enemy continued to use mortars and AT fire on their position. It advanced about 200 yards, with one platoon on each side of the road, and almost reached the dragon’s teeth. Since it was getting dark, however, it did not try to breach the obstacle but held this position for the night.
“Meanwhile, I Company attacked in two columns along parallel trails leading northeast from the main road. The plan was for I to conduct a flank movement from the north on the enemy position and thus secure the area from the rear. I Company came under fire from the pillboxes and emplacements to its front as soon as they left the highway in Lammersdorf. The enemy used small arms at this time. [I Company] was able to advance no more than 200 yards before it became too dark to see. It then held its position for the night.
“Throughout the development of the attack by the 3d Battalion, the entire right flank was open to attack by the enemy from the southeast. Therefore, L Company was brought up to act both as a reserve for the battalion and as protection of the right flank. L Company set up a thin line from the railroad tracks on the west to a small trail near the dragon’s teeth on the east and began to receive some fire from the southeast.
“By night, the entire battalion was thus deployed and under the fire of the enemy. One section of heavy machine guns were, as usual, with each company and the mortars were set up in the rear. The section of tanks with K Company fired at enemy positions, while the other section remained in the town to guard road crossings with the TD platoon. The AT guns were set up to hold the defense on the open flank to the southeast. L Company began to get long-range artillery fire, but K Company and I Company as yet received nothing heavier than 50mm mortars.”
On the dawn of the third day, the enemy developed a counterattack against I Company. The Americans drove off the Germans and fought forward along two trails while under fire from pillboxes. Tanks and tank destroyers forced the bunkers to button up until the infantry could envelop them. But even though they were neutralized, I Company managed to gain only 300 yards, and the enemy small-arms and mortar fire remained heavy. Similarly, K Company could measure its success only in a few hundred yards.
The following day, 16 September, saw another very strong counterattack by German soldiers on I Company. The Teutons captured several GIs and swarmed over the lead outpost. Mortars and riflemen repulsed further efforts. I Company, with tanks in immediate support, then reversed the situation, and the enemy broke. A large number of them were taken prisoner, but K Company again struggled to maintain its positions because of small-arms fire and finely pinpointed artillery and antitank shells. The resistance continued to stiffen. Soldiers from L Company, hidden by a smoke screen, cleared a minefield through a gap in the dragon’s teeth. But when a tank unit started through the opening, a mine blew up the first one. During the night, German engineers had remined the passageway. Almost an entire day was lost as other mines detonated during efforts to clear away the disabled tank and open the narrow gap.
Having regrouped, K Company renewed its thrust into the Scharnhorst. At a road junction a pillbox pinned down the company. Those at headquarters insisted that the map of the sector showed the emplacement arrow marked a different field of fire. The embattled company commander radioed, “To hell with the arrow. It’s shooting on me.”
Help appeared in the form of I Company moving along a trail that led toward the pillbox. Approaching from a different direction than that of K Company, the startled GIs suddenly realized they were on top of the fortification. When they called on the inhabitants to surrender, the reply came in the form of a rifle grenade out the door. The position seemed impregnable, with the Germans able to shoot through the door and its machine guns housed so deep in concrete tunnels that grenades thrown through openings could not do damage.
A prisoner taken by K Company agreed to speak to his comrades. He pleaded with the troops inside, telling them to think of their wives rather than continuing the war. They refused to yield. From the rear, out of reach from shot or shell by the pillbox, a tank dozer started to push dirt over the top, filling up the entrance halfway. The Germans were told they had five minutes to surrender. When the allotted time passed with no response, the dozer sealed the pillbox, burying the defenders.
The creators of the Westwall had correctly noted that a plateau without the natural impediments of heavy forest growth behind the border at Lammersdorf would provide easier terrain for an attacking force. Accordingly, the military engineers packed the Westwall in the Lammersdorf vicinity with an abundance of concrete fortifications to compensate for what nature omitted. Between 1,200 and 1,500 soldiers, albeit drawn largely from a training regiment, manned the weapons in the redoubts. When the 39th Infantry emerged from Lammersdorf, a murderous assortment of small arms and mortars from well-protected positions met them. The deadly outburst pinned down the GIs. Subsequently, a series of flanking maneuvers, tanks, and mobile guns managed to carve a narrow pathway through the Scharnhorst. However, the enemy retained control of a stretch of this band of the Westwall between Monschau and Lammersdorf, exposing the 9th Division to assaults on its flanks. Under these circumstances, the hoped-for avenue through the Monschau corridor to the Roer remained unavailable.
In the first days of the offensive, the mood at First Army headquarters was sunny. Sylvan spoke of the successes on 14 September. He wrote, “1st Division advanced within 3 kilometers of Aachen, surrounding the city on three sides. 3d Armored Division approximately 5 miles due east. 9th Division made good progress during the day, 47th Infantry smashing well over the German border. V Corps advance spotty, some pillboxes completely unmanned.”
He also indicated the involvement of the two other U.S. divisions hammering at the Westwall: “4th Division made excellent progress. 2d Bn, the 22d Infantry reporting it passed all fortifications. The 28th Div. Infn. 6 miles inside the border, 112th approximately 3.”
With movement slowed and the casualty count climbing, First Army headquarters pondered a disturbing report from the 1st Division’s 16th Infantry. The mes
sage spoke of Germans approaching in a column of twos, “as far as the eye could see.” All along the line GIs heard heavy vehicle traffic behind the front. Worse still, Task Force Lovelady from the 3d Armored, seeking to gain further real estate, cropped up against a contingent of tanks and self-propelled guns that in quick order eliminated seven medium tanks, a tank destroyer, and even an ambulance. Colonel Lovelady, with only a baker’s dozen of Shermans still operable, less than 40 percent of the normal complement, received permission to button down for the night. Both CCA and CCB of the 3d Armored could progress no farther.
On 15 September, Sylvan sounded an ominous note. “Col. [Benjamin “Monk”] Dixon reported today, based on intelligence he had, the Germans now resolved to throw in everything on the present line in an attempt to hold the Americans before they could crack the defenses along it. The statement seemed borne out by the slowing down of all corps. In the V Corps … Gen. [Hodges] noted the three divisions spread out on an exceedingly wide front. Progress made by the XX Corps of 3d Army on its right flank is slow. It doesn’t appear to cover the right successfully.”
The anxiety expressed by Sylvan is all the more significant because on the same day the 47th Infantry captured 400 prisoners while penetrating the Westwall’s first band. A day later the outfit achieved its immediate mission by breaking through part of the second barrier near Schevenhutte.
As could be expected, the demands of Montgomery’s Operation Market Garden affected the First Army. Sylvan reported that Omar Bradley flew to headquarters for a long and, for the most part, secret conference with Hodges. “On the established facts of supply, both the [fuel], ammunition, and food continues to become more critical. We are now not even holding our own. It was acknowledged that we would probably have to slow up or altogether halt our drive into Germany in the very near future.” In a desperate attempt to alleviate the deficits, Hodges arranged for emergency supply by air, requesting a minimum of 3,000 tons of ammunition.
