As in the previous year, the third siege of the fortress of Badajoz was hampered by the problems in keeping a pontoon bridge across the river Guadiana. 1812 also saw the Allied lines of communication significantly improved through an innovative repair to Trajan’s Roman bridge at Alcantara. At the same time, Wellington ordered a raid to destroy the French pontoon bridge at Almaraz. Combined, these two actions meant that Wellington could manoeuvre his troops much faster than the French. Following the siege at Burgos, the engineering services played a major role in slowing the French pursuit by destroying bridges
1813 was the first time a pontoon train travelled with the army. It was used a number of times during the Allied advance that led to the successful battle at Vitoria. Later in the year a range of methods were used to cross the rivers Bidassoa, Nivelle and Nive around the French border. 1814 started with the daring crossing of the fast-flowing and tidal river Adour where the wide river was bridged using local boats held in place with five massive cables. Around twenty-five were used with several being held in reserve.
Wellington had to use pontoons to cross numerous rivers as he pushed the retreating French army further east. He was close to disaster at Toulouse when the pontoon bridge over the river Garonne was swept, away leaving part of the Allied army stranded on the wrong side of the river for three days.
The quick summary above shows that river crossing was an essential component of Wellington’s strategy throughout the war. Whilst these were the key events, officers from the Royal Engineers and Royal Staff Corps along with their Portuguese, Spanish and Hanoverian counterparts laboured throughout the war to keep a myriad of smaller river crossings operational.
The bridge over the Adour, from Douglas.
As discussed earlier, there were three British engineering units present, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Military Artificers (the Royal Sappers and Miners from 1812) and the Royal Staff Corps. Theoretically there was a distinction, in that the role of the Royal Engineers was for static defences i.e. the attack and defence of fortresses whilst mobile work was the responsibility of the Royal Staff Corps i.e. field works and bridging. There is still a debate going on about bridging, as the perceived view is that it was primarily done by the RSC. My research indicates that the Royal Engineers did most bridging work. There is a difference in that the Royal Engineers tending to do most destruction whilst the Royal Staff Corps were more involved in construction. What is apparent is that the officers from the different corps did share information and experience for the benefit of all. The picture of the bridge at Ponte de Murcella comes from Douglas’ book on military bridging. Identical pictures are in the contemporary notebooks of Engineer and Staff Corps officers (Burgoyne, Scott and West).
What all the engineer officers faced was a lack of resources, both in men and materials. This meant that river crossings often had to be made with whatever material was available. At its simplest this could be preparing the banks and bed of a river for fording. For smaller rivers and smaller loads, pontoons or boats could be rowed across, sometimes with lines to keep them in place.
The real challenge came when large bodies of troops or heavy loads needed to cross big rivers. Here the nature of the river determined the bridging methods that could be used. Flying bridges, trestles, local boats, wine casks and pontoons were all used at different times. The most frequent method was probably the repair of an existing bridge. More often than not, temporary repairs were carried out using locally-sourced wood. There are many examples where the material obtained either from nearby woods or by dismantling buildings. The two most impressive examples of this during the war were the repair to the stone bridge at Alcantara in 1812 and the crossing of the Adour in 1814. The repairs to the bridge at Alcantara (and also Almaraz) were designed by Henry Sturgeon and Alexander Todd of the Royal Staff Corps. The design is described by Andrew Leith-Hay:
The arch destroyed was of so extensive a span, and the parapet of the bridge so great a height from the bed of the river, that no repair by using timber was practicable; the gap to be passed over being ninety feet wide, and the height of the bridge, one hundred and eighty from the bed of the river … The work was commenced by placing two beams on supporters four feet high and ninety feet asunder. These were secured to the side and end walls of the building by braces and tackles, to prevent their approximating by the straining of the ropes. Eighteen cables were then stretched round them, extending from end to end; eight pieces of timber, six inches square, at equal distances, were placed upon the ropes, with notches, one foot asunder, cut on their surface to secure them; these notches were seared with hot irons to prevent the ropes from chafing. The cables were then lashed to the beams; they were netted together by rope-yarn, and chains of sleepers were bolted and laid on the network, and secured to the two beams originally placed at the extremities of the work. Planks were cut and prepared for being laid across, bored at the ends so as receive a line destined to secure them to the sleepers and to each other … The next point was to prepare the edge of the fractured part of the bridge, and to cut channels in the masonry for the reception of the purchases. When arrived on the spot, four strong ropes were stretched from side to side, as conductors, for passing the cable-bridge across, the beam on the south side having been previously sunk into the masonry; the whole was then stretched by windlass erected on the opposite pier, by which means it was so tightly drawn as to prevent any great sinking, or the vibration which might render it insecure and dangerous, even when heavy weights were passed over.3
The rope bridge at Alcantara.
Crossing the river Adour in February 1814 required the construction of the largest boat bridge of the war. Over forty large local boats were used, held in place by five 13in cables. These were secured at one end by connecting them to a number of siege gun barrels and tightened using a capstan and pulley arrangement on the other bank. The design of this bridge bears striking similarities to the ones at Alcantara and Almaraz and must be attributed to Sturgeon and Todd.
Pontoon Trains
For the first part of the war, the Allies had very little mobile bridging equipment. Their only pontoon train was lost to the French when Badajoz was captured in March 1811. It is unlikely to be coincidence that Wellington wrote home on 31 March asking for a full pontoon train to be shipped out to the Peninsula. He was now commanding forces operating in two different theatres and it was essential that reliable communications were maintained between these two forces. Probably based on their excellent work over the past few weeks, on 18 April Wellington asked for two more companies of Royal Staff Corps to be sent out and noting that as ‘there are no people of the description of pontooneers belonging to the service, I beg that ten warrant artificers may be sent with the pontoons … who will be employed to superintend the persons who must be hired in Portugal to attend them [the pontoons]’.4
The bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, by Leith-Hay.
The experience of crossing the Guadiana in May 1811 reinforced the need to have an effective pontoon train with the army. The first of the pontoons from England did not arrive until June 1811, by which time most of the campaigning for the year was over. In October, Fletcher asked for a ‘person well acquainted with the construction of pontoons, the various articles belonging to them and the method of applying them would be extremely useful in this country as foreman of pontoon bridges’.5
British pontoons came in two sizes; small, approximately 16ft × 4ft (4.9m × 1.2m) and large, approximately 21ft × 5ft (6.4m × 1.5m). They were made of tin-plated iron and, with all their equipment, weighed over 1.5 tons.
A British pontoon.
A pontoon carriage needed eight horses and, I assume, a greater number oxen to move them even on good roads. Transporting the pontoon train was a massive undertaking as its components were very large, very unstable and very fragile. There was also no clear responsibility. A Royal Engineer officer was usually in overall charge, with the Royal Artillery responsible for the horses. No one took responsibility
for the drivers whether they were hired locally, seamen or from the Corps of Drivers.
Lieutenant Piper RE, who commanded the pontoon train in 1812, reported that Portuguese seamen who had been attached to the pontoon train had no rations supplied to them. He also reported in December that year that most of the bullock drivers deserted through not being paid, Piper not saying if they took their bullocks with them. In the same letter he reported that the pontoons were rusting badly. A second pontoon train joined the army at the start of 1813. Writing in May 1813, Harry Jones reported the delays in its progress:
Piper was … left to himself without any assistance to be found … or any provision made against desertions of cattle, [i.e., the bullocks to pull the pontoon train] which unquestionably would be great from non-payment; so we are doomed always to labour under the greatest disadvantages of service and want of exertion on the part of those whose duty it is to provide us, or do their best, with everything that we may require.7
In a return of May 1813, Fletcher described the pontoon train that was moving up for the Vitoria campaign. It comprised 48 wagons with 350 men, 520 oxen and 310 horses. He also recorded the breakages it suffered over a three-week period:8
Problem
Numbe
Axle bed broken/repaired/replaced
40
Draft poles repaired/replaced
25
Carriage wheels repaired/replaced
64
Carriage/boat upset
14
Pontoon boats repaired
3
Total breakages
146
The pontoons continued to be a problem when they were in use. The poor design of the English pontoon, with a square bow, shallow draft and an open top, led to predictable results; they were prone to sinking. This happened spectacularly in early 1812 during the third siege of Badajoz. Several were recovered from the bottom of the river but some were lost. A new enclosed design was approved in 1814, but they were too late for service in the Peninsular War.
A British pontoon in use.
The final campaigns of the war saw the greatest need for military bridging and also the greatest difficulties. December 1813 saw the great rivers of the Bidassoa, Nivelle and Nive being crossed. The winter weather in the Pyrenees made working difficult, the rivers being invariably rapid and the level could rise by several feet with almost no warning. Keeping bridges in place was a constant challenge.
February 1814 saw the audacious crossing of the river Adour, as described above. Wellington took a small pontoon train east with his forces which was sufficient for most of the rivers he crossed but failed spectacularly around Toulouse, where one attempt had to be abandoned as the bridge was too short and the main crossing was held up for three days.
Considering the strategic importance of bridging in the Peninsula, it is surprising that more attention was not paid to it. Typically, the bridging train was commanded by a junior engineer, with the Royal Artillery responsible for much of the motive power, be that horses or oxen. The boatmen were provided by the Portuguese Navy. There were several civilian commissary staff and wagons attached and the drivers could come from the Royal Corps of Drivers, Royal Artillery or be hired locally. As previously mentioned, locally-hired mules and their owners were rarely paid or fed. It is surprising the system worked at all!
Whilst the focus of most books on the war remains on the military operations, it must not be forgotten that without bridges, those operations would have been much more limited or impossible. Wellington’s campaign in the Pyrenees and southern France would have been impossible without the efforts of the various engineering forces and the pontoon trains. They were far from perfect, but they were indispensible.
Appendix 5
Military Education
The need for trained specialists had been recognised in the English army since the invention of gunpowder. Artillery specialists had always been present in very small numbers, but there was no recognition that training was required for army officers prior to them receiving their first commissions. The chapter on tactics in the first monthly edition of the Royal Military Chronicle in 1810, began with: ‘It is often mentioned … [by] foreigners who have travelled in England, as a subject of reasonable astonishment, that we are totally without any general school for military instruction’.1 Contradicting the views of many of the most senior officers of the day, including Wellington, the article went on to argue against the ‘very shallow’ objections to the study of military science to allow an infantry officer to perform his role effectively.
The eighteenth century saw the formation of the first school in England to specifically address military education. The opening of the Royal Military Academy by the Board of Ordnance in 1741 recognised the need for consistent training for artillery and engineer specialists to meet the growing demand for officers. The Army would not recognise the need for ‘scientific soldiers’ for another fifty years.
The question of effective provision of training and resources to the Royal Engineers is an important one. Their activities during the Peninsular War have been heavily criticised by many authors and it is time for a reevaluation of their performance based on the availability of new primary materials and a greater understanding of the logistical and political challenges that they faced.
The Royal Military Academy and its Role in the Training of Officers
The Royal Military Academy was created in 1741 to meet the need for better-trained officers for the Ordnance Department, primarily for the Royal Artillery. At this time the Royal Engineers did not exist as a distinct corps, although the Ordnance Department retained some officers trained as engineers. The Royal Warrant of 30 April 1741 stated ‘that it would conduce to the good of our service if an Academy … was instituted … for instructing the … people belonging to the Military branch of this office, … to qualify them for the service of the artillery, and the business of engineers’.2
The rules and procedures that were drafted made it clear that the original intention was wider than the training of new cadets. The Rules and Orders, with the associated Directions for the Teaching of Theory and Practice, made it clear that the lectures should be attended by ‘Engineers, Officers, Sergeants, Corporals and Cadets’ of the Royal Artillery, and also all such … as have a capacity and inclination’.3 The word ‘inclination’ suggests that the various officers and soldiers mentioned had some choice in their attendance, and it should be noted that there was no greater onus on the cadets’ attendance than there was on the others.
The Governor of the Academy was the Master-General himself, who delegated its day-to-day command to the Commanding Royal Engineer at Woolwich. In 1744, it was decided that the cadets would be withdrawn from the artillery companies and formed into ‘The Company of Gentlemen Cadets’ with an original establishment of forty.4 Apart from attending for lectures and parades, the cadets were left to themselves, which did not appear to have done much for discipline or their studies. In many cases these cadets were young children, possibly away from home or some form of control for the first time in their lives.
In 1764 a Lieutenant Governor was appointed with direct responsibility for the day-to-day running of the Academy and in 1772, the first Inspector of the Royal Military Academy was appointed. Through their efforts, the teaching standards and the behaviour of both cadets and masters improved.5
In 1798, the number of cadets was increased to 100, although this was actually a decrease due to an agreement with the East India Company (EIC) that allowed forty of its engineer cadets to be trained. To make up the numbers for the Ordnance Department, ‘extra cadets’ were placed in local schools around Woolwich. In 1803, numbers were increased again to 180, of which sixty were for the East India Company. One hundred of these were at Woolwich and eighty were placed at the new Royal Military College at Great Marlow.7 In 1810, the East India Company opened its own college at Addiscombe, and the Ordnance cadets were all moved back to Woolwich.8
From 1741 to 1
774 all requests for entry to the Royal Military Academy were made directly to the Master-General. At this time there was no entrance examination. The newly-appointed Lieutenant Governor found on his arrival that many cadets on the muster-roll were not present at the Academy. On ordering them to report, he found the youngest was not yet ten years old. In 1774, the Master-General approved the use of an entrance examination based on the ‘the first four rules of arithmetic with a competent knowledge of the rule of three and the elements of Latin grammar’.9 This was seen as essential to improve entry standards.
In 1782 the minimum age of entry was raised to fourteen.10 The general requirements were ‘to be well grounded in arithmetic, including vulgar fractions, write a very good hand, and be perfectly the master of the English and Latin grammars’. In 1813, the Lieutenant-Governor, Colonel Mudge, persuaded the Master-General to further tighten the entry qualifications for the admission of Gentleman Cadets:11
No candidate can be admitted under 14 or over 16 years. Must be possessed of (at 14) decimal fractions, duodecimals, or cross multiplication, Involution, Extraction of the square root, notation and the first four rules of Algebra, Definitions in Plane Geometry, English Grammar and Parsing, French Grammar. At 16 add, remainder of Algebra except cubic equations, the first two books of Euclid’s ‘Elements of Geometry’ or the first 65 theorems of Dr Hutton’s course of Mathematics, construing and parsing the French language.12
Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 Page 30
