Hitler’s second major strategic error was to reject the welcome from many of the people of Russia’s subject states, who initially saw the Germans as rescuers from Stalin’s oppression. Had he recruited them to his aid, he would not only have secured willing allies but also dramatically shortened the length of his Eastern Front supply lines which ran through hostile territory. However, the ingrained Nazi contempt for the Slavic people prevented this.
His third major mistake was to declare war on the USA in December 1941 when he did not have to; however, the USA was already fighting an undeclared war against the German U-boats as well as keeping the UK and the USSR supplied with vital materials and equipment, so it is hard to see how open warfare could have been avoided for very long. If it had been, the outcome of the war would have been difficult to predict.
On the more technical side, the U-boat was historically Germany’s most effective weapon against the UK and it is suggested that the very expensive and strategically rather pointless heavy cruisers, battlecruisers and battleships could have been deleted in the interests of boosting U-boat development and production (although the earlier Panzerschiffe – ‘pocket battleships’ – and light cruisers would have been already built). However, the historical Type VII and IX submarines were primitive by comparison with the Elektroboote (actually, the Type XXI and the coastal Type XXIII, designated Types X and XI respectively in the book) which were just entering service at the end of the war. There was no technical reason why these could not have been developed much earlier. Had that happened in reality, together with earlier development of the advanced pattern-running and homing torpedoes, they could well have brought the UK starving to the negotiating table. However, in this book their effects are more or less balanced by the earlier development of RN anti-submarine technology, the MAC ships and the much more extensive deployment of long-range maritime patrol aircraft; aided of course by the retention of the British bases in the Republic of Ireland which historically were given up in 1938.
The Luftwaffe has also been criticised for focusing almost entirely on supporting army operations rather than developing a strategic bombing role (the opposite criticism to that of the RAF!) This meant that their bombers were mostly small, with limited range and bombloads, and they relied for long-range maritime patrol (important for providing convoy information to U-boats) almost entirely on small numbers of a converted airliner. A bomber/MP fleet more balanced around heavy four-engined types as well as medium twins (based on the excellent Ju 88 and its derivatives) could have served them better.
It is assumed that both the UK and Germany could have developed jet aircraft earlier if sufficient official encouragement – and resources – had been provided, but it seems doubtful that these could have had a significant effect on the outcome of the conflict as they would, to some extent, have balanced each other out.
It is also assumed that with appropriate direction the more powerful aircraft guns, like the 13 mm MG 131 and 30 mm MK 103 and MK 108, could have been introduced earlier, as could Flak developments like the 30 mm guns, smooth-bored large-calibre weapons, and guided surface-to-air missiles.
In terms of Army equipment the suggested German tank development is simplified, with one tank replacing the historical PzKpfw. III and IV (designated PzKpfw III in the book), and one larger tank, capable of mounting either version of the 88mm gun (and designated PzKpfw IV ‘Panther’), replacing the actual PzKpfw. V (Panther), IV (Tiger) and ‘King Tiger’.
In small arms, the late-war StG.44 was the first of the modern line of assault rifles firing cartridges intermediate in power between the pistol rounds used in SMGs and the full-power rifle/MG rounds. This concept was being explored before World War 2 and the first prototypes were actually produced in 1942, so development could have been brought forward to produce the ‘StG.40’ in the book.
Finally, there is one area of author’s licence which I employed for obvious narrative reasons: it was Hitler’s normal practice to meet his senior Nazi commanders individually rather than collectively as portrayed in the book.
Anthony G Williams
October 2004
THE FORESIGHT WAR Page 42
