by H J Weaver
The story told by some members of U-47’s crew that the Scapa defences swept the sky above their heads with searchlights, apparently in the belief that there had been an air raid, was probably inspired by the light shone by Pegasus in an attempt to find out what was going on. It is, however, a misinterpretation of the facts. When U-47 regained the open sea at 0215, it was still believed in Scapa Flow that Royal Oak had been destroyed by internal explosion, and the only positive action taken aboard Iron Duke, headquarters of ACOS, apart from informing the Admiralty of the loss of the battleship, had been to order all boats to proceed to the Royal Oak anchorage at 0155.
It was not, in fact, until more than three quarters of an hour after the escape of U-47 that the hunt for a suspected submarine began. Mashona, one of three Tribal class destroyers to take part, slipped from No. 8 buoy in Gutter Sound at 0303. She was followed by Somali at 0328 and Ashanti at 0445. The first lieutenant of Ashanti at the time was Viscount Jocelyn, now Captain, the Earl of Roden, RN (retired), who retains a very clear picture of the events of that night.
In a letter from his home in Co. Down he told me: ‘In those days one or more of the destroyers in harbour were kept at short notice – one hour, I think – but were expected to be under way much sooner than that. The remainder were officially at four hours’ notice for sea. This allowed some maintenance on machinery to be carried out, but if none was actually in hand steam could be raised from cold boilers in about two hours. I remember that my captain had dined in another ship that night, which would not have happened had we been one of the emergency destroyers. It is likely therefore that Ashanti was at normal notice while the other two were at short notice as duty destroyers.
‘The whole feeling in the ship was one of incredulity that a submarine could penetrate Scapa Flow undetected. My captain, who had served for three years in submarines, was firm in his opinion that navigational difficulties would make a submerged approach impossible at night and that it was a reasonable assumption that entries not protected by nets would be sufficiently patrolled to make an undetected approach on the surface impossible as well. The conclusion was therefore that Royal Oak had been destroyed by some internal explosion resulting from unstable ammunition or some human error in the handling of it. There had, of course, been several unfortunate precedents of this happening during the 1914 war.
‘Scapa Flow was quiet when we slipped from our moorings to start the search and the impression on Ashanti’s bridge was that the other two destroyers, which were already in the Flow, shared the feeling that we were wasting our time. This did not, of course, mean any laxity in the search operation, which was conducted most effectively. All three destroyers were from the same Flotilla and were well used to operating together at night. My memory of the weather was that it was a still, clear night.
‘Our aim was to detect any submarine and prevent it from leaving the Flow. This involved a pattern of patrol rather than a search for a submarine lying on the sea bed. It did not allow time to assess whether one of the many contacts in a place like Scapa Flow could possibly be a U-boat deserving the ultimate test of a depth charge attack. When daylight came the operation changed in the direction of a search for a bottomed submarine as a result of a Staff appreciation that a U-boat had made the penetration and might still be lying up inside the Flow.’
The hunt was led by Captain (D) aboard Somali, later Admiral Sir Gresham Nicholson, KBE, CB, DSO, DSC, RN, who died in the summer of 1975. One of his officers, however, is now Rear-Admiral Maurice Ross, CB, DSC, RN (retired), who confirms Lord Roden’s statement that the first reaction to the suggestion that a submarine might have penetrated the anchorage was one of incredulity. ‘No one believed it,’ he said. Admiral Ross confesses that, after 39 years, his recollection of events is somewhat hazy, but he went on: ‘There was not an orgy of fireworks soon after the attack and certainly not in the neighbourhood of the entrance which U-47 used. Everyone thought this was effectively blocked and that the only possible entry was through the boom when the gate was open for another ship.’
Out in the open sea, Lt. Prien set a south-easterly course across the Moray Firth and noted – somewhat defensively, it has been suggested – in his log: ‘I still have 5 torpedoes for possible use against merchantmen.23’ The only British naval vessel anywhere near U-47 at this time was the destroyer Matabele, which had been detached from the patrol with Southampton to escort the 750-ton cargo ship St Clare from Lerwick in the Shetlands to Aberdeen. They arrived off Aberdeen at 0945, having passed a few miles astern of U-47 during the night. Lt. Prien and his crew were by then lying on the bottom of the North Sea, some 40 miles north-east of Fraserburgh. U-47 submerged at 0630 and Lt. Prien wrote: ‘The glow from Scapa is still visible for a long time. Apparently they are still dropping depth charges’23
This was not the case. No depth charges had been dropped in Scapa Flow up to that time. Examination of the logs of naval vessels based at Scapa Flow and at Rosyth, or on passage from the Western Approaches, plus all the Admiralty documents relating to the anti-submarine war, also show that no depth charges, which might have been mistaken for Scapa Flow depth charges, were fired in the North Sea at any time during that Saturday. The only recorded U-boat incident involving a British surface vessel was, in fact, an attack carried out by the destroyer HMS Inglefield in the Western Approaches at 1530 hours.
In Scapa Flow, and at the Admiralty, it had been a long and confusing night which was to be followed by a long and confusing day. The varied events, signals and suggestions can be most conveniently set out in the form of a log:
0200
ACOS to Admiralty: ROYAL OAK SUNK IN SCAPA FLOW, SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS.
0211
ACOS to Admiralty: NO DETAILS YET AVAILABLE.
0320
ACOS to Admiralty: ONLY EVIDENCE TO DATE THREE EXPLOSIONS. ROYAL OAK WAS LYING OFF EASTERN END OF SCAPA FLOW.
0345
ACOS to Admiralty: PEGASUS REPORTS 300 SURVIVORS ON BOARD.
0500
The tug St Martin recovered two bodies in Scapa Flow.
0504
ACOS to Admiralty: REPORT FROM CAPTAIN BENN. HE BELIEVES ROYAL OAK TORPEDOED.
0506
Admiralty to ACOS: CAN IT BE DEFINITELY STATED SINKING NOT DUE TO ENEMY AIRCRAFT?
0620
ACOS to Admiralty: YES.
(In between these two signals the only incident involving the land defences of Scapa Flow took place. At 0530 an oil lamp fell over and caused a fire which burned down an Army observation post on Flotta.)
0641
ACOS to Admiralty: ROYAL OAK PROBABLY SUNK BY TORPEDOES. DIVERS BEING SENT.
0643
Admiralty to ACOS: REQUEST INFORMATION WHEN ROYAL OAK LAST CARRIED OUT FIRINGS, DATE OF LAST AMMUNITIONING AND OILING, WHEN SHE TOOK UP BERTH AND WHETHER SCAPA IS DEFINITELY SUBMARINE-PROOF.
0704
ACOS to Admiralty: NO REFERENCE TO ROYAL OAK TO BE MADE IN PLAIN LANGUAGE UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS. THIS INCLUDES LIST OF SURVIVORS.
0730
Belfast, Caledon, Cardiff, Colombo and Delhi put to sea from Scapa Flow in quick succession.
0746
ACOS to Admiralty: CONSIDER ROYAL OAK SUNK BY TORPEDOES WITH MAGNETIC PISTOL FIRED BY SUBMARINE.
0805
St Martin recovered a third body.
0829
Aurora sailed from Scapa Flow for Loch Ewe.
0905
St Martin recovered two more bodies.
0915
Pegasus moored alongside the accommodation ship Voltaire in Gutter Sound.
0930
Pegasus began to disembark survivors and, in the interests of good naval housekeeping, recorded that ‘three cork lifebelts, pattern 305, used in the rescue of Royal Oak personnel’ had not been returned.
1003
C.-in-C., Home Fleet, to ACOS: CONSIDER [THE NETLAYER] GUARDIAN LAYING NETS TO COVER EXITS FROM KIRK, SKERRY AND EAST WEDDEL SOUNDS. USE EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT,
TO PREVENT SUBMARINE GETTING OUT AND INFORMING GERMAN ADMIRALTY.
1030
Ashanti carried out an attack on a contact in Scapa Flow [these were the first depth charges fired in the anchorage since the loss of Royal Oak nine hours earlier].
At the Admiralty a Statement of Facts So Far Known was prepared. It read: ‘12.10.39. German plane over Scapa Flow would have shown Repulse, Furious and Royal Oak in harbour, besides smaller craft. Dusk, 12/10, Repulse and Furious sailed, Repulse to dock, Furious because of possibility of air attack. 2200/12 Men sleeping in gate vessel at Hoxa Gate heard sounds of propellers and reported to watch on deck. Some indication boom nets may have been disturbed, but nothing seen. Presumed submarine entered at this time [note: this theory was later dismissed by the Board of Inquiry]. May have looked for Repulse and Furious and, having failed to find them, remained on bottom throughout 13th.
‘0055/14 Submarine presumably located Royal Oak during 13th, fired first torpedo: 20 minutes later two or three more torpedoes, which caused Royal Oak to sink. ACOS ordered all ships to raise steam and, except destroyers, they proceeded to sea through Switha Gate. Hoxa Gate closed at this time, not since reopened. Three destroyers now hunting inside the Flow, but ACOS thinks submarine may have escaped through the boom.
1034
C.-in-C., Home Fleet, to ACOS: SEND ALL BIG SHIPS TO SEA . . . BELFAST TO PORT A (Loch Ewe).
1109
ACOS to Admiralty: REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WITHHOLDING CIVILIAN TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION WITH MAINLAND.
1133
C.-in-C., Home Fleet, to ACOS: POSSIBILITY . . . THAT SUBMARINE ENTERED THROUGH KIRK SOUND AT SLACK HIGH WATER AT ABOUT 2315 AND WILL ATTEMPT TO GET OUT THE SAME WAY TODAY OR TOMORROW.
1155
Admiralty to ACOS: YOUR 1109/14. FOLLOWING HAS BEEN GIVEN TO PRESS [the official announcement of the loss of Royal Oak followed].
1255
Mashona attacked a contact in the Flow.
1323
Ashanti attacked a contact in the Flow.
1325
ACOS to Admiralty: SEARCHES BY DESTROYERS, MINESWEEPERS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIED OUT.
1327
Somali attacked a contact in the Flow.
1505
An expression of condolence from the King of Norway was transmitted to the Admiralty by the Naval Attaché in Oslo.
2046
Admiralty to ACOS: GERMAN OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. THEY ARE WITHOUT CONFIRMATION FROM ANYGERMAN SOURCE. FROM THIS IT WOULD APPEAR THATSUBMARINE IS STILL IN HARBOUR.
2233
ACOS to Admiralty: DIVERS EXAMINED PORT SIDE AND FLAT BOTTOM OF ROYAL OAK, FOUND NO DAMAGEYET.
2253
Admiralty to ACOS: DO NOT HESITATE TO USE SEARCHLIGHTS FOR HUNTING SUBMARINE TONIGHT.
The belief that a U-boat was still trapped inside Scapa Flow died hard. As late as Wednesday, October 18, the day after Lt. Prien’s safe return to Germany and his broadcast, the C.-in-C., Home Fleet, sent a signal timed 1858 containing the somewhat bizarre advice: SUGGEST SEARCH ALONGSIDE ROYAL OAK, STARBOARD SIDE: SUBMARINE MAY HAVE BEEN PINNEDDOWN WHEN ROYAL OAK SANK. It was not until Sunday, October 22, that the destroyer search inside the Flow was finally abandoned.
In the interval, Lt. Prien had completed a voyage home that passed without any incident of great importance. On the night of Saturday, October 14, U-47 surfaced at 1935 and set off on a course of 180°. Lt. Prien explained in his log: This course was chosen in the hope that we might catch a ship inshore, and to avoid U-20.24 The shape of the Scottish coastline meant, however, that he actually put a progressively greater distance between himself and land once he had passed Peterhead. In the course of the night U-47 was in radio communication with Germany and Admiral Dönitz noted in his war diary: ‘Received from U-47 the following message: “Operation carried out as planned. Royal Oak sunk: Repulse damaged.” ’
When Lt. Prien submerged at 0600 on the Sunday morning, he was in a position (56°20'N, 0°40'W) some 78 miles off the Bass Rock at the entrance to the Firth of Forth. At this point, Lt. Prien’s log makes another reference to depth charges which has, with the passing years, given rise to the myth that U-47 was the object of the attack although Lt. Prien’s entry makes it perfectly plain that this was not the case. The entry reads: From 1000, depth charges were fired from time to time in the far distance. Thirty-two were definitely counted. Therefore I remain lying on the bottom until dusk.25
This account tallies precisely with Admiralty records. At 1000 the destroyer HMS Afridi carried out a depth charge attack on a target, subsequently identified as a wreck teeming with pollack, to the north-east of the Bass Rock. Afridi and the destroyer HMS Woolston carried out further attacks in the Firth of Forth between 1130 and 1400. More depth charges were fired by HMS Valorous in the same area at 1414. In addition, the destroyer HMS Broke carried out an attack off Blyth, Northumberland, just over a hundred miles from U-47, at 1615. All of the depth charges dropped in these operations would have been audible at those distances to the crew of U-47, which eventually surfaced at 1823 and set a south-easterly course for home.
At that time, back in Germany, the Luftwaffe was busy making preparations for what is sometimes referred to in Britain as ‘The Forth Bridge Raid’. This is a misnomer. The target was not the Forth Bridge, despite its importance as a means of communication, but a ship – Repulse, which Lt. Prien had ostensibly left crippled in Scapa Flow 40 hours earlier.
The following morning, while U-47 lay safely on the Dogger Bank in the middle of the North Sea, the telephone rang in the office of Captain Helmut Pohle at Westerland on the island of Sylt. Captain Pohle, C.O. of I/KG30 bomber squadron, had been one of the disappointed pilots involved a week earlier in the Gneisenau foray which had lured the Home Fleet out of Scapa Flow just as Lt. Prien was leaving on his mission. Now there was more bad news for him. At the other end of the telephone was Lt.-Gen. Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, with some final, and very definite, instructions about the procedure to be followed on the Forth raid, scheduled for that afternoon.
Hitler had given a personal order that the battlecruiser26 spotted in the Forth by aerial reconnaissance was not to be attacked if she had entered dock because, still hoping for peace, he did not wish to risk bombs falling on British soil and killing civilians.
This is the account of the raid which appears in the Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker: ‘At 1100 on October 16, I/KG30’s bomber squadron took off. By 1215 they had reached the outer estuary of the Forth and started to push inland . . . As Pohle flew at the head of his scattered formation, Edinburgh came into view below. For the first time since the war began a German bomber unit was flying over the United Kingdom. There was the great bridge separating the outer and inner Firth of Forth and, immediately beyond it on the north bank, the docks of Rosyth naval base.
‘At once Pohle spotted the ship that he had come to sink, distinguished by its length and much greater width from the much smaller ships around. It could only be the Hood, but she was no longer at sea, but in dock – or, rather, in the sluice gate leading to it . . . “She was a sitting target,” Pohle reported, “but orders robbed us of our prize.” ’
That report had to be made very much later, however, for the Forth raid was Captain Pohle’s last mission of the war. Robbed of Repulse because of her position, he turned his attention to the cruiser Southampton, recently arrived after her patrol off the Shetlands. As Captain Pohle dived on Southampton at 400 m.p.h., the cabin roof of his Ju88 dive-bomber sheered off. That was only the beginning of his misfortunes. The thousand-pound bomb which he launched at the cruiser from 3,000 feet struck its target but failed to explode, and as Captain Pohle turned away he was set upon by three Spitfires. Over East Lothian, with his aircraft badly damaged and his radio operator, rear gunner and observer dead, he decided to put down in the sea: ‘We were finished. I spied a trawler steaming north and thought perhaps I could reach it.’ He crash-landed in the water, lost consciousness and woke up five
days later in a Scottish hospital.
U-47 tied up at Wilhelmshaven at 1144 on the Tuesday morning. It was an euphoric occasion. Hitler had already promoted Commodore Dönitz to Admiral; awarded Lt. Prien the Iron Cross, First Class, and his crew the Iron Cross, Second Class; and given Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, C.-in-C. of the German Navy, authority to intensify the U-boat war. He had also ordered that the entire crew of U-47 be flown to Berlin where Lt. Prien was to receive the coveted Knights’ Cross of the Iron Cross on their behalf.
Both Grand Admiral Raeder and Admiral Dönitz were at Wilhelmshaven in person to greet Lt. Prien and hear from his own lips the details of his mission. Admiral Dönitz later recorded in his war diary: ‘It is obvious from the report that the operation has been carried out with enormous courage and competence . . .’
In the afternoon, Lt. Prien and his crew were flown first to Kiel for their uniforms, then to Berlin to be received by the Führer. From Tempelhof Airport they drove in open cars through streets lined with waving, cheering throngs. After he and his crew had been received by Hitler at his Chancellery, Lt. Prien was introduced to German and foreign correspondents by Hitler’s Press chief, Dr Otto Dietrich, who – the American correspondent William Shirer notes in his book Berlin Diary – ‘kept cursing the English and calling Churchill a liar’. Then it was on to an evening at the theatre where the heroes of Scapa Flow were joined by a delighted Dr Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister.
The delight of Dr Goebbels was understandable. At the time a great deal of his energy was being devoted to making maximum capital out of the war at sea and U-47 could hardly have served him better. It is therefore not surprising that the hand of the propagandist, as well as the genesis of some of the myths surrounding Lt. Prien’s exploit, can be detected in the story written for Der Angriff, Dr Goebbel’s own newspaper, by a correspondent who had flown to Berlin with Lt. Prien:
