by H J Weaver
‘There are at Scapa seven entrances, of which three are closed with booms, but each of the booms has a permanent gap at its shore end. When you took up your duties were you satisfied with the state of defence and the lookout arrangements at the seven entrances?’ – ‘No, my reaction was to ask for more patrol vessels in order that I could have two at each boom with certainty.’
‘You told us in your previous evidence that you thought the Royal Oak submarine had probably entered through Hoxa boom. Were you more concerned with the safety of the boom entrances and the other four, and, if so, why, please?’ – ‘Because I thought that following another ship through the gate was much the easiest method of getting into the Flow.’
‘Have you had time personally to examine the other four entrances?’ – ‘I have only examined the Kirk and Skerry Sounds and that was at high water only.’
‘Evidence given to us has suggested that there was room for a small submarine to pass in at certainly five of the seven entrances if the conditions were favourable enough. Can you say what defence there was in the shape of shore lookouts on these gaps, guns to cover them, or rapid method of signalling by rocket or Very light?’ – ‘There were no shore lookouts except at Stanger Head, which covered Hoxa and Switha booms, where there are also guns to cover these booms. At the Hoxa, Switha and Hoy entrances there were the patrol drifters when available. At the four entrances at Holm and Water Sounds there was only an occasional drifter patrol, no lookouts, no guns and no coastwatchers.’
‘Did you at any time suggest that more blockships were desirable?’ – ‘Yes, I was sent up here in June last and one of the things the Commander-in-Chief asked me to look out for was the question of whether more blockships were required. I saw the survey that had been made and went out and personally visited, and passed through, both Kirk and Skerry Sounds. I reported that, in my opinion, there would be no difficulty for a submarine to come in by either of these two Sounds at slack water. It was my opinion that the other two Sounds were impassable to submarines on account of the natural navigational difficulties, assisted by blockships that were placed there. I do, however, consider, now that a German submarine has entered the Flow, that we can no longer rely on the psychological aspect that we had resulting from the last war, and we must make all these entrances absolutely 100 per cent proof.’
‘What blockships have been placed between the date of your report in June and October 13?’ – ‘One blockship has been placed in Skerry Sound which, in my opinion, completely blocks that Sound. Another blockship has been placed today in Kirk Sound, the Lake Neuchatel.’
‘Do you consider that the four eastern gaps could be made entirely secure with blockships or would you prefer to have shore lookouts, guns and lights in addition?’ – ‘I have come to the conclusion that, since we know that a submarine got into the Flow, we must have lookouts, searchlights and guns at all four entrances.’
‘Is there in the defence organisation any arrangement for urgent signals to indicate that a ship is in need of immediate help?’ – ‘None other than are laid down in the signal manual.’
‘Will you say what action was taken when you received Pegasus’s signals on the night of October 13–14?’ – ‘I cannot give you times without reference to the signal log, but I immediately ordered all boats and drifters to be sent, made a general signal to raise steam with the utmost despatch and ordered RA(D) [note: Rear-Admiral, Destroyers], through the telephone, to send his destroyers out into the Flow to search for a submarine.’
In the course of the inquiry it emerged that one man who actually claimed to have seen the U-boat had been allowed to return to the Royal Marine Barracks at Portsmouth. He was Marine Owens, Bandmaster, Second Class, who was quite positive about the matter although, in the light of what is known now about the range of Lt. Prien’s attacks and his immediate departure after the second of them, it seems fairly certain that Marine Owens was deceived by the upturned gig of Royal Oak with one or two men sitting on it. But, at the time, the Board found his evidence impressive.
It came initially in the form of a signal, sent at 1530 on October 21, by the Commandant of the Royal Marine Barracks to Admiral Drax. The signal read: ‘Marine Owens, Bandmaster 2nd Class, demonstrably states abandoned ship port side, swam aft accompanied by officer, tall and wearing night clothing. When some 300 yards astern of Royal Oak, companion drew his attention to something in water. Owens is emphatic saw clearly conning tower of submarine some 300 yards distant from him, starboard side of Royal Oak, submarine appearing to be stationary. Owens unable to trace companion but certain of above facts. Owens later swam to drifter, did not look out for submarine again.’
The Board asked for further details and, on October 23, received a verbatim copy of a report telephoned by the Commandant of the Royal Marine Barracks at 1200 that day. It said: ‘I carefully examined Marine Owens on his arrival here from Thurso and obtained the following statement: “I went to the quarter-deck on the second explosion by the officers’ ladder and abandoned ship over the port side and got to barnacles and went into water. My one idea was to get clear of the ship. I went over in company with another person, I think an officer. He was wearing pyjamas and was very tall.
‘ “After we got 300 yards from the ship, we trod water to have a rest. He then said: ‘Hello, do you see that over there?’ I looked in the direction he pointed and distinctly saw the conning tower of a submarine some 200 (sic) yards away. The submarine was on the starboard quarter of the Royal Oak and appeared to be stationary. After that I said to my companion we had better make for the drifter, which was lying some 400 yards to the port of the Royal Oak. We swam towards the drifter. I then missed my companion and have been unable to trace him since. I am absolutely certain I saw the conning tower of a submarine from my position in the water. I have not the slightest doubt whatever.” ’
This message ended with the following note: ‘The Commandant particularly impressed on Commander Newcombe, Naval Officer in Charge, Thurso, who took in this message that Marine Owens was a first-class witness. He gave his evidence in a simple, straightforward manner without the slightest doubt or hesitation. He was an old soldier of three badges and in every way a splendid character.’
The members of the Board of Inquiry took the testimony of the three-badge Marine, the transcript of evidence, what other facts they had been able to glean, the pile of survivors’ statements, surveys of the Scapa defences and newspaper cuttings relating to Lt. Prien’s exploit, and retired to consider their findings. But there was no doubt in their own minds now about what had happened.
8
Flowers for a Fallen Hero
The first of two separate reports produced by the Board of Inquiry – one on the entry of a German submarine, the other on the sinking of Royal Oak – began uncompromisingly: ‘We have obtained no evidence that a submarine was seen or heard entering or leaving the Flow.’ Nor, said the Board, had any trace of a submarine been found subsequently. The survivors’ evidence suggested, however, that the explosions had been caused by torpedoes fired in one or two salvoes, and the claim by Bandmaster Owens to have seen a submarine was considered accurate.
‘We are definitely of opinion therefore that HMS Royal Oak was sunk by torpedoes fired from a submarine,’ the Board went on. ‘Though it is possible that the submarine entered the Flow prior to the night of October 13–14, this is considered unlikely.’
After listing the 11 possible ways a U-boat might have entered the Flow (see Appendix B) and making the point that no lookout was kept at any of the eastern Sounds, the Board continued: ‘The weather on the night of October 13–14 was fine and clear and the sea calm. The night was fairly light and for periods the sky was lit up by the Aurora and Northern Lights. High water at Kirk Sound was at 2338 on October 13 . . . Any opinion as to which entrance the submarine came in at must be conjecture only, but in many respects Kirk Sound would present the least difficulty. Having found a way in, the submarine would no doubt aim to return by the
same route, but if it entered by Kirk Sound at slack water and left as soon as the torpedoes were fired the tide would then have been running against it perhaps as much as eight knots’ [note: Board’s emphasis].
The Board next went on to say, not without justification, that it considered ‘the whole problem of the defences of Scapa required reconsideration’ and it recommended a series of measures, most of which Commodore Dönitz, in understandable innocence, had assumed to be already in existence – an adequate force of patrol vessels, asdic defences for boom gates when they were open, minefields, blocking of the eastern entrances, closure as far as possible of the gaps at the sides of booms, lookouts, guns, searchlights, and the extension of boom nets as close to the seabed as was feasible without damaging them.
The whole question of the arrangements for the defence of Scapa Flow that were made prior to the outbreak of war is complex – so complex that a separate sub-committee was appointed to consider the matter before Mr Churchill made his second statement to the Commons about the loss of Royal Oak – but the Board now turned its attention to the vulnerability of the eastern Sounds. ‘The general feeling at Scapa,’ it said, ‘was that the eastern entrances to the Flow were considered by the Admiralty to be satisfactorily closed. Local opinion was no doubt influenced by Admiralty message 1546/May 26.’
This message was transmitted after a survey by HMS Scott, and it was certainly phrased in confident terms. It said there was ‘no, repetition no’ risk of a submarine entering Holm Sound (the approach to Kirk, Skerry and East Weddel Sounds) or Water Sound submerged, and entry on the surface would be extremely hazardous and unlikely. Nor would further blocking measures guarantee complete security. It had therefore been decided that ‘further expenditure on blockships cannot be justified’.
This confidence seems curiously misplaced, not only in view of what happened but in the light of the contents of the Scott report and another submitted at about the same time by Thomas Mackenzie of Metal Industries Ltd. The Scott survey estimated the gap between the blockship Soriano and the northern shore of Kirk Sound as 820 feet at high water and 500 feet at low water, with 14 feet of water under the bows of the blockship. The Mackenzie figures were 750 feet at high water and 460 feet at low water, with 18 feet of water under the bows of Soriano.
The Scott survey put the gap between the blockship Thames and the southern shore of Kirk Sound as 1,050 feet at high water and 720 feet at low water, adding: ‘This channel is obstructed by submerged wreckage [of the blockship Minich] . . . but a channel 250 feet wide remains in which a depth of 22 feet could be carried.’ The Mackenzie report described the southern gap as ‘a 400ft. channel giving 4.5 to 5 fathoms [27–30 feet] at low water between the broken portions of the blockship Minich and the two-fathom [12 feet] line on the Lamb Holm [note: southern] shore.’
The Board made the point that the situation was even more hazardous than these figures indicated. At high-water springs, the state of the tide on the night of October 13–14, a U-boat would have another nine feet of water to play with. It also drew attention to what it described as ‘two very striking paragraphs’ in the Mackenzie report. He had written: ‘At the present time a good-sized tramp steamer could enter Skerry Sound without serious difficulty on a course west true, and a similar vessel could, with careful navigation, pass to the south of the blockships in Kirk Sound. Water Sound and East Weddel Sound could be entered with a vessel such as a 500-ton or 600-ton coaster at high water. Our tug Imperious, draught 12ft.6ins., passed in and out of Water Sound recently round the bows of the [blockship] Naja at low water.’
Although the Board did not mention it, the Mackenzie report had then gone on to give an absolutely specific warning that, in the event of war, any ship anchored in Scapa Flow might be considered at risk: ‘It is fully recognised that the navigation of the Sounds, even now, presents difficulties owing to the strong tidal stream and the existing obstructions, but it is safe to assume that an intrepid submarine officer in wartime would take risks which no discreet mariner would think of taking in peacetime. The possibility of a hostile submarine entering Scapa Flow if the Sounds are left as at present cannot therefore be excluded, and the fact that any such craft successful in passing through one of the Sounds could be within torpedo range of capital ships in 15 to 30 minutes makes it of vital importance that the Sounds should be efficiently blocked.’
The Admiralty decision not to spend money on more blockships, despite these ominous figures and comments, inspired protests from the Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland, and from the C.-in-C., Home Fleet, the latter quoting Admiral French’s view that he would be happy to take a submarine or destroyer through Kirk or Skerry Sounds ‘provided I could see and select slack water to do it in.’
These protests, as mentioned earlier, resulted in the Cape Ortegal being placed in Skerry Sound on September 8 and the ordering of the Lake Neuchatel, designed to seal off Kirk Sound, which actually arrived the day after Royal Oak was lost.
The Board agreed that this confusion about what was needed had not been helpful to the officers who arrived at Scapa Flow a few days before the outbreak of war. It said: ‘That [the defences] were not entirely efficient was known, but the extent to which they were vulnerable was certainly not generally appreciated. In the past various officers have been responsible for various sections of the defences, but it appears that no one officer has been responsible for the whole of it. Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands, has not got sufficient patrol vessels. There are about 40 drifters under his orders, manned by civilians, but when asked to assist with patrols the crews were not willing to do so. Had they volunteered, or had there been means to compel them to assist, the situation as regards patrol craft would have been very different.’
The Board also agreed that, despite its deficiencies, the Scapa defence scheme had Admiralty sanction, and that ACOS and his staff, nearly all retired officers, had been ‘constantly harassed by current administrative work’.
The Board went on to give the positions of Royal Oak and Pegasus, the only two vessels in the north-east corner of the Flow at the time of the sinking. ‘The position of Royal Oak on the night of October 13–14, 1939, was 185 degrees, 1.7 miles, from Scapa Pier light. She is now lying with bows approximately 044 degrees. The position of Pegasus on the same night was 205 degrees, 9.2 cables (1,840 yards) from Scapa Pier light.’ This is not quite accurate. Royal Oak was a hundred yards closer to Scapa Pier light and slightly north of west of the position given by the Board. In a letter to me, the Wreck Section of the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Defence stated: ‘The position given on November 6, 1939, by the King’s Harbourmaster at Scapa Flow was: “The stern lies 259°, 4,590ft. from Gaitnip, with the bows 0528, 620ft. from the stern”. This gives exact position 058° 55' 50" N, 002° 59' 00" W.’
In one of several appendices, the Board analysed three newspaper cuttings clipped from the Scotsman, the Daily Record and the Aberdeen Press and Journal. They described how Lt. Prien had slipped into Scapa Flow through the defences; one torpedo was fired at Repulse, more than half-hidden by Royal Oak, but identified by her two funnels; Repulse was hit, ‘the bows, as we established beyond dispute, sinking deep into the water’; a second torpedo struck Royal Oak, which blew up violently. The Aberdeen Press and Journal was the only one to contain the story of the car driver on the shore. It was also the only cutting to mention that the attack had been made easier because of the Northern Lights, ‘the brightest I have seen in 15 years at sea’, Lt. Prien explained.
The Board found a number of points in the cuttings puzzling. It said: ‘The reports are interesting and provide a certain amount of information, but not enough to enable us to decide by which entrance the submarine came in. Lt. Prien is careful to speak of “two torpedoes” and never admits that he fired one or two salvoes. The reason for this is not clear. If we assume that most of his statements are intended to be truthful, it appears that he fired first at Pegasus beyond Royal Oak, thinking that Pegasus wa
s the forepart of Repulse, covered by Royal Oak’s forecastle. His first shot certainly hit Royal Oak with one torpedo under the forecastle. All evidence from Royal Oak suggests that she was hit later by a salvo of three, but Lt. Prien says: “The effect of the second torpedo was queer. Several columns of water rose high from the ship’s sides and columns of fire were visible in all the colours of the rainbow.” This matter can only be cleared up by divers, who have not yet completed their examination.
‘If it be true that only two torpedoes were fired, we must assume that they came from a specially small submarine with only one or two tubes. Prien remarks on seeing shaded anchor lights, which is correct and authentic. His alleged statement: “As I left port I heard two explosions and saw a column of water rising from the ship furthest north” is obviously untrue. The time between the first and second torpedoes was certainly not less than 10 minutes . . .
‘Prien, speaking of the car . . . says: “It stopped and the driver got out, apparently to take a good look at us.” He is hardly likely to have invented this. The only place where a car is likely to have been so close to the water is on the road running eastward from St Mary’s along the north shore of Kirk Sound. No motorist has made a report so we presume that the submarine was not observed from the car. The exact passage where it entered and left remains a matter of great uncertainty, but Kirk Sound is one of the more probable.’
The Board’s second report, which dealt with the sinking, recorded that, when Captain Benn went toward following the first explosion and learned that water was entering the inflammable store, no one thought there had been a torpedo attack. Captain Benn ordered salvage pumps to be started and preparations made for opening and examining damaged compartments. In his own words: ‘I had no thought other than that a local explosion had taken place in the inflammable store . . . I felt no uneasiness about the safety of the ship.’
