by Tim Saunders
One of the track layers that made it up onto the Esplanade.
Conversely, Canadian trials on what they thought to be similar beaches found that the Churchill could cope with a pebble beach, but none the less, measures for assisting in crossing shingle were developed. However, the combination of enemy fire, steep banks and the large pebbles was to prove an almost insurmountable obstacle for much of the armour.
As the landing-craft tank approached the Red and White beaches, they started to attract enemy fire. Some were hit before they touched down, and others were hit while they were disembarking their load or withdrawing from the beach. Losses among the landing craft and their crews on both Red and White beaches were heavy and made up a significant proportion of the Royal Navy’s losses during Operation Jubilee.
It had been planned that the first flight of the Calgary Regiment’s Churchills would land with the infantry at 0520 hours, accompanied by engineers who were to construct the timber crib ramps and carry out any demolitions necessary to get the tanks off the beach. The Canadian report explains that:
‘Orders had been issued that the three Churchill tanks on each landing craft would go off first, taking the chance of beach mines (which in fact appear not to have been present), in order to engage the enemy pillboxes. The fighting infantry and beach signal parties, and subsequently the sappers and the infantry working parties, would follow.’
With the tank-landing craft being fifteen minutes late, the RHLI and Essex Scottish were denied the close support and the cover of the tanks that could have helped get them across the beach. There were further delays once the craft had touched down. For example, LCT 2, which landed near the mole at the east end of the beach, took fifteen minutes to disembark its cargo of three Churchills. This delay was apparently because the tanks’ engines had not been warmed up, and all three vehicles stalled on the ramp as they left the landing craft. To confound the Germans’ armoured mobility trials that they had conducted on the beach, one of the chespaling Churchill track-layer, trialed during the early summer, worked well. COHQ noted a report that the ‘first tank... was seen to proceed up the beach to the Esplanade wall, lay its tracks, climb the wall, jettison the apparatus and move west. The other two tanks followed in its tracks and likewise crossed the wall successfully.’
Landing with the tanks from LCT 2 was Sergeant March, a member of the Black Watch of Canada’s mortar detachment, who recalled:
‘I had a clear view of the tanks as they left the craft. The first tank was hit three or four times but kept going. It went through the wire, but much to my surprise the wire seemed to spring into place again after the weight of the tank had passed over it. After receiving a couple of shots from the French tank which was standing close to the mole along-side of which we landed, our tank opened fire and must have scored a direct hit as the French tank seemed to explode into the air. [This was the tank concreted into the Mole]. While this was going on, our second tank ‘Cheetah’ was on the way out and headed for an enemy pillbox slightly to our left. The Jerries immediately ran from the pillbox and were promptly mowed down by our two Vickers guns, which were being coolly handled by the Essex Scottish. Our third tank ‘Cavell’, which was towing the scout car ‘Hector,’ seemed to get stuck half on the beach and half on the landing craft’s ramp .
. . but a shell burst on the ramp and broke both winch cables. The tank now released rapidly pulled the scout car through the wire and tore through the wall. The last I saw of the scout car it was tearing like hell up Foch Boulevard.’
Major Rolfe’s damaged armoured car ‘Hunter’ abandoned on the beach.
Carnage on Red Beach
Among the scout cars landed by the LCTs were those of the tactical headquarters of the two Canadian brigades: 4 and 6 Infantry Brigades and the Calgary Regiment’s HQ. Major Rolfe of the Canadian Signals was aboard ‘Hunter,’ which was damaged when the Churchill that was towing him reversed into his armoured car, crushing its front. Major Rolfe recalled ‘I guess the scout car looked like a derelict to the enemy, but my radio sets were undamaged, so I operated from the wreck on the beach throughout the operation.’ Other radio equipment was brought ashore in hand carts, and Brigadier Southam set up his first HQ in the relative shelter of a crater in the beach, where unfortunately the radios were crushed by a Churchill that was struggling up the shingle slope towards the Casino. The Brigadier joined Major Rolfe in the ruins of his armoured car and was able to pass some information back to Calpe.
‘Ringer’, a churchill Mk II belonging to the Calgary’s RHQ.
Most of the Churchills that reached the Esplanade used the path laid by tracklayers. However, a few tanks were able to motor straight up the beach without the aid of cheapsaling, but those that had to manoeuvre on the shingle inevitably became casualties stranded on the beach. Trooper Pinder, driver of ‘Ringer,’ one of the Regimental Headquarters tanks (second flight), described the difficulties encountered by many of the Churchills:
‘Almost immediately we were going up hill, very slowly, then we lost traction and could go no further... we backed down under our own power, swung to the right and started along the beach parallel to the sea in the lowest gear, because of all those damnable round stones that no one mentioned beforehand... A short distance along the beach and there was a “clang” from the front of the tank and we stopped dead, with at least one broken track. Up ahead of us we could see the Casino, and near it a large pillbox which one of our tanks was bouncing 6-pounder shells off with no visible effect. There we were for the rest of the morning, using up our ammunition... Every now and again a mortar bomb would land on the tank, doing us no harm but creating havoc with some of the infantry who were using us for shelter’.
Canadians watch the action ashore from the bows of an LCT
A photograph taken after the battle shows the bulldozed ditch and the sea wall.
In the shingle by the seawall, other tanks encountered a ditch that the Germans were in the process of digging as a tank obstacle at the time of the raid. Here more than one tank bellied in the pebbles as it attempted to manoeuvre across the bund. Although the shingle caused many of the tank casualties, some of the Churchills were disabled by shells hitting their tracks. However, there are few reports of the heavy Churchill tanks being fully knocked out, as such guns as were available to German coastal divisions in 1942 were mainly of a small calibre when judged by later standards. Many tanks, disabled in the shingle or hit on the tracks such as ‘Ringer,’ became in effect pillboxes stranded on the beach firing away at enemy positions until they ran out of ammunition.
‘Blossom’ another Mk III threw a track when it drove off the cheapsaling track-way.
Despite the Port Commander’s confidence that tanks could not get off the main beach, it is estimated that fifteen of the twenty-seven tanks landed) reached the Esplanade, mainly via points where the shingle was heaped against the seawall: another two drowned in the surf. However, the Calgary Regiment’s tank crews who got off the beach and onto the lawns found that concrete anti-tank walls, eight feet high and up to four feet thick, blocked the roads from the Esplanade into the town. The engineer detachments that were supposed to demolish them had not arrived, as they had either become casualties or were pinned down on the beach. Lieutenant Breithaupt, commander of 7 Troop B Squadron, was amongst the tanks that successfully crossed the seawall. He reported that he ‘spent the morning circling the Esplanade clearing the infiltration of German snipers into slit trenches and firing at the buildings and cliffs from which we saw enemy fire directed to the beach.’
Churchill Mk III ‘Cat’ knocked out on the lawns of the Esplanade.
Lieutenant Bennett landed in his tank, ‘Bellicose’: ‘It was a pretty grim trip as there were so many wounded lying helpless in our path, but we managed to get around them.’ Bellicose was able to get off the beach over a bank of shingle near the Casino:
‘We made a dash for the Germans who were pinning down our infantry on the near side of the road. To our su
rprise, they poured out from everywhere, running like hell. Both gunners opened up and we got plenty of them. We even had the pleasure of running down one who tried to dodge us. Then we tried to get into the town behind the Casino but all the streets were very narrow and were blocked with solid concrete walls. We were finally hit properly and our steering was buggered.’
Trooper Clark said:
‘The one thing that irks me and has irked me for all these years is that there were several of us up there on the promenade, waiting for the order to advance into the town itself. We were just going round in bloody circles, using up our ammo, being shelled and rolling over people.’
However, Sergeant Dumais, fighting in the area of the Casino, was under fire from enemy position on the seawall, and had cause to be grateful to a roaming tank:
‘I was at a loss to know how to stop the enemy fire, but a tank solved the problem: it had seen the firing and engaged the position with cannon and machine gun. The enemy fire stopped immediately.’
Later, another tank scaled the seawall 150 yards from the Casino. Coming to a halt, facing towards the old Castle, it seemed to Dumais that the Churchill had been knocked out.
‘It made me mad to see one of our tanks knocked out so easily at a crucial moment. But what was this? The tank cannon was moving around through 180 degrees and fast too. It was hardly on target when three shots rang out in quick succession. The tank was not dead by a long chalk! The tank stood there, waiting for a reply, and it seemed to be asking How’s it feel to get a dose of your own medicine? After about twenty seconds it moved off as if nothing had happened.’
Overall, the tanks provided significant support to the Essex Scottish and the RHLI, but many of the infantry casualties had been inflicted before the LCTs had arrived and while the cumbersome Churchills were being off-loaded. Too few tanks reached the Esplanade to support too few surviving infantry, and a coordinated engineer effort failed to reached the anti-tank walls.
Major General Roberts.
The Situation at 0630 Hours
According to the COHQ report, aboard HMS Calpe, General Roberts had heard that the enemy’s opposition was considerably greater than had been expected he:
‘...realised at 0600 hours that all had not gone according to plan. It was known that the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish Regiment had landed on Red and White Beaches, and that the situation on Green Beach, where the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada had gone ashore, was developing not unfavourably. On the other hand, as far as was then known, no landing had taken place on either of the Yellow Beaches [No. 3 Commando] and no word had been received from the Royal Regiment of Canada at Puits [Blue Beach]. The LCT carrying the third and fourth wave of tanks were waiting offshore ready to go in, but were not ordered to do so. They subsequently returned to England.’
With poor communications to the troops ashore, glimpses of the action through the smoke could be misinterpreted.
General Roberts was unaware of the disaster that had befallen the Essex Scottish and the RHLI. He had interpreted positively such messages as he received, and believed that his battalions were across the beach and the Esplanade and were fighting in the town. From this analysis, he concluded that he should reinforce Red Beach, as
‘At that time, his main preoccupation was to secure the East headland at all costs, and it seemed to him that more infantry were necessary to achieve this purpose, with the help of the tanks he now knew had got ashore.’
It was also reported that ‘the intensity of the enemy fire on Red Beach had slackened.’ Accordingly, he decided to deploy his floating reserve, les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, who were embarked in twenty-six LCP(L)s, under their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Menard.
In parallel with General Robert’s review, the naval commander Captain Hughes-Hallett was considering the cutting-out operation of the German craft in the harbour to be mounted by HMS Locust, the French Chasseurs and the Royal Marine Commando. However, Locust had already reported that she had been engaged by heavy enemy fire during an earlier attempt to approach the harbour entrance, and with reports from stricken landing craft coming in to HMS Calpe, Hughes-Hallett decided to cancel the cutting-out operation.
At approximately the same time, Commander 302nd Division, Generalmajor Hasse came forward to 571 Regiment’s Advanced Headquarters on the Western Headland to see for himself the scale of the Allied operation. He later recounted that ‘I was contented to see that the attack was mainly halted on the beach or on the lawns and that it appeared that only patrols had penetrated into the town.’ Being on the spot and not having to rely on messages and watch-keepers’ interpretation of events, of the two land commanders, Hasse had formed the correct picture of the battle’s progress.
Deployment of the Floating Reserve
As the landing craft carrying les Fusiliers Mont Royal approached the beach through the shrouds of smoke laid by the Royal Navy, Sergeant Major Dumais recalled that he could hear ‘...one continuous roar, unbroken even for a fraction of a second.’ Two landing craft were sunk as they broke out of the smoke into the sunlight, and all the other craft were hit in some way before touching down at 0704 hours. However, due to the strong westerly set of the tide, they landed further right on White Beach than had been intended, west of the Casino. The French Canadian soldiers could clearly see that the enemy’s fire had not, as reported, ‘been subdued.’ With a new target on the beach, the German defenders let lose the full force of their fire. So heavy was the expenditure of ammunition that the German post-operational report complained that 571 Regiment had ‘expended several days’ stocks in less than half a day.’ One artillery battery alone fired 1,300 rounds in a matter of four hours.
As was the case with the RHLI and the Essex Scottish, the Fusiliers took what cover they could beneath ‘an unscaleable cliff’ at the western end of the beach. From here, they made several attempts to move to the flanks: their first attempt was to the right, endeavouring to join up with the South Saskatchewan Regiment, which they knew was attacking the RDF station on the Western Headland from Green Beach; but they found themselves frustrated by machine-gun fire. Next, they attempted to move to the left towards the Casino, but the majority of the men remained pinned down on the beach. The COHQ report recorded that:
‘Sergeant Dubuc and his men landed opposite the western end of the Casino and succeeded, after a while, in subduing two pill-boxes to their immediate front. The Sergeant and one man then went back to a deserted tank left high and dry by the receding tide. This was the tank that had fallen off the damaged ramp of LCT 159 during the landing. They entered it and got its gun into action against the German defences on the western headland. Having fired off all its ammunition, Sergeant Dubuc left the tank.’
Despite the heavy fire from the headland, Sergeant Major Dumais had reached the Casino, and from his new position spotted three members of his mortar platoon.
‘I saw them leave the cover of the beach together and make a mad dash across the Esplanade. They were soon separated by their speed. A machine gun opened up on them. Ulrich had got across and hugged the wall out of reach of the Germans. Marechal fell, badly wounded. The machine gun had ripped his belly wide open and he was holding his guts in with both hands. The firing had stopped, so Simard, who could not leave his companion writhing in full view, in mortal pain and yelling for help, jumped up and ran out to him. He picked up his friend and dashed back to cover with him through a renewed hail of bullets. But there was no hope for Marechal and Ulrich dashed back in time to see his friend die.’
Rue de Sygogne – the exit from the Esplanade at its western end. Note the concrete wall with its light vehicle gate open.
Later the Sergeant Major was able to take his revenge. Peering over a parapet in the Casino, he had a narrow escape from a well-directed burst of Spandau fire.
‘I was livid, not scared, just plain mad. The RHLI Corporal had a Bren gun across his knees. “Is this thing w
orking?” “Yes Sir,” he replied, “but don’t get yourself killed. That guy is good.” “So am I!” I retorted. I slapped on a fresh magazine, adjusted the drum, cocked the gun and aligned the muzzle on top of the sandbags. . . I quickly raised myself and the window was right in my sight. I poured a whole magazine of twenty rounds into that window. We had no more trouble from that window!’
However, despite heroism such as this, the majority of les Fusiliers Mont-Royal were, in the words of the Canadian Official History, ‘unable to accomplish anything at all, except to add to the losses being suffered.’ As at Puys, the Germans were supplementing the accurate artillery and mortar fire by dropping grenades from the cliff, and amongst the rocks and shell holes, men were becoming casualties. Major Painchaud saw his men lying on the beach. ‘They should have taken cover at the bottom of the cliff. Then I realized they were all dead or wounded.’ Eventually, Paichaud, the Battalion’s Second-in-Command, and Lieutenant Colonel Menard numbered amongst the wounded.
The Air Battle
‘Very soon after first light the fighters started their shuttle service over to the French coast... The sky was black with them – a very comforting sight.’
Lieutenant R. Beswick, Landing Craft Flack 4 One of the aims of the raid had been to provoke the Luftwaffe into a major air battle. To achieve this, the Allied air forces planned to mount the largest air effort since the Battle of Britain two years earlier. However, even though the RAF put sixty-seven squadrons into the air, including three US squadrons, the range of aircraft at this point in the war meant that their time over target was strictly limited – in some cases, to under ten minutes. For example, the preponderance of Spitfires (forty-eight squadrons of them) was a problem: though an outstanding defensive fighter, the aircraft, until modified later in the war, had small fuel tanks and a thirsty engine, which limited its endurance in a battle area sixty-five miles across the Channel. However, two aircraft types that later in the war were to play a considerable role in ground attack did well in the raid. Four squadrons of Mustangs (RAF recce variants) flew from Gatwick, while two squadrons of Typhoons operated from Duxford.
