by Unknown
Whether or not they share my reasons, most people share my conclusion: Human cloning is unethical in itself and dangerous in its likely consequences, including the precedent it will establish for designing our children. For us the real questions are: What should we do about it? How best to succeed? What we should do is to work to prevent human cloning by making it illegal. We should aim for an international legal ban if possible and for a unilateral national ban at a minimum—and soon, before the fact is upon us. To be sure, renegade scientists may secretly undertake to violate such a law, but we can deter them by criminal sanctions and monetary penalties, as well as by removing any incentives to proudly claim credit for their technological bravado and success. Such a ban on clonal baby making, moreover, will not harm the progress of basic genetic science and technology. On the contrary, it will reassure the public that scientists are happy to proceed without violating the deep ethical norms of the human community. And it will protect worthy science against a public backlash triggered by the brazen misconduct of the rogues.
I appreciate that a federal legislative ban is without American precedent, at least in matters technological (though the British and many other European nations have banned cloning of human beings, and we ourselves ban incest, polygamy, and other forms of “reproductive freedom”). Perhaps such a ban will prove ineffective; perhaps it will eventually be shown to have been a mistake. But—and this is maybe the most important result—it would at least place the burden of practical proof where it belongs, requiring proponents to show very clearly what great social or medical good can be had only by the cloning of human beings. Only for such a compelling case, yet to be made or even imagined, should we wish to risk this major departure in human procreation.
We Americans have lived by and prospered under a rosy optimism about scientific and technological progress. The technological imperative has, on balance, probably served us well, though we should admit that there is no accurate method for weighing benefits and harms. But there is very good reason for shifting the paradigm around, at least regarding those technological interventions into the human body and mind that will surely effect fundamental (and likely irreversible) changes in human nature, basic human relationships, and what it means to be a human being. Here we surely should not be willing to risk everything in the naïve hope that, should things go wrong, we can later set them right again.
The present danger posed by human cloning is, paradoxically, also a golden opportunity. In a truly unprecedented way, we can strike a blow for the human control of the technological project, for wisdom, prudence, and human dignity. The prospect of human cloning, so repulsive to contemplate, is the occasion for deciding whether we shall be slaves of unregulated innovation, and ultimately its artifacts, or whether we shall remain free human beings who guide our technique toward the enhancement of human dignity. The humanity of the human future is in our hands.
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SPEECHES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
British Statesman William Pitt the Younger Urges Abolition of the Slave Trade
“How shall we hope to obtain… forgiveness from heaven for those enormous evils we have committed…?”
He was known as Pitt the Younger for good reason: the second son of William Pitt was made prime minister of England at the age of twenty-three by George III in 1783, and he held that position until his resignation in 1801.
Pitt the Younger—then middle-aged—was recalled as prime minister three years later, when Napoleon loomed as a serious threat to England. After Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar, Pitt was toasted on November 9, 1805, as “the savior of Europe,” and his three-line reply ranks among the best examples of the modest response: “I return you many thanks for the honor you have done me. But Europe is not to be saved by any single man. England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.” A month later, Napoleon achieved his major victory at Austerlitz against England’s allies, and the shock of that news caused Pitt’s rapid decline; he died in early 1806, at the age of forty-six.
At the height of his rhetorical power, however, Pitt addressed the House of Commons at a late hour on April 2, 1792, on a controversial resolution: “That it is the opinion of this committee that the trade carried on by British subjects, for the purpose of obtaining slaves on the coast of Africa, ought to be abolished.”
Pitt’s speech in favor of the resolution relies on arguments of morality and British history. Through a series of rhetorical questions and parallel structures (“If then we feel… if we view… if we shudder”), Pitt argues “the most pressing and indispensable duty.” The amended motion on abolishing slavery was carried, 230 to 85.
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AT THIS HOUR of the morning I am afraid, sir, I am too much exhausted to enter so fully into the subject before the committee as I could wish; but if my bodily strength is in any degree equal to the task, I feel so strongly the magnitude of this question that I am extremely earnest to deliver my sentiments, which I rise to do with the more satisfaction; because I now look forward to the issue of this business with considerable hopes of success.
The debate has this day taken a turn, which, though it has produced a variety of new suggestions, has, upon the whole, contracted this question into a much narrower point than it was ever brought into before.
I cannot say that I quite agree with the right honorable gentleman over the way; I am far from deploring all that has been said by my two honorable friends. I rather rejoice that they have now brought this subject to a fair issue, that something, at least, is already gained, and that the question has taken altogether a new course this night. It is true, a difference of opinion has been stated and has been urged with all the force of argument that could be given to it.
But give me leave to say that this difference has been urged upon principles very far removed from those which were maintained by the opponents of my honorable friend when he first brought forward his motion. There are very few of those who have spoken this night who have not thought it their duty to declare their full and entire concurrence with my honorable friend in promoting the abolition of the slave trade, as their ultimate object. However we may differ as to the time and manner of it, we are agreed in the abolition itself; and my honorable friends have expressed their agreement in this sentiment with that sensibility upon the subject which humanity does most undoubtedly require. I do not, however, think they yet perceive what are the necessary consequences of their own concession, or follow up their own principles to their just conclusion.
The point now in dispute between us is a difference merely as to the period of time at which the abolition of the slave trade ought to take place. I therefore congratulate this House, the country, and the world that this great point is gained; that we may now consider this trade as having received its condemnation; that its sentence is sealed; that this curse of mankind is seen by the House in its true light; and that the greatest stigma on our national character which ever yet existed is about to be removed! And, sir, (which is still more important) that mankind, I trust, in general, are now likely to be delivered from the greatest practical evil that ever has afflicted the human race—from the severest and most extensive calamity recorded in the history of the world!
In proceeding to give my reasons for concurring with my honorable friend in his motion, I shall necessarily advert to those topics which my honorable friends near me have touched upon, and which they stated to be their motives for preferring a gradual and, in some degree, a distant abolition of the slave trade to the more immediate and direct measure now proposed to you. Beginning, as I do, with declaring that in this respect I differ completely from my right honorable friends near me, I do not, however, mean to say that I differ as to one observation which has been pressed rather strongly by them. If they can show that their proposition of a gradual abolition is more likely than ours to secure the object which we have in view—that by proceeding gradually we shall arrive more speedily at our end, and attain it with more c
ertainty, than by a direct vote immediately to abolish—if they can show to the satisfaction both of myself and the committee that our proposition has more the appearance of a speedy abolition than the reality of it, undoubtedly they will in this case make a convert of me and my honorable friend who moved the question; they will make a convert of every man among us who looks to this, which I trust we all do, as a question not to be determined by theoretical principles or enthusiastic feelings, but considers the practicability of the measure—aiming simply to effect his object in the shortest time, and in the surest possible manner.
If, however, I shall be able to show that our measure proceeds more directly to its object, and secures it with more certainty and within a less distant period, and that the slave trade will on our plan be abolished sooner than on his, may I not then hope that my right honorable friends will be as ready to adopt our proposition as we should in the other case be willing to accede to theirs?
One of my right honorable friends has stated that an act passed here for the abolition of the slave trade would not secure its abolition. Now, sir, I should be glad to know why an act of the British legislature, enforced by all those sanctions which we have undoubtedly the power and the right to apply, is not to be effectual: at least, as to every material purpose? Will not the executive power have the same appointment of the officers and the courts of judicature, by which all the causes relating to this subject must be tried, that it has in other cases? Will there not be the same system of law by which we now maintain a monopoly of commerce? If the same law, sir, be applied to the prohibition of the slave trade, which is applied in the case of other contraband commerce, with all the same means of the country to back it, I am at a loss to know why the actual and total abolition is not likely to be effected in this way, as by any plan or project of my honorable friends for bringing about a gradual termination of it. But my observation is extremely fortified by what fell from my honorable friend who spoke last: he has told you, sir, that if you will have patience with it for a few years, the slave trade must drop of itself, from the increasing dearness of the commodity imported, and the increasing progress, on the other hand, of internal population. Is it true, then, that the importations are so expensive and disadvantageous already that the internal population is even now becoming a cheaper resource? I ask, then, if you leave to the importer no means of importation but by smuggling, and if, besides all the present disadvantages, you load him with all the charges and hazards of the smuggler, by taking care that the laws against smuggling are in this case watchfully and rigorously enforced, is there any danger of any considerable supply of fresh slaves being poured into the islands through this channel? And is there any real ground of fear, because a few slaves may have been smuggled in or out of the islands, that a bill will be useless and ineffectual on any such ground? The question under these circumstances will not bear a dispute.
Perhaps, however, my honorable friends may take up another ground and say, “It is true your measure would shut out further importations more immediately; but we do not mean to shut them out immediately. We think it right, on grounds of general expediency, that they should not be immediately shut out.” Let us therefore now come to this question of the expediency of making the abolition distant and gradual, rather than immediate.
The argument of expediency, in my opinion, like every other argument in this disquisition, will not justify the continuance of the slave trade for one unnecessary hour. Supposing it to be in our power (which I have shown it is) to enforce the prohibition from this present time, the expediency of doing it is to me so clear that if I went on this principle alone, I should not feel a moment’s hesitation….
Having now done with this question of expediency as affecting the islands, I come next to a proposition advanced by my right honorable friend which appeared to intimate that, on account of some patrimonial rights of the West Indians, the prohibition of the slave trade might be considered as an invasion on their legal inheritance.
Now, in answer to this proposition, I must make two or three remarks, which I think my right honorable friend will find some considerable difficulty in answering. First, I observe that his argument, if it be worth anything, applies just as much to gradual as immediate abolition. I have no doubt, that at whatever period he should be disposed to say the abolition should actually take place, this defense will equally be set up; for it certainly is just as good an argument against an abolition seven or seventy years hence as against an abolition at this moment. It supposes we have no right whatever to stop the importations; and even though the disadvantage to our plantations, which some gentlemen suppose to attend the measure of immediate abolition, should be admitted gradually to lessen by the lapse of a few years, yet in point of principle the absence of all right of interference would remain the same. My right honorable friend, therefore, I am sure will not press an argument not less hostile to his proposition than to ours. But let us investigate the foundation of this objection, and I will commence what I have to say, by putting a question to my right honorable friend. It is chiefly on the presumed ground of our being bound by a parliamentary sanction heretofore given to the African slave trade that this argument against the abolition is rested.
Does, then, my right honorable friend, or does any man in this House, think that the slave trade has received any such parliamentary sanction as must place it more out of the jurisdiction of the legislature forever after than the other branches of our national commerce? I ask, is there any one regulation of any part of our commerce which, if this argument be valid, may not equally be objected to, on the ground of its affecting some man’s patrimony, some man’s property, or some man’s expectations? Let it never be forgotten that the argument I am canvassing would be just as strong if the possession affected were small and the possessors humble; for on every principle of justice, the property of any single individual, or small number of individuals, is as sacred as that of the great body of West Indians.
Justice ought to extend her protection with rigid impartiality to the rich and to the poor, to the powerful and to the humble. If this be the case, in what a situation does my right honorable friend’s argument place the legislature of Britain? What room is left for their interference in the regulation of any part of our commerce? It is scarcely possible to lay a duty on any one article, which may not, when first imposed, be said in some way to affect the property of individuals, and even of some entire classes of the community. If the laws respecting the slave trade imply a contract for its perpetual continuance, I will venture to say, there does not pass a year without some act, equally pledging the faith of Parliament to the perpetuating of some other branch of commerce. In short, I repeat my observation that no new tax can be imposed, much less can any prohibitory duty be ever laid on any branch of trade that has before been regulated by Parliament, if this principle be once admitted….
But, sir, let us see what was the motive for carrying on the trade at all? The preamble of the act states it—“Whereas the trade to and from Africa is very advantageous to Great Britain, and necessary for the supplying the plantations and colonies thereunto belonging with a sufficient number of Negroes at reasonable rates, and for that purpose the said trade should be carried on,” etc. Here, then, we see what the Parliament had in view when it passed this act; and I have clearly shown that not one of the occasions on which it grounded its proceedings now exists. I may then plead, I think, the very act itself as an argument for the abolition. If it is shown that, instead of being “very advantageous” to Great Britain, this trade is the most destructive that can well be imagined to her interest; that it is the ruin of our seamen; that it stops the extension of our manufacturers; if it is proved in the second place that it is not now necessary for the “supplying our plantations with Negroes”; if it is further established that this traffic was from the very beginning contrary to the first principles of justice, and consequently that a pledge for its continuance, had one been attempted to have been given, must have been comp
letely and absolutely void; where, then, in this act of Parliament is the contract to be found by which Britain is bound, as she is said to be, never to listen to her own true interests, and to the cries of the natives of Africa? Is it not clear that all argument, founded on the supposed pledged faith of Parliament, makes against those who employ it? I refer you to the principles which obtain in other cases. Every trade act shows undoubtedly that the legislature is used to pay a tender regard to all classes of the community. But if for the sake of moral duty, or national honor, or even of great political advantage, it is thought right, by authority of Parliament, to alter any long-established system, Parliament is competent to do it. The legislature will undoubtedly be careful to subject individuals to as little inconvenience as possible; and if any peculiar hardship should arise that can be distinctly stated, and fairly pleaded, there will ever, I am sure, be a liberal feeling towards them in the legislature of this country, which is the guardian of all who live under its protection. On the present occasion, the most powerful considerations call upon us to abolish the slave trade; and if we refuse to attend to them on the alleged ground of pledged faith and contract, we shall depart as widely from the practice of Parliament as from the path of moral duty. If indeed there is any case of hardship which comes within the proper cognizance of Parliament, and calls for the exercise of its liberality—well! But such a case must be reserved for calm consideration, as a matter distinct from the present question.
