The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

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The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It Page 2

by John W. Dean


  Because all these transcripts were prepared from analog recordings, and most are only partials, I realized I needed to start from scratch and prepare ones of all the conversations to really be sure I understood what had occurred. There are good reasons no one had done this. Not only was it not easy to obtain digital copies of it all, but even with them, it is challenging work.

  Most of the audio from telephone conversations is of relatively good quality compared with that obtained in other locations. Telephones in the Oval Office, the Executive Office Building (EOB) and the Lincoln Sitting Room in the residence and the telephones in the president’s study in Aspen Lodge at Camp David created near-broadcast-quality recorded telephone calls. In the Oval Office, if the speakers were seated not too far from the president’s desk, where the microphones were embedded, conversations are discernible with patience. Recordings made in the president’s study at Camp David are similar to those from the Oval Office. But those from the EOB office are consistently challenging, when not totally impossible, because of where people typically sat: They were usually out of the range of the microphones. Similarly with the Cabinet Room: It is possible usually to pick up only the gist of the president’s remarks, while others almost never can be understood.

  Because of the poor sound quality, transcribing Nixon’s recordings is extremely arduous and time consuming, sometimes not even possible. It can take many hours to transcribe less than a minute of conversation from the poor-quality recordings in the president’s EOB office; sometimes these efforts are especially essential, as particularly important discussions were often held there. Most people who have transcribed these tapes discover that listening over and over and over enabled them to better understand what is being said, as does listening on different audio equipment, with different digital software, and at different speeds—and I occasionally employed all these techniques to the same conversation to tease out important information.

  I found the most efficient, if not most reliable, process was to have someone else prepare a first draft, because it takes far longer to prepare the initial one than to correct someone else’s. Accordingly, in 2010 I hired graduate students and created an evolving team to prepare them. Cherity Bacon, a former legal secretary working on her graduate degree in archival science, worked relentlessly and became the de facto team leader. It required almost four years to transcribe all the Watergate-related conversations, and the project continued when I started writing. And while writing this story, when the material was important I would listen to the conversation myself, for I am often able to hear words and phrases others do not because of my familiarity with the players and the subject matter.

  There was far more Watergate material than I expected, for in addition to the Nixon tapes, I pulled over 150,000 pages of related documents from NARA. But had I known what I was getting into with the tapes, I might never have taken on the assignment of transcribing them all. Yet there was no other way to do the project and be sure I knew everything that could be known, so once I committed to it, there was no turning back. Actually, I am not sure which has been more challenging—transcribing about a thousand Watergate conversations or digesting and condensing the four million transcribed words into this story. Suffice it to say, neither could be done quickly.

  The conversations fall into four general categories, which give form to this story. While not every conversation is quoted, they were all reviewed to write the following: Part I, Covering Up, is based on 35 conversations that occurred between June 20 and July 1, 1972; Part II, Containing, on 158 conversations held from July 2, 1972, through December 1972; Part III, Unraveling, on 110 conversations from January 1973 to March 23, 1973; and Part IV, The Nixon Defense, on 669 conversations from March 23, 1973, to July 16, 1973, when the recording system was dismantled. To give a full picture, other information relevant to the break-in is reported in the Prologue. The Epilogue summarizes events after the recording system was disconnected, on July 16, 1973, when Watergate became Nixon’s fight to prevent the disclosure of his tapes, among other battles. In telling this story, which has much new information with which I certainly was never familiar, as a general rule I have not tried to highlight it as such; rather, I have allowed the story to unfold as it happened, only occasionally noting extraordinary new material.

  These recordings also largely answer the questions regarding what was known by the White House about the reasons for the break-in and bugging at the Democratic National Committee headquarters, as well as what was erased during the infamous 18½-minute gap during the June 20, 1972, conversation and why. Because these questions have had enduring public interest, they are addressed in Appendices A and B. (Appendix C is a listing of Nixon’s Watergate-related recorded conversations, as well as other data. See www.penguin.com/thenixondefense.)

  Finally, in assembling this story I have not, except in a few instances, recounted my own involvement in these events, as I already have, first in testimony (in 1973 and 1974) and later in my autobiographical account, Blind Ambition: The White House Years, which was published in 1976. However, when listening to these secretly recorded conversations, or in reading the transcripts, I have recalled countless facts and actions I had forgotten, for the recordings provide information that was not previously available to me. Accordingly, I have, from time to time, flushed out some autobiographical details, usually in endnotes or footnotes, but occasionally in the narrative as well. Other than a meeting on September 15, 1972, I had no Watergate conversations with the president until eight months after the scandal commenced. It was not until late February 1973 that the president started calling on me to discuss it. Alex Butterfield, who knew the workings of the Nixon White House intimately, accurately described where I fit in the pecking order early on to the House Judiciary Committee during its impeachment inquiry, which may add some perspective to the material that follows.

  Now, Mr. Dean . . . was the counsel to the president, but I must say the president never did know this. The President may have heard his name, the President may possibly have seen him in one or two meetings prior to the summer or fall of 1972, but I would rather doubt it. Dean was young, he was very bright. I speak of him as though he were no longer with us, but he is. He is young, he is bright, affable, highly intelligent, gets along well with everyone, and was very effective. But he just could not, through no fault of his own, penetrate the system. He could not get close to the President. I don’t think he tried. . . . And the President never stopped looking to John Ehrlichman as his counsel on legal matters, or on matters which bordered on or which involved legal matters or had some legal aspect. He called on John Ehrlichman. . . . John Dean . . . was put into a somewhat untenable situation at times, because he did have two masters; he was responding to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman.3

  While this is my account of what I found in Nixon’s recorded conversations, I have tried to stay out of the way and let that information speak for itself. These recordings certainly answer Senator Howard Baker’s question about what the president knew and when he knew it. Behind the closed doors of the president’s office we also learn most of the details of what happened, when it happened and how it happened, not to mention how I became the centerpiece of the Nixon defense. Fortunately for everyone, his defense failed.

  List of Principal Characters

  (Positions at time of the story)

  Robert Abplanalp

  (1922–2003)

  Founder of Precision Valve and friend of the president

  Jack Anderson

  (1922–2005)

  Journalist; syndicated columnist

  Sen. Howard Baker

  (R-TN)

  (1925– )

  Vice Chairman, Senate Watergate Committee

  Richard Ben-Veniste

  (1943– )

  Assistant Watergate Special Prosecutor

  Patrick J. Buchanan

  (1938– )

  Special Assistant to the President; speechwriter

  Stephen Bull

  (
1941– )

  Special Assistant to the President; personal aide

  Alexander P. Butterfield

  (1926– )

  Deputy Assistant to the President; Haldeman aide

  J. Fred Buzhardt

  (1924–1978)

  Special White House Counsel for Watergate

  Joseph Califano

  (1931– )

  Washington attorney; partner Williams & Connelly

  Dwight Chapin

  (1940– )

  Deputy Assistant to the President; Haldeman aide

  Ken W. Clawson

  (1936–1999)

  Special Assistant to the President; Colson aide

  Charles W. “Chuck” Colson

  (1931–2012)

  Special Counsel to the President

  Archibald Cox

  (1912–2004)

  Watergate Special Prosecutor

  Kenneth Dahlberg

  (1917–2011)

  Fund-raiser, Committee to Re-elect the President

  Samuel Dash

  (1925–2004)

  Chief Counsel, Senate Watergate Committee

  John W. Dean

  (1938– )

  Counsel to the President

  John D. Ehrlichman

  (1925–1999)

  Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

  Sen. Sam Ervin

  (D-NC)

  (1896–1985)

  Chairman, Senate Watergate Committee

  W. Mark Felt

  (1913–2008)

  Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

  Fred F. Fielding

  (1939– )

  Associate Counsel to the President

  Leonard Garment

  (1924–2013)

  Special Assistant to the President; Counsel to the President

  L. Patrick Gray

  (1916–2005)

  Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

  Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

  (1924–2010)

  Aide to Kissinger; White House Chief of Staff

  H. R. (Bob) Haldeman

  (1926–1993)

  White House Chief of Staff

  Richard Helms

  (1913–2002)

  Director, Central Intelligence Agency

  Lawrence Higby

  (1947– )

  Haldeman aide

  E. Howard Hunt

  (1918–2007)

  Consultant, White House; former aide to Colson

  Leon Jaworski

  (1905–1982)

  Watergate Special Prosecutor

  Herbert Kalmbach

  (1921– )

  Nixon’s personal attorney; campaign fund-raiser

  Sen. Edward Kennedy

  (D-MA)

  (1921–2009)

  Chairman, Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee

  Henry A. Kissinger

  (1932– )

  Assistant to the President for National Security

  Egil “Bud” Krogh

  (1939– )

  Deputy Assistant to the President; Ehrlichman aide; Undersecretary of Transportation

  Fred LaRue

  (1928–2004)

  Mitchell aide, Committee to Re-elect the President

  G. Gordon Liddy

  (1930– )

  General Counsel, Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-elect the President; former aide to Krogh and Young

  Clark MacGregor

  (1922–2003)

  Assistant to the President for Congressional

  Relations; Director, Committee to Re-elect the President

  Jeb Magruder

  (1934–2014)

  Deputy Director, Committee to Re-Elect the President

  Robert Mardian

  (1924–2006)

  Deputy Director, Committee to Re-elect the President; Mitchell campaign aide

  James W. McCord

  (1924– )

  Chief of Security, Committee to Re-elect the President

  John N. Mitchell

  (1913–1988)

  Attorney General; Director, Committee to Re-elect the President

  Richard A. Moore

  (1914–1995)

  Special Counsel to the President

  Pat Nixon

  (1912–1993)

  First Lady, wife of the president

  Richard M. Nixon

  (1913–1994)

  President of the United States

  Manuel Ogarrio

  Mexican attorney; clients include a contributor to the Committee to Re-elect the President

  Henry Petersen

  (1921–1991)

  Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division

  Raymond K. Price, Jr.

  (1930– )

  Assistant to the President; speechwriter

  Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo

  (1912–1998)

  Friend of the president

  Elliot L. Richardson

  (1920–1999)

  Attorney General; Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

  Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.

  (D-NJ)

  (1920–2005)

  Chairman, House Judiciary Committee

  Chapman “Chappie” Rose

  (1907–1990)

  Private Nixon adviser

  Sen. Hugh Scott

  (R-PA)

  (1900–1994)

  Senator Minority Leader

  Donald Segretti

  (1941– )

  California attorney; friend of Chapin and Strachan

  John Sirica

  (1904–1992)

  Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

  Hugh Sloan

  (1940– )

  Treasurer, Committee to Re-elect the President; former Haldeman aide

  Maurice Stans

  (1908–1998)

  Chairman, Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-elect the President; former Secretary of Commerce

  Gordon Strachan

  (1943– )

  Haldeman aide; General Counsel, United States

  Information Agency

  Fred Thompson

  (1942– )

  Chief Minority Counsel, Senate Watergate Committee

  Vernon “Dick” Walters

  (1917–2002)

  Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency

  Sen. Lowell Weicker

  (R-CT)

  (1931– )

  Member, Senate Watergate Committee

  Rose Mary Woods

  (1917–2005)

  Personal Secretary to the President

  David Young

  (1936– )

  Special Assistant to the National Security Council; Kissinger aide; Ehrlichman aide

  Ronald L. Ziegler

  (1939–2003)

  Press Secretary to the President

  Prologue

  Although President Richard Nixon was enjoying the best days of his presidency, he was looking forward to a few days of rest from his busy schedule as he departed from the South Grounds of the White House for the Bahamas on an early Friday afternoon, June 16, 1972.1 The president had reason to feel good about his accomplishments, both foreign and domestic, not to mention his prospects for reelection, since it had become increasingly clear that his opponent would likely be South Dakota senator George McGovern; he had all but locked down the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. McGovern was Nixon’s challenger of choice, given the senator’s hard-left positions on many issues, and the president did not want the Vietnam war any more than McGovern did, but Nixon wanted to resolve it with honor rather than merely quit, which the president felt would have long-term negative consequences for the nation.2

  When Air Force One landed at Grand Bahama Island the president was met by his close friend Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo, owner and president of the Key Biscayne Bank and Trust Company, and together they climbed into the president’s awaiting helicopter for a brief flig
ht over to the smaller Grand Cay Island. There they would stay with their mutual friend Robert “Bob” Abplanalp, founder of Precision Valve Corporation (inventor of the aerosol valve), who owned the 125-acre island and had refurbished a separate house just for the president’s use. It would be a relaxing stag weekend of walking, swimming, boating (Abplanalp’s fifty-five-foot yacht was docked there), good food and a few movies, courtesy of the motion picture industry. Other than the usual retinue of Secret Service agents and a White House physician, who always accompanied the traveling president, the only other aides on the trip were White House chief of staff H. R. “Bob” Haldeman, accompanied by his wife and daughter, and the president’s press secretary, Ron Ziegler. The White House staff would take up residence for the extended weekend over on the mainland, at the Key Biscayne Hotel near the president’s Florida vacation home where both Rebozo and Abplanalp also had homes.

  The White House Communications Agency (a special unit of the Army Signal Corps) had set up a secure telephone line from the president’s study in the Abplanalp house to the living room of his chief of staff’s villa at the Key Biscayne Hotel, but there had been no communication until the president called upon his return to his Key Biscayne home on Sunday morning, June 18, 1972, and even then they did not discuss the breaking news of the weekend. Haldeman called the story “the big flap” in his contemporaneous diary, a record that would not be published until some two decades later.3 His diary entry for that Sunday evening noted that he had spoken briefly with the president that morning, but not about the news reported to him “last night [Saturday, June 17, 1972], then followed up with further information today, that a group of five people have been caught breaking into the Democratic headquarters (at the Watergate). Actually to plant bugs and photograph materials.”4 Haldeman learned the details about what had transpired at the upscale Watergate hotel, office and apartment complex from John Ehrlichman, his longtime friend (Ehrlichman had been a classmate of Haldeman’s at UCLA, and both were veterans of two Nixon campaigns) and professional peer on the White House staff, where he served as assistant to the president for domestic affairs. Haldeman also spoke with Jeb Magruder, a former member of his staff at the White House, whom he had sent over to serve as the deputy director of the Committee to Re-elect the President (also known as “CRP,” “reelection committee” or, because the offices were located across the street from the White House at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, “1701”).

 

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