by John W. Dean
June 30, 1972, Friday, the White House
The president invited John Mitchell and Bob Haldeman to lunch in his EOB office, where they discussed the Martha situation from 12:55 P.M. to 2:10 P.M.* Mitchell and Haldeman had crab soufflé, while the president had his usual pineapple and cottage cheese.18 Nixon later described this lunch as “a painful session” and observed that “Mitchell looked worn out, and his hand shook so much that he had to put his soup spoon down after the first taste.”19 There had always been an awkward distance in Nixon and Mitchell’s relationship, even though, as former law partners, they had spent almost six years working closely together. Nixon, I was once told by Haldeman, believed that he owed his election as president to Mitchell’s work in 1967 and 1968. Mitchell himself once said to me that the only reason he took the post of attorney general was because Nixon had insisted, and Nixon made him one of his closest advisers during the first term. During the few meetings in which I witnessed them together, I noticed a stiffness in their working relationship that is present in their recorded conversations as well.20
The president welcomed Mitchell with comments about Iran’s gray caviar, which he was not serving but that had been served to him on his last trip to Iran, when visiting the shah. He continued with some familiar topics, including the Supreme Court (with a negative comment about Justice Potter Stewart, one of Nixon’s least favorites justices), and then proceeded to the reason for their meeting, telling Mitchell with empathy that he understood that Martha’s problems had created an impossible situation for him.
“Let me say this,” Nixon continued. “I’ve always had a theory about politics. I covered the situation somewhat in Six Crises. I dedicated that book, on the flyleaf, you may recall, to Pat—‘she also ran’—and it’s always seemed to me, and it’s true for Martha as well, that for a woman, being the wife of a politician is infinitely more difficult than probably being one.”
“I think you’re right on,” Mitchell said.
“And Martha’s been a great asset to us,” the president continued. “I mean, she’s a star, she has star quality, she always will, but I can see what happens here, the reason she’s damaged after three years as wife of the attorney general, that’s over, all of a sudden you’re out of that, in a new area, you’re in the line of fire, and kicked around, and you’re not home, and this, that and the other thing, she’s wondering what the hell is this all about? And as time goes on, it doesn’t get better, and so forth and so on. Until finally she reached the breaking point. My own view is that . . .” Nixon cleared his throat. “Probably, I say this with the greatest reluctance, but understanding of your desire and the situation, probably [your decision is] correct. I think the real problem is how to handle the timing. What’s going to happen in the campaign, the pressures are never going to get less, they’re going to get a hell of a lot worse, and I would never want to put her through all that. So take her back home. I just wanted to give you a little background. I totally understand. I, the affection, you know, I feel about her—”
Mitchell had a barely audible question about timing, and Nixon responded, “You’re the best judge of that.” He added, “But the only thing I would say, of course, [is that] you can’t put amateurs in running the campaign, for example, California, or New Jersey, also some of the Southern strategy.”
“Well, Mr. President, Martha’s around the point where she understands it’s crucial that you get reelected president,” Mitchell assured Nixon. Haldeman, who genuinely liked John Mitchell, felt he should resign sooner rather than later. He noted, “Well, there’s another practical point: If you wait, you run the risk of more stuff, valid or invalid, surfacing on the Watergate caper type of thing.” The president picked up on that point. “That’s the other thing. If there is something that does come out, we hope nothing will, it may not, but there’s always the risk.” Haldeman added, “As of now there’s no problem there,” but at any moment in the future there could be one. “Nope, I’d cut the loss fast,” Nixon agreed. “That’s my view, generally speaking. And I think the story is positive rather than negative,” he assured Mitchell.
As the lunch was ending, the president shared, “in confidence,” the fact that he had spoken with Billy Graham, “a great admirer of Martha’s,” who offered to help if it was sought. Nixon said he’d told Graham it was a personal problem, but he thought Graham’s sympathetic reaction was typical. Mitchell agreed, and the session ended with the president saying, “Well, anyway, we’ll try to work it out.”
After a nap, Nixon went to the Oval Office, where he had a brief meeting with Clark MacGregor on legislative matters.21 Not until later that day did Nixon formally ask MacGregor to take the assignment to head his campaign, although Haldeman had already made sure he would do so.
After MacGregor departed the Oval Office at 3:18 P.M., Ziegler said he needed to talk with the president before he met with newly confirmed attorney general Dick Kleindienst. Kleindienst was scheduled to go to the press room to explain the administration’s request to add the death penalty to federal cases involving kidnapping, hijacking and the killing of police officers.22 Ziegler, however, had been bombarded with Watergate questions at his 12:50 P.M. press briefing, because of a report that the FBI had found a “bugging device, maps and a loaded pistol” in Howard Hunt’s White House office.23 He was now worried that Kleindienst, who as attorney general was in charge of the FBI and the criminal investigation of Watergate, would face a Watergate feeding frenzy from the press.
As Ziegler departed, Kleindienst arrived with Haldeman. This meeting, which lasted almost an hour, was remarkable not for what was said but rather for what was not said. Without explaining the reason, the president advised Kleindienst that his press briefing on death penalty cases would be rescheduled for the following week. Twelve days earlier, the day after the arrest of his bugging and burglary team at the Watergate, G. Gordon Liddy had met with Kleindienst, revealed that his men were in jail and asked Kleindienst to get them out. Kleindienst, who had no such power, had sent Liddy packing. Yet Kleindienst’s visit turned out to be little more than a shoot-the-breeze conversation, one in which Watergate was never mentioned.24
As Kleindienst departed, Haldeman and the president turned to the subjects they had been avoiding until others had departed: Watergate and Mitchell’s resignation. Haldeman told Nixon that Mitchell had accompanied him back to his office after lunch.25
Nixon had not known Hunt had an office in the White House complex and was curious about what had been found in it. Haldeman explained that there had been no map of the DNC, contrary to the press reports, but there was a handgun. The president was surprised that the FBI was still pursuing Hunt. “But I understood, though, that on that Bureau thing, that they were to keep off of this guy, you know what I mean?” the president asked, thinking about his approval of Haldeman’s meeting with the CIA regarding the Mexican money that he had expanded to include Hunt.
“That’s what they were told. They aren’t,” Haldeman reported. “We’re having problems here with the Bureau. That’s what we were talking about with Dean and Mitchell before our meeting with you.”
“I see. You mean, despite Walters going over there?” the president asked, recalling their conversation.
“Gray doesn’t know how to turn them off, and neither does Felt, I guess,” Haldeman replied. “They’re concerned about how to do it, get the record clear on the completeness of the investigation, and all this sort of stuff. Kleindienst hasn’t turned Justice off either, which is another problem. The U.S. attorney and his criminal head [Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen] are both pushing the Bureau, and forward, now. We’ll work it out. We’ve got to somehow get Kleindienst to tell them.”
“Well, I’d have Walters go see them, too,” Nixon suggested, to further exploit the CIA ties to the situation. “The gun and the wiretapping doesn’t bother me a bit with this fellow [referring to Hunt]. He’s in the Cuban thing, the whole Cuban business. He’s out of the country now, I
assume?”
“He never went out, but it doesn’t matter. They say his main stock in trade is, he’s a master of disguise,” Haldeman said, chuckling. “He’s someplace under some disguise, although he’s supposed to go abroad.”
The president stopped to think about the situation, then continued, “Was Colson aware he had stuff in his safe and all that sort of thing?” “Colson wasn’t there when they opened the safe,” Haldeman explained, “I don’t think he knows what was in it. In fact, I’m sure he doesn’t. They haven’t told him what was in it.”
Haldeman said that Ziegler had basically given no comment on the report, which had appeared in The Washington Daily News, although he did try to suggest that it had not been totally accurate, explaining, “The story says they found a Spanish-made gun. The reason that’s not true is, they did not find a Spanish-made gun.”
“They didn’t find a map?” Nixon inquired.
“John Dean’s the one who knows about this, and he says there wasn’t any map. He says there was a road map, but it had nothing to do with the Democratic National Committee, and there was no map of the committee headquarters.”
Nixon noted, “Sort of adds up that he has wiretapping stuff, of course.”
“Dean hasn’t discounted the possibility that we’re dealing with a double agent in this thing somewhere,” Haldeman reported. (Because neither Ehrlichman nor anyone else was sharing details of Hunt, Liddy and the plumbers’ earlier activities with me, I was truly confused for several weeks about how all the relevant details fit together.)
“Meaning this fellow Hunt?” Nixon asked.
“Probably not this guy. Probably one of the other guys, or several of them,” Haldeman advised.
“A double agent who is putting out this information, giving leads, or what?” Nixon asked.
“Well, who purposely moved this thing. It’s complex, it’s so ridiculous, it’s still kind of hard to figure the whole thing out,” which accurately described the situation for Haldeman. We were all trying to understand the situation, but Haldeman was making it difficult for the president because he was withholding information about his role in allowing Liddy’s operation to proceed at the CRP, for Haldeman was way ahead of the president in figuring it all out but not sharing his knowledge.
“Well, I wonder, then,” Nixon said, “in view of this break today, if that means whether Mitchell’s going tomorrow is a good idea after all.”
“Yes. This thing doesn’t tie back to that,” Haldeman assured him. “Why not?” Nixon asked, and Haldeman explained, “Because Hunt’s work leads to the White House, not to Mitchell and the reelection committee. They haven’t tied Hunt to the reelection committee. They’re tying him to Colson.”
“Well, they haven’t really tied Hunt to the group [that was arrested] yet, have they?” the president clarified.
“No, except that his name was in their [address] book.”
“Yeah. Or Colson, does he know about all this, so he’s told the story? What does he say?” the president asked.
“I haven’t talked to him, since the story just came this afternoon. But knowing Chuck, I’m sure he’s very disturbed.”
“Hmm. Well, there’s not much we can do about it, is there,” Nixon said. “No,” Haldeman agreed, but as they were speaking, Haldeman had another thought. “Well, if it’s Mitchell,” he said firmly, “I want him to call Kleindienst and Gray in and say, look, this happened. I used to sit on the National Security Council. You know, this happens to lead to some lines that don’t relate to the Watergate/Democratic National Committee caper. Your people are investigating stuff that must not be investigated. That’s the signal you’ve gotten from the CIA. For Christ’s sake, smarten up, smarten up and turn this off. Go ahead and toss your cards to the grand jury on the open-and-shut-case stuff and let it go at that.” When Nixon did not respond, Haldeman continued, “McCord is developing a case, talking to the attorneys over there. He is trying to get F. Lee Bailey to handle his case. So we may be getting into an F. Lee Bailey versus Edward Bennett Williams—” Haldeman said, savoring the idea.*
Nixon observed, “I don’t know anything about that,” pointing out, “I thought it was all over in the reelection committee.” Haldeman replied, “Hunt is the only tie,” referring to the White House, and he assured Nixon that Colson had told the FBI he had nothing to do with it. “What did he tell them?” Nixon asked.
“He told them the straight truth. He told them he had nothing to do with Hunt as far as this thing was concerned, that he’d worked with Hunt on totally unrelated—see, Hunt was working for—”
“We know, in a sense, the fact that his gun and wiretapping equipment is still there and so forth, it would seem to me it would be an indication that he’s not afraid of anything. You get my point?” Nixon observed.
Haldeman, who was unhappy that Hunt had these things, explained that Hunt had returned to his EOB office after the arrests at the Watergate. “I can’t understand why he didn’t empty his safe. A lot of this just totally passes me by. I just can’t put it together and have it add up,” Haldeman declared. “It’s just a lot of very strange things in it.”
“Well, the committee contact was through Liddy. What was his job?” Nixon asked. Haldeman explained, “He was the counsel for the finance committee, this job for Stans. That was just a cover.” As Haldeman reported this information, Nixon can be heard tapping his fingers on his desk, contemplatively taking it all in. Haldeman added, “And he’s the guy—” and Nixon finished, “—that did this with apparently Mitchell’s knowledge?” Nixon then pressed, with a questioning and doubtful “Well?” Haldeman’s failure to respond caused Nixon to answer his own question, “We don’t know.”
“Not this, not specifically this, but—” Haldeman was carefully phrasing his response when Nixon interrupted, “—but he was getting information?” Still cautious, Haldeman answered, “Developing intelligence and so forth.”
“He was off on his own, though?” Nixon asked. Haldeman evaded the question and responded vaguely, “And some counteractivity, and that stuff.” “Which, as we know,” Nixon replied confidently, “is standard practice.”
After a long pause, Haldeman volunteered a bit more information. “See, Liddy used to work at the White House, too.” Nixon, surprised, had totally forgotten that in October 1971 he had read and praised a Liddy memorandum arguing for why FBI director Hoover, for whom Liddy had once written speeches, should be removed from his position.26 “He worked for Bud Krogh,” Haldeman explained. “So did Hunt.”
“Where was Krogh? What capacity?” Nixon asked.
“Narcotics,” Haldeman said. Controlling drugs and narcotics had been a major push by Nixon and his White House, but this was less than a full description of Hunt and Liddy’s work.
“Well, there’s nothing particularly wrong with that,” Nixon noted.
“No, there isn’t,” Haldeman confirmed. “And he worked, at the same time, on the Pentagon Papers.” Haldeman then quickly changed the subject back to Mitchell’s resignation and his proposed brief announcement, which would be accompanied by a longer letter to the president drafted by Moore. Haldeman had a copy of that letter, and after quickly scanning it, said, “Hey, this is pretty good” and read it aloud:
Dear Mr. President,
Your words of friendship and understanding when we met today meant more to me than I can possibly convey in this letter. I have long believed, and often said, nothing is more important to the future of our country than your reelection as president. I had looked forward to devoting all my time and energy to that result. I have found, however, I can no longer do so on a full-time basis and still meet the one obligation which must come first: the happiness and welfare of my wife and daughter. They have patiently put up with my long absence for some four years. The moment has come when I must devote more time to them. Relatively few men have the privilege of serving the president of the United States. In my service, it has been special indeed, because of the strength of
your leadership. As I said today, I shall continue to work for your reelection as well as to be grateful for your unfailing friendship and confidence.
“It’s an excellent letter, it couldn’t be better. It’s very subtle,” Nixon observed, and Haldeman agreed, “Very personal, and all that.” Haldeman said the letter would be released with a straight announcement: “John Mitchell announced today he’s resigned as campaign director for the Committee to Re-elect the President in order to devote more time to his wife and family. He will continue to serve the committee in an advisory capacity.” The president was so taken with Moore’s draft for Mitchell that he decided to have Moore work up a draft response for him as well, which he outlined for Haldeman.
At 4:30 P.M. Nixon asked Clark MacGregor to join him in the Oval Office and explained to him why Mitchell was leaving, citing ITT (though clearly meaning Watergate) and Martha’s health.27 Then, speaking more candidly, Nixon added, “But due to that, John has been unable to watch the committee, it is not as well organized as we would like, but he must never know that we think that.”
Haldeman joined the conversation at 4:48 P.M., and after a discussion of how to operate the congressional relations staff after MacGregor’s departure, the conversation turned to Watergate. Nixon and Haldeman proceeded to assert the innocence of all the key figures, and while much of this conversation has been redacted, it is clear that MacGregor, a savvy lawyer, did not ask any questions but simply told the president, “I don’t need to know anything about the past, but I need to, I guess, know something about the future. I have said to people absolutely flat-out, I’ve talked to congressmen and senators, that the Committee to Re-elect the President and the White House had absolutely nothing to do with the recently disclosed incident.”
