by John W. Dean
“Oh, yeah, then you’ve got a cover-up and Mitchell,” the president said, which was the worst case. “Which, I’d say, is what happened in our little investigation so far,” Nixon added, mentioning again the faux investigation that Ehrlichman had earlier noted but nonetheless modifying it to cover new circumstances. “Yep, yep,” Ehrlichman agreed. Then he added, “Well, and Dean’s been admonished not to contrive a story that’s liable not to succeed.” When Ehrlichman reported this blatant subornation instruction the room went silent, until finally Ehrlichman added, “Ah, they’re trying to take all the risk out of it. If there’s risk that remains, he might as well just go whole hog.” Again silence, until the president spoke in a hushed tone, “That’s right.” Silence followed, and Nixon then added, “Well, I must say that I, I can’t see how—” The president paused, then finished, “Magruder should stand firm on Mitchell.
“Well, he may want to, but he may not be tough enough,” the president quickly added.
When the president met with Chuck Colson and Bob Haldeman in his EOB office that afternoon, Watergate ran throughout the conversation, although with Colson the president was guarded.4 While this audio recording is very difficult to hear, it is clear that the president was seeking Colson’s reactions to the prospect of Magruder’s being the stopgap of the cover-up as well as sharing the latest with Haldeman.
The president mentioned his conversation with Ehrlichman about Magruder and the need to “cut our losses.” Nixon said he was not sure Magruder “will stand up as far as Mitchell,” which was a serious problem, because “we just can’t get Mitchell in this.” When Nixon probed Colson about Hunt’s potential testimony, Colson speculated that “Hunt will not think that anything he did was wrong.” When Haldeman pressed the topic, Colson was more specific: “Well, if he’s properly coached, and he’s got a good lawyer, he’s one guy that I would figure would take the rap, take the heat, and I’m not speaking for him.”
The president explained that Magruder’s testimony would make or break his criminal liability, as well as Mitchell’s. This was a problem, he said, because Ehrlichman had no confidence in Magruder, referring to his ability to lie, without saying that. Everyone understood, though, and Colson responded, “Hell, I wouldn’t put much confidence in him, but I think he’s scared,” and “he’s scared enough that he would do it.” Colson said he felt Watergate was a tragedy, because its political notoriety meant the people involved would likely go to jail. If it was an industrial espionage case, they’d only be fined and given suspended sentences. Those involved were going through a horrible experience, not to mention that their actions would forever be on their records. This prompted the president to mention pardons, and that after it was all over those involved might be pardoned in a general amnesty that included antiwar protesters with criminal records. Or as Nixon put it, “We’ll just basically pardon the whole kit and caboodle after the election.”
After Colson departed Nixon asked Haldeman for an update. Haldeman still did not have all he needed to know but reported that the Magruder plan was proceeding: “They’ve started on that path now, where we’re in this thing with Magruder.” His meaning was clear: Magruder was going to lie. Haldeman explained that Mitchell and Magruder had “this guy, Porter” at an FBI interview and that he had done “very well.” Porter, Haldeman said, worked at the reelection committee, and his testimony “cuts it off before it gets to Mitchell.”
“Is that something Magruder thought up?” Nixon asked. “Well,” Haldeman said, “I’m not sure that Magruder thought it up or if it’s these other guys who thought about it and recruited him. But Magruder got it in the end.” Haldeman explained that Magruder’s testimony was “going to come into the campaign,” that that was almost guaranteed to happen, for there was “no way to contain” it. While no one wanted to see it get to Magruder, “it’s a matter of trying to turn it off before it gets Mitchell, which everybody agrees is very unfortunate. Cut it off at the Magruder level, and not because I want to get Magruder.”
“Can Magruder do that?” Nixon asked, and Haldeman said, “Well, that’s the problem. He says he will. Some question as to whether he can. On the other hand, Dean and Ehrlichman think it’s problematic.” He explained that Magruder had the authority to approve funding for Liddy, and the investigators and prosecutors had this information. Haldeman could not give the president any reassurances about Magruder, adding, “It’s probably better to take whatever losses we have to take.”
“Yeah,” Nixon agreed. “It’s just a God damn shame about Magruder. God damn, he’s such a good man.”
That evening Haldeman noted in his diary that the “Watergate thing flared up again today with the problem on Bart Porter’s testimony which will start the implicating of Magruder. He decided to go ahead with that. Mitchell and John Dean have spent a lot of time working out the details and apparently have something developed that will work out all right.”5
July 20, 1972, the White House
Haldeman sat in on the president’s meeting with Armand Hammer, the chairman of Occidental Petroleum, who had recently signed an assistance agreement with the U.S.S.R. The real reason Nixon was meeting with Hammer was to get him to provide his executive vice president, Marvin Watson, an experienced Democrat operative, to run the Democrats for Nixon operation at the request of John Connally, who would head the organization, to which Hammer agreed.6 As soon as Hammer departed the president asked Haldeman, “Any further developments on Watergate?”7 Haldeman did not have any new information, which prompted the president to ask, “Who is really watching from the White House? You, Ehrlichman, who?” Haldeman responded, “John Dean is watching it on an almost full-time basis and reporting it to Ehrlichman and me on a continuing basis.” “Alright, good,” Nixon said, and Haldeman added, “And no one else. There’s no one else in the White House who has any knowledge of what’s going on there at all.” When the president suggested including Colson, Haldeman disagreed. “There isn’t anyone else in this, and I think it’s much better that way. In the first place, there’s no need for anybody to know, and there’s nothing they can do about it.”
“That’s right, we can’t.” As regarded Colson, the president observed, “It’s so bad for his stress. Just a few of us that know to worry about it.” With a painful-sounding small chuckle, he added, “Don’t let anybody else worry about it.” Haldeman said that that was appropriate, again repeating that no one could do anything about the situation. Nixon modified that observation, “Except we can, of course, stretch it to [a] certain extent. The really key question at the moment, and sometime we’ve got to answer it, it’s in regard to Magruder. Not waiting for the ax to fall, and the risk of waiting it out is that he might have to be thrown out.” Haldeman said, “Let me ask Mitchell about it. Because that’s one thing Mitchell wants to talk about.” Nixon continued, “Right. I just don’t want that to happen. I think they’re going to get Magruder. My own feeling is that his good and our good will both be served by, if he’s going to get it, in other words, by his statement, whatever the hell it is.” Thinking that Magruder might have to leave the campaign caused the president to ask about Hugh Sloan, who he learned was at odds with Magruder over Sloan’s testimony.
Haldeman explained how the prosecutors were handling his situation. “What they’ve done with Sloan, and which apparently is a very good break, is they’ve granted him informal immunity. Sloan is clean on his own involvement [regarding Watergate], but he knows things that have nothing to do with the Watergate caper, but there apparently are some substantial irregularities under the Campaign Spending Act which Sloan’s aware of.”
“Christ, they should have stayed the hell out of that one,” the president added with alarm. Haldeman explained, “And some cash movements and things like that. And so they’ve granted Sloan temporary immunity, and he’s going to cover what he knows about the Watergate stuff, which is nothing. And that gets him out of things. Now, what they had planned to do is, he was going to take the Fift
h, but this avoids his having to take the Fifth, which is much better, because he has no guilt under the Watergate thing, he has some under the other.” Haldeman coughed, and then, catching his thought about taking the Fifth, he added, “That’s the one thing I wanted to raise with Dean this morning, is whether there isn’t a way to give Magruder immunity, and maybe get him out from under, too. I don’t see why they couldn’t.” With no real understanding of how prosecutors use immunity, Haldeman suggested, “Give Magruder immunity in order to get information on the Watergate caper people, and Liddy maybe, or something like that.” The president, who understood prosecutorial immunity only slightly better, was confused. “If he goes in and says, ‘I will say this and that and the other.’”
“Well, apparently that’s the thing our people have been worried about is, if they give immunity to the wrong people and get too much of the story out, but if Magruder’s given immunity, he could then go in and inculpate himself, plus the others, but his immunity protects him from prosecution, and he seals the case on the others.”
The president sat silently, and then, barely audibly, replied, “I think the way that we’ve trusted people to stand up that, the way this [unclear] Magruder scenario, I don’t care.” He then addressed Magruder’s testimony and suggested returning to his original scenario: “But if it’s at all possible, it should be put in a way that the group of people who were hard-nosed and extreme on the Cuban communists, they came to express their concern about McGovern and wanted to do this sort of thing, and these people said, ‘Alright, we’ll finance it.’ I don’t know whether that’ll work, or whether it was the other way around.” Haldeman noted, “On the public side, that’s sure what we want.” Nixon agreed, “That’s what I mean. It fits in with the public image, the public story.” They sat wordlessly for several seconds, and when the president continued, he could not figure out how Magruder might get immunity but told Haldeman to check it out. He then asked, “Who else besides Sloan and Magruder are our people, who’s this fellow, Wardman, Bart, what’s his name?”
“Bart, Bart Porter.” “Bart Porter,” the president repeated, sounding exasperated at the involvement of another person. “Did he work for Magruder?” When Haldeman reported that he did, the president fell silent again. Then Nixon said, clear displeasure in his voice and with a tone of protest about the ever-expanding investigation, “The question is, how many people that they’ve involved in—” Haldeman said, “They’re not going any further.” Speaking to the president’s frustration, he added, “Magruder’s the last one they’re going to call, apparently.”
“Yeah,” Nixon added, with something of an angry growl. “Well, it seems it would stop someplace. I mean, Jesus Christ, you can’t go through the whole God damn committee. They’re not going to call Mitchell, apparently?” Haldeman thought not. “No. At least not as of yesterday, that was the word.” As they walked toward the office door after discussing other pending business, Nixon, sounding both concerned and confessional, mentioned that he’d had some sort of troubling premonition: “I had this strangest dream last night. I have a feeling Watergate’s going to be a nasty issue for a few days. But I can’t believe that, you know, or maybe I’m whistling in the dark, but I can’t believe that they can tie it to me.” He let that question hang for a moment, and then answered his own question: “Huh? I don’t know. What’s your feeling?”
“It’ll be messy. But I think John [Ehrlichman’s] probably right. We’re going to take any heat, some tie to us, we can’t avoid getting the [reelection] committee tied in somehow, so it’s going to be untidy. I hope you can get over that.” “Yeah,” the president said, hoping so, too.
That afternoon, between 3:16 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., Haldeman and the president met again in his EOB office.8 After discussing in astounding detail the food to be served on a cruise on the presidential yacht, Sequoia, that evening, Haldeman had some good news to share: “It appears that there’s a very good chance that Magruder will not be indicted. On the grounds that there’s a fine-line question as to whether he made a knowledgeable decision and therefore was a part of this thing or not.” “Well, conspiracy is a hard case to prove,” Nixon observed (incorrectly). Haldeman continued, “Well, the point is, his line will be that he did not know about this specific action, which apparently, is true.”
That was true only in the sense that Magruder had no knowledge of the time of the operation, the team members, the place of entry and other specific details, although he was very aware that they had broken into the DNC earlier and bugged the place, and that one of the bugs was not working. Haldeman continued, “And that he had this guy, Liddy, and sure he authorized certain sums of money to be paid to Liddy for various Republicans and for campaigning activities, but he was not personally aware of this. Then he can say that it was stupidity on my part, bad management, but no criminal guilt. And I was the sweet young guy in a campaign, and I didn’t realize all the things you ought to check out.”
“Yeah,” Nixon said uncertainly, unsure of what to make of this explanation. Haldeman continued, “And John [Ehrlichman] seems to feel that it’s at least fifty-fifty, but he still feels that it can go that way, and maybe even better, we’ll know a lot more, he’s being interrogated today by the FBI. That’s the end of their interrogation. It was the FBI, not the grand jury, that Bart Porter was interrogated [by] yesterday. He has not been before the jury. Pat Gray told John Dean today, he just wanted to chat, that the Bureau is going to require at least another month to complete their investigation.” Haldeman added that Gray felt that the grand jury would need three to four months to do their work after the Bureau completed its own. “And Mitchell and Dean are reading [the conversation with Gray] as a message from the Bureau and Justice that this thing was not going to be brought before the election. Mitchell argues very strongly that with Magruder there’d be a real good chance of not getting any high-level campaign command involved in the case, and therefore we shouldn’t let Magruder go now, because [his] going out now would really put the focus on it.” Haldeman added that Mitchell felt they would have ample warning if they needed to act on Magruder.
Haldeman felt prompted to provide additional information as the president began speculating about what Gray and Petersen might do. “Well, another thing I didn’t know that Mitchell told me is that John Dean [thinks] that Petersen [is on our team totally]. John Dean ran into Petersen and laid out the whole scenario of what actually happened, who was involved and where it all fit. Now, on the basis of that, Petersen was working with that knowledge and directing the investigation along those channels that will not produce the kinds of answers we don’t want produced. Petersen also feels that the fact that there were some lines in this case that ran into the White House is very beneficial to you, because that has slowed them down in pursuing things, because they all are of the view that they don’t want to indict the White House. They only want to indict the criminal [acts], they want to tighten up that case on the criminal acts and, and limit it back to the degree that they can. Now that’s the reason, for instance, that they were partially—” At this point the conversation is interrupted by a recording malfunction, making it impossible to understand over a minute of the discussion about the grand jury, Magruder and the reelection committee. It then becomes audible as follows:
“Is anybody listening to the lawyers over there?” the president asked, about the reelection committee. Haldeman said they were, and that the two lawyers, Paul O’Brien and Ken Parkinson, were “just superb.” He then explained to the president the conflict that had developed between Mitchell and Ehrlichman: “It’s fallen into a pattern we’ve got,” which he described as “the Ehrlichman and Mitchell controversy,” where Mitchell is of the “totally-stonewall-it-the-hell-with-everybody” approach versus “Ehrlichman’s complete-panic-cut-everything-off-and-sink-it-immediately,” which was soon called the “hang-it-all-out route”—or some variation of it. Haldeman added, “They’re both wrong.” “Yeah,” the president agreed. “Fortunat
ely, we haven’t followed either of their leads,” Haldeman concluded.
July 22, 1972, Camp David
During a conversation at Camp David, Haldeman gave the president an update on Magruder: “There were no problems. We don’t have the interrogation report, but the lawyer who sat in said he did extremely well.”9 “And is he going before the grand jury now?” the president asked. Haldeman reported, “Not as of yet.”
“Well, what the hell is the grand jury going to do, then? Are they going to keep, keep, keep, keep investigating? Is that the whole point of this thing?” Nixon pressed. Haldeman said, “It seems they will.” On reflection, the president felt that this was not all bad: “As far as I’m concerned, that’s the best of both worlds. Let it go.” Haldeman suggested, “Let it go until after the election.” But then Nixon simply dismissed them all, “Oh, they can, those pricks.” Haldeman continued, “Again, Ehrlichman urges to get them indicted now, get them out, but I’m not really sure that’s the best, if you accept as inevitable that you’re going to get indictments, and then you have to get them before the election. But better yet is to have nothing happen.” And Haldeman reported that there was still a reasonable chance that nothing would happen: “They’re just going to let it go.”
The president wanted to know who was talking with whom. “Dean is instructed to, talking to whom? Talking to you?” Haldeman answered, “He’s talking to us.” Nixon again wanted to be clear, “You and Ehrlichman?” Haldeman affirmed that that was the arrangement, and added the other people with whom I was talking: “On our side, Mitchell and two lawyers and Petersen at Justice and Gray at the Bureau.”
