by John W. Dean
Haldeman reported that the media reaction to his April 17 statement showed that news people were still focused on who had ordered the Watergate break-in rather than any possible cover-up. Nixon wondered if the press was interpreting his new statement as a repudiation of his prior one, in which he asserted that no one in the White House had been involved in the break-in. When Ziegler asked if he was referring to the August 29, 1972, statement, Nixon confirmed that he was and urged Ziegler to call me and assure me he was not now claiming anything different, notwithstanding news media misinterpretations to the contrary.
While Ziegler left the president and Haldeman again sorted through their recollections, particularly of Hunt’s demand and the president’s involvement. Haldeman recalled that money was paid to the Watergate defendants “to keep them, as they say, keep them on the reservation.” Haldeman again suggested that Hunt’s demand could be considered as “a national security threat” and then offered another rather extreme suggestion: “I haven’t really thought it out, but there is another route. Which would be, throw the entire prosecution, the entire Justice Department, out.” Given that the president would later fire a special prosecutor and allow his attorney general and deputy attorney general to resign after they refused to do so themselves, Haldeman’s suggestion may well not have sounded excessive to Nixon, but this line of discussion ended when Ziegler returned to report on his conversation with me.
Ziegler had found me at home, my house still surrounded by a crowd of television cameras and reporters, and as he reported our conversation: “I said, ‘I wanted to check in with you this morning following the briefing and so forth, and to let you know that in the news I saw someone make references to the fact that the Dean report was full of holes. We’re not characterizing this in any way on specific instructions from the president. We are not going to focus on any individual; this is not fair to any individual to do that. And as my briefing yesterday showed, we did not do that.’ And then I went through with him what I propose I’ll say again in the briefing, which is, I’m not going to comment. He said, ‘I understand that.’ And he said, ‘The thing to keep in mind is that the Dean report also involved the [March] twenty-first conversation with the president, the oral discussion with the president.’ I said, ‘I don’t think there is any question about that, John.’”
Nixon noted that the “Dean report” was not false, and Ziegler continued, sharing what I had reported: “He said, ‘Ron, look, I understand the position you’re in.’ He said, ‘The important thing is that we now have the president out in front.’” My comment provoked Nixon to interrupt and ask if I said Haldeman and Ehrlichman should go. “No, that’s all he said,” Ziegler responded. This conversation gave the president little comfort, for he had told Haldeman and Ziegler he was confident that, if I did not get immunity, I would launch an attack on the White House.
The president’s schedule was full throughout the morning and early afternoon. A camera crew in the Oval Office was packing up after Nixon had filmed his message on energy for the evening news, so Nixon stepped into his private office to call Henry Petersen shortly before three o’clock for a quick conversation.73 Petersen told him there had been no significant developments, although he thought Gordon Strachan was coming by, and that he was being represented by Fred Vinson, a former assistant attorney general and Petersen predecessor in running the Criminal Division, for the Johnson administration. Petersen said they had not “finished with Magruder,” and when Nixon asked about me, Petersen said, “Dean’s, well, we’ve backed off of him for a while. His lawyers want time to think.” The president said he was treating me “like everybody else because” to do otherwise would be unfair.
After talking to Petersen Nixon returned to the Oval Office and requested a meeting with Ehrlichman.74 He again raised the question of whether or not I should have immunity, and after a long sigh, Ehrlichman answered, “If he has immunity, he’s got to deliver.” As Ehrlichman saw it, immunity would only give me incentive to deliver against him and Haldeman; without immunity my incentive would be to deliver against the president. “Bob and I parsed out pretty carefully what Bob’s recollection of the meeting you had with Dean was, the blackmail/Bittman stuff. And it’s Bob’s recollection that there’s nothing in that meeting, even if it were tape-recorded and published, that could harm you in the sense of you appearing to obstruct justice.”
Nixon, who knew that Haldeman had been present only at the end of the March 21 meeting, did not feel as certain. Ehrlichman continued, reporting that they had been going through the president’s schedule and found that he had had some eight or nine meetings with me, more than Nixon had thought.* Ehrlichman said that while he had no way of knowing what was said in those meetings, he was not concerned, as he did not believe that I would seek to damage the presidency if I did not receive immunity: “I just don’t think he’s made that way, but assuming he did, you would have to ask yourself what took place in those private meetings that might have given him any ammunition.” Nixon countered that, even though I might not be inclined to attack the president, my lawyers would be. The president wanted to know when Ehrlichman had started his Watergate investigation, and Ehrlichman replied, March 30, explaining that he had chosen that date because of McCord’s letter, and that when Pat Gray had called me a liar, I had removed myself from Watergate matters. The president wanted to know if Ehrlichman acted before or after Magruder talked, and he said before.
The president told Ehrlichman, speaking rather elliptically at first, that if the Ellsberg break-in came up, it should be explained as a national security matter: “On that we just have to be stonewalling, of course.” In short, Nixon would simply say that any investigation was out of bounds if it involved national security. Ehrlichman agreed, saying, “That’s in the laps of the gods, as I see it.” He said he had been going through his old files and had more information. “The way that project was finally represented to me was that it was a covert look at some files, which could be read to be that they walked in when the nurse wasn’t looking, and they flipped through the file. It wasn’t until much later that we learned that they had actually conducted a burglary.”
“What about the other thing, the wiretapping?” Nixon asked, since he knew I was aware of it. “The wiretapping, in most cases,” Ehrlichman explained, “was conducted under the statute by leave of the attorney general with the Bureau.” With regard to the private wiretapping, “Dean had told me he thought it was done,” Ehrlichman said. “The only private one that I know of that was not actually conducted by the Bureau under proper sanction was one that was going to be attempted in Georgetown, and they were never able to do it.”75 Incorrectly Nixon assumed, “That’s pretty good. Should I get Dean in sometime and talk to him about my various [concerns]?”
Ehrlichman suggested Ziegler voice them instead: “I tell you, Ziegler’s got a pretty good thing going with him. And they talk, and Ron seems to keep him calmed down.” He went on to explain that the operations of the counsel’s office had come to a halt; he was offering them no guidance, and I was not coming into the office. Ehrlichman was also busy spinning the facts, claiming we had not really talked about Watergate, using his calendar as evidence to establish that we had met infrequently. (He excluded our frequent telephone conversations.) To deal with the problem of the Ellsberg break-in, he wanted the president to get Henry Petersen to advise him about how to invoke executive privilege or national security to keep that information from surfacing. The conversation ended when the president said he was going to go to Camp David “and try to see if I can break my sleeping pattern,” and he invited Ehrlichman and Haldeman to join him to get “a little rest.” He considered inviting Kissinger as well, but then, on second thought, said Henry was “a pain in the ass.”
As the president and his aides flew to the Catoctin Mountain retreat, the Watergate story was bursting at the seams: The Washington Post was ready to break a story that somehow involved Magruder, Mitchell and me, not to mention Paul O’Brien
and Bill Bittman. Carl Bernstein was pressing Henry Petersen for information about when he was going to indict Mitchell and me. Petersen spoke with the president in the early evening, but the conversation was not recorded, because Nixon had requested that all the recording equipment at Camp David be removed. From later recorded conversations back at the White House, we know that Nixon got quite angry with Petersen and scolded him about investigating matters he considered “national security,” like the activities of the plumbers.* From Haldeman’s diary, we also know that he and the president discussed the Post piece. 76 The Post had called the press office to get confirmation but because much of their information was wrong, it was not confirmed so they were holding back on the story. When talking to Petersen, Nixon told him that I had claimed I had been granted immunity by the prosecutors (which I not), and the president chided Petersen for granting it. When Petersen denied the charge, Nixon said he had a tape-recording that proved I was making this assertion.77 Haldeman also noted that the president warned Petersen specifically to stay out of the Ellsberg break-in, which Petersen said he had already learned about from me.78
At 6:30 P.M. the president met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, which became a meal that lasted until almost eight o’clock. Haldeman later described the session as “a painful sort of farewell dinner”—“painful” because the president got into “the whole problem of whether John and I should go.” Haldeman said Nixon made three points they needed to consider: one, that Magruder would accuse them in open court; two, if they left would it buy off an indictment; and three, the risk of being destroyed by constant assaults if they remained at the White House. Nixon felt they should move on and devise another strategy: “Get out and fight like hell,” as Haldeman wrote, although the president told them he had not yet made a final decision. Haldeman also noted that Nixon claimed he was not being emotional about all this, when, in fact, Haldeman thought he had been overly emotional. They returned to the White House the next morning.79
April 19, 1973, the White House
After arriving on the South Grounds at 9:28 A.M., Haldeman, Ehrlichman and the president went directly to the Oval Office.80 After discussing but reaching no conclusion about my replacement as White House counsel, Ehrlichman reminded the president that they had become involved in the Ellsberg investigation because J. Edgar Hoover had restrained the FBI’s own inquiry. He conceded, however, that the Liddy and Hunt operation was “apparently in excess.”
Nixon again brought up the subject of Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s leaving the White House. Haldeman said that Kissinger had called to counsel him not leave “until you’re totally convinced” that a criminal proceeding was inevitable, and then to move to stay ahead of any criminal actions. Haldeman said he thought they had been badly served by a number of people, and though he was not certain who all of them were, he volunteered Mitchell and myself as likely suspects. “I don’t know today,” Haldeman said, “and I don’t believe you do, really, what happened in the Watergate case.” Nixon agreed.
Ehrlichman pointed out that when the president expressed his public confidence in people, it helped boost their morale, and their reputations, so he hoped that Nixon would be very slow in eroding that confidence. He added, “That’s why I say I think we ought to wait and see what develops here. See what Petersen says this morning.” With that the president requested Petersen come to his office, but he was concerned about their delaying. Nixon felt they were in a “horrible mess.” It all had been extremely hard on him, but “I hope, I think, I will see it through. I can sweat it out,” while still dealing with other problems that confront the president. “[On the] other hand,” he stressed, Haldeman and Ehrlichman had to “face the fact” that there needed to be some way to insulate him. His “official family” was no different that his personal family, so the impact of Watergate was ultimately personal. Add in all his other responsibilities as president, and “the wear and effect of this is enormous, and it may be destructive, it may be fatal.”* He told them, “I think you should be aware of that, so I was not really kidding about Agnew,” referring to allowing his vice president to take over the presidency. Nixon continued, “I wonder if this whole thing, whether you stayed or not, is not so destructive that our ability to govern will be totally destroyed.”
Ehrlichman was the first to respond, saying coldly, “I think that depends on how you handle yourself in the next few months. If you take occasions to separate yourself from this, take occasions to condemn the wrongdoers in a way that’s not faultily [sic], if you communicate your sentiments in some way or other, as backgrounders or otherwise, I think you can come through this rough water very nicely.” “Absolutely,” Haldeman agreed. “I don’t think it even remotely approaches being fatal.” Nixon had “to hang tough and rise above it, as you do it.”
Ehrlichman shifted the discussion to New York Times columnist James Reston’s interesting piece on Mitchell, wondering why Mitchell had not come forward and taken responsibility. Yet Ehrlichman felt Nixon should refrain from reading such stories, spend a week in Florida and delegate calls to others: “Hell, they can’t wreck the country in a week.” Nixon assured them he did not read the newspapers, nor did Bebe give him such information when he was in Florida.
Ehrlichman continued, “But if you could just detach yourself for a week, and then come back from the mountains, so to speak, with a fresh perspective on this, and sit in the sun and listen to some good music, and see some shows, and just take a week off, I just think you’ll come back with an entirely different view of this.” “That’s probably the best advice you’ve gotten,” Haldeman concurred, and he reminded Nixon that in the past he had dealt with problems by pulling back, stepping away from them, and thinking them through. “We’re assuming a set of events that we don’t know [are] going to take place. We’ve got to be prepared.” Haldeman also reminded the president that Kissinger had argued strongly that he had to cancel the Soviet summit before he started bombing Vietnam, lest the Soviets cancel in response; Nixon had argued the opposite position and had proven to be correct. “Whatever we do,” Nixon replied, “the only man, the only problem we’ve got here is what we do with regard to John Dean, and I think maybe John Dean is going to do it anyway.” The president felt the most powerful force to prevent me from doing anything was to make certain I “did not get immunity and had to look [to Nixon] for amnesty.” Ehrlichman asked if he wanted that leaked to the news magazines, and the president said sure.
When Henry Petersen arrived later that morning, Haldeman and Ehrlichman went up to Ehrlichman’s office for a five-hour session with their attorneys, John Wilson and his partner Frank Strickler. In the Oval Office Nixon got directly to the point with Petersen: “Well, the problem is this, with the Ellsberg case,” he began. He reported that their “dear, departed friend Edgar Hoover” had refused to investigate Ellsberg, who was married to the daughter of a close friend of Hoover’s.81 “Under the circumstances, Henry, an investigation was undertaken with a very, very small crew at the White House.” Nixon explained that that was “the Hunt group” and quickly added, “Nothing in terms of break-ins or anything was approved. But seeing what these crazy bastards have done since,” the president suggested, they had acted on their own. “They didn’t do a damn bit of good. I mean, all they got was what appeared in the [news]papers, that Ellsberg had psychiatric problems,” which they learned from Henry Kissinger, who had once had Ellsberg as a student. None of what they obtained in the break-in would help win in the prosecution of Ellsberg. “Then, after that, Hoover got into it,” the president said. “Now when Hoover got into it, you should know he wiretapped.” But Nixon was confused and there had never been an order to wiretap Ellsberg; rather, Ellsberg had been picked up accidentally when wiretapping a former member of Kissinger’s national security council staff, Morton Halpern, when Ellsberg had been a house guest at the Halpern home.
The president explained that his reason for informing Petersen about “the Hunt thing” was “simply to say it
was a national security investigation. It is not related in any way to the Watergate thing,” which was untrue for it had both informed Liddy and Hunt about activities that Nixon’s top aides felt were acceptable and driven the White House’s interest in the cover-up. Petersen understood and asked if there was anything else, because “I can’t stay away from that which I don’t know.” He explained that he did not want to inadvertently get into such matters through Hunt. “Yes, you could get into other things,” the president warned him. “For example, Hunt [was] involved in bugging, apparently. He tried, for example, on one occasion, it was basically during this whole Ellsberg period, this place was leaking like a sieve, and you remember Kissinger’s national security people?” Petersen did, but Nixon did not elaborate any further. Petersen mentioned to the president that the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department had been moved under him, into the Criminal Division, and explained that authority for national security undertakings “runs from you to the attorney general.”
“In the case of the Hunt thing, you should know that when he was at the White House, and he was working in the field of drugs, he worked on this particular activity, and Liddy worked with him, as I understand. But frankly, I really didn’t know this myself until this case came out. I said, ‘What in the name of God is Hunt doing?’ I understand [now] what he was doing, and I would have approved at the time, because we had nothing that we could get out of Hoover.” Nixon added, “I want you to understand that I have never used the word ‘national security’ unless it is.” He assured Petersen that he wanted no stone left unturned regarding Watergate, and proceeded to another matter of importance: “In terms of privilege, any conversations with the president are obviously privileged.” “Yes, sir,” Petersen assured him, “I understand that,” and with his privileges—national security and presidential conversations—firmly established, he moved on.
