The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It

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The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It Page 71

by John W. Dean


  9:13 A.M. telephone call with Petersen: Nixon told Petersen that he was at Camp David (“I don’t come here to look at the Easter lilies”) and that things were going to work out, but he did not want any information leaking about people he was seeing. But, he added, “I am not going to see Dean, because I cannot be in a position where he will want to come in and talk to me about how he’s going to plea.” Petersen approved. When they got onto a tangent regarding the immunity law, Petersen explained, “As a practical matter, when we, as the sovereign, extend immunity it would be almost an impossible situation to prosecute [Dean], even if we came in with evidence from an independent source. Technically, I think that’s possible, but a Supreme Court decision has indicated—” Nixon interrupted to say, “In other words, if you give him even use immunity, he gets [full immunity]?” Petersen affirmed, “That’s right. Yes, sir.” No one understood this body of law better than Shaffer, and this reality was integral to his thinking.160 Nixon asked about Judge Byrne, and Petersen said he was going to have an evidentiary hearing in open court. Petersen reported that Ehrlichman had spoken to the FBI and told them that “he heard of the incident but had no independent knowledge of it.” The conversation ended with Nixon expressing exaggerated disgust that Shaffer had told them, “‘Look, we’re going to try the president on other things than the Watergate,’ Jesus Christ, and then without being specific.” They agreed it was evidence of my desperation.161

  11:10 A.M. telephone call with Ziegler: Ziegler said he had spoken with Haldeman, and he wanted to reassure the president that John and Bob were comfortable about taking a leave of absence, but he suggested that the real “master stroke of all this” and a truly “dramatic action” would be if “Rogers is named as the attorney general,” and “if Rogers is then in a position to name a special prosecutor.” Ziegler said, “That action in itself will then allow the presidency to totally remove itself from the whole process.” Ziegler reported that Bob Woodward had information about Henry Petersen’s running of the investigation of a fairly recent previous case in which “he can come under some criticism.” “The difficulty with a special prosecutor,” Nixon noted, was that “it’ll be months before they could ever learn the case.” Nixon explained that he was going to handle my being placed on leave of absence by having Garment notify me. Returning to Ziegler’s master stroke, Nixon said, “I don’t think Rogers would ever do it,” but that he did have another plan, which he shared with Ziegler: “Maybe I may get Richardson to do it.” Elliot Richardson was then serving as secretary of defense and had earlier served as Nixon’s undersecretary of state, as well as having been the attorney general of Massachusetts and the United States attorney of Massachusetts. Nixon said he would get back to Ziegler when he knew more. The call ended with Nixon reporting that his daughter Tricia had come to Camp David to tell him that the family had discussed the matter, and “they felt strongly that Haldeman and Ehrlichman should resign.”162

  Bill Rogers arrived at Camp David while the president was speaking with Ziegler. He spent the day with Nixon, talking, having lunch on the patio of Aspen Lodge, and walking the grounds. Nixon later recorded that Rogers, too, felt strongly that Haldeman and Ehrlichman should resign. Nixon asked Rogers to share that assessment with them, but Rogers declined, saying he did not have a good relationship with either.163 While Rogers had no interest in becoming attorney general, he did agree to try to persuade Elliot Richardson to take the post.

  5:35 P.M. telephone call with Ziegler: Ziegler reported press interest was running toward the plumbers operations, the Ellsberg break-in, and the bogus cable regarding the overthrow of Diem. Nixon wanted to know how this information had gotten out, suggesting maybe I had leaked it, and Ziegler (incorrectly) assumed that had been the case. Nixon shared what Bill Rogers had said regarding the Ellsberg break-in: “If they did this, and if Ehrlichman knew they did it, and then they were weren’t fired, and then went over to the committee, this is going to be very, very tough. Not in a legal way, for Ehrlichman, but in terms of coming back.” Nixon said, “Now we’ve got to make it go, Ron. You’re not losing it, are you?” “Absolutely not,” Ziegler assured him.164

  6:33 P.M. telephone call with Ehrlichman: Nixon began this call to Ehrlichman by citing Rogers on how the Eisenhower administration handled anyone who took the Fifth or sought immunity: They had to resign. Ehrlichman reported that it was all over that day’s newspapers that I would testify, with or without immunity, and he speculated, “Now that means the jig is up. He wasn’t able to make his deal, and he’s trying to put the best face on it that he can.” This caught Nixon by surprise, and they discussed its meaning. In a friendly but pointed tone Ehrlichman said, “Sometime during the time we’re there, I would very much appreciate having a few minutes alone with you.” Nixon agreed to that, and Ehrlichman continued, “I know that we’re sort of coupled like Siamese twins in this, Bob and I, but I do have a couple of things I would like to—”

  “I understand, Bob, ah, John. Fine. Of course, you can have some moments alone. Now let me ask one thing. Ron said that today is sort of moving toward the California plumbers operation. Is that right?” When Ehrlichman said he had not been following the news, Nixon asked, “Do you have any thought about it at the moment?” “I really don’t,” Ehrlichman replied. Nixon then asked, “I suppose that the question was, who was in charge, huh? Now, was Dean in charge?” “No, I was,” Ehrlichman acknowledged. “And Krogh and Young, of course, ran the operation.” Nixon inquired about its purpose and what happened to Hunt and Liddy after the Ellsberg break-in.“I never saw them again,” Ehrlichman said. When the president questioned how the operation had been turned off, Ehrlichman explained, “I talked to either Krogh or Young.” However much the president pressed, Ehrlichman would volunteer little other than that the undertaking “got nothing” and that he had given a “negative” when they wanted to go back again. “Well, that’s a solid position, isn’t it?” Nixon asked, to which Ehrlichman replied, “Well, it’s what actually happened.” “I’m just trying to put it in terms of saying as far as your part of it was concerned, this was something you never authorized,” Nixon clarified, and Ehrlichman (falsely) assured him that was the situation.165

  The president next shared Ziegler’s information about press interest in the fake material prepared by Hunt regarding “Kennedy on the Diem thing.” Had Ehrlichman ever heard about this? “Yes, sir, and it leads directly to your friend Colson,” Ehrlichman told a startled Nixon, explaining that it was a fake cable allegedly involving President John F. Kennedy. “Oh, my God. I just can’t believe that,” Nixon exclaimed, as he tried to recall what had occurred, remembering that Ehrlichman and David Young were conducting a study of “the whole Diem thing, and the Bay of Pigs thing.” Ehrlichman confirmed that they had done so, and Nixon remarked that he had only asked for the facts. “Well, I don’t know where Colson got this inspiration,” Ehrlichman replied, “but he was very busy at it.” After listening to further explanations from Ehrlichman, Nixon can be heard sighing, and then saying, “I should have been told about that, shouldn’t I?” “Well,” Ehrlichman said, “I’m not so sure that you weren’t.”

  “But by whom?” Nixon demanded, and Ehrlichman could only concede, “I don’t know. I don’t know.” The only thing the president could recall was an article being prepared for Life magazine, but he had not been informed that it was based on a fake cable. “My recollection is that this was discussed with you,” Ehrlichman said, although he admitted he might be wrong. He said he would check his notes when Nixon ordered, “I’ve got to know about that.” Ehrlichman then recalled that it had been Colson, which may have refreshed Nixon’s memory, for he decided he did not want to hear any more about the matter, explaining, “Well, it’s maybe better I wouldn’t know if you told me. Because Chuck didn’t.”

  Nixon then turned to the subject of his Monday speech, which he wanted to keep short. When Ehrlichman observed, “There’s no virtue in brevity, I don’t think,” the president
said he was thinking twenty to twenty-five minutes rather than thirty-five or forty. “I gather from Bob that this leave [of absence] business is a closed subject, as far as you’re concerned?” Ehrlichman asked. “Yes, it has to be,” Nixon replied. “I can’t see any way to handle it otherwise.” Ehrlichman then questioned, “Do you have anything from Petersen at all that we don’t know about?” He did not and would not, which prompted Ehrlichman to tell him that John Wilson had all but fallen out of his chair when he learned that Petersen was refusing to keep the president informed. Nixon did not want to get into a debate with Ehrlichman and returned to the leave of absence: “Well, this is the way I feel I have to move, John. I mean, you know, one of the prerogatives of the president is to make mistakes, and sometimes you have to make some. I’ve made my share, but on this one, I just feel it’s the right thing to do.”166

  7:06 P.M. telephone call with Petersen: Nixon called Petersen in response to Ehrlichman’s report about my willingness to testify without immunity, wondering if I had been granted some sort of informal or equitable immunity. Petersen said I had not (forgetting that I had been granted informal immunity for my initial meetings with the prosecutors).167

  April 29, 1973, Camp David

  The president slept in on Sunday morning. When Kissinger called midmorning, Nixon told him, “Now I’ve got something to tell you in the greatest of confidence, that I’ve decided I’ve got to get a new attorney general.”168 He was going to move Elliot Richardson from Defense to Justice, he said, and filled Kissinger in on Richardson’s background. Nixon then added, “I am going to get the most mean son of a bitch I can find and put him in the FBI, and let all hell break loose.” He also reminded Kissinger, “As you know, Henry, we did do some surveillance with the FBI on these leaks, you remember?” Kissinger answered, “Oh yes.” Nixon said they were approved by the attorney general in 1969 and 1970. But when the FBI had failed to investigate Ellsberg, the White House got involved, and “that’s why some of that crap was done in the White House. But that’s too bad. That’s just one of those things. But I just wanted you to know when that comes out, don’t back off. Anything that’s national security, we’re going to fight like hell for.” Kissinger agreed, “Absolutely. No, I will certainly not back off.”

  10:26 A.M. telephone call with Rogers: After agreeing that Nixon should announce Elliot Richardson’s appointment as attorney general in the speech, and telling Rogers he hoped to appoint Judge Matt Byrne to head the FBI “if he survives Ellsberg,” Nixon added, “Can I ask you one other thing, if you would?” To reveal the president’s state of mind, the initial section of this passage has been transcribed verbatim: “The, ah, Ehrlichman is hanging terribly tough, and, ah, I wanted, just to get your, just your, your judgment on, ah, on this question again as to, ah, the ah, ah, ah, you, you have, you have no, you believe that we, that they both must, at the very least, take, take a leave of absence?” “Yes, I do,” Rogers replied. “As a matter of fact, my own preference is for resignations.” Nixon said that that was his preference as well. In something of a pleading tone, he said, “Would it be asking too much if I was asking for you to come up and help me talk to them about this thing a little?” When Rogers said he would, Nixon wondered, “How would you, how would you, just go about talking to them? I mean, I’ll talk to them, but what will you say. You’ll just, just lay it out?” A surprised Rogers said he thought that this had all already been agreed upon.

  “Well, with Haldeman, yes,” Nixon reported. “But Ehrlichman, I talked to him last night on the phone, and he said he wanted to raise the question with me again. He feels that not only is his case separate, but I think he probably wants to give the president hell for not getting at this himself earlier, and this and that. You know, he’s not behaving well, frankly. Not behaving well, to my surprise.” Nixon told Rogers how Ehrlichman’s attorney John Wilson had reacted when Nixon did not extract further information out of Petersen: “Ehrlichman says that Petersen’s horsing me. He can give me that if he wished.” The president, with a nervous laugh, noted, “But the problem is, Petersen may be canned due to the fact that he knows damn well I’ll give it to Ehrlichman.”

  Rogers was appalled that Ehrlichman was putting Nixon in the position of attempting to obtain information from the prosecutor’s office and annoyed at Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s obstinacy. “I didn’t realize that they were being reluctant,” Rogers said, and noted, “They can’t perform their duties now. For Christ sakes, the whole government has been in a standstill because these guys are reluctant.” When Nixon mentioned Haldeman’s claim that “half of them is worth two of anybody else, and nobody else can do it,” Rogers replied, “They’re nuts.” He advised Nixon that their sense of their own indispensability had been trouble all along, and that this matter should have been resolved two weeks earlier. Rogers wanted them to abide by their earlier agreement. As the call ended, Nixon said, “Ehrlichman’s coming apart.”169

  11:46 A.M. telephone call from Rogers: Rogers, having mulled over his conversation with Nixon, had second thoughts about his own role in dealing with Haldeman and Ehrlichman; he called to urge the president to find somebody else to do it. “I have no idea what they’ll say if they get desperate,” Rogers conceded, concerned about charges they might make to him against Nixon, information he did not want to have. He was also apprehensive that anything discussed might be leaked, because, as he told Nixon, although he had not spoken with another soul, details of his conversations with Haldeman and Ehrlichman were appearing in news stories. “It seems to me that you shouldn’t have to convince them to leave,” Rogers pointed out. Nixon said he did not know how they would react, lamenting, “I guess anything can happen, can’t it?” Rogers answered, “Well, absolutely. That’s the lesson that has to be learned from these things. Men get shaken and desperate, and particularly ones that have been dictatorial in their conduct with others.” Rogers had, in fact, been experiencing the dictatorial demands of Haldeman and Ehrlichman for years. As they talked it through, Nixon again asked if Rogers would come up, “and then if it gets into a donnybrook, then could I ask you to come over and help? Would you mind doing that?” Rogers did not think it would become a donnybrook. He said he was happy to help, “as long as I don’t get into a pissing match with them.”170

  12:28 P.M. telephone call with Rogers: Nixon requested that Rogers come up around four o’clock to help Ray Price refine the draft of the speech, which he thought overall was “pretty good.” He had a special reason, he explained, for asking Rogers to join him: “I remember how helpful you were at the time of the fund,” the president said, referring to Nixon’s 1952 Checkers speech. He added, “And, frankly, I might not even see you,” regarding the meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The president seemed to take solace just in knowing Rogers would be present, should he be needed.171

  12:32 P.M. telephone call with Ziegler: This brief call reveals that the president had by now firmly changed his thinking from asking leaves of absence from Haldeman and Ehrlichman to demanding their resignations. Rather than deliver this news himself, Nixon decided to deputize Ziegler to do so. He explained the reason for his decision was that leaves of absence would have an uncertain duration, while resignations would provide the certainty he needed. Ziegler agreed, and went about the task.172

  12:49 P.M. telephone call from Ziegler: Ziegler reported on his conversation with Haldeman: “Your [i.e., Nixon’s] decision was to ask for their resignations, you talked to Rogers, and thought this through for now three weeks. You feel that a leave of absence would be detrimental to them and to the presidency, and that you intend to ask them for resignations.” Ziegler added, “That you recognized that their lawyers don’t agree with this approach and that they don’t agree with this approach, but the president feels clear in his mind now that this must be done, and that’s what he wants. And Bob said, ‘Fine.’ He understands. He feels it’s the wrong decision, but he will abide by it. And in terms of John, he said, ‘I think John is going to
be more difficult in accepting this.’” Ziegler said he told him, “‘I believe the president recognizes that but is prepared to stand by his decision.’ And Bob said, ‘I’ll do what I can with John.’” The president, who was very subdued, said of Haldeman, “Good. A big man.” Ziegler added, “He sure is.” They discussed the matter briefly, with the president giving Ziegler suggestions to pass on for Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s resignation letters, and wondered aloud what they, particularly Ehrlichman, would do for money. Ziegler offered that they could get advances from friends. “Okay, thank you,” Nixon said grimly.173

  A few weeks earlier Nixon had had the room recording device removed from his Aspen study, so no records exist of his meetings with Haldeman and Ehrlichman after they arrived at Camp David that afternoon, although they all later recounted their memories of the event. Nixon met first with Haldeman at 2:20 P.M. for just over twenty minutes at Aspen Lodge. Haldeman says he found Nixon “in terrible shape.” When Haldeman arrived, Nixon shook his hand, which was the first time he had ever done so. They walked out on the patio and looked at the tulips and discussed their beauty, and as they headed back to the study Nixon said, “Well, I have to enjoy it, because I may not be alive much longer.” The president said he felt resignation was the right course, and it had been a difficult decision for him. Although Nixon seldom spoke of his religion, he told Haldeman that since becoming president, he got down on his knees every night and silently prayed he would do right in meeting his responsibilities. In Nixon’s own account, he told Haldeman, “When I went to bed last night I had hoped, and almost prayed, that I wouldn’t wake up this morning.” Both Haldeman and Ehrlichman reported that Nixon accepted general responsibility for what had happened at the Watergate. In Haldeman’s account; “He said he’s thought it all through, and that he was the one that started Colson on his projects, he was the one who told Dean to cover up, he was the one who made Mitchell Attorney General, and later his campaign manager, and so on. And that he now has to face that and live with it, and that for that reason, after he gets his other things completed, that he, too, will probably have to resign.” Haldeman added, “He never said that directly, but implied it.”

 

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