All peace efforts having failed, war was inevitable, Knox immediately informed Wayne; “judge whether your force will be adequate to make those audacious savages feel our superiority in arms.”121 Jefferson said much the same but admitted: “We expected nothing else, and had gone into the negociations only to prove to all our citizens that peace was unattainable on terms which any one of them would admit.”122 Washington assured Congress in his annual message on December 3, 1793, that his government had made every reasonable effort to negotiate peace consistent with “the essential interests and dignity of the United States.”123 Indian intransigence, not American aggression, was to blame for the impending bloodshed.
Having satisfied himself and his citizens that he had made good-faith efforts to secure peace, Washington turned to winning the war for the Old Northwest.
Chapter 18
Achieving Empire
Washington’s vision for the west entailed not only acquiring Indian land but also imposing federal authority and order in a region of international, intertribal, and interstate competition, and conflicting loyalties, violence, and disorder. In the North, he dispatched federal forces to defeat Indian resistance and regional rebellion. In the South, he refrained. For all the challenges his administration faced fighting an Indian war north of the Ohio, it feared an Indian war south of the Ohio even more. Washington and Knox knew Spain was trying to build a multitribal coalition, and if the southern nations united with the northern nations in a general Indian war, they would set the entire frontier ablaze. Keeping the Republic safe required preventing that nightmare from becoming a reality, and that, Washington knew, meant keeping on good terms with the powerful tribes bordering the southwestern frontiers. Friendship with the tribes required halting rampant assaults on their lands. Doing that threatened the fragile loyalty of people who thought the federal government should promote expansion, protect its citizens, and wage war against Indians and who resented the difference in how federal power was applied in the Northwest Territory and the Southwest Territory.1
As the new nation endeavored to strengthen ties between the North and the South, so did the old nations. Emissaries from the Northwestern Confederacy tried to enlist the support of the Creeks and Cherokees. Most Cherokees wanted peace and kept their distance from the Northwestern Confederacy, and Washington was anxious that they continue to do so. However, the Chickamauga Cherokees who had migrated to western Tennessee during the Revolution and established new towns—often referred to as the Five Lower Towns—continued their fight and made common cause with the Northwestern Confederacy. Some historians have drawn parallels between the Chickamauga and American struggles for independence and even between the Chickamauga leader Dragging Canoe and Washington himself.2 If there were parallels, Washington did not see them. “The Chiccamogas, aided by some Banditti of another tribe, in their vicinity, have recently perpetrated wanton, and unprovoked hostilities upon the citizens of the United States in that quarter,” he told Congress in 1792. In other words, they were terrorists, not freedom fighters.3 After Dragging Canoe died in March 1792, Chickamauga leadership passed to Kunoskeskie, also known as John Watts, whom Knox described as “a bold, sensible, and friendly half breed,” but Chickamauga resistance continued to complicate US-Cherokee relations.4
Recognizing that American settlers had shattered the boundaries established by the Treaty of Hopewell, Knox in early 1791 instructed North Carolina governor William Blount to negotiate a new treaty with the Cherokees, as a sequel to the treaty just made with the Creeks in New York. Blount met 1,200 Cherokee people in a conference on the Holston River in June. His idea of negotiating a new treaty was to tell them the Treaty of Hopewell was defunct and they must sell the land between the Clinch and French Broad Rivers as well as a twenty-five-mile tract south of the French Broad. John Watts, Bloody Fellow, Doublehead, and the other chiefs balked at giving up such amounts of land, but by threat, coercion, or other means, Blount secured their reluctant acquiescence. Forty-one chiefs and warriors signed the Treaty of Holston on July 2, relinquishing 2.6 million acres of land and agreeing to return captives and forgo retaliation for crimes. Blount told Governor Charles Pinckney of South Carolina he wanted more land but it was the best he could do. He said the chiefs left “well pleased.” In fact, the chiefs sent a delegation to Philadelphia to protest the treaty. “I was desirous of going to General Washington and Congress to see whether I could obtain better satisfaction,” Bloody Fellow said. Bloody Fellow (as principal spokesman), Nontuaka, Chutloh or Kingfisher, Teesteke, Kithagusta or the Prince, and two interpreters set out before the end of the year.5
Washington proclaimed the Treaty of Holston on November 11, before he learned of St. Clair’s defeat the week before.6 By the time the five chiefs arrived in Philadelphia on December 28 on board a vessel from Charleston, South Carolina, news of the disaster on the Wabash had sunk in. On January 4 the Cherokees met with Washington, who asked them to meet with Knox. Over the course of several days, in talks with Knox at his home, they voiced their complaints about the Holston Treaty. Nontuaka had met Washington before, in New York in 1789, and when he returned had “sent good talks to all the nations, of the kindness with which he was treated, and of the good intentions of General Washington to do justice to the red people about their lands. We hope General Washington has not forgotten his good talks to Nontuaka,” Bloody Fellow said; “we desire nothing more.” Bloody Fellow assured Knox they would keep the peace but asked the government to increase their annuity to $1,500, expel squatters from Cherokee land south of the ridge separating the waters of the Tennessee and the Little River, and stop the projected settlement at Muscle Shoals, an area North Carolina speculators had eyed for some time. Blount had tried to acquire the Muscle Shoals lands at the Holston Treaty, but the Cherokees insisted they could not sell as them, “as they were clearly not our property” but “common hunting grounds” belonging to the four nations. Bloody Fellow also asked Washington to send them an agent “who shall protect us in our lands, and be our friend; and who will explain all things, and at all times. He shall reside with us, and we will take care of him.”7
Washington appointed Leonard Shaw, a recent Princeton graduate, to accompany the chiefs on their journey home and serve as their temporary agent, and took the opportunity to reaffirm relations with the Cherokees. Their requests, Washington told Charles Pinckney, who had secured the Cherokees’ passage from Charleston, “were of a nature to be readily complied with,” and he submitted their request to the Senate along with Knox’s report recommending approval. The Senate approved the increase in annuity payments just two days later: $500 was a small price to pay to appease the Cherokees in the midst of an Indian war. The formal document revising the Treaty of Holston was completed and signed on February 17. The Cherokees, who had been delayed by severe winter weather that closed New York harbor, sailed for home the next day, with an additional $500 in goods and gifts from the federal government and the Quakers of Philadelphia.8
Bloody Fellow returned home “fully satisfied and pleased,” and Washington followed up by giving him “the more honorable name of General Eskaqua” or Iskagua, meaning “Clear Sky.”9 Nontuaka told the Cherokee National Council: “When we left our father, the President, and General Knox, my heart was easy.”10 It did not remain easy for long. Settlers and speculators like Blount would not stop encroaching on Cherokee land, and Washington’s government could not stop them from doing so. After waiting six months for the redress the Cherokees had been promised, Bloody Fellow declared, “Congress are Liars general Washington is a Liar & governour Blount is a Liar.”11 The Scottish traders William Panton and John McDonald worked as Spanish agents to break down Bloody Fellow’s relations with the United States. McDonald, who married a Cherokee woman, fought alongside the Cherokees during the Revolution, and lived the rest of his life with the tribe, escorted Bloody Fellow and other chiefs to Pensacola. From there they traveled to New Orleans in November 1792 to negotiate with Baron Carondelet, along
with representatives from the Chickasaws and Choctaws, and ask for assistance against American thefts of their lands.12 Blount put a price of five hundred pesos on McDonald’s head.13
Like Carondelet, Chickasaws and Choctaws watched with concern as American power expanded in the East. But Indian power in the West posed a more immediate threat. The Osages dominated the prairies between the Missouri and Arkansas and controlled the intertribal gun trade. Well-mounted and well-armed Osage warriors battled Indians who crossed the Mississippi to hunt and escape growing American pressure; they pushed other prairie tribes south and west, and they pillaged traders. According to one Chickasaw chief in 1793, the Osages were “at war with all men, white and red, steal the horses, and kill all the white men they find.” Unable to match Osage power, Spain tried to deal with them on their terms. Carondelet granted a monopoly on trading with the Osages to Auguste Chouteau and his younger half brother Pierre, members of the French family that had founded St. Louis in 1764, built its commercial empire trading with the Osages, and spent much time living with the tribe. At the same time, Carondelet tried to build a multitribal buffer against the Osages as well as against the United States. Faced with the Osage threat, Choctaws and Chickasaws set aside their differences and looked for trade and alliance with Spain or the United States or both.14
When the Cherokee delegation left for Philadelphia, the Choctaws and Chickasaws gave Bloody Fellow a white wampum belt and asked him to convey a message to the president. “Tell General Washington, that the Carolina people ought not to be appointed to hold talks with Indians, as they always ask for lands.” He should appoint someone who wanted justice, not land, they said.15 Piominko had signed the Treaty of Hopewell, befriended General James Robertson, the founder of Nashville, and led the Chickasaw scouts in St. Clair’s campaign. Knox recommended that he be “rewarded liberally” for his services and cultivated as someone who might be able to unite the Chickasaws and Choctaws as allies of the United States.16 He sent messages to the Choctaws and Chickasaws, telling them the president had received their talk and inviting them to send warriors to serve in the next campaign. He also sent Piominko and several other chiefs silver medals and “rich uniforms” and “a great white belt” from Washington “as a perpetual evidence of the pure intentions and strong affections of the United States to the Chickasaw nation.” The president invited Piominko and other chiefs to Philadelphia so he could convince them in person “how desirous he is to promote your happiness.” The peace medal and a uniform were subsequently delivered to Piominko and to the Chickasaw chiefs William and George Colbert.17 Washington hoped the favorable impression Bloody Fellow’s delegation had received during their visit would have a good effect on the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws.18
In April 1792 Blount turned back three Chickasaws on their way to Philadelphia carrying a letter from Piominko to Washington. But in August he held a conference at Nashville, which most of the Chickasaw chiefs attended, including Piominko and his rival Wolf’s Friend or Ugulayacabe. Piominko traced the Chickasaw lands on a map and said his only wish was to have the boundaries confirmed and secured. Blount lied: “The United States do not want to take land from any red people; they have land enough.” Ugulayacabe, a big man wearing a scarlet coat trimmed with silver lace and sheltering under “a large silk umbrella” in the heat of the day, handed Blount a string of white beads as a token of peace and friendship, but when he said he got all the supplies he needed from the Spaniards, Blount “looked at him with evil eyes.” Ugulayacabe told him that in the event of a war between Spain and the United States he would take no part, but he would never allow the Americans to advance any farther into Chickasaw country.19 General Robertson’s pronouncement “Never was a people more attached to a nation, than the Chickasaws are to the United States” was an exaggeration.20
Chickasaw foreign policy was a challenge for Washington’s administration. In need of allies and ammunition as they confronted the threat of war with the Creeks and raids by the Osages, the Chickasaws explored an alliance with the United States as one of their options, but Spain was an active suitor. Carondelet was willing to pay “any price” to win the friendship of Ugulayacabe and Piominko as a check on American expansion and on Osage power.21 He redoubled his diplomatic efforts with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and in October 1793 Ugulayacabe and one group joined delegates from the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and other nations in making a treaty of alliance with Spain at Nogales.22 Piominko and another group set out for Philadelphia to remind Washington of promises that had been made to supply them with arms and ammunition. They turned back because of yellow fever in the city.23
A year later, in July 1794, five chiefs (including Piominko and George Colbert), seven warriors, four boys, and an interpreter, completed the thousand-mile journey to Philadelphia. John Quincy Adams, who attended the reception “and assisted in smoking the pipe with them,” noted in his diary that some of the Chickasaws wore US Army uniforms. After the ceremonial smoking of the pipe, Washington gave a short speech, stopping at the end of each sentence for the interpreter to translate his words. He thanked them for their assistance against the misguided tribes northwest of the Ohio. “I love the Chickasaws,” he said, “and it will always afford me sincere satisfaction, to be instrumental to their happiness in any way or manner.” As a means of introducing them to “the blessings of civilized life,” he offered to support at public expense any Chickasaw boys who wished to learn to read, write, and manage a farm, and return them whenever the Chickasaws wanted. He also offered to have Knox make travel arrangements if the chiefs wanted to see New York City. Knox had furnished Washington with commissions for some of the chiefs, which “delivered by your hands will have greater value.” Piominko, who was unwell, declined to speak but said he would do so in a few days. The Chickasaws did ask questions—with “a mixture of curiosity and animosity,” Adams said—about the Cherokees who had recently been there. Then, after cake, wine, and punch were served, they shook hands and departed. More meetings were held during the next ten days. Piominko asked for a document that explicitly stated the eastern boundaries of Chickasaw territory. Washington provided the document and declared Chickasaw country under the protection of the United States.24 Ugulayacabe, meanwhile, was talking to the Spaniards.25
As so often happened, land-hungry and Indian-hating frontiersmen undermined Washington’s policies and peace initiatives. “The difficulty of deciding between lawless Settlers & greedy (land) Speculators on one side, and the jealousies of the Indian Nations & their banditti on the other, becomes more & more obvious every day,” Washington lamented to Knox.26 In December 1792 he issued a proclamation, offering a reward for the apprehension of “certain lawless and wicked persons” who had burned a Cherokee town and killed several people.27 He invited John Watts, Little Turkey, and other chiefs to come to Philadelphia, but they were hesitant to travel while there were hostilities between the Creeks and other Indians and between Indians and settlers.28
Then, in June 1793, only a few days after the Cherokees had received Washington’s invitation, said the Cherokee chief Hanging Maw, Captain John Beard, or Baird, and a group of Tennessee mounted infantry attacked Cherokee leaders who, at Blount’s request, had assembled for peace talks at Hanging Maw’s house. They killed and wounded a dozen people, including Hanging Maw’s wife.29 The Cherokees would not be coming to Philadelphia, Hanging Maw explained in a letter to Washington, whom he recalled meeting “when we were both young men and warriors.” They liked his talk of restoring peace and making their lands safe, but the white people had spoiled it. “The heads of our land thought well of going to Philadelphia, but some of them now lie dead, and some of them wounded. You need not look for us to go there at this time.” This was the third time whites had killed Cherokees when they were talking in peace. The dead had to be avenged. The territorial secretary, Daniel Smith, begged them to wait for the government to punish the perpetrators, because the president was “a great and good man, and will keep his
word.”30 The Cherokees did not buy it. A large war party set out to destroy Knoxville; instead they attacked a fortified farmstead known as Cavett’s Station, where they killed thirteen men, women, and children.31
The violence played into Spanish hands. Manuel Luis Gayoso de Lemos, governor of the Natchez District, told Indian delegates that some Americans on the frontiers were “like mad dogs doing evil to whomever they meet,” and neither Washington nor Congress could do anything to stop them.32 After yet another spate of killings, Washington reassured the Cherokees that summer that he was determined to treat “his red children … with the same humanity and justice as his white children.” He directed Blount to bring the perpetrators to justice and again invited Hanging Maw and the chiefs to Philadelphia in the fall of 1793. They would be well treated if they came; “by being face to face, the remembrance of all former injuries will be done away,” and “we may establish a firm and lasting peace and friendship.”33 It would take a lot more than that.
The Indian World of George Washington Page 56
