Smithsonian History of Aviation and Spaceflight Series
Dominick A. Pisano and Allan A. Needell, Series Editors
Since the Wright brothers’ first flight, air and space technologies have been central in creating the modern world. Aviation and spaceflight have transformed our lives—our conceptions of time and distance, our daily routines, and the conduct of exploration, business, and war. The Smithsonian History of Aviation and Spaceflight Series publishes substantive works that further our understanding of these transformations in their social, cultural, political, and military contexts.
© 2001 by Thomas J. Kelly
All rights reserved
Copy editor: Karin Kaufman
Production editor: Robert A. Poarch
Designer: Chris Hotvedt
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kelly, Thomas J., 1929–
Moon lander: how we developed the Apollo lunar module / Thomas J. Kelly.
p. cm. — (Smithsonian history of aviation and spaceflight series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-58834-273-7
1. Lunar excursion module. 2. Project Apollo (U.S.). I. Title. II. Series.
TL795.K45 2001
629.44—dc21 00-063728
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available
This is an electronic release (eISBN: 978-1-58834-361-1) of the original cloth edition
For permission to reproduce illustrations appearing in this book, please correspond directly with the owners of the works, as listed in the individual captions. Smithsonian Books does not retain reproduction rights for these illustrations individually or maintain a file of addresses for photo sources.
www.smithsonianbooks.com
v3.1_r1
To Joan, whose loving support made my lunar adventure possible.
Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
List of Illustrations
List of Acronyms
1 A Difficult Delivery
Part 1. Winning
2 We Could Go to the Moon
3 The LM Proposal
4 The Fat Lady Sings
Part 2. Designing, Building, and Testing
5 Engineering a Miracle
6 Mockups
7 Pushing Out the Drawings
8 Trimming Pounds and Ounces
9 Problems, Problems!
10 Schedule and Cost Pressures
11 Tragedy Strikes Apollo
12 Building What I Designed
Part 3. Flying
13 First LM in Space: Apollo 5
14 The Dress Rehearsals: Apollos 9 and 10
15 One Giant Leap for Mankind: Apollo 11
16 Great Balls of Fire! Apollo 12
17 Rescue in Space: Apollo 13
18 The Undaunted Warrior Triumphs: Apollo 14
19 Great Explorations: Apollos 15, 16, and 17
20 Our Future Slips Away
Epilogue: The Legacy of Apollo
Notes
Illustrations
3.1 Lunar module proposal design
5.1 Reaction control system configuration
5.2 Lunar module’s ascent stage
5.3 Lunar module’s crew compartment
5.4 Lunar module’s descent stage
6.1 Final lunar module design
7.1 NASA officials view lunar module mockup
7.2 Tom Kelly in his office, 1965
8.1 Lunar module’s weight history
12.1 Mated lunar module in final assembly
12.2 Micrometeorite and thermal shields
12.3 Tom Kelly and Dick McLaughlin at LM-1 delivery
15.1 Supporting Apollo 11 in the Spacecraft; Analysis Room
15.2 Celebrating the Apollo 11 Moon landing
Acronyms
Acronym Full Name Definition
ACE Automated checkout equipment Computerized system for testing spacecraft
AEA Abort electronics assembly Computer used in AGS
AGS Abort guidance system Backup guidance and control in LM
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics Aerospace engineering professional society and Astronautics
ALSEP Apollo lunar surface experiments Experiments deployed on the lunar surface package
AMPTF Apollo Mission Planning Task Prepared mission plans (time lines) and the Force design reference mission
APS Ascent propulsion system Ascent rocket engine and tanks
ASA Abort sensor assembly Inertial reference sensors for AGS
ASDTP Apollo Spacecraft Development Test Plan Overall program test plan
ASPO Apollo Spacecraft Program Office NASA-Houston program management group for the Apollo spacecraft
ATCA Attitude and translation control Flight-maneuver hand controllers assembly
BAFO Best and final offer Contractor’s last offer in competition
CARR Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Formal review authorizing spacecraft delivery to NASA
CDR Critical Design Review Approval of detailed design
CM Command module Launch and reentry spacecraft
CRT Cathode ray tube Monitor for computer processed data
CSM Command/service modules CM and SM mated
DECA Descent engine control assembly Descent-engine controller
DEDA Data entry and display assembly AGS data entry keyboard
DFI Development flight instrumentation Added measurements for engineering data
DOD Department of Defense U.S. Department of Defense
DPS Descent propulsion system Descent rocket motor and tanks
DR Discrepancy report Chits written against problems during reviews and flights
DRM Design reference mission “Typical” mission plan and time line to establish design requirements
ECS Environmental control system Oxygen and thermal control
EMI Electromagnetic interference Unintended electrical or magnetic signal distortion
EO Engineering order Documentation authorizing drawing changes
EOR Earth-orbit rendezvous Mission mode with two Earth launches and rendezvous and assembly in Earth orbit
EPS Electrical power system Batteries and power distribution
ETRB Executive and Technical Review Board Corporate oversight board for LM
EVA Extravehicular activity Spacewalks outside the spacecraft
FITH Fire in the hole Igniting LM ascent engine atop the descent stage
FTA Flammability test article Boilerplate LM cabin for flammability tests
GNC Guidance, navigation, and control Guidance and attitude system control
ICD Interface control document Drawings/specifications defining interfaces between spacecraft
IFM In-flight maintenance Component replacement in flight
ISS International Space Station Large space station produced by NASA and an international team
KSC Kennedy Space Center Launch site at Cape Canaveral, Florida
L/D Lift-to-drag ratio Index of aerodynamic maneuvering capability
LEM Lunar excursion module NASA’s early name for the lunar module
LES Launch escape system Escape rocket atop CM at launch
LGC LM guidance computer Computer for LM guidance and control
LM Lunar module Lunar landing spacecraft
LMP LM mission programmer Special programmer for controlling unmanned LM flight
LMS LM mission simulator Ground-based LM flight simulator
LOR Lunar-orbit rendezvous Mission mode in which LM rendezvous with CM in lunar orbit
LRV Lunar roving vehicle Electric-powered car used on later missions
LTA LM test article Full-scale, partially equipped LM for special tests
LTM LM test model Reduced-scale test model LM or components
MCC Mission Control Center Room in NASA-Houston where the flight director and controllers directed flight missions
MER Mission Evaluation Room Room in NASA Houston Building 45 where contractor engineers supported flights
MET Modular equipment transporter Hand-drawn cart for carrying equipment on lunar surface
MOCR Mission Operations Control Room Main control room in NASA-Houston MCC
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center NASA center at Houston responsible for developing the Apollo Spacecraft (now called Johnson Space Center [JSC])
MSFC Marshall Spaceflight Center NASA center at Huntsville, Alabama, responsible for booster-stage development
MSFN Manned spaceflight network Ground-based radar net work for tracking spacecraft in flight
MSR-B Mission Support Room Flight support room at Grumman-Bethpage—Bethpage
NAA North American Aviation Apollo spacecraft (CSM) contractor
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration Federal agency responsible for civilian spaceflight
O/F Oxidizer/fuel ratio Required ratio for rocket firing
O&C Operations and Checkout Building at KSC for spacecraft launch preparation
OCP Operational checkout procedure Step-by-step test procedure
OMS Orbital maneuvering system Space shuttle’s propulsion and RCS
PCM Pulse code modulation Digital sensor readout technique
PD Preliminary Design Engineering group for systems studies and proposals
PDR Preliminary Design Review Meeting for approval of preliminary design
RCS Reaction control system Small rockets that control attitude and maneuvers
RFP Request for proposals NASA’s invitation to contractor bids
RTG Radioisotope thermoelectric generator Isotope power source for ALSEP
S/CAT Spacecraft Assembly and Test LM final assembly and test organization
S&C Stabilization and control Controls flight attitude and maneuvering
SCAPE Self-contained air protection equipment Propellant-resistant suit
SEB Source Evaluation Board Proposal evaluators
SIM Scientific instrument module Moon observation sensors aboard CSM
SLA Spacecraft/LM adapter Structure housing LM on Saturn
SM Service module Consumable and propul sion module for CM
SPAN Spacecraft Analysis Room in Mission Control from which spacecraft contractors supported flights
SPS Service propulsion system Rocket engine system in SM
SSA Source selection authority Senior source selection official
STG Space Task Group Organization at NASA-Langley studying manned spaceflight
STM Spacecraft team manager Responsible for a specific spacecraft (LM or CSM)
SWIP Super Weight Improvement Program Major weight reduction effort
TPP Total package procurement Fixed-price purchase of weapon system
TPS Test preparation sheet Detailed procedures for readying LM for tests and checkout
TSM Technical staff meeting Daily LM engineering meeting
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building Facility at KSC for assembling the Apollo booster and spacecraft “stack”
VHF Very high frequency 2.5 to 3 megahertz for LM
VIP Very important persons Special viewing area in Mission Control
1
A Difficult Delivery
Bone weary, I shuffled across the Grumman parking lot after midnight under a full Moon, its light throwing my shadow ahead on the asphalt. I looked up, hesitated, stopped, and stared. The Moon looked close enough to touch, but it seemed impossibly far away. Almost a quarter of a million miles.
Galileo named the shadows on the Moon Maria because he thought they were oceans. The Egyptians plotted its phases. The Druid builders of Stonehenge calculated its rise and fall. Down through the ages, people have stared at the Moon’s mysterious surface and wondered what was there. And now I—an obscure young engineer working for a small Long Island airplane company—I was going to provide the answers? It seemed absurd to me.
But the next morning I was back in the shop supervising a team preparing the lunar module spacecraft for its first test in space, a vital step in putting men on the Moon. Whenever I thought we had passed a crisis and the pressure of readying the craft would ease, we would find yet another broken wire in the spacecraft and have to stuff yet another two hours of splicing and retesting into our twenty-four-hour work schedule.
We were scrambling to complete the required tests, equipment installations, and inspections on LM-1, which was specially equipped to be flown unmanned in Earth orbit to verify the operation of the craft’s major systems in space. It would be launched alone atop a Saturn 1B booster rocket, a smaller, two-stage precursor to the mighty three-stage Saturn 5, which would launch the combined Apollo spacecraft (command module [CM], service module [SM], and lunar module [LM; pronounced “lem”]) to the Moon.
The lunar module was my baby; I had led the technical studies and proposals that over a period of two and a half years resulted in Grumman’s winning a NASA competition to design, develop, and build it. (After the first Moon landing, I was called “the Father of the LM.”) It began in early 1960, when I was assigned to the Space Group in Grumman’s Preliminary Design (PD) Department and told to find out about NASA’s plans to put men on the Moon. We put company-funded effort into both studying the missions NASA was investigating and designing conceptual spacecraft to accomplish them. When President Kennedy announced in May 1961 that America would indeed put men on the Moon, Grumman had in place a knowledgeable technical study group that could prepare a competitive proposal.
Nevertheless, our company fathers decided that Project Apollo was too big for our small aircraft company. They directed that we work as subcontractor to a larger prime contractor, General Electric (GE). We gained a place on GE’s Apollo proposal team as the command module crew compartment subcontractor. Joe Gavin headed Grumman’s effort as vice president and program director, and I led the technical work as project engineer. As it turned out, the Apollo spacecraft competition was won by North American Aviation, but Grumman gained a great deal of knowledge and insight into the program as a result of the GE proposal effort.
We bounced back by helping NASA resolve how to perform the lunar landing and exploration mission, developing the rationale behind favoring the lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR) approach. My group worked out many variations on both the mission and the design of the lunar module, the unique spacecraft that LOR required. When NASA decided upon LOR for Apollo, Grumman was well prepared. I led the technical proposal effort in the fall of 1962 that won the job for us over seven competitors.
After contract award, as project engineer and then engineering manager, I was the chief engineer for LM at Grumman. I directed the LM engineering team, which grew from an initial few dozen people to about three thousand at its peak, as LM progressed from preliminary to detailed design and, finally, to manufacturing assembly and testing. In February 1967, as the critical activities shifted from engineering to assembly and testing, I was put in charge of LM Spacecraft Assembly and Test (S/CAT).
As S/CAT transformed the LM from lines on paper into functional hardware, I strengthened the dedicated but undermanned crew by adding engineers and providing additional training and supervision. The work was slow and frustrating because we were developing many new things at once: the LM spacecraft itself, the critical manufacturing processes needed to build it, the ground-support equipment and acceptance-checkout equipment that tested it, and the detailed written procedures that controlled and documented every action
we performed on it.
We were under pressure to solve problems quickly and to complete the preparations for LM-1’s delivery to the launch site at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. The Apollo Project’s goal, set by President Kennedy, was to land men on the Moon before the end of the decade, less than three years away. Although we still could not keep to promised schedules, we had completed most of the tests and installations required for LM-1’s delivery. The LM-1 Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) was scheduled for 21 June 1967 at Grumman’s main facility in Bethpage, Long Island, New York.
The CARR was a formal review lasting one week, attended by more than two hundred NASA engineers and their Grumman counterparts. Its purpose was to establish LM-1’s compliance with all NASA and Grumman requirements by reviewing the documentation accumulated on the spacecraft as it was built and tested in S/CAT and at our suppliers. The LM-1 itself would be physically inspected by the review team.
The review team was organized into panels according to technical disciplines and systems. As the panels waded through the assembled documentation, they generated discrepancy reports, called DRs or “chits,” for any apparent deviation from requirements, which were reviewed each night by the panel co-chairmen (NASA and Grumman) and “dispositioned” by categories.1 Only chits in the “Unresolved” category were presented to the CARR Board for decision on the final day of the review.
The CARR was semiorganized chaos. Finding adequate work space and meeting rooms for more than four hundred members of forty panels was a challenge, as was the effort required to gather, reproduce, and index the thousands of documents that had to be scrutinized. A review center was established in three large conference rooms on the first floor of Plant 25, the primary LM engineering building. Many of the reviewers physically inspected items on LM-1, which remained in the Assembly and Test clean room for final outfitting. I made sure that S/CAT completed all remaining LM-1 items required before delivery.
Grumman’s senior vice president, George Titterton, handled the meeting arrangements. A five-foot-two blustery man who was determined to prove he could take on any challenge, he decided to pattern the CARR on the annual Grumman stockholders’ meeting. The day before the meeting, airplanes were moved out of the Plant 4 flight operations hangar onto the adjacent apron and a wooden dais was assembled at one end of the cavernous space. The hangar had a vaulted elliptical roof, and its end walls nested ceiling-high sliding doors that could be fully opened to allow the crowd to assemble and disperse easily. Several hundred folding wooden chairs were set up in rows facing the dais, and a portable sound system and several large trumpet-shaped loudspeakers on collapsible metal stands were provided to penetrate the acoustically dead environment. Behind the last row of folding chairs there was a food catering area, complete with serving counters and dining tables and chairs. A large projection screen was positioned catty-cornered on the stage, where it could be viewed by both the CARR Board and the audience, and lecterns and microphones were provided for the board chairman and the briefer.
Moon Lander: How We Developed the Apollo Lunar Module (Smithsonian History of Aviation and Spaceflight) Page 1
