by mike Evans
It is the Sunni Arab heartland of Iraq that has become the battleground for American forces, terrorists, Shiite militias, and leftovers of those who supported the Baathists. Baghdad is a city divided into armed camps. Concrete barriers protect public buildings, hotels, and the homes of the rich and powerful. The wealthiest Iraqis fund their own private security forces, as do ministers and other government officials. Baghdad has come under a miasma of murders, kidnappings, robbery, and rape—a poster child for the breakdown of civil authority.
While Sunnis are a minority (roughly 32 to 37 percent of the nation including Arabs and Kurds), they have ruled Iraq—and none too kindly—since the Ottoman Empire began control of the area nearly five hundred years ago. As a result, tensions between the factions have not been difficult to ignite.
The answer to ending Iraqi sectarian violence is not dividing Iraq into semiautonomous regions or states, but rather closing the spigot of Iranian and Syrian support of fractious militias and suicide bombers. It means securing the Iraqi borders so that the flow of terrorists and weapons into the country can be made much more difficult.
Again I say, since Syria is almost as much a puppet of Iran as Hezbollah, the road to victory in Iraq leads through Tehran. If we are to stop the fighting, we must squelch the hate-mongering flow of propaganda from the Islamofascists aimed at toppling the free world for their own agenda of Islamic domination. Eliminate the flame-throwers in Tehran, and don’t be surprised when the fires in Baghdad suddenly get small enough for the Iraqis to handle themselves.
THE PROBLEM OF DIVIDING UP OIL REVENUES
According to conventional studies, Iraq now holds the third largest known oil reserves in the world at roughly 115 billion barrels (this is behind Saudi Arabia’s 260 billion and Canada’s 180 billion). However, oil experts also believe that the deserts of western Iraq—only about 10 percent of which have been explored—may hold as much as 100 billion barrels more, while others believe that it may prove to have even larger oil reserves than Saudi Arabia. It is a fact that seems to have Tehran and Damascus salivating and hoping the United States cuts Iraq up to make the pickings easier.
Iraq’s oil is also nearer to the surface than it is in other countries and therefore easier to extract, making it much more profitable. Estimates are that Iraq can produce oil at $1 to $1.50 a barrel, while it costs about $5 a barrel in other countries and as much as $12–16 a barrel in the North Sea. Analyst Mohammad Al-Gallani pointed out in the Canadian Press that of the 526 potential drilling sites in Iraq, only 125 have been opened.12 However, despite its potential, much of Iraq’s oil extraction infrastructure has been damaged in the wars of the last three decades, and it will take some time to get these fields efficiently productive again.
Iraq’s major oil fields are in two locations: Kirkuk in the north and around Al-Basra in the south. Roughly 65 percent of Iraq’s known oil reserves are in the Shiite south. Kirkuk holds roughly ten billion barrels but is also quite close to the other major fields of Bay Hassan, Jambur, and Khabbaz. If Iraq were divided in three regions, it is likely Kirkuk would be controlled by the Kurds and the southern fields in the south by the Shiites, leaving a disproportionately small amount to the central/western Sunni area.
While the Iraqi Constitution, as Senator Biden pointed out, allows for the formation of regions within Iraq, it was the Sunnis who showed the least support for the Constitution because of this. They knew there was an incredible risk of their being denied partial control of the oil production and revenues if Iraq were divided along ethnoreligious lines. Neither did the Sunnis want to be forced to rely on the good faith of their Kurdish and Shiite neighbors for financial support.
In my recent interview with former Navy captain Charles Nash, he told me that one of the reasons Iraq needed to stay together was that the different regions need each other if they are to succeed economically. While most of the oil is in the south, he noted that the south also has the most fertile soil for farming in all of the Middle East. The area could easily become the breadbasket of the entire region—something both the Kurds and Sunni Arabs could greatly benefit from with one exception: the Sunnis in the central region of Iraq have control of the greatest water supply in the Middle East, because of the courses of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. As one nation, Iraq has the potential to be a regional economic powerhouse; divided, it continues squabbling, and many in the Middle East stay hungry.13
A plan to give each region oil revenues proportionate to their populations seems fair, but again, the Sunnis would have no real control of the production in the other two regions and could not increase or decrease that production as demanded by their economy. It is a recipe for disaster. If there is a cause for civil war, it would be over that lack of control of its own destiny. Then borders dividing the Sunnis from these oil fields would serve as little more than Mason-Dixon lines.
ARE WE WILLING TO COMPROMISE OUR VALUES FOR THE SAKE OF GETTING OUT SOONER?
Another major problem with the idea of partitioning Iraq into three regions is the racial and religious segregation it would condone. Have we forgotten the point of the civil rights movement in the United States? After dismantling segregation at home and fighting apartheid in South Africa, are we now going to sanctify the sectarianism that is causing the strife in the streets of Iraq?
It is as if we learned nothing from fighting the previous two World Wars. World War I ended with too high a price exacted by the victors—a solution that only laid the foundations for World War II. Had we ended it instead by securing Germany’s political future and solidifying its government before withdrawing, World War II might never have happened. Did we depose the Baath Party only to let Iraq fall into more dangerous hands? Did we end the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan only to return it to the merciless tribal warlords who ruled it before them? If we do not replace the iron-fisted regimes with freedom-friendly governments, we will only face bigger problems down the road. Partitioning Iraq into three regions and then withdrawing our troops would weaken Iraq’s future, put a stamp of approval on their racism, and make it easier for Iran and Syria to pick the country apart after our forces are gone.
In addition to this, it is also worth noting that partitioning countries has never led to lasting peace. Let’s not forget it has been tried in Israel, India, Korea, Vietnam, Cyprus, and Bosnia—and those places are still political time bombs today.
BRINGING THE WAR BACK HOME
By bringing our troops home before Iraq is secure, we also turn the attention of terrorists back to their activities on U.S. soil rather than abroad. As terrorist responses to the Iraq Study Group plan have shown, the only thing terrorists are looking forward to more than winning in Iraq is being able to focus their attention once more on attacking Americans at home. As long as we keep them engaged in Iraq, attacks in the United States are much less likely. Should we withdraw our troops from Iraq before accomplishing all that they were initially sent to do—namely, deposing a terrorist-supporting regime and replacing it with one that will help us fight terrorism—then all we will have accomplished is to have strengthened their resolve to strike us again.
While it is unquestionable that we do not want to lose more lives to terrorist activities anywhere in the world—and that minimizing our military causalities is an important goal—who is better prepared to bear the brunt of such attacks: our military forces or our civilian population? In the end, the question should really not be one of withdrawing our troops to avoid harm but of the best way to reduce the risks of seeing them injured or killed. Perhaps the question should not be one of fewer troops but of more troops, or, as Daniel Pipes has suggested, concentrating our troops in less populated areas and getting them out of the crossfire between Sunnis and Shiites. While this is certain to allow more civil violence in Iraq, it would maintain the presence we need to keep the region stable, emphasize the need for Iraqis to police their own streets, and, as Pipes put it, “permit the American-led troops to carry out essential tasks (protecting border
s, keeping the oil and gas flowing, ensuring that no Saddam-like monster takes power) while ending their non-essential work (maintaining street-level order, guarding their own barracks).”14
President Bush reiterated why we need our troops on the ground in Iraq in a press conference on October 25, 2006:
Despite the difficulties and bloodshed, it remains critical that America defeat the enemy in Iraq by helping the Iraqis build a free nation that can sustain itself and defend itself.
Our security at home depends on ensuring that Iraq is an ally in the war on terror and does not become a terrorist haven like Afghanistan under the Taliban….
…The fact that the fighting is tough does not mean our efforts in Iraq are not worth it. To the contrary; the consequences in Iraq will have a decisive impact on the security of our country, because defeating the terrorists in Iraq is essential to turning back the cause of extremism in the Middle East. If we do not defeat the terrorists or extremists in Iraq, they will gain access to vast oil reserves, and use Iraq as a base to overthrow moderate governments across the broader Middle East. They will launch new attacks on America from this new safe haven. They will pursue their goal of a radical Islamic empire that stretches from Spain to Indonesia….
If I did not think our mission in Iraq was vital to America’s security, I’d bring our troops home tomorrow….
Our troops are fighting a war that will set the course for this new century. The outcome will determine the destiny of millions across the world. Defeating the terrorists and extremists is the challenge of our time and the calling of this generation. I’m confident this generation will answer that call and defeat an ideology that is bent on destroying America and all that we stand for.15
Unfortunately, such words of resolve are falling on deaf ears. Democrats and liberals are trying to convince America that the war was ill-conceived, that they were misled into supporting it, and that the cost has already been too great. Meanwhile they avoid the issue that pulling out now would guarantee an even greater and more costly conflict down the road. Again, their humanistic blinders are keeping them from seeing the true nature of the Islamofascists’ doggedness and determination to end the dominance of Western democratic philosophy and replace it with Sharia law. Is that really so easily missed in Ahmadinejad’s letter to President Bush?
Liberalism and Western-style democracy have not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity. Today these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can already hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the Liberal democratic systems.16
ADMITTING DEFEAT
In his NewsHour With Jim Lehrer interview, Peter Galbraith advocated the division of Iraq into highly autonomous regions by saying it this way:
Our ability to influence events in Iraq is extremely limited. I see no purpose for a continued U.S. presence in the Shiite southern half of Iraq.
It is true that, if we withdraw, it will be theocratic. It will not apply the human rights provisions in the Iraqi constitution, and it will be dominated by Iran. But that’s the case now, and we aren’t going to do anything to change it.17
This pretty much summed up Galbraith’s comments overall. For Democrats like him and Senator Biden: things are bad now and there is nothing we can really do to change them, so why not pull out and cut our losses? They speak as if leaving Iraq in the hands of Iran is something that will save U.S. lives in the long run. The liberals are too ready to surrender to the terrorists, blame the loss on the Republicans, and think afterward they can laugh themselves all the way to the White House in 2008 with little thought as to what that president will face because of their shortsightedness.
I wonder how it made the Democratic winners feel to have Al Qaeda celebrate their November 2006 midterm victories. Shortly after those elections Abu Hamza al-Muhajir said on an Internet audio, “The American people have put their feet on the right path by…realizing their president’s betrayal in supporting Israel. So they voted for something reasonable in the last elections.”18 Al-Muhajir sounded as if he were gladly welcoming new allies into the U.S. Congress. I pray to God he was wrong, but liberals are going to need to wake up. If they continue on the path they are on at present, they will be just the allies for whom al-Muhajir is hoping.
We need to get back to winning this battle, as I have already outlined, and set our resolve to accept nothing short of clear victory in Iraq. If we don’t find the moral clarity to fight this evil until it is soundly defeated, all we will be doing is importing the war back to U.S. soil and facing a far bloodier war down the road. Is that what we really want to do?
Chapter Four
THE CENTERS OF GRAVITY
There is no way, either to stabilize the situation in Iraq, or to solve any kind of conflict around us—the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, all other conflicts—without dealing today with this Iranian regime…. The center of gravity to deal with the problem today is Iran.?
—LT. GEN. MOSHE YA’ALON,
former Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff,
now a fellow at the Washington Institute for
Middle East Policy
I believe that the Iranians are a very politically aware group of folks—as are the folks that are running Al Qaeda, who are the Sunni extremists. All of these people at the top leadership of these countries and these organizations understand that the center of gravity in the war against them is the will of the American people to fight.?
—CAPT. CHARLES NASH,
retired U.S. Navy pilot of more than twenty-five years
and member of the Iran Policy Committee
For the American people in late March and April of 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom seemed a textbook example of what modern warfare could be. In less than six weeks, U.S.-led coalition forces took on Saddam Hussein’s defiant regime as an initial step in the war on terrorism that began in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our air raids were surgically precise, losses were at a minimum, civilians were spared as much as possible, and Iraqis celebrated in the streets and toppled statues of the dictator in what looked like the tearing down of the Berlin wall. Americans read into President Bush’s May 1, 2003, proclamation of the end of major combat operations3 nothing short of complete victory. A “Mission Accomplished” banner hung proudly behind him from the USS Abraham Lincoln as he made this speech—and on that day no one was willing to say otherwise.
A JUST WAR?
Why was Operation Iraqi Freedom necessary in the first place? It has been an issue of some debate in the years since President Bush gave that speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. It’s now a mantra of preference among liberals that the United States was tricked by oil-greedy Republicans to invade Iraq and that we never should have toppled Hussein’s Baathist regime in the first place.
The seeds of the second Gulf War were sown in the late 1990s in Somalia. Jihadist forces, under the command of Ayman al-Zawahiri—a suspected instigator of the August 7, 1998, bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya—were aided and funded by Iraq through Sudan. The union was solidified in 1998–1999 with the realization between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden that cooperation was vital in order to humiliate the “Great Satan” of the United States and its “Little Satan” Middle Eastern ally, Israel. While courting bin Laden, Hussein was also paying homage to Yasser Arafat, supporting the Palestinian Authority’s terror network by showering monetary awards on the families of suicide bombers attacking Israel. The plan was to create total disarray in the Middle East, thereby jeopardizing the interests of the United States and its regional allies, which also include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan.
When terrorists struck at the heart of America on 9/11, what had been the possibility of a war on terror became a grim reality. Noting the response to the attacks, Hussein was persuaded that after Afghanistan, Iraq would be first on President Bush’s list of terrorist-harboring, terrorist-supporting nations and that an attack was imminent
. Hussein began to plot a possible guerrilla defense against a U.S. invasion.
One of the most prolific providers of information to the West on Saddam Hussein’s war plan was Lt. Col. al-Dabbagh. He spent in excess of seven years spying on Hussein, in persistent fear for his life. Al-Dabbagh’s reports were delivered through Dr. Ayad Allawi, cofounder of the Iraqi National Accord, an exile group that opposed Hussein’s regime, and the man who would serve as the first interim president in the new Iraqi government after Hussein’s fall.
One of the documents forwarded to London by al-Dabbagh was the minutes of a Hussein meeting in December 2001. The gathering of top military commanders focused on how Iraq would defend itself against an almost inescapable U.S. attack. Aware of the impossibility of winning a conventional war, Hussein ordered large caches of weapons to be deposited at various locations throughout Iraq. According to the document, Hussein was concerned with “how to sustain the continuation of war after occupation.”4
According to Lt. Col. al-Dabbagh, it was at about this time that he and other senior commanders were informed that Saddam intended to deploy his WMD arsenal to defend the country against an American-led attack. Dr. Allawi said of this information from al-Dabbagh:
