by Mark Zuehlke
TWENTY-ONE
Summer of Stalemate
JULY-AUGUST 1814
Although many Federalists and New Englanders grumbled and postured, in fact no organized plan to impeach James Madison existed. While northerners remained ill disposed to support the war, there was little popular support for bringing Madison down.
There was also no forum for Federalists so inclined to argue their case. Congress was in recess until October. Despite the crisis posed by the British reinforcement, Madison had no intention of issuing an early recall. Doing so, he feared, would only “uselessly spread alarm.”1
Yet Madison was personally alarmed. At a July 1 executive meeting, he warned that the “fierce aspect which British military power now had” made it almost a certainty that “the capital would be marked as the most inviting object of a speedy attack.”2 He wanted 10,000 men, including at least 1,000 regulars, raised to defend the District of Columbia. Madison created a special capital military district commanded by Brig. Gen. William H. Winder of Maryland. A peacetime Baltimore lawyer and nephew of the state’s Federalist governor, Winder’s appointment was intended to facilitate cooperation between state and federal officials in developing the district’s defences.3 Everyone except John Armstrong concurred. Armstrong countered that Baltimore more likely faced attack because of its strategic naval importance. Protect both cities, Madison replied. Clearly the British could strike anywhere along the eastern seaboard or even at New Orleans. Madison ordered the drafting of a defensive plan for all the ports from Boston to New Orleans and issued a call to “invite” the state governors to raise an army of 93,000 militiamen to provide coastal defence.4
Armstrong had no intention of complying. He merely issued a circular inviting the governors to call out thousands of militia, left Winder to prepare Washington’s defences while providing no resources to do so, and turned his attention to the campaign against the Niagara Peninsula, over which he could exert no meaningful control. Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown’s northern army was too distant from Washington for Armstrong’s furtive directives to influence events. News from this front was scant and generally weeks out of date by the time it arrived. Armstrong downplayed the threat to coastal cities, declaring that excessive “bustle” would convince the British that the populace was afraid. Panic must be avoided. Pleas from coastal city councils for federal assistance building fortifications were ignored. Repeatedly, the Washington mayor sought Armstrong’s commitment to mobilize the local militia only to have his concerns dismissed by assurances that the city was not at risk.5 The secretary of war’s attention remained firmly fixed to the northwest.
The campaign in Niagara had begun on July 3, when Brown bypassed Fort Niagara by crossing upriver of the falls, with Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott’s brigade landing below Fort Erie and Brig. Gen. Eleazer Ripley just above. Brown’s entire force consisted of only 3,400 men, of which about 2,400 were New England regulars divided evenly between the two brigadiers. The rest consisted of more than 300 artillerymen and some 600 Pennsylvania volunteers. There were also about 600 friendly Indians. Although small it outnumbered the fewer than 2,500 British troops divided into several garrisons. Most of the redcoats manned Fort George or Fort Niagara. Only 137 were posted to Fort Erie.6
Brown’s troops were better trained than those of previous campaigns—credit for this going to Scott. Previously the troops had been barely trained in marching and battle-formation drill, the assumption being that accurate musketry was what mattered. Relying on a tattered copy of Napoleon Bonaparte’s regulations for the French army, Scott relentlessly trained officers and men. Ten hours a day, virtually every day, drill was conducted until the men were not only thoroughly competent with musket and bayonet but could also efficiently perform in squad, company, and battalion formations. Strict discipline and maintenance of hygiene were emphasized so successfully that dysentery all but disappeared from the military camp and the men’s morale increased greatly.7Despite a lack of blue cloth for standard army uniforms, the men marched to battle sharply turned out in grey jackets and white trousers—an outfit that would become known as Cadet’s Grey after it was adopted as standard dress for West Point cadets.8
Fort Erie fell to Brown’s Indians, who discovered that the rear of the fort facing away from the water was almost undefended and managed to fight their way inside. After firing several cannon rounds to maintain their honour, the British surrendered.
Learning of the American crossing at mid-morning, Maj. Gen. Phineas Riall sent five companies of the Royal Scots from Fort George to reinforce the now threatened garrison at Chippawa. Riall galloped ahead, gathering up troops scattered among various outposts. Long lines of redcoats soon double-timed along the river road.
At sunrise on July 4, the Americans marched from Fort Erie toward Chippawa. Clear skies promised a warm day. Before them British light troops under Chippawa’s commander, Lt. Col. Thomas Pearson, exchanged musket fire with Scott’s advance scouts and damaged bridges crossing the many creeks and ditches. Despite this harassment, Scott reached Chippawa by sunset. Realizing he had outdistanced Ripley’s brigade and the combined Pennsylvania volunteers and Indians under Gen. Peter Buel Porter, he fell back a mile to put Street’s Creek between himself and the British. The rest of the American force encamped close by.
Thinking the British would remain on the defensive, Scott decided to throw a belated July 4 dinner followed by a dress parade. For security, Porter’s force was sent to drive away the British light troops who had been harassing the American lines. The festivities were just being readied when Scott learned the British had crossed the Chippawa and were headed his way.
Riall’s attack represented a gamble, for he had only 1,500 regulars and about 300 militia and Indians. But he assumed the Americans would be as disorganized as always. Hit them hard and they should bolt.
Instead, Scott’s brigade moved to meet him. The Americans stood with backs to the creek, formed into the long firing line that the redcoats favoured. Riall’s men were on the road, packed in columns rather like the formation common to French assaults. Disconcerted by this reversal of form, Riall was heartened to see the Americans wore grey uniforms, assuming them to be militia. Just then the facing troops wheeled their line with uncanny precision as if conducting a parade-ground drill. “Those are regulars, by God!” he exclaimed.
Muskets fixed with bayonets were quickly raised as the Americans let loose a devastating volley. Holding back his centre, Scott threw both his flanks slightly outward so that the musketry slashed into the advancing columns from three sides. Riall galloped about trying to rally his troops, but soon gaps opened in the British lines. Unable to close with the Americans, they faltered and then broke. Riall was one of the last to leave the field.9
The British lost 148 killed, 22 wounded, and 46 taken prisoner. American casualties were overall higher at about 300, but only 60 were fatal. With only Scott’s brigade involved, Riall’s troops had enjoyed numerical superiority, but American steadiness won the day.10
Scott’s victory at Chippawa forced a general withdrawal to Fort George. The Americans pursued as far as Queenston, where they paused on July 10 to fortify the heights. Brown ordered the army halted until Commodore Isaac Chauncey could bring up the naval squadron. He hoped Chauncey would supply some heavy guns for reducing Fort George and Fort Niagara.
Three days later not a single sail had yet appeared on Lake Ontario. Brown sent an urgent appeal. “Meet me on the lake shore north of Fort George with your fleet, and we will be able, I have no doubt, to … break the power of the enemy in Upper Canada …. At all events let me hear from you …. For God’s sake let me see you.”
Chauncey ignored him. Claiming to be laid low by fever, but more determined not to subordinate his fleet to the army or risk leaving Sackets Harbor undefended, the commodore allowed the American offensive to crumble. Knowing Riall was receiving more reinforcements in the form of local militia and redcoats marching from the east, Brown withdrew on July 24 to the
south bank of the Chippawa. His army was in an ever-weakening state. Casualties and illness had reduced it to 2,644 effectives, and there was no prospect of reinforcement.11
Riall sent an advance guard of 1,000 men under Lieutenant Colonel Pearson after them. On Monday morning, July 25, Pearson established his troops atop a hill where Lundy’s Lane intersected the road paralleling the Niagara River. At the same time, Lt. Gen. Gordon Drummond reached Fort George from York with about 500 reinforcements. Drummond moved this force to the American side of the river to threaten Brown’s supply base at Fort Schlosser. No sooner did they cross over than Drummond changed his mind and recalled them. Instead, he ordered Riall to take everyone and join Pearson. By noon, the British had about 1,600 men at Lundy’s Lane. Another 1,200 regulars and militia with two six-pound guns were on the way from Burlington.
Brown had, meanwhile, learned of the British move on Fort Schlosser. Knowing he was helpless to defend his supply base, Brown decided to advance on Fort George in the hope that the British would turn about to protect their own supply line. Accordingly, at about four in the afternoon, Scott wheeled his brigade about and made for the fort. Two hours later, he approached Lundy’s Lane with 1,072 men. Across an open plain, a ribbon of scarlet lay unfurled across a low hill. Bayonets and the brass of several cannon close to the summit glistened in the sun.
No sooner had Drummond arrived on the scene than, as he laconically put it, “the whole front was warmly and closely engaged.”12 Throwing his men at the British with fierce determination, Scott achieved initial success on the left flank, where the line was driven back. Suffering from a bad wound (which eventually led to the amputation of an arm), Riall was captured. In the twilight’s gathering gloom the Americans attacked repeatedly, trying to take the British guns. Hand-to-hand fights developed and gunners were bayoneted, but each time counterattacks drove Scott’s men off.
By nine o’clock Scott had barely 600 men, but reinforced by Porter’s and Ripley’s brigades, the fight continued. Using the cover of shrubs, one of Ripley’s regiments overcame the guns with a flank attack. Ripley’s men slowly began to push the British line back. At this pivotal moment the 1,200 men from Burlington arrived and the line straightened.
The fighting raged on, confused by darkness. Cannon were exchanged repeatedly as attack met counterattack. Men fired muskets at point-blank range. Scott was bleeding heavily from a musket ball that shattered his left shoulder joint. Brown was shot in the right thigh and then stunned when a spent cannonball struck him.13 Ripley had taken command, but the Americans were so cut up he ordered a withdrawal to the camp across the Chippawa. The dead-tired British and Canadians let them go; a pursuit in the darkness was likely to achieve nothing. From his stretcher, Brown claimed victory on the grounds that the British did not pursue. Yet the Americans had surrendered the field, giving Drummond a tactical victory. American casualties totalled 171 dead, 572 wounded, and 110 missing. Of these, 560 were from Scott’s brigade. The British fared no better, with 84 killed, 559 wounded, 193 missing, and 42 taken prisoner. Lundy’s Lane was the war’s bloodiest battle.14
Ripley retreated to Fort Erie and strengthened its defences, expecting any moment to face a British attack. But Drummond decided to await reinforcements from Kingston, which had to come overland rather than aboard Commodore Sir James Yeo’s fleet because Commodore Chauncey had finally sortied out of Sackets Harbor aboard Superior on August 1 to assert American dominance of Lake Ontario. Ironically, Chauncey now controlled the lake when it was too late to support the American offensive, while Yeo conceded the issue just as his ability to reinforce Drummond’s advance on Fort Erie could have sped the pace of events to British benefit.
Chauncey’s ships demonstrated off Fort George on August 5 and he haughtily dismissed all criticism for failing to sail earlier by pointing out that Brown’s troops never got closer to the lakeshore than Queenston, so his presence one way or the other would have been immaterial. Leaving several small schooners to blockade the mouth of the Niagara, Chauncey sailed to the eastern end of the lake and blockaded Kingston.
Much vexed by this development, Governor Prevost wrote Lord Bathurst on August 14 to complain that whereas reinforcements could have reached Drummond in two days by water, the troops now had to march more than 250 miles overland through “a tract of Country impenetrable for the conveyance of Extensive supplies.” After sixteen to twenty day.’ marching they arrived “fatigued, and with an exhausted equipment.” By comparison, American reinforcements arrived fresh and ready for battle.15
This last observation evidenced Prevost’s predilection to exaggerate American strength. Other than receiving a new commander, Brig. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, who arrived at Fort Erie from Sackets Harbor, the Americans received few reinforcements and numbered just 2,200 men, who were poorly supplied.
Drummond first attempted a raid on Buffalo to destroy the enemy supply depot there, hoping to force the Americans to abandon the Canadian side of the Niagara in order to protect their vulnerable supply lines. Although his thinking was sound, the operation proved a fiasco. Six hundred redcoats gained the American shore uncontested, but soon encountered a lightly defended breastwork where a firefight broke out. Although half of the British troops were veterans, the orderly line crumbled. Men crouched, ducked, lay down, crawled behind fallen logs or into bushes, and altogether displayed, in the words of Lt. Col. J. Tucker, an “unpardonable degree of unsteadiness, without possessing one solitary excuse.” Unable to control them, Tucker abandoned the attack and returned to the British camp two miles north of Fort Erie.16
Still, Drummond delayed laying siege to the fort, waiting instead for heavy guns to be dragged up from Fort George for use in breaching the walls. Finally, on August 13 the siege began in earnest. It was quickly realized that the guns were too far back to have much effect. Only one shot out of ten reached the ramparts, and these, observed Briton Dr. William Dunlop, harmlessly bounced off.17
After two days of this fitful bombardment, Drummond ordered a general assault on the night of August 14–15. The attack was to strike the defences simultaneously at three points under cover of darkness. Drummond divided his 2,200 men into three columns, of which one numbered 1,200, another 650, and the third 250.18
At 2:00 a.m., the main column stepped out toward Snake Hill, a sandy mound right of the fort dominated by an American battery. Ripley’s brigade faced them and he expected the attack. The column marched into withering fire and then found its path blocked by an abatis the men were unable to breach. Although some got around this obstacle by wading along the Lake Erie shoreline, they were quickly cut off and captured. The column was forced to retire.
Meanwhile, the smallest column attacked Douglass Battery, but its commander was soon killed. Disorganized, the soldiers drifted toward the centre in the face of relentless fire and mixed in with the central column attacking the fort itself. Three times this combined force tried to breach the defences, only to be thrown back. A fourth effort gained the northeast bastion and overran the cannon, but, unable to advance farther, the redcoats could only try to hold the bastion until reinforced. The reserves never came, and shortly after daylight tragedy struck when an ammunition chest caught fire and “a most tremendous explosion followed by which almost all the troops which had entered the place were dreadfully mangled.” Dr. Dunlop, caught inside the bastion, miraculously escaped unharmed. He was soon “scouring along the road at the top of my speed, with a running accompaniment of grape, canister and musketry whistling about my ears.”19 Those who survived retreated.
Drummond’s assault was in ruins. Casualties totalled 905, of which 57 were killed, 309 wounded, and another 539 reported missing. In the aftermath, the Americans found 222 British dead on the field—most inside the destroyed bastion. How many others had been reduced to uncountable body parts or had taken the opportunity to desert was impossible to determine. Drummond suspected more deserted than were killed, for he had noted that the morale of the British regulars was fal
ling dramatically. Many troops were undisciplined and openly rebellious. In a letter to Prevost, he assumed responsibility for the attack’s failure. But he also attested that the “agony of mind I suffer, from the present disgraceful and unfortunate conduct of the troops committed to my superintendence, wounds me to the soul!”
American casualties were just 84 officers and men.20
The siege continued, with Drummond receiving another 1,200 reinforcements. Slowly the guns were pushed up to a battery closer to the American lines and inflicted real damage. Yet morale among the Americans remained high even after a shell wounded Brigadier General Gaines on August 29. Recovered from his wounds, Major General Brown returned to the fort and resumed command.
Meanwhile, the British situation steadily worsened. September brought incessant rains that reduced the camp into “a lake in the midst of a thick wood.” Chauncey’s blockade reduced the flow of supplies that reached Drummond to a thin trickle. Ammunition was particularly short. Hundreds of men were sick and the rain depressed them all. Yet they laboured on and by mid-month had placed guns in a third battery only 500 yards from the fort, from which their fire could tear great holes in its breastworks.
Recognizing the threat on the afternoon of September 17, Brown ordered 1,600 troops to destroy the battery standing on the extreme British right flank facing Snake Hill. Another 400 ventured from the fort to eliminate the second, more distant battery. Under cover of a veritable deluge, Gen. Peter B. Porter led the 1,600 men from Snake Hill through woods toward the battery. With the guns of Fort Erie bombarding the battery with covering fire, Porter’s men achieved complete surprise. The guns were quickly spiked and the magazine blown, and the large column swung to assist the smaller force assaulting the second battery. A fierce fight ensued and much damage was caused before the Americans withdrew to the protection of their fortifications.
