Not very encouraging, Volckmann thought.
But what other choice did they have? USAFFE remnants in North Luzon were still heavily dispersed and maintained virtually no contact with one another. To make matters worse, the Japanese had intercepted more guerrillas, their “fifth column” continued to grow, and Moses and Noble—the presumed “leaders” of the North Luzon resistance—had not issued any orders since disappearing into Apayao the previous December. In all, the “lay low” advisory did nothing more than restate the obvious conclusions that Volckmann had made months ago.
The waiting game is perhaps what frustrated Volckmann the most. Until Moses and Noble gave him a clear picture of what was supposed to happen, he had no choice but continue waiting. Nevertheless, Volckmann used his downtime productively. The first thing he decided to do was build a communication network with other guerrilla elements in the adjacent area. There were many Filipinos who were eager to help him, but Volckmann wanted to find more of his American compatriots. For this, he sent Blackburn on a reconnaissance mission to re-establish contact with units in the Benguet area. It had been a few months since the chaos of the previous fall had forced Volckmann into Ifugao. Consequently, he wanted to see if any Americans remained in Benguet and get any updates on the Japanese activity there. 198
When Blackburn began his reconnaissance mission, he departed Ifugao the same way that he and Volckmann had entered—through the treacherous Taboy River Valley. After running through the valley of leeches, Blackburn arrived in Ekip, where the same townspeople who had taken care of him only a few months ago now greeted him with a cascade of disheartening news. Apparently, enemy activity had not quieted down at all: their friend, Daisy Baison—the wife of the Filipino doctor at Oding—had been shot by the Japanese; Herb Swick, who had chosen to stay in Benguet, had been captured; Parker Calvert and Art Murphy were on the run—whereabouts unknown; Charles Cushing had deserted his camp; and Herman Kluege had also been captured. Blackburn did, however, find another American at Ekip. His name was Fish and he had been a lumberman before the war.
Fish had been conducting guerrilla warfare in Benguet for some time—although the nature and the extent of his operations were never made clear. Fish knew of some friendly elements that remained in the area despite the recent fury. Offering to take him back to Volckmann’s camp in the Haliap highlands, Blackburn told Fish of the idea for a communication network, explaining that his knowledge of the Benguet “friendlies” would certainly be helpful. Hearing this, the ex-lumberman agreed to join Blackburn on the trip back to Ifugao. 199
Back at the Haliap camp, Fish brought Volckmann up to speed on the events of the past few months. The Japanese had certainly devastated the province, but there were enough friendly outposts left in Benguet to form cadres of a small guerrilla force.
4 April 1943. Took Fish over to see the ladies [Miss Spessard and Mrs. Kluege]. He gave them all the news he had.
5 April 1943. Fish was going to leave today but stayed over waiting for some supplies from Kiangan.
6 April 1943. Fish left with two of our boys [presumably Haliap] to return to his place.
Although he presumably had a hand in coordinating the guerrillas in Benguet, the role that Fish ultimately played in the conflict remains a mystery. He was captured in July 1943. 200
By the end of April, Volckmann had regular contact with the other USAFFE personnel in the Ifugao and Bontoc sub-provinces. His line of communication with Moses and Noble in Apayao ran through Captain Manalo’s area of operation in Kalinga, a few miles north of Ifugao. Manalo was an excellent information buffer, for he relayed messages both from other nearby units and from Moses and Noble. The system kept Volckmann up to date on enemy activity, but did nothing to inform him of the war outside North Luzon. Anxious for any news concerning the Allied situation in the Pacific, Volckmann sent a search party into Benguet to locate a radio. They returned with a radio receiver on 16 April and, although the battery died two weeks later, listening to KGEI-San Francisco provided him with the news he had been yearning for. Not all of the broadcasts were encouraging, but at least this news was reliable. 201 Reports included the Allied advance in North Africa and the latest victories of the RAF in Europe.
The progress that Volckmann had made throughout the spring of 1943, however, was about to be reversed. Just as they had done the previous fall, the Japanese were poised to disrupt Volckmann’s operation yet again. Little by little, punitive expeditions began to flood the countryside. In early May, Captain Manalo was hit hard by a Japanese expeditionary force. Now on the run, his absence disrupted Volckmann’s line of communication. In the north, Ralph Praeger—the only man in Luzon with a functioning radio transmitter—was forced to go off the air and bury his radio.* Meanwhile, Rufino Baldwin had been captured south of Baguio and Major Enriquez surrendered his elements of the14th Infantry Regiment. 202
To make matters worse, Captain Manalo’s records had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. From these documents, the enemy had supposedly learned the location of Volckmann’s headquarters. Although his Haliap hosts were visibly upset by the news, Volckmann knew the details of the records that Manalo had kept—the Japanese may have known that Volckmann was in Ifugao, but they did not have enough information from Manalo’s records to pinpoint him in the Haliap tribe lands. 203
Volckmann knew, however, that it wouldn’t stop the Japanese from combing the province. Not wanting to jeopardize his hosts, Volckmann met with Kamayong and asked him to help cache any surplus equipment and records in the event they had to move out. Kamayong instead responded with four pagan priests. This stunned Volckmann, for what he needed was an evacuation plan, not a pagan ritual. Undaunted, Kamayong let the four commissioned priests do their work. He explained to Volckmann that the priests would, after reciting a few incantations, bury a pair of chicken feet on the trails leading to the camp. If a Japanese patrol came upon the site where the feet were buried, they would suddenly become lazy and discontinue their search. 204
*Praeger was captured by the Japanese later that year.
This sounded preposterous, and Volckmann again protested that the surplus equipment needed to be cached. Nothing he could say, however, would alter Kamayong’s decision. A Japanese platoon did make its way to the foot of the hill upon which Volckmann’s camp was located, but miraculously, when the patrol arrived at the very site of the chicken feet, they changed course and moved down into the river valley! Volckmann never again questioned the pagan priests. 205
Perhaps the most devastating blow to the North Luzon guerrillas, however, occurred on 1 June 1943: Colonels Moses and Noble were captured just outside of Lubuagan, Kalinga. Returning from Praeger’s hideout in Apayao, they sent word to Volckmann to alert him of their pending return and advise him of the increased Japanese activity. Unfortunately, while traveling back toward Lubuagan, the colonels had taken ill and sought refuge in a cave not far from a native barrio. After sending one of their men into the barrio for food and medical relief, he was intercepted by a Japanese patrol. True to form, the Japanese tortured the man until he broke down and gave the exact location of the colonels’ hiding place. 206
Apprehended and beaten, Moses and Noble were sent to Bontoc, where the Japanese garrison commander forged a surrender order with the colonels’ names attached:
Bontoc, Mt. Province
Philippine Islands
June 9, 1943
Special Orders
1. I surrendered for the peace and happiness of the Philippines to the forces of the Imperial Japanese Army in Kalinga on June 2, 1943. Since our surrender we have been treated with kindness and generosity and in every case according to the Rules of the International Law.
2. I have been assured by officials of the Imperial Japanese Army that all members of the USAFFE still at large on Luzon, who surrender now, will be treated in the same way and in no case will any of them be tortured or killed.
3. All members of the USAFFE now at large on Luzon are, therefore, here
by “AT ONCE” to surrender to the Bontoc Garrison of the Imperial Japanese Army.
4. We will pray to God for your happiness and peaceful life.
Signed Martin Moses [signature]
Martin Moses [typed]
Lt. Col. Infantry, U.S. Army
Commanding
Witness: Arthur Noble [signature]
Arthur Noble [typed]
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, U.S. Army 207
Volckmann would not have followed the order even if it were legitimate. Nevertheless, the capture of these two colonels left Volckmann as the senior-ranking officer in North Luzon. The entire guerrilla movement in North Luzon now rested on the shoulders of this 31-year-old-officer.
CHAPTER 7
Master and Commander
Throughout the summer of 1943, the guerrilla movement in North Luzon had reached its lowest ebb. The Moses-Noble operation, for all its grand intentions, had done little more than send the Allied resistance into further chaos. Now, as the senior officer in North Luzon, it was up to Volckmann to pick up the pieces of their shattered enterprise. Since Volckmann’s camp in the Haliap highlands was now “General Headquarters,” he devised a numbering system to keep track of his other camps. His current location assumed the title of Camp #1, while Volckmann’s men at his outpost back in the Antipolo territory became Camp #2. 208 More numerical designations followed as he brought more camps under his command.
Volckmann would spend the rest of June trying to organize his thoughts. What do we do now? How are we going to take the fight to the enemy? But before he could answer any of these questions, this new commander-by-default had a bigger problem to worry about: the Japanese were on their way to Haliap. 209
Whether it had been the work of informers or just the tenacity of the Japanese, it didn’t matter—Volckmann had to clear the area. Hopefully Moses and Noble hadn’t broken down under torture and given the guerrillas’ location.
10 June 1943. The news hasn’t changed any. All reports coming in sound bad. Looks like the Japs plan on giving us a good chase. Started spreading rumor that we have left for Benguet. I’m feeling lousy today. They [Haliap] called a couple of witches to pray for me.
14 June 1943. Well, the Japs haven’t come out yet. Don’t know how long it is going to be now.
15 June 1943. Japs placed a garrison at Burnay.
17 June 1943. Another 50 Japs came to Kiangan from Bontoc.
18 June 1943. 80 Japs came to Kiangan from Bontoc.
20 June 1943. About 4 P.M., we were notified that the Japs were in the barrio below us. Hid-out our surplus things and went to our hide-out. Made the last part of the trip in the dark; very hard walking.
21 June 1943. Japs are still around. The shack that we are hiding in is built like a tent. The roof is made of wild gan leaves (each leaf is about three to four feet across). 210
When Volckmann evacuated the Haliap camp, he had taken Bruno, Emilio, and Pedro, Bruno’s cousin, with him. On the evening of the 21st, Volckmann and Blackburn sent Pedro back to the Haliap village for any further news. After what seemed like an eternally restless night, Pedro returned in the morning with the news that the enemy patrol had finally moved on. Surprisingly, the Japanese hadn’t asked any questions and refrained from firing a single shot. Volckmann couldn’t be sure what the Japanese were up to—or what they had expected to find in the Haliap lands—but for now, the enemy was gone. Despite the relief, however, Volckmann elected to stay at his “evacuation hut” until he was certain the Japanese were out of range. 211 Although the close encounter had turned out to be a minor affair, it stoked his passions to destroy the enemy once and for all.
Meanwhile, Art Murphy and Parker Calvert had re-emerged on the western end of Benguet and were now sending messages to Camp #2. In other news, Bando Dagwa and Dennis Molintas had likewise reemerged from the wilderness. Dagwa, who had owned a transportation company before the war, had reacquired a few of his buses and offered any mobility that he could to the guerrillas. 212 Other reports flowing into Camp #2 included an update on the 14th Infantry Regiment. When Manuel Enriquez surrendered the regiment, the 14th found itself under the command of Major Romulo Manriquez. Major Manriquez had since herded his elements of the 14th Infantry into small camps throughout the Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya provinces. 213
By the end of July, the fury of the anti-guerrilla campaign began to die down. Apparently, with the capture of Moses and Noble and the recent failures to apprehend any other high-value targets, the Japanese concluded that the guerrilla movement had lost its momentum and could do no serious harm to the occupation force. Russell Volckmann, however, was about to prove them wrong.
With enemy activity at an all-time low, Volckmann made his move. As commanding officer of the Allied resistance, the first thing he decided to do was reorganize the entire North Luzon command structure. At this point, the guerrillas had only operated within a few isolated bands. Too many guerrillas operating independently of one another had produced many of the problems that Volckmann recognized: there was no effective communication network, no intelligence sharing, no feasible system to protect against informers, and no standard dispositions against the enemy. 214 To have any impact on the Japanese, USAFFE guerrillas in North Luzon had to form a united front. A centralized command structure would establish operating guidelines and synchronize combat operations to have the most devastating effect on the Japanese.
With the “Reorganization Plan of 1943,” Volckmann established guidelines covering the organization, communication, supply, and operating principles of his guerrilla force. 215 From what he could estimate, there were four regimental commands left in the area. These included remnants of the 121st, 15th, 14th, and 11th Infantry Regiments.* Determining the whereabouts of these regiments, Volckmann divided North Luzon into five military “districts.” The Regimental assignments were as follows:
District 1 — 66th Infantry
District 2 — 121st Infantry
* These were former regiments of the Philippine Army. The 11th Infantry spoken of here is not the same regiment that Volckmann commanded during the retreat to Bataan.
District 3 — 15th Infantry
District 4 — 11th Infantry
District 5 — 14th Infantry
The 66th Infantry was a composite unit that Volckmann created especially for the occasion. It consisted of three battalions that had previously belonged to other regiments prior to the invasion. During the retreat, 1st Battalion, 43rd Infantry (Philippine Scouts), 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry (Philippine Army), and 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry (Philippine Army) were separated from their parent units along the western coast of Luzon. Now within Volckmann’s command, he organized the lost battalions into one regiment. Adding together the numerical designations of their former regiments—43, 11, and 12 for a total of 66—he designated them as the 66th Infantry. 216
Consolidating the five “districts” under one command, Volckmann established the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines—North Luzon (USAFIP-NL). One commander would be assigned to each district, with all units and personnel operating therein reporting directly to that commander. To assist Volckmann in his command duties, he established the General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL, in the Ifugao subprovince. Operating along the same lines as a divisional headquarters, he created staff functions to oversee the administrative needs of his guerrilla force. Each staff section was designated by an alphanumeric code indicating its area of responsibility. The Adjutant (G-1) and his staff were responsible for the maintenance of personnel records and contact rosters; the Intelligence staff (G-2) oversaw matters of intelligence, espionage, and interrogations; G-3 referred to the Office of Operational Planning—the staff with which Volckmann had the most interaction; and supply was the responsibility of G-4. In addition, the general staff also included a section for civil affairs (G-5). 217
Each district commander was directed to organize a regiment consisting of three rifle battalions with four companies each. Regimental camps would
be dispersed throughout each district with no camp larger than company-size. 218 This way, if a camp were raided or compromised, the unit could easily disperse and the damage would be localized to only that camp—not the entire regiment. Volckmann directed that all camps be established away from populated areas and main routes of travel. This dispersion method facilitated secrecy and mobility.
As a corollary, knowledge of the location of each camp was restricted only to members of that unit, those authorized to deal with that unit, and the USAFIP-NL General Headquarters. In giving this order, it appears that Volckmann wanted to create an additional safeguard against the possibility of his guerrillas being captured by limiting the amount of information that the enemy could extract from them. This principle applied to all USAFIP-NL command, technical, and support installations. 219
As the senior ranking officer in North Luzon, Volckmann had full legal authority to assert command over the remaining USAFFE forces in the area. It was a simple concept in theory, but it did not come without its setbacks and frustrations. Some of the units that Volckmann tried to bring under USAFIP-NL solidly rebuffed him—including Robert Lapham’s raiders. Many of them, however, did not. Given the urgency of the war, the guerrilla campaign had to make inroads—and quickly.
Under Volckmann’s reorganization plan, Parker Calvert became the commander of the 66th Infantry. Calvert had quite a reputation as a guerrilla. After the Moses-Noble debacle, Calvert directed his small group of Philippine Scouts into Benguet and began conducting raids on Japanese outposts. The anti-guerrilla campaign of 1942, however, destroyed much of his momentum. Like many units operating in Benguet, the Calvert posse was badly dispersed. However, unlike many of his comrades, Calvert was fortunate to have evaded capture and remained alive. Now in command of the newly formed 66th Infantry, Calvert appointed new commanders for each of his battalions. 220
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