When the Japanese declared 14 October as the new Philippine “Independence Day,”* the local officials ordered a celebration in Kiangan and all Haliap were expected to attend. During the celebration, a number of Haliaps—including Kamayong—were seized by the constabulary and taken to a nearby jail.
15 October 1943. Spent most of the day answering reports from the west [presumably Calvert]. The radio news we received is only up to the 27th [September]. They sure are moving slow in the Southwest Pacific. Received more reports on the mistreatment of the Haliap people in Kiangan. Method used (a common Jap trick): tie up a man, force his mouth open under a faucet, fill him full of water, then kick him and beat him in the stomach! 250
*“Independence” was provisional, pending a Japanese victory against the Allies.
Furious, Volckmann thought it was another Japanese hit-job. He was surprised to learn, however, that the constabulary had acted independently, and that the seizure of Haliaps had nothing to do with the war.
18-22 October 1943. The story between the civil trouble that is going on here at present seems to go back to old tribal troubles. It seems that during the early part of the war, the Haliap people killed a man that was causing trouble. This man was related to [a family in Kiangan]. The Kiangan people rose up, secured arms, and attacked the Haliap. A Captain Jewel (American) stopped the fighting and patched things up. 251
Since that time, however, tension between the Kiangan residents and the rural Haliap continued to boil. Most recently, the new leader of the Kiangan precinct—identified only as “Beylong”—accused the Haliap of killing one of his relatives. Inciting the old feelings of hatred and distrust, Beylong rallied the Kiangan population against the Haliap. The entry continued:
The Kiangan people, under the leadership of one Beylong, singled out [Kamayong] and about fifteen other Haliap people and maltreated them severely. The Haliap people even believe the Mayor of Kiangan was in on the deal. It’s going to be a job to settle the whole affair. 252
But settle it he did. And the “whole affair” was quite the double-edged sword. His natural instinct was to launch a raid on the Kiangan jail, execute Beylong, and hang his traitorous comrades. 253 Begrudgingly, however, Volckmann knew that this was a bad idea. Kiangan was too close to the USAFIP-NL Headquarters—and if a local police station went up in flames, the Japanese would comb the area looking for perpetrators. Yet, if Beylong stayed where he was, it would only be a matter of time before his hatred for the Haliap led him to discover the nearby guerrillas.
Kamayong was later transferred to a nearby hospital, where the Mayor of Kiangan brought up a trumped-up charge of assault against him. Apparently, Beylong’s accusation that Kamayong had killed his relative wasn’t enough to get the Haliap leader out of the way—there had to be some sort of formal charge. Volckmann, already disgusted by the troublesome mayor, wrote him a letter demanding both Kamayong’s release and punishment for the reckless constable. But the mayor, true to his Vichy-ite instincts, settled on a compromise: Kamayong would be released, the charges would be dropped, and Beylong would be transferred to another province. 254
After the incident with the Mayor of Kiangan, Volckmann’s diary entries became progressively shorter and less frequent. From that point on, he often wrote only one entry to cover an entire week’s activity.
25 November 1943. Thanksgiving. No Turkey. Spent the day answering communications from the various units.
28 November –18 December 1943. The only thing exciting during this period is the offensive on the Gilbert Islands and Bougainville. However, the action on Bougainville has been so slow after the initial landings that it’s hard to figure out what they are waiting on. Had report, (reliability unknown) that Col. Thorp, Nakar, and Straughn were taken from Ft. Santiago to Cemetary North Manila—executed. Can’t understand why this war in the Pacific is moving so slowly. No action in Burma yet?
19-24 December 1943. Nothing exciting.
25 December 1943. Another Xmas in the mountains. Formoca sent us some cigars, a bottle of Chinese whiskey, some cakes.
26-31 December 1943. Received some pretty good news; New Britain landed on. Rumors also they have landed in Mindanao. So ends another year. I’d sure like to see something come in here before too many months of the New Year pass. 255
On New Year’s Day 1944, Volckmann and Blackburn intercepted a spy near General Headquarters. A few Haliaps had noticed a stranger wandering around the trails close to Volckmann’s hideout. He didn’t necessarily look suspicious, but none of the Haliap had ever seen this man before. Choosing to err on the side of caution, Volckmann ordered the man to be picked up and brought in for questioning. The following day, Blackburn questioned the stranger until he finally admitted that he was a spy for the Japanese. For this, he was executed on the spot. 256
The moral of the story was harsh, yet simple: spies and informers were a deadly nuisance and they would be taken care of accordingly. Volckmann knew that if he expected to survive the war, he would have to make the “fifth column” fear him more than the Japanese. And he did so by instituting ways to eliminate those who were confirmed as spies.*
Throughout the spring of 1944, Volckmann’s diary recorded new feats of guerrilla warfare as he continued to expand his forces, train his men, and coordinate strikes on enemy garrisons and troop movements. However, on 18 June 1944, his diary abruptly stopped. The last entry simply reads:
The raid on the Philippine Constabulary Co. in Baguio fell through. One of our undercover men got cold feet and exposed the plan. No casualties on our side.**
But aside from organizing his forces and planning attacks on Japanese outposts, Volckmann wanted to engage the enemy in open combat; he wanted to take back the Philippines. By raids and ambushes alone, he could no doubt harass the Japanese and possibly, over time, defeat the enemy juggernaut. But this approach would take years to accomplish, and he was bound to run out of supplies long before the Japanese did.
*See Epilogue.
**By the middle of 1944, USAFIP-NL kept a daily record of its activities. Also, the task of organizing a guerrilla army would have undoubtedly left him with little time to keep up a daily journal.
For the first two years of the war, many of the firearms that USAFIPNL procured came either from local civilians or dead Japanese. Volckmann’s current supply system satisfied his immediate needs but arms, ammunition, and medical supplies—the essential tools for guerrilla warfare—grew scarcer as the war dragged on. Recognizing that he didn’t have the resources for a “toe-to-toe” campaign, Volckmann knew that he would somehow have to make contact with MacArthur’s Headquarters. Doing so would accomplish two ends: first, it would provide a lifeline to his guerrillas; second, it would provide a means to direct the incoming Allied forces to key positions and facilitate combined operations with USAFIP-NL. 257
It was a lofty goal, but Volckmann did not lend himself to the notion of guerrilla warfare as a series of “pot-shots” against the enemy while biding his time for MacArthur’s return. For Volckmann to destroy the enemy and take back North Luzon, General MacArthur would have to fulfill the two-year-old promise he had made on Corregidor.
Images from American Guerrilla
Relief map of Luzon, the largest island in the Philippine archipelago. Visible from the map are the rugged mountains of the Cordillera Central in North Luzon.
U.S. Army Center for Military History.
Russell William Volckmann, 1917. Dressed in his uniform as the C Com - pany “mascot,” the six-year-old Volckmann (right) is flanked by childhood friend John Smoller. Coincidentally, Smoller also attended West Point and graduated with the Class of 1934.
The Volckmann Family Collection.
Cadet Volckmann, U.S. Military Academy, ca. 1932. “Russ,” as he Volckmann’s graduating class at the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1938. Volckmann stands in the top row, third from right. USMA Fifty Year Book: 1934—1984. came to be known, was popular among his classmates and
well-liked by those who knew him.
The Volckmann Family Collection.
Volckmann’s graduating class at the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1938. Volckmann stands in the top row, third from right.
USMA Fifty Year Book: 1934–1984.
Philippine Scouts receive training on a 37mm anti-tank gun.
U.S. Army Center for Military History.
A wrapper to one of many chocolate bars SWPA sent in its propaganda submarine to Volckmann. The caption near the bottom reads: “This chocolate bar, the ration carried by American soldiers around the world, will give you valuable nourishment. It is fortified with vitamins essential for health and strength.”
National Archives and Records Administration.
Japanese victorious at Bataan.
National Archives and Records Administration.
Elements of the 32nd Infantry Division (US) take up positions on Hill 504, 1 April 1945. As part of the I Corps’ assault on Yamashita’s southern perimeter, they assisted Volckmann’s 14th Infantry Regiment in destroying the Japanese 2nd Tank Division before moving into the Bessang Pass area.
U.S. Army Center for Miltary History.
Elements of the 122nd Field Artillery Battalion (USAFIP-NL) fire on Japanese positions during the Battle of Bessang Pass.
U.S. Army Center for Military History.
A 1940 postcard depicting the Ifugao rice terraces in Mountain Province. This is a representative sample of the rugged terrain in North Luzon.
The Donald D. Blackburn Collection.
This map, constructed by Volckmann, shows the path of his trek to North Luzon. Guerro’s (Guerrero’s) and Fausset’s (Fassoth’s) represent civilian evacuation camps. Also visible is Mt. Arayat where Volckmann solicited help from the Hukbalahap.
The Russell W. Volckmann Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
Elements of the 122nd Field Artillery Battalion provide suppressing fire while USAFIP-NL engineers construct a hasty bridge.
The Volckmann Family Collection.
This map, although crudely titled, shows the activity of Volckmann’s regiments as they fought within their respective districts against the Japanese. Visible on the map is the Sixth Army front created by General Kruger as a diversion for the southern forces of Yamashita’s defense perimeter.
The Russell W. Volckmann Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
Volckmann stands with Major General Basilio Valdes, the Philippine Army Chief of Staff, 1945.
The Volckmann Family Collection.
Volckmann examining the blade of the sword owned by General Osaki, commander of the 19th Tora Division.
The Volckmann Family Collection.
Volckmann (seated on the far right) sits at the table with General MacArthur and other flag officers to formally accept Yamashita’s surrender.
The Volckmann Family Collection.
Tamicpao, leader of the Antipolo tribe.
The Donald D. Blackburn Collection.
Undated portrait of Volckmann.
U.S. Army Center for Military History.
After his return from the Philippines, Volckmann was highly celebrated by his hometown newspapers, though his contributions were largely forgotten by subsequent historians of the war.
Don Blackburn on V-J Day, 1945.
The Donald D. Blackburn Collection.
Vacationing in Virginia Beach, 1949. Pictured from left to right are: Helen Volckmann, Russell Volckmann, Ann Blackburn, and Donald Blackburn. The two families remained lifelong friends after the war.
The Donald D. Blackburn Collection.
CHAPTER 8
Lifelines
North Luzon had been without radio contact since Ralph Praeger went off the air in March 1943. Now, some fifteen months later, Volckmann still had no feasible way of communicating with MacArthur. Under the reorganization plan of the previous year, Volckmann had ordered all district commanders to scavenge any radio equipment they could find. His orders also called for finding radio technicians to build and operate the device. These efforts eventually produced an assortment of radio parts and two technicians from Manila. Volckmann made every effort to provide them the tools they needed, but many integral parts of the radio were still missing, which necessitated all missing pieces to be crafted by hand. The final product, however, was a homemade 75-watt transceiver with enough power to communicate directly with SWPA! To compensate for the lack of electricity, Volckmann secured the device to a water wheel on a nearby stream, thus providing 220 volts of hydroelectric power. 258
Morale in USAFIP-NL surged to an all-time high. Volckmann’s first message to SWPA emphasized the need for arms, ammunition, and medical supplies. When SWPA replied a few days later, they confirmed that:
ONE OFFICER AND FIFTEEN MEN TOGETHER WITH FIFTEEN TONS OF SUPPLY HAVE LANDED BY SUBMARINE ON LUZON. PARTY IS PROCEEDING NORTH OVERLAND TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS. 259
As it were, the submarine USS Stingray had landed on the northern shore of Ilocos Norte near Bangui. Units within Volckmann’s Third District (15th Infantry) intercepted the landing party near Highway 3 but recovered only half the tonnage of supplies promised by SWPA. Lieutenant Valera, the officer in charge of the landing party, explained that while consolidating their materiel on the beach, a Japanese naval detachment came within shooting range of the submarine. Fearing detection, the sub commander made an emergency dive and vacated the inlet. 260 This left Valera and his men with half the anticipated supplies and without any means to navigate through the treacherous jungles. How fortunate that the 15th Infantry intercepted Valera before the Japanese did!
Even with half the material that was originally promised, it was nonetheless a boon to Volckmann and his guerrillas. Re-supply meant relief from chronic shortages that had plagued them since Bataan. If the supply train remained unbroken from now until the Allied invasion of Luzon, Volckmann and his men would no longer have to rely on scavenging from the Japanese or continue borrowing from the local civilians.
On 29 August 1944, Volckmann sent a communiqué to SWPA outlining the directives he had given to USAFIP-NL. 261 His command policies called for:
1. Harassment and destruction of all enemy lines of communication.
2. Delay and destruction of all enemy troop and supply movements.
3. Destruction of enemy supply dumps.
4. Prevent the enemy from securing food supplies, construction materials, civilian labor assets, and means of transportation. 262
The message was an indirect effort to discover any tentative dates for the Allied invasion and, hopefully, give MacArthur an incentive to expedite the process. At this point, Volckmann had no idea of when it might come, but he anticipated it happening sometime within the next twelve months. Reports over KGEI confirmed that the Allied push toward Tokyo was gathering steam. Volckmann received no direct answer to the message but instead got a radiogram asking for the locations of principal and alternative rendezvous points for the next incoming submarine. Volckmann consulted with Barnett, commander of the Second District, and radioed SWPA with the coordinates for Darigayos, La Union, and San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, as the respective primary and alternate points. SWPA radioed confirmation of the rendezvous points and set an ETA for 19 October 1944. 263
On the day of the 19th, however, the submarine was nowhere to be found, and neither rendezvous point had reported any contact. Frustrated, Volckmann again radioed SWPA and demanded an explanation. The answer he received was a vague and apologetic pronouncement that there had been a slight misunderstanding. 264
A misunderstanding? A misunderstanding of what? SWPA had already confirmed the location of the rendezvous points and Volckmann had followed the contact procedures perfectly. Nonetheless, Volckmann could do nothing more than negotiate another contact date and hope for better luck. The next submarine, USS Gar, had embarkation orders for November. Years later, Volckmann found out that the “misunderstanding” had been between the submarine and the Army Air Forces; the
submarine was sunk by friendly fire. 265 On a brighter note, the following day, 20 October, brought news that Allied forces had landed at Leyte Gulf, only 400 miles to the southeast.
Just as before, SWPA confirmed the location of Darigayos and San Esteban as the rendezvous points. This latest submarine carried a party of fifteen men and some twenty-five tons of equipment. Volckmann dispatched Barnett to the alternate rendezvous point while he and Blackburn oversaw the principal site. The situation required much more oversight than Volckmann had originally anticipated: in the overlapping time since the previous submarine, a Japanese garrison had sprung up less than five miles away from the primary rendezvous point. Worse, a Japanese naval base lay fifteen miles to the south and its patrol boats were regularly sighted along the coast. 266
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