8. John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 98; Willmott, Barrier and Javelin, 208.
9. Bates, Battle of the Coral Sea, 32; Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 145.
10. In his postwar memoir, the captain of the Lexington, Frederic “Ted” Sherman, called Fletcher’s decision to withhold fighter support for the attack force a “serious mistake.” Had Hara’s carriers been within range, it might well have proved so. Sherman, Combat Command: The American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War (New York: Dutton, 1950), 93.
11. One reason the Okinoshima survived was that the American bombs were armed with impact fuses, so that, while the ship suffered significant topside damage, no bombs penetrated to her vital engineering spaces. Nimitz to King, June 17, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2, p. 3; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August, 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), 25–26; Lundstom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 146, 149; Bates, Battle of the Coral Sea, 36; Willmott, Barrier and Javelin, 217–18.
12. Stuart D. Ludlum, They Turned the War Around at Coral Sea and Midway: Going to War with Yorktowns Air Group Five (Bennington, VT: Merriam, 2000), 70.
13. Nimitz to King, June 17, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2, p. 3; Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 120; Lundstrom, “Failure of Radio Intelligence,” 113.
14. Nimitz to Fletcher, May 5, 1942, CinCPac message file, Nimitz Papers, Operational Archives, NHHC, box 1:422. See Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, 103–4, as well as Lundstrom, “Failure in Radio Intelligence,” 108–10, 115; and Willmott, Barrier and Javelin, 234–35.
15. Neilson is quoted in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 73–74; John B. Lundstrom, The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 193.
16. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 165; Lundstrom, First Team, 194–96. Fletcher is quoted in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 77.
17. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 165.
18. Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 74.
19. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 176–77; Lundstrom, First Team, 191; Dull, A Battle History, 124.
20. Lundstrom, First Team, 200; Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 78.
21. Both Burch and Taylor are quoted in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 76–77.
22. Office of Naval Intelligence, Combat Narrative: The Battle of the Coral Sea (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, 1943), 15–16; Lundstrom, First Team, 199, 205; Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 169; Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 79, James H. Belote and William M. Belote, Titans of the Seas: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 76; Sherman, Combat Command, 100.
23. The conversation was remembered by Taylor and is recorded in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 80.
24. For the rest of this life, Biard (who died in 2010) insisted that Fletcher missed a great opportunity by not listening to him. It is possible that Biard’s assertions found their way to Washington and contributed to Admiral King’s growing unease about Fletcher’s aggressiveness. Author’s interview of RADM Donald “Mac” Showers (May 4, 2010). See also Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 78, 167–68, 170–71.
25. Belote and Belote, Titans of the Seas, 76–77; Lundstrom, First Team, 212.
26. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 176–77; Sherman, Combat Command, 102; Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 82; Judson Brodie interview (March 13, 2007), NMPW, 28.
27. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 176–77; Belote and Belote, Titans of the Seas, 77. In his memoir, Sherman insisted that postwar evidence proved that the Japanese carriers had been just where he claimed they were—only thirty miles away—and this proved that Fletcher should have ordered a night surface attack. In fact, postwar evidence places those carriers about a hundred miles to the east, in which case a night surface attack would have been futile and probably dangerous. Sherman, Combat Command, 102.
28. Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–1945, ed. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, trans. Masataka Chihaya (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 128 (diary entry of May 18, 1942). Burch is quoted in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 80.
29. The official Navy reports credit the sighting by Smith without mentioning Dixon, though Dixon’s postwar testimony makes it clear that he, too, played a crucial role. Buckmaster to Nimitz, May 25, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2, p. 3; Belote and Belote, Titans of the Seas, 78; Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 84–85.
30. Pederson to Buckmaster, May 16, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2; Dull, Battle History, 126; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Action, May 1942–August, 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), 47–48; Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 87.
31. Burch and Short are quoted in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 87–88; Office of Naval Intelligence, Battle of the Coral Sea, 24–25.
32. Pederson to Buckmaster, May 16, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2. American torpedo plane pilots reported dropping nine torpedoes and making four hits. See Office of Naval Intelligence, Battle of the Coral Sea, 23. Taylor’s quotation is in Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 86.
33. Noel Gayler oral history (Feb. 15, 2002), Naval Historical Foundation, 6; Morison, Coral Sea, 49–51.
34. Sherman, Combat Command, 31.
35. Ibid., 109–10.
36. Buckmaster to Nimitz, May 25, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2, pp. 7, 40.
37. Frederick D. Parker, A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians (Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1993), 29–30.
38. Ronald Russell, “Sam Laser in Sky Control,” transcript available at BOMRT, http://www.midway42.org/vets-laser.html.
39. Sherman, Combat Command, 111, 114; Buckmaster to Nimitz, May 25, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2, p. 10; Paul Stroop oral history (Sept. 13, 1969), 144, U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Collection, USNA; Judson Brodie interview (March 13, 2007), NMPW, 30.
40. Sherman, Combat Command, 115; Judson Brodie interview (March 13, 2007), NMPW, 31.
41. Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 96.
42. Ugaki, Fading Victory, 128 (diary entry of May 18, 1942).
43. Ludlum, They Turned the War Around, 96, 100; Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 194.
44. Sherman, Combat Command, 117; Walter Lord, Incredible Victory (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 11; Ugaki, Fading Victory, 122 (diary entry of May 7, 1942).
Chapter 9
1. Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, trans. John Bester (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), 302; Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–1945, ed. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, trans. Masataka Chihaya (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 118 (diary entry of May 1, 1942).
2. RADM Ko Nagasawa, quoted in Robert E. Barde, “The Battle of Midway: A Study in Command” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1972), 43; Ugaki, Fading Victory, 118 (diary entry of May 1, 1942); Sanematsu to Lord, Jan. 22, 1967, Walter Lord Collection, NHHC, box 18.
3. The Japanese observer at the war game was Chihaya Masataka, who wrote an analysis of the Imperial Japanese Navy a few years later. He is quoted in Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, eds., The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), 348. See also Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy’s Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955), 91–92; and Of
fice of Naval Intelligence, The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway: A Translation, OPNAV P32–1002, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 2.
4. Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, 96; Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 303; Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 61–62.
5. Ugaki, Fading Victory, 119, 120 (diary entry of May 4, 1942).
6. Gordon Prange interview with Watanbe Yasuji (Oct. 6, 1964), Prange Papers, UMD, box 17; Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, Miracle at Midway (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 35. Yamamoto is quoted in John Deane Potter, Admiral of the Pacific: The Life of Yamamoto (London: Heinemann, 1965), 44.
7. The “knowledgeable scholars” are Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, 62–63.
8. Ugaki, Fading Victory, 120 (diary entry of May 5, 1942). Turret no. 5 on Hyūga was removed, the barbette roofed over, and antiaircraft guns were put there. I am indebted to John Lundstrom for this information.
9. Agawa, Reluctant Admiral, 305; Ugaki, Fading Victory, 123–24 (diary entry of May 7, 1942).
10. Ugaki, Fading Victory, 125 (diary entry of May 10, 1942).
11. Ugaki, Fading Victory, 127 (diary entry of May 17, 1942).
12. Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, 66.
13. Ibid., 64–65.
14. Frederick D. Parker, A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians (Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1993), 43–45; CINCPAC Intelligence Briefs, OP-20G File (May 10, 1942), Special Collections, Nimitz Library, USNA, 75.
15. Joseph Rochefort oral history (Oct. 5, 1969), 203, and Thomas Dyer oral history (Sept. 14, 1983), 241, both in U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Collection, USNA; author’s interview of RADM Donald “Mac” Showers (May 4, 2010). The list of known designators (060710) is in the Layton Papers, NWC, box 26, folder 4.
16. Rochefort oral history (Oct. 5, 1969), 203. See John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976).
17. Traffic Intelligence Summaries, Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District (July 16 1941—June 30 1942), Special Collections, Nimitz Library, USNA, 3:326; King to Nimitz, May 15, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:468.
18. Nimitz to King, May 16, 1942, and the Running Summary, May 16, 1942, are both in Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:471, 482; King to Nimitz, May 15, 1942, is also in the Nimitz Papers, but in box 8, unnumbered page, date-time group 152130.
19. Nimitz to Halsey, May 17, 1942, and King to Spenavo, May 18, 1942, both in Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:491, 492.
20. King to Nimitz, May 17 and 18, 1942, both in Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:490, 492.
21. Nimitz to King, May 17 and May 21, 1942, both in Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:488, 490.
22. The summary of air strength on Midway is from the Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:505. Spruance’s handwritten note shows 115 airplanes on Midway: Spruance Papers, NWC, box 2, folder 4. See Appendix C.
23. There has been a lot of discussion about who came up with the idea for the bogus message. The account here relies heavily on RADM “Mac” Showers, who recalls the conversation between Rochefort and Holmes that took place as they were standing next to his desk in the Dungeon. See W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 90; Rochefort oral history (Oct. 5, 1969), 211; and Dyer oral history (Sept. 14, 1983), 241.
24. The message (Com 14, 200050) is in Edwin Layton’s handwritten journal, May 20, 1942, Layton Papers, NWV, box 29, folder 3. William Price asserts that the man who discovered the key intercept was Yeoman Second Class William Tremblay who worked at Belconnen, though others recall that the initial discovery took place in “the Dungeon” at Hypo. What is clear is that both units played an important role in the final decryption of the messages. Willam Price interview (May 4, 2010). See also Russell, No Right to Win, 30–33.
25. See the list of decrypts in Appendix III of Edwin Layton’s unpublished manuscript, “The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese War” (which he submitted in September of 1942), in Layton Papers, NWC, box 15, folder 1. Interview of RADM Donald “Mac” Showers by the author (May 4, 2010); Henry F. Schorreck, “The Role of COMINT in the Battle of Midway,” Cryptologic Spectrum 5, no. 3 (Summer 1975), 3–11; “Estimate of the Situation” (May 26, 1942), Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:544. Rochefort’s words are from his oral history (Oct. 5, 1969), 219.
26. Rochefort oral history (Oct. 5, 1969), 217–19. See also the Traffic Intelligence Summaries, 3:381.
27. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 569–70.
28. “Estimate of the Situation” (May 26, 1942), Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:516, 520.
29. E. B. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 84.
30. Ibid., 118; Gordon Prange interview of Spruance (Sept. 5, 1964), Prange Papers, UMD, box 17; C. J. Moore interview (Nov. 28, 1966) in Spruance Papers, NWC, box 2, series 4, folder 1; John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 225.
31. Quoted in Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 122.
32. Ashford to Walter Lord, Feb. 26, 1966, Lord Collection, NHHC, box 18; Potter, Bull Halsey, 78.
33. Nimitz to Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, May 28, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 8, no page, date-time group 280233.
34. Potter, Bull Halsey, 79; Nimitz to Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, May 28, 1942, and Fletcher to Nimitz, May 11, 1942, both in Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 8, no page number, date-time group 280233 and 092102; E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 85.
35. Craig L. Symonds, Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles that Shaped American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 202.
36. Nimitz to King, May 10, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 8, no page number, date-time group 092219.
37. King to Fletcher, March 30, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:322; King to Dudley Pound, May 21, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2; King to Nimitz, May 11, 1942, and Fletcher to Nimitz, May 15, 1942, both in Nimitz Papers, NHHC., box 1:468, 469. See Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, 68–70; and Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 116–17.
38. Fletcher to Nimitz, May 28, carbon copy in King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2; Potter, Nimitz, 86.
39. Nimitz to King, May 29, 1942, King Papers NHHC, Series I, box 2.
40. Examples of King’s use of the phrase are in King to J. H. Ingram, March 14, 1942, and King to Freeman, March 17, 1942, both in King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2. Nimitz’s use of it (italics mine) is in Nimitz to King, May 29, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2.
41. Nimitz to Commander Striking Forces, May 28, 1942, Action Reports, reel 2, pp. 1, 6. See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “Clear Purpose, Comprehensive Execution: Raymond Ames Spruance (1886–1969),” in Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 52.
42. Nimitz to Spruance, May 28, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 8/280105.
43. Interview of Captain John W. “Jack” Crawford, USN (Ret.) by the author (May 5, 2004).
44. Nimtiz’s visit is discussed in a questionnaire completed by LT Clarence E. Aldrich, in Walter Lord Collection, NHHC, box 18.
Chapter 10
1. Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 90–91.
2. Beardall to King, Jan. 12, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 1;
King Secret File, Feb. 1, 1942, Gruening to Ickes, Feb. 14, 1942, and Ickes to FDR, Feb. 18, 1942, all in King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2.
3. Nimitz to Theobald, May20, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, 1:496.
4. Marshall and King Memo, April 16, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2; Nimitz to King, May 20, 1942, Nimitz Papers, NHHC, box 1:496.
5. Robert Theobald, “Memorandum for Whom it May Concern,” July 2, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2, p. 8 (hereafter Theobald Memorandum); Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August, 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), 170.
6. Theobald Memorandum, 9; interview of VADM William D. Houser by the author (May 5, 2004).
7. Morison, Coral Sea, 175–76; Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, Miracle at Midway (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 153.
8. J. W. Reeves to King, June 13, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series I, box 2; Theobald Memorandum, 4.
9. Theobald Memorandum, 11.
10. Ibid., 11–12.
11. J. W. Reeves to King, June 13, 1942, King Papers, NHHC, Series, I, box 2. In a handwritten comment on this message, King wrote: “The basic trouble was that CTF8 [Theobald] did not set up a Joint Air Command until about 20 June.”
12. Morison, Coral Sea, 178.
13. It was Commander Miyo who proposed Operation K at the April 5 conference with the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. See Robert E. Barde, “The Battle of Midway: A Study in Command” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1972), 41–42, 41n.
14. Alec Hudson, “Rendezvous,” Saturday Evening Post, Aug. 2 and 9, 1941, quotation from the Aug. 9 issue, 32; Steve Horn, The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K and Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 73–74.
15. Horn, Second Attack on Pearl Harbor, 65–90.
16. Edward T. Layton, with Roger Pineau and John Costello, “And I was there”: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: Morrow, 1985), 374.
The Battle of Midway (Pivotal Moments in American History) Page 45
