by Gus Russo
Hoover realized that if Campbell ever talked, she might also implicate the President directly in the Rosselli/CIA plots, as well as tie him to the underworld through not only Rosselli, but also Sam Giancana. This was just the kind of political dirt Hoover so coveted. On February 27th, Hoover sent a memo to the Attorney General, laying out the problem. Hoover backed this up by also sending a copy to JFK’s close friend and aide, Kenny O’Donnell—virtually guaranteeing that the President would see it. On March 22, Hoover met with JFK, and according to Hoover aide Cartha DeLoach, told the President what he knew of the affair, pressing Kennedy to call it off. Years later, the Church Committee stated that the contact with JFK’s “good friend” ended that night. In fact, according to both Campbell and White House phone records, the affair continued for at least eight more months.
The next day, Hoover sent a memo to the CIA, demanding an official explanation. On April 10th, Hoover heard from the CIA’s Sheffield Edwards, who again asked Hoover not to prosecute Maheu.
Hoover’s strategy was brilliant. He established a paper trail clearing himself of any involvement in the plots on Castro—whereas Bobby Kennedy’s only record was the memo received from Hoover a year earlier informing him of the plots. His failure in the ensuing year to stop the plotting effectively incriminated him. The Attorney General had to move fast to establish a new record, praying that the old one would never surface. He set about devising a memo to protect himself from incrimination.
On May 7th, Bobby held a meeting with Sheffield Edwards, and the CIA’s counsel, Lawrence Houston. At this meeting, on hearing of the plots, RFK feigned surprise and outrage. Houston would later say, “[RFK] was mad as hell. . . but what he objected to was our involvement with the Mafia. He was not angry about the assassination plot.”93 Houston and Edwards later drafted the all-important new memo for the Attorney General’s files describing his outrage. The memo read, in part:
Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring [Maheu, Rosselli] and Giancana with the Department of Justice he issued orders that CIA should never again take such steps without checking with the Department of Justice.94
The new memo served two distinct functions. First, it gave the impression that Bobby Kennedy was “outraged” at the plots, and secondly, it implied that the plots were to be ended. Edwards next wrote an internal memo which noted that the Rosselli plots were now terminated. Nothing could be farther from the truth. William Harvey later testified that the Edwards memo “was not true, and Edwards knew it was not true.” Rosselli would later say that the plots were always “a going operation.” Harvey then ventured a guess as to why the internal memo was created, saying, “If this ever came up in the future, the file would show that on such and such a date, he was advised so and so, and he was no longer chargeable with this.” It was, he continued, “an attempt to insulate against what I would consider a very definite potential damage to the Agency and to the government.”95
J. Edgar Hoover not only recognized RFK’s display as a sham, but he let him know it, in so many words. On October 29, 1962, four months after Bobby’s disingenuous show of outrage, the FBI Director sent RFK a memo detailing an interview of a mob informant who claimed to have strong ties in Cuba as well as with the Meyer Lansky mob. The informant had recently told the FBI that his connections could “buy practically any Cuban official. . . He believes some of these underworld figures still have channels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro can be successfully arranged.”96 Knowing that Kennedy’s earlier protestations had no real meaning, Hoover passed this information on to RFK, possibly intending to incriminate him with it. There is no record of Bobby’s reaction.
Lawrence Houston, the CIA’s General Counsel who attended the May 1962 briefing of Robert Kennedy on the Mafia plots, told author Thomas Powers, “All I know is that Robert Kennedy knew about one of them [the assassination plots] in very great detail.” Powers concluded:
The record is clear, then, that Kennedy was thoroughly briefed about the details of an attempt to murder Castro during his brother’s presidency. The record is clear that the attempts to kill Castro continued [with Phase Three]. And the record is clear that despite his knowledge of the earlier attempt, Robert Kennedy did not protest to the CIA, to its director John McCone, to Helms, or to anyone else in the Agency for that attempt.97
Assassination to the Forefront
“There was a rumor around the Agency that the Kennedys wanted Castro out by the Congressional elections of 1962.”
—Bruce Cheever, CIA officer on the Cuba Project98
“We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know, according to prognostication, that he will die within the present year.”
—Morse Zabola, Communist Party cell leader, January 5, 196299
On October 5, 1961, National Security Action Memorandum 100, “Contingency Planning for Cuba,” was issued. Consisting of only twenty words, it stated: “In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State [Robert Frobes] Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency.” Earlier that same day, Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer serving as the SGA’s secretary, intended to meet with Woodward to elucidate the meaning of “the contingency.” Because Woodward was leaving the country, he advised Parrott to meet with his Deputy, Wymberley Coerr. In a memo discussing that October 5, 1961 meeting, Parrott wrote, “What was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene.”100 Parrott added: “I mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President’s interest in this matter, before General Taylor told me he preferred this not be done. . .[Woodward] understood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office.” For future reference, Parrott suggested how the paper trail be worded: “I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture.” Woodward clearly understood the need for presidential deniability.
The same contingency would be mentioned again in an August 8, 1962 memo from Lansdale to the SGA. On page 7073 of that memo, a “contingency to assassinate Castro and his handful of top men” is noted. The “contingency” referred to in John F. Kennedy’s National Security Action Memo 100 was clearly the assassination of Castro.
Throughout that fall, word passed throughout the White House that something big was afoot. An increasingly unhappy Vice-President was yelling about it all the way to Texas.
“That son of a bitch Bobby wants to kill the whole fuckin’ world,” Lyndon Johnson barked into the telephone. He was responding to a query by fellow Texan, Lonnie Hudkins. Prior to his career as a reporter for the Houston Post, Hudkins had been a sometime contract agent for the CIA. In this capacity, he occasionally “ran guns” to Central American anti-Communists, and became friends with such CIA luminaries as David Atlee Phillips, Win Scott, and others. Hudkins had often received interesting offers from these men, but the most recent was so bizarre that he sought confirmation from above.
“One of my CIA contacts asked me in 1962 to get involved in an operation that involved assassinations of both Cuba’s Castro and Cheddi Jagan of Guyana,” recalls Hudkins. “I frankly didn’t think this kind of thing could possibly be sanctioned, First, I called [Senator] George Smathers. He told me to call Johnson, which I did.”101 Hudkins says Johnson knew all about it, telling Hudkins that the project indeed had White House authorization, “but it’s unofficial.” Recently, Air Force Colonel Howard Burris, Johnson’s Military Aide, fellow Texan, and friend of over thirty years, affirmed that LBJ was aware of both Mongoose and the assassination plots. According to Burris, Johnson had back-channel sources at the CIA that kept him apprised of such matters. “Johnson found the whole policy distasteful,” Burris said.102
Hudkins and his cohorts decided against joining up, not for Johnson’s reasons, but for more pragmatic ones. “We figured we couldn’t knock off Castro without forfeiting our own lives,” says Hudkins. “We said to h
ell with that—money doesn’t do you any good if you’re dead.”103
Robert Kennedy had wanted to start 1962 on a high note. Calling a meeting of all Mongoose principals on January 19, 1962, the Attorney General read them the riot act, saying,” a solution to the Cuban problem [carries] top priority in the U.S. government. No time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared.” Only the day before, he continued, the President had indicated to him that “the final chapter had yet to be written—it’s got to be done and will be done.”104
Although he differed with Bill Harvey on strategy, and completely underestimated the Cuban people’s loyalty to Fidel, Bobby faced his most formidable obstacles in his brother’s own administration. The White House’s own SGA (Special Group Augmented) constantly shied away from approving Bobby’s sabotage proposals. None could legally go forward without its approval. SGA Executive Secretary Thomas Parrott recalled, “Bob Kennedy was very difficult to deal with. He was arrogant. He knew it all, he knew the answer to everything. He sat there, tie down, chewing gum, his feet up on the desk. His threats were transparent. It was, ‘If you don’t do it, I’ll tell my big brother on you.’”105
Harvey’s proposals were countered by time-consuming deliberations, and by demands for paperwork from the military members of the SGA. Harvey complained to Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Plans, about the SGA’s head, General Maxwell Taylor, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Taylor never approves anything. . . Can’t you do something about this?”106 Taylor implies he denied the Kennedy/Harvey requests in response to Robert Kennedy’s attitude: “I don’t think it occurred to Bobby in those days that his temperament, his casual remarks that the president would not like this or that, his difficulty in establishing tolerable relations with government officials, or his delight in causing offense, was doing harm to his brother’s administration.”107
CIA executives like Richard Helms privately agreed with the SGA that Mongoose limit itself to intelligence gathering. While the SGA was responsible for deciding on specific items of sabotage, both Helms and Bobby Kennedy were aware that the Special Group had no control system for assassination activity.108 On that score, the Kennedys had free rein. They were soon to exert it.
Although typically perceived as a strategy of last resort, the counterinsurgent use of assassination soon became the method of choice for the increasingly frustrated Kennedys. In August 1962, the SGA met to assess the lack of progress in Cuba. With Bobby Kennedy present, Robert McNamara delivered a staggering judgment, “The only way to get rid of Castro is to kill him. . . and I really mean it.” To which Richard Bissell responded, “Oh, you mean Executive Action.” According to aide Richard Goodwin, no one objected, although some were privately against the idea.109
“I was surprised and appalled to hear McNamara propose this,” remembers Goodwin. “He [McNamara] said that Castro’s assassination was the only productive way of dealing with Cuba.”110
The increasing talk of assassination was tightly held, with only those in a “need-to-know” position informed. “We in Operation Mongoose were told nothing about assassination plans against Castro,” remembered Grayston Lynch, the first American to land on the beach at the Bay of Pigs. “In fact, that kind of talk was forbidden.”111 Lynch may have occupied an important position in the conduct of raids under Mongoose, but he was not in the loop, even ex officio.112 He wasn’t told what his bosses, Bill Harvey and General Edward Lansdale, the Mongoose military commander, knew, or what others assumed as fact.
It wasn’t just the “grunts” who were out of the loop. CIA Director John McCone was not part of the assassination planning—but that, apparently, was by his own wish. McCone later wrote, “Through the years, the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as ‘dispose of Castro, ‘remove Castro,’ ‘knock off Castro,’ etc.”113 It was common knowledge with the upper echelons that McCone would never approve such activity. Bill Harvey later testified that the decision to keep McCone in the dark was made by Richard Helms.114 McCone, having just converted to Catholicism, was known to have strong moral objections to murder. He told assistants that he feared ex-communication. According to Helms’ personal assistant, George McManus, Helms knew that “if McCone had been asked to approve an assassination, he would have reacted violently immediately.” Helms indeed knew for certain because McCone’s assistant Walt Elder told him so. Elder would later testify: “I told Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling. . . that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. . . Mr. Helms responded, ‘I understand.’”115
Bill Harvey testified as to what happened next: “There was a fairly detailed discussion between myself and Helms as to whether or not the Director should. . . be briefed. . . We agreed that it was not necessary or advisable.”116 However, Harvey made it clear that another VIP was aware of the plots. His name was Robert Kennedy. As Harvey would tell the FBI in 1968, “Robert Kennedy was knowledgeable of the operation which had been devised by the CIA with the collaboration of Rosselli and his cohorts. . . Kennedy is in an extremely vulnerable position if it were ever publicized that he condoned an operation which involved U.S. Government utilization of hoodlum elements.”117 Seven years later, testifying under oath before Congress, Harvey said, “I was completely convinced during this entire period that this operation had the full authority of every pertinent echelon of the CIA and had the full authority of the White House.”118
In 1991, McCone’s assistant, Elder, added a subtle but important addition to this story. While attending a CIA seminar commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, Elder remarked that McCone had not been inadvertently left out of the loop. He had taken himself out. Elder said that McCone, upon learning of the administration’s intentions, instructed Helms to not tell him about the murder plots. He didn’t want to know about them. Helms complied with his wishes.119 (As with many others involved in the Cuba Project, McCone may have been a tad disingenuous. A Congressional investigator, later going through McCone’s files, would find a memo authored by McCone in which he stated that the ultimate objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba should be “to encourage dissident elements in the military. . . to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage.”)120
The Early Reinvasion Plans
Simultaneous with Mongoose and the assassination plotting, the Kennedys’ pressure for “action” on Cuba caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to produce intensive operational plans. The JCS formulated an elaborate series of OPLANS to provide a pretext for an all-out U.S. invasion of the island, according to documents withheld from the public until 1997. The invasion was to be overseen by the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), Admiral Robert “Denny” Dennison. Favored ploys preceding the invasion included:
Creating “incidents around Guantanamo. . . to give the genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.”
Creating “the appearance of an [air] attack on Guantanamo. . . we could blow up a U.S. ship. . .[or] paint an F-86 to look like a Cuban MIG type aircraft [and] have it destroy a U.S. drone aircraft.”
Using the MIG mock-up to “shoot down a U.S. charter airline drone” that would appear to have been filled with U.S. college students.121
On April 10, 1962, the JCS wrote to the Secretary of Defense, “Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. . . Accordingly, we believe that military overthrow by the United States will be required to overthrow the present Communist regime.” The project’s secrecy is noted in the postscript: “This paper NOT be furnished to the Chairman, U.S. Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.” Nine days after this memo was sent, John Kennedy paid a secret visit to CINCLANT headquarters, where Admiral Dennison briefed him in depth on Polaris missile firing procedures.122 The JCS sent a “memo to CINCLANT on February 22nd: “Plans supporting OPLAN 314-61 Be Completed as Expeditiously as Possible.”
The OPLAN noted that, when the pretext for invasion had occur
red, U.S. troops would be massed in nearby U.S. states, like Florida and Texas, ready to commence hostilities.
All this plotting should have given someone pause, and it did. On January 17, 1962, the Army coordinator for the Cuba Project sent a memo to Lansdale warning, “The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.”123 The alert was given short shrift and the planning escalated.
In fact, the warning was right on target—the American-backed sabotage and plotting was not going unnoticed, either by the Cubans, or by their powerful sponsor, the Soviet Union. As a result, the Kennedys’ fanatical desire to avenge the Bay of Pigs defeat was about to take the world to the brink of thermonuclear war.124 And, incredibly, it was JFK himself who let the cat out of the bag.
On January 31, 1962, the President met with Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei. The two were engaged in a wide-ranging conversation when the President brought up the topic of Cuba. “If I run for re-election and the Cuban question remains as it is—then Cuba will be the main problem of the campaign, [and] we will have to do something,” Kennedy said to a startled Adzhubei. Digging himself a deeper hole, Kennedy added, “[After the Bay of Pigs,] I called Allen Dulles into my office and dressed him down. I told him: ‘You should learn a lesson from the Russians. When they had difficulties in Hungary, they liquidated the conflict in three days.’”125
Adzhubei dashed off a secret communiqué to Khrushchev summarizing the conversation with Kennedy. One week later, on February 8, 1962, the Soviet Presidium approved a $133 million military assistance package for Cuba—a proposal that had been stalled for over four months. On February 21, the head of the Soviet KGB sent a memo to the Kremlin, warning, “Military specialists in the USA had revised an operational plan against Cuba, which according to this information, is supported by President Kennedy.” In an indication of how competent Soviet intelligence was, the memo added that the assault would “be supported by military air assets based in Florida and Texas.”126
