by Bob Woodward
Because the CIA had been working aggressively against terrorism for years, Tenet said, the agency had done extensive target development and network analysis. What it needed was money, flexibility and broad authority - so that it could move quickly, instantly, if it discovered targets.
Rumsfeld was enthusiastic about the broad concept, but he still wanted the order to be more carefully written and restrictive.
The president made no effort to disguise what he thought of Tenet's proposals, virtually shouting "Great job!"
"OKAY, MUELLER," BUSH said, turning to the FBI director, "give me a brief. Where are we on what's happening?"
Robert Mueller was a former federal prosecutor who had spent years working on the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and he knew that the worst thing that can happen to an FBI director is to have a major domestic terrorist incident on his watch. Perhaps the second is being called on by the president when unprepared. The brand-new director had been surprised by the invitation to attend the war-planning session. He had expected to be called on much later, if at all.
Not used to the company, intimidated by the presence of the nation's top leadership, Mueller gave a routine summary of the investigation into the hijackings. He realized he was almost babbling and quickly yielded the floor.
Attorney General Ashcroft provided an update on his efforts to develop a legislative package to expand the powers of law enforcement to fight terrorism. He warned that it was important to disrupt the terrorists now but added, "We need to remember these are patient people," reminding them that eight years passed between the two attacks on the World Trade Center. The administration needed a new long-term strategy, "because that's the kind of strategy they have in place."
The final presentation of the morning was by General Shelton, who had also brought a big briefcase to Camp David. Bush had ordered the Pentagon to come to the meeting with plenty of options, and Shelton was prepared to talk about military action against both Afghanistan and, if pressed, Iraq.
He had three general options for Afghanistan.
Option One was a strike with cruise missiles, a plan the military could execute quickly if speed was the president's overriding priority. The missiles could be launched by Navy ships or Air Force planes from hundreds of miles away. The targets included al Qaeda's training camps.
The problem, he noted, as they all knew, was that the camps were empty. Clearly, Shelton, Bush and Rumsfeld were not enamored of this idea, nor were the others. It might as well have been labeled the Clinton Option. There was palpable disgust at the mere mention of cruise missiles only.
The second option combined cruise missiles with manned bomber attacks. Shelton said Bush could initially choose a strike lasting three or four days or something longer, maybe up to 10 days. The targets included al Qaeda training camps and some Taliban targets. This too had limits.
Shelton described the third and most robust option as cruise missiles, bombers and what the planners had taken to calling "boots on the ground." This option included all the elements of the second option along with elite commando units of U.S. Special Forces, and possibly the Army and Marines, being deployed inside Afghanistan. But he said it would take a minimum of 10 to 12 days just to get initial forces on the ground because bases and overflight rights would be needed in the region for search and rescue teams to bring out any downed pilots.
Veterans of the Gulf War, certainly Powell and Cheney, were struck by how the military situation in Afghanistan was shaping up as far different from Desert Storm. On Saturday, August 4, 1990, in the same lodge at Camp David, General Norman Schwarzkopf, then the commander in chief of the Central Command, had presented a detailed, off-the-shelf proposal for military action. It was called Operations Plan 90-1002, and it was the basic military plan that would be executed over the next seven months to oust the Iraqi army from Kuwait.
Now there was no off-the-shelf military plan. One would have to be devised fast and from scratch, once the president had decided the shape of the war, the initial focus of the campaign and the relationship between the CIA and the Pentagon.
At one point, someone said this was not likely to be like the Balkans, where ethnic hatreds had occupied the Clinton administration for nearly eight years. "We're going to wish this was the Balkans," Rice said, the problems of Afghanistan and the surrounding region were so complicated. She looked at a map and just thought "Afghanistan." It evoked every negative image: far away, mountainous, landlocked, hard.
Bush said that the ideal result from this campaign would be to kick terrorists out of some places like Afghanistan and through that action persuade other countries that had supported terrorism in the past, such as Iran, to change their behavior.
Powell asserted that everyone in the international coalition was ready to go after al Qaeda, but that extending the war to other terrorist groups or countries could cause some of them to drop out.
The president said he didn't want other countries dictating terms or conditions for the war on terrorism. "At some point," he said, "we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America."
Powell didn't reply. Going it alone was precisely what he wanted to avoid if possible. He thought that the president's formulation was not realistic. Without partners, the United States could not launch an effective war even in Afghanistan, certainly not worldwide. He believed the president made such statements knowing they might not withstand a second analysis. Tough talk might be necessary, but it shouldn't be confused with policy.
Cheney, in contrast, took Bush at his word. He was convinced that the president was serious when he said the United States would go it alone if necessary.
Rumsfeld raised another problem. Although everyone agreed that destroying al Qaeda was the first priority, any singling out of bin Laden, particularly by the president, would elevate him the way Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had been during the Gulf War. He said that the worst thing they could do in such a situation was to misstate their objective. It would not be effective to succeed in removing or killing bin Laden or Taliban leader Mohammad Omar without solving the basic problem of terrorism. Vilification of bin Laden could rob the United States of its ability to frame this as a larger war. In other words, the "No bin Laden" sign that graced every page of the CIA briefing pack was off-message and shouldn't be repeated in public.
Another puzzle was the Taliban. The United States was clearly going to apply pressure in the hope that it would break with al Qaeda and give up bin Laden. They didn't think this was likely but they agreed they had to make the effort.
Afghanistan's history nagged at the president's advisers. Its geography was forbidding and its record of rebuffing outside forces was real. Despite the options that had been presented earlier that morning, several advisers seemed worried. Bush asked them: What are the worst cases out there? What are the real downside risks?
One was triggering chaos in Afghanistan that would spill over into Pakistan. Rice and Cheney in particular viewed this as a great danger. Afghanistan was already a mess, Cheney said. If Pakistan went, they would have unleashed a whole other set of demons. He was worried that Pakistan's choice to support the United States could lead its extremists to try to bring down Musharraf's government. That could give Islamic fundamentalists access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
Everyone understood that President Musharraf was the crucial barrier between stability and a worst-case scenario.
Have the Pakistanis fully thought through the risks of supporting us? Bush asked.
Powell said he believed they had. First, Musharraf had seen how serious the administration was. Second, he said, Musharraf realizes he has gradually been losing control of his country, and he may see this as an opportunity to stop the slide into extremism. Musharraf did not want Pakistan to turn into a rogue state, Powell believed. He sought a more secular, westernized country.
President Musharraf is taking a tremendous risk, the president said. We need to make it worth his while. We should help h
im with a number of things, including nuclear security. Put together a package of support for Pakistan, he directed.
Another risk they faced was getting bogged down in Afghanistan, the nemesis of the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th. Rice was wondering whether it might be the same for the United States in the 21st.
Her fears were shared by others, which led to a different discussion: Should they think about launching military action elsewhere as an insurance policy in case things in Afghanistan went bad? They would need successes early in any war to maintain domestic and international support. The United States's rapid victory in the 1991 Gulf War, and the immediacy of watching it unfold live on CNN, had redefined people's expectations about warfare, which the Clinton administration's occasional cruise missile attacks had done nothing to alter.
Rice asked whether they could envision a successful military campaign beyond Afghanistan, which put Iraq back on the table.
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz perked up. Mild in manner but hard-line in policy, Wolfowitz, 57, believed that the abrupt end to the Desert Storm ground campaign in 1991 which left Saddam in power had been a mistake.
Since taking office, Bush had been seeking ways to undermine Hussein, with Wolfowitz pushing efforts to aid opposition groups, and Powell seeking support for a new set of sanctions. The fear was that Saddam was still attempting to develop, obtain and eventually use weapons of mass destruction, and without United Nations inspectors in the country, there was no way to know the exact nature of the threat they faced. The terrorist attacks of September 11 gave the U.S. a new window to go after Hussein.
Wolfowitz seized the opportunity. Attacking Afghanistan would be uncertain. He worried about 100,000 American troops bogged down in mountain fighting in Afghanistan six months from then. In contrast, Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime that might break easily. It was doable. He estimated that there was a 10 to 50 percent chance Saddam was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks. The U.S. would have to go after Saddam at some time if the war on terrorism was to be taken seriously.
Andy Card thought Wolfowitz was just banging a drum, not providing additional information or new arguments.
During a break, Bush joined a side discussion that included
Cheney, Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, and Wolfowitz. He told them that he had found some of Shelton's military options unimaginative.
Wolfowitz expanded on his arguments about how war against Iraq might be easier than against Afghanistan.
The president asked why he didn't present more of this at the meeting.
"It is not my place to contradict the chairman of the Joint Chiefs unless the secretary of defense says to," said Wolfowitz, knowing Shelton was opposed to an attack on Iraq.
When the group reconvened, Rumsfeld asked, Is this the time to attack Iraq? He noted that there would be a big buildup of forces in the region and he was still deeply worried about the availability of good targets in Afghanistan.
Powell objected. You're going to hear from your coalition partners, he told the president. They're all with you, every one, but they will go away if you hit Iraq. If you get something pinning September 11 on Iraq, great - let's put it out and kick them at the right time. But let's get Afghanistan now. If we do that, we will have increased our ability to go after Iraq - if we can prove Iraq had a role.
Bush had strong reservations about attacking Iraq, but he let the discussion continue. He was concerned about two things, he said later. "My theory is you've got to do something and do it well and that... if we could prove that we could be successful in [the Afghanistan] theater, then the rest of the task would be easier. If we tried to do too many things - two things, for example, or three things - militarily, then. . . the lack of focus would have been a huge risk."
Bush's other concern was one that he did not express to his war cabinet but that he would say later was part of his thinking. He knew that around the table were advisers - Powell, Cheney, Wolfowitz - who had been with his father during the Gulf War deliberations. "And one of the things I wasn't going to allow to happen is, that we weren't going to let their previous experience in this theater dictate a rational course for the new war." In other words, he didn't want them to use the war on terror as an excuse to settle an old score.
At another point during the morning, Wolfowitz interrupted his boss, Rumsfeld, and expanded on a point he had made earlier about Iraq. He may have taken the president's remark during the break as encouragement.
There was an awkward silence. Rumsfeld seemed to ignore the interruption but his eyes narrowed. Some thought he might be annoyed; others thought he was just listening.
Bush flashed a pointed look in Card's direction. During another break in the meeting, the chief of staff took Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz aside.
"The president will expect one person to speak for the Department of Defense," Card told them.
Sometime before lunch, Bush sent a message to the group that he had heard enough debate over Iraq. "There wasn't a lot of talk about Iraq in the second [afternoon] round," he later recalled. "The second round of discussion was focused only on Afghanistan, let me put it to you that way."
LUNCH WAS SERVED at 12:45, and Bush told his advisers that they should take some time to exercise or rest. Then, I want everybody back here at four o'clock, and I want to hear what you think we ought to do.
Rice was concerned about the lack of focus during the last part of the morning. The NSC meetings usually were more structured, with the principals reporting on their departments or agencies, and then together they would work through the problems - "noodle it around," she once said - and come up with options. The morning meeting had started well, but then had become repetitious, unusually freewheeling. She didn't know where the morning discussion had left them. How are we going to get a plan out of this? she wondered. Have we got anything here? She knew the president wanted to come away from the meeting with a plan of action.
Rice convened the principals - Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Card - without the president. She expressed her concerns. We need to bring more discipline to the discussion in the afternoon, she said, urging them to be specific.
Powell went back to his cabin, where his wife, Alma, was reading a book. As he saw it, the big questions were still on the table: what to do, when to do it, and do you go after this one thing - al Qaeda and Afghanistan - that they knew was out there, or do you expand the war at this time? He sat down in a chair and closed his eyes for half an hour.
Tenet and McLaughlin went out on a golf cart for a ride. McLaughlin wondered how the president was going to take the discussion, which had sprayed all over, and bring it together.
Rice went back to her cabin, returned some phone calls and went off to exercise. About 3:45 P.M., she ran into the president outside his cabin. He had worked out on the elliptical machine and lifted weights. Now he told his national security adviser that he had a plan for the afternoon. "I'm going to go around the table and I'm going to ask people what they think," the president said. "What do you think about that?"
"That's fine," she replied. "Do you want me just to listen?"
"I want you to listen," Bush said. She could offer her thoughts after they had heard everyone out.
I WANT TO hear recommendations from the principals - Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Card, and the vice president - said the president when the group reconvened in Laurel Lodge at 4 P.M.
Okay, who will start? He looked at Powell.
Powell had expected more general discussion but plunged ahead. "In the first instance, it's about al Qaeda and UBL," he said, using the common government shorthand for bin Laden, based on the spelling "Usama." Make them the target, their camps and their infrastructure. "Beyond that, there are other networks, but not the FARC," the left-wing guerrilla group in Colombia. They needed a sustained air campaign in places where bin Laden was known to hide, he said, and they should issue a warning to the Taliban 48 hours before the campaign starts th
at they will be held responsible. If not, they would start to pay a price.
"Don't go after the leadership in their capital," Powell continued, "go after the things that keep them in power like their air force. Start with the bottom of the loop first, rather than the top down."
He had several other ideas. "Stay away from CNN," he suggested. Instantaneous battlefield coverage could create unnecessary pressure. He also said it would be desirable to leave somebody in the Taliban to negotiate with, and it might be possible to work with the Saudis to try to get to the Taliban, since the Saudis were the only other major government besides Pakistan that formally recognized the Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan.
"All the states that supported terror, you can do at a time of your choosing," Powell said, repeating Bush's phrase from the cathedral speech the day before. "They are not going anywhere." Don't go with the Iraq option right away, or we'll lose the coalition. we've been signing up. "They'll view it as bait-and-switch - it's not what they signed up to do."
If we weren't going after Iraq before September 11, why would we be going after them now when the current outrage is not directed at Iraq, Powell asked. Nobody could look at Iraq and say it was responsible for September 11. It was important not to lose focus. "Keep the Iraq options open if you get the linkages," he said. "Maybe Syria, Iran" - the chief state sponsors of terrorism in the 1980s - "but doubt you'll get the linkages."
Though the U.S. military claims to be designed and equipped to fight two full-scale conflicts simultaneously, Powell thought the Defense Department was overestimating its ability to do two things at the same time from the same command, with the same commander and staff. Military attacks on both Afghanistan and Iraq would be under the jurisdiction of CENTCOM.
He didn't articulate that point, but he figured it was his ace in the hole. No military plan had been presented for Iraq. No one, neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz, had told the president precisely what should be done in Iraq and how it might be done. Nobody had taken it to the next step and said, This is what we're talking about. The absence of a plan was a gaping hole.
