by Bob Woodward
"The bombers that need to leave Missouri are about to leave," Rumsfeld continued. "And that will be noticed." The radar-evading B-2 Stealth bombers that were participating in the initial strikes in Afghanistan were being deployed directly from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and would have to leave 15 or more hours in advance, potentially tipping off the start of operations.
"Let them go," the president said. "Try some disinformation."
"We'll tell people they are full of food," Rumsfeld said.
"When is the humanitarian drop?" Rice asked.
"From 2:30 to 3:30 D.C. time," Myers said, "about two hours after the start of military action. And the threat to the aircraft will be gone by then." The meager air defense system of the Taliban was, they hoped, going to be pulverized in the first strikes.
The president said he would announce the attacks in a brief appearance on national television on Sunday. "We'll certainly have a statement. We'll circulate to the principals for review."
"We need a 'go' for the operation," Rumsfeld said.
"Go," Bush said. "It's well thought through. It's the right thing to do."
THE MORNING OF Sunday, October 7, Karl Rove was at his home in Northwest Washington. The days since the terrorist attacks had not been Rove's happiest. Though he had known Bush for 28 years and been his strategic adviser, Rove had been excluded from the war cabinet and NSC meetings. Bush and Cheney had deemed it impossible to have the controversial political guy in on the war discussions. It would send the wrong message.
Rove could see their point, but at the same time, politics was a continuing element of the presidency even during war, not to be ignored. Bush and Rove both believed that the Bush presidency would be judged largely on his performance dealing with September 11.
On one of the days shortly after the attacks, Rove was in the Oval Office and Bush had told him, Just like my father's generation was called in World War II, now our generation is being called. His father had signed up for the Navy, sworn in as a seaman second class in 1942 on his 18th birthday. They were being called to serve when they were in their 50s.
"I'm here for a reason," Bush said, "and this is going to be how we’re going to be judged."
Rove, 50, had been hailed by many, including Bush himself, as ±e architect of the 2000 victory. Just before September 11, The Weekly Standard, a plugged-in conservative magazine, had run a cover story, "The Impresario, Karl Rove, Orchestrator of the Bush White House." A large, respectful drawing of Rove, intellectual, learned and carrying a presidential folder, graced the cover. A miniature, clownish-looking Bush was in the breast pocket of Rove's-jacket.
That Monday, the White House Office of Strategic Initiatives, which Rove headed, had sent around a two-page analysis of the latest polling data.
This was Rove's Racing Form, which he studied methodically.
"The president's job approval is stronger than ever." The numbers were 84 to 90 percent.
"The president's recent job approval increase is unprecedented even for a time of crisis." Bush's job approval had been around 55 percent before September 11 and the jump to 90 percent in the ABC News/Washington Post poll "is unparalleled in modern polling." Sudden crises had in the past triggered an immediate increase in a president's job approval. "The durability of such increases is usually only seven to ten months," meaning presidents sink back to normal approval averages rather quickly.
Bush's father had an approval rating of 59 percent before the Gulf War began, but it jumped to 82 percent at the height of the crisis. Forty-one weeks later, it was back to 59 percent.
Rove took the polling information to Bush, and explained that if history was a guide, they had about 30 to 40 weeks before the polls returned to the norm.
"Don't waste my time with it," Bush told Rove, pretending to have no interest but looking at the data. Later Bush recalled their discussion of the poll numbers, which he said are a snapshot that might be inaccurate 24 hours later. "My job is not to worry about the political consequences, and I don't," the president maintained. It was Rove's job, and Bush knew that Rove managed the account with an unparalleled intensity and devotion to mission. This was definitely one thing that somebody else could handle better.
At the same time, the president carefully monitored his political standing. On this, like all matters, there was a scorecard.
Rove also kept in touch with the party apparatus and leading conservatives. One important-looking confidential communication came in to Rove from one of Bush senior's friends, so Rove took it to the Oval Office.
Roger Ailes, former media guru for Bush's father, had a message, Rove told the president. It had to be confidential because Ailes, a flamboyant and irreverent media executive, was currently the head of FOX News, the conservative-leaning television cable network that was enjoying high ratings. In that position, Ailes was not supposed to be giving political advice. His back-channel message: The American public would tolerate waiting and would be patient, but only as long as they were convinced that Bush was using the harshest measures possible. Support would dissipate if the public did not see Bush acting harshly.
ABOUT 8:30 A.M. Rove's phone rang.
"I suggest you be at the office at about 11 o'clock," the most recognizable voice said from Camp David. Things are going to happen. Get my drift? Bush asked over the nonsecure phone line. "I'm going to speak to the country this afternoon. And, so be there."
Rove arrived at the White House about 11 A.M. A serious amateur historian, he hung out with his notebook.
Rove walked up to the White House Treaty Room on the second floor where Bush was to give his televised announcement. He looked around. On the right was the painting that gave the room its name: President McKinley supervising the signing of the treaty ending the Spanish-American War in that room. The painting included the corner of the room where the chair and cameras were set up for Bush. ;
At 12:30 P.M., the president was in his chair ready to address the nation. Someone came in to apply the president's makeup. Five minutes later someone announced that there was a leak, one of the networks had said this was the beginning of the war.
"They don't get it," Bush said in a loud voice. "The war already began. It began on September 11th."
Card and Rice were conferring off to the side, and the president seemed irritated that he was not in on the discussion. "What is it?" he called out.
Card told him it was the Pentagon. "They're asking for more authority."
"I've told them they have whatever authority they need," Bush said, "as long as it abides by the rule of low collateral." Commanders and pilots had discretion to hit targets as long as they expected it would only cause minimal damage to civilians. Anything that could cause high collateral damage or make it look or feel like a war against civilians had first to come to Rumsfeld and then him for approval.
At 12:40, the staff began clearing the Treaty Room.
Where are the cards with the text as a backup for the TelePrompTer? Bush asked. Someone brought him the cards. He did a dry run of the speech.
"You've got the paragraphing wrong," he said, and requested changes so the pauses would be more natural. Someone brought him a glass of water.
"We've done this before," Bush said impatiently to one of the crew members he recognized. "Let's get doing it."
The awkward moments of the countdown continued and Bush looked around.
"Big Al!" he said to a Secret Service agent he had run with. He asked where the agent had been on a recent run.
Silence.
One agent said he had done a five-minute mile.
"I'm impressed," Bush said, adding that he had recently had an excellent run, 21 minutes, 6 seconds for three miles. The second mile had been the slowest, the first and third were the good ones, he added.
Silence.
"Where's the pool?" Bush asked. The networks had just received notice and a camera and sound crew was on its way that would feed video and sound for all. Finally, at 12:50 the pool showe
d up. They were late and frantic, rushing to get set up in time. One pool member couldn't get fully hooked up.
"Plug it in," Bush said, motioning to the location.
"Good afternoon," Bush said at 1 P.M. "On my orders the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan."
The Taliban had not met his demands. "And now the Taliban will pay a price." He didn't mention ground forces, but he came close. "Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them [the terrorists] out and bring them to justice."
The president promised food and medicine to the people of Afghanistan. "We will win this conflict by the patient accumulation of successes.
"I know many Americans feel fear today," he acknowledged, pledging that strong precautions were being taken by all of the government. To the men and women of the military, he said in effect this would not be Vietnam. "Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just; you have my full confidence; and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty."
He read a letter he had received from a fourth grade girl whose father was in the military. She had written, "As much as I don't want my dad to fight, I'm willing to give him to you."
At 2:45 P.M. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers appeared in the Pentagon press room. In a long introductory statement, Rumsfeld presented the military strikes as a "complement" to the diplomatic, financial and other pressure. He laid out six goals - sending a message to the Taliban, acquiring intelligence, developing relationships with the anti-Taliban groups such as the Northern Alliance, making it increasingly difficult for the terrorists, altering the military balance over time, and providing humanitarian relief. He gave no numbers or timetables.
General Myers offered some details - 15 land-based bombers, 25 strike aircraft from carriers and 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. and British ships and submarines. What he did not say was that they had only 31 targets on their strike list, all very low collateral damage targets in remote areas. The targets were the al Qaeda brigade, early warning radar, some command facilities used by al Qaeda and the Taliban, Taliban military aircraft, Taliban military airports and runways, the terrorist training camps, which were largely empty, and several surface-to-air missile sites.
"Was Osama bin Laden targeted in the raid?" a reporter asked.
"The answer is no with respect to him," Rumsfeld replied, though he noted that command facilities in Afghanistan had been targeted.
Rumsfeld lowered expectations; he called it "this so-called war."
Asked how many targets had been hit, he replied, "There is no way to discuss the outcome of this operation." There was a way, but he was not going to do it publicly. The vagueness was a protection from later contradiction, revealing the smallness of the operation and his own frustrations.
Another reporter asked, "Are you running the risk of being characterized as attacking the Afghan people rather than military targets?"
"You know," Rumsfeld replied, "in this world of ours if you get up in the morning you're running a risk of having someone lie and someone mischaracterize what it is you're doing. What the United States of America is doing is exactly what I said." It was defense against those who killed thousands of Americans and now threaten, intimidate and terrorize the world. "Thank you very much."
Bin Laden issued his own threat through a videotape that was released by Al-Jazeera. Sitting in an unidentified rocky site, wearing his military fatigue jacket, holding a microphone like a lounge singer, he said, "Here is America struck by God Almighty in one of its vital organs, so that its greatest buildings are destroyed.
"God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America."
BEGINNING BEFORE 7 A.M. on Monday, October 8, Rumsfeld made brief appearances on all five television network morning shows to offer a low-keyed and hedged assessment. Of the targets he said to ABC television, "We know they were successfully hit in many respects."
At 9:30 A.M., at the NSC meeting, Tenet said, "The picture is of the Afghans against al Qaeda in the north." The CIA was trying to help with the targeting up north. "The picture in the south is still unresolved. The Predator is flying in the north."
General Myers turned to the target problem. They didn't know what to hit. "Our TAG air are loitering, waiting for emerging targets identified by the Predator." It was an incredible moment, barely imaginable in the annals of modern warfare. After a day of strikes, the airborne might of the United States had been a somewhat helpless giant lumbering around the sky - "loitering," in the words of the nation's top military man, waiting for targets of opportunity.
Rumsfeld had some good news: "All aircraft are back safely," he said, "including the humanitarian aircraft."
Myers had harder news, the Bomb Damage Assessment, the key after-action analysis about what damage had been inflicted from bombs and cruise missiles. He said lots of targets were not destroyed sufficiently. "We're going to go back today to those things we missed."
The BDA was going to be treated as highly classified and the press and the public would not be told much.
Bush said that the latest communications intercepts and other intelligence showed that some major al Qaeda lieutenants, even possibly including bin Laden, were in Tora Bora, a region of natural and man-made caves in the White Mountains along the Pakistan border near Jalalabad. As the mujaheddin did during the Soviet occupation, al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were using the Tora Bora cave bunkers, accessible only by mule, as hideaways and depots.
"What ordnance do we put in Tora Bora?" he asked.
Myers's answer grabbed everyone's attention - 32 individual 2,000-pound bombs.
"We're not hitting a number of Taliban military targets," Rumsfeld said, because of potential high collateral damage. The question for tomorrow, he asked, was whether and when to go after more Taliban military targets.
"Look," Bush said, "we're going to have a series of strikes. We're going to then slow down, we're going to do our intelligence, see what the picture is, then we're going to restrike." At the moment, he seemed to be exhibiting some patience, glad finally to be bombing. But in an interview later, the president said he realized they weren't doing much of consequence militarily. "We're bombing sand. We're pounding sand," he said.
He was still on edge about anthrax. The first victim in Florida had died and a co-worker from the same building was infected. The FBI had launched a massive investigation, and anthrax was now front page news.
THE PRINCIPALS MET later that day. Tenet was happy. Musharraf had dismissed his intelligence chief, Mahmoud, and several of his key lieutenants, a dramatic signal. The bad witch was dead. The Pakistani intelligence service had been the Taliban's sugar daddy, and the removal of Mahmoud meant that Musharraf was increasingly serious. The French had 30 aircraft they wanted to move into the theater, and wanted U.S. support diplomatically with the Tajiks and Uzbeks to find a place to put them.
Rice said, "We'll check with Franks as to the need for those aircraft. And then we can discuss how we can facilitate it diplomatically. I'm grateful that Tommy is allowing the coalition partners to participate in different ways."
Rumsfeld turned to the sensitive subject of the Bomb Damage Assessment for the second day's strikes. "We destroyed 11 of 12 SA-3 radars. We hit seven of eight airfields. We've hit one half of the long-range radars, we'll go after the rest with our aircraft. We pounded Tora Bora. We don't know what effect. We got three radio towers, we made humanitarian drops. We used 70 attack aircraft doing 166 sorties."
The group turned to one of the most challenging problems they faced. How might the U.S. deter bin Laden and his network from using weapons of mass destruction?
No one had any great ideas.
"They may not be deterrable," Rice said, "but we can discourage others who would support him in it and incentivize them to turn on him."
But bin Laden was already pretty isolated. He seemed to have little support other than the Taliban, and the U.S. had failed to get them to turn on him.
DURING A MEETING in the Oval Office that day it was suggested to the president that he visit the Pentagon.
"I'm not going over there to say the planes all returned safely," Bush said, "because some day all the planes aren't going to return safely."
TENET BEGAN THE 9:30 A.M. NSC meeting on Tuesday, October 9, addressing the No. 1 problem - the lack of military targets in Afghanistan three days into the bombing campaign. "Today we're focused on working with the CINC to provide new targets, especially in the north," he said. His CIA paramilitary men on the ground in the north, Jawbreaker, might help identify "emerging targets" by flushing out new information on installations and troop concentrations. The Predator drones, the unmanned aerial vehicles, were also providing excellent reconnaissance video. "We're using the UAV to look at Tora Bora, to validate the maps provided by the Northern Alliance.
"Tribal groups in the south are not yet moving. We're holding the Northern Alliance in place and there's a question of when we release them."
So the ground situation remained static, partly at the U.S. military's behest, as everyone waited to see what effect the bombing campaign would have.
"In the south they're still on the fence. There are folks in Paktia - that's the most active group in the south," said Tenet, referring to the province due south of Kabul that includes the cities of Gardez and Khowst.
One promising development he could tell the president was the change in leadership of the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service. The new chief was cleaning out the agency's pro-Taliban members. This was a big deal for the CIA and a gutsy move by Musharraf. "We'll then ask them for more information," he said. He still distrusted ISI and wasn't sharing all his intelligence with them, and CIA source development in the south was being done independent of the Pakistanis.
Tenet also reported that switching of sides among the less militant Taliban had begun. It was something the agency had anticipated. "We're getting some defections of Taliban commanders in the north." Thirty-five to 40 Taliban commanders and about 1,200 men had defected Monday, handing the Northern Alliance control of a key Taliban resupply route northwest of Kabul. The commanders had been bought with CIA money.
