by Bob Woodward
"Some places we can do that, some places we can't," Rumsfeld answered. Given the air traffic of thousands of planes across the entire nation it was not realistic to have sufficiently large keep-out zones that would allow the CAP enough time to always intercept an aircraft that entered the zones.
Bush asked about resupply efforts for the Northern Alliance.
"We got a lot of supplies into Dostum and Fahim," Rumsfeld replied. "Karzai and Attah got ammunition and food yesterday, and they'll get it again today." They needed a base for humanitarian assistance in the north. The president said they needed more than a single base. "We need one in Mazar and we need one in Kabul."
Franks gave his assessment of his meetings with top people in six countries. The warmth of his reception with the Saudis surprised him, he said. They understood that this was going to be a long effort. He had found some bureaucratic resistance below the highest levels in Saudi Arabia and that meant there would be some frictions, but we'll work through them, he said.
On Qatar, he said, "We've got some requests of them. They are working through our requests.
"Musharraf is calm, confident and committed. We have to recognize that what we do in Pakistan creates problems for him in his street and we have to be sensitive to that." He reported that the Pakistani leader had told him he would like the thing in Afghanistan to end soon. He said he had responded by telling Musharraf, "That will depend more on you than it does on me."
Pakistan was the linchpin of the operation.
Uzbekistan needed more work. He recommended that Rumsfeld go see Karimov.
Franks said he had an assessment team working at Tajikistan's air base.
: The U.S. needed to have more and better public affairs outreach. We need to do it at home, Franks said. "We need to get our message into the media of countries overseas. We need to be visible where we need to be visible, and invisible where we need to be invisible." He seemed to be saying that it was important to have as light a footprint as possible.
"They generally understand our effort will not be short," Franks said. "It's terribly important that we show resolve.
"We're still getting into the theater assets that we need to prosecute the war the way this war has to be prosecuted." They were sending in their own Predators for aerial surveillance, but unlike the CIA's version, the U.S. military's drones were not armed with Hellfire missiles.
He was moving in Global Hawks - high-altitude, long-range unmanned surveillance planes - and JSTARS 0oint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), which detected ground movements of tanks or other vehicles over large areas. JSTARS did for the ground what AWACS did for air surveillance. "We're at this point getting in those kinds of assets that you really are going to need when this thing begins to move up."
Franks said they had not increased the teams on the ground since the last week. "Dostum is the best we've got. He's tired, lacks medical supplies, clothing and ammunition." But resupply would take place within seven days. Overall, Franks said they needed to do a better job getting supplies to all the opposition forces. "We need to go on high burn."
Bush said he agreed.
It turned out that the Russians were willing to send weapons to the Northern Alliance. They had some distribution networks, but somebody would have to pay for the arms. It was eventually decided that the CIA would pay. They would give their former enemy about $10 million. Rice would deal with the Russian defense minister to make the final arrangements.
Franks had been compiling a list of caves and tunnels that were possible hiding places for bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban. He had 150 to 160 on his list. He said 75 of these had been struck. In addition, the CINC had a list of suspected WMD sites - and he was checking them out one by one.
"Now, Mr. President," Franks said, "let me tell you the specific problems I'm working on in the next seven days." He wanted to give Bush an operational feel for the details. One problem was that forces from the United Kingdom were having trouble getting into Pakistan, and the CINC was trying to make sure that happened. "I'm trying to make sure we can get aircraft" - a particular kind of aircraft - "based in Uzbekistan. I'm trying to get cold weather supplies in, tents, clothing," some of which he had gotten from the Russians. "I've got two more Special Forces teams I need to get in this week. I need to get JSTARS up and operating in the environment. And I've got to get my relationships square with Qatar."
As usual Cheney had been mostly silent, listening carefully, his head occasionally tilted. "I think time is on our side militarily in Afghanistan," the vice president said, "but in the broader context, we need greater urgency. The longer UBL is free, the greater risk of a hit here at home."
Tenet thought that bin Laden's freedom might or might not increase the risk. If he was free, he might order another attack. But if he was captured or killed, other al Qaeda might decide to act in retaliation or desperation. He said nothing.
"They may have nukes," Cheney said, laying out the worst case scenario. "They may have CW/BW. The allies in the region are a fragile proposition for us. The strategic consequence of a radical takeover in Pakistan or Saudi would be enormous. And third, the degree of patience in the United States may dissipate if we get hit again.
"Therefore," Cheney said, addressing Franks and Rumsfeld, "we may need to think about giving you more resources, a different timeline, more forces and a higher tempo of operations." He asked Franks if he needed more guidance about taking greater risks in the theater.
"Whether we use surrogates or use a more direct U.S. role is the issue," Franks said. "And I need to present it to you. I haven't yet satisfied myself I can present it to you."
Franks and his staff and the Joint Chiefs were forcing themselves to face the possibility that a large ground force of American troops would have to be sent to Afghanistan. The number 50,000 to 55,000 was being mentioned. It was a staggering number, suggesting the kind of land war that military history dictated should be avoided in Asia, at all costs.
The president was aware of the figure under consideration. In a later interview, he recalled dealing with "the scenario where we may need to put the 55,000 troops in there."
"What's the capability of the opposition forces?" Powell asked. "Do we need to train them?" In his 35 years in the military, he had found that good training could go a long way. Neither Powell nor anyone else was prepared for Franks's answer.
"I don't place any confidence in the opposition," the commander said. On the question of whether the Alliance could be trained, he said, "I don't know." He was depressed about Fahim, who had the advantage and was not really moving. In contrast, Dostum on horseback was aggressive, a General Patton. "Dostum rides 10 to 15 miles a day in windstorms or snowstorms with guys lacking a leg. They go to blow up a Taliban outpost and take casualties knowing they had no medical assistance."
So even though he had lost confidence in the opposition forces, Franks said he would continue with the current strategy "while at the same time doing some planning to see if we need to be able to do the kind of things the vice president described."
The president had not known that Cheney was going to raise these issues, but he had found that when Cheney asked questions it was worth listening to them. He wanted Franks to take them seriously. "When can you give me some options," Bush asked Franks, "along the lines of what the vice president talks about?"
"In one week," Franks said, "to a very small group."
Bush had previously asked Franks what response would be possible if al Qaeda struck the U.S. at home again in a major way, and he wanted to order an escalation.
"And I also owe you options of what we do if we get hit again," Franks said.
After the meeting, Cheney called Libby, who had also been in attendance. "Nobody ever said these jobs were easy," the vice president said.
THE SATURDAY, November 3, secure video NSC meeting, McLaughlin reported that the CIA now had four paramilitary teams inside Afghanistan. The plan was to have the agency's Delta team, which had just
joined Khalili some 100 miles west of Kabul, link up with Jawbreaker and Fahim north of Kabul and drive south to the capital.
The other two teams would drive north on Mazar, Alpha with Dostum and Bravo with Attah.
"The bad guys are looking for good news in the next few days," he told them. The threat reports were escalating again.
The news on both fronts was bad - little progress on the ground in Afghanistan and a big possibility of another attack at home. And that attack may have already started with the mailing of anthrax spores. The day before, Bush had referred to a "two front war."
Wolfowitz was standing in for Rumsfeld, who was on a quick four-day trip to Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and India, and he too had some disappointing news. "The weather is bad. We lost a second Predator because of icing. We've got 16 left. We're producing more."
"How about the pending invasion of Mazar?" the president asked. "Did somebody say it was going to happen on November 5th?" That was two days away.
Yes, that was the plan. They were not sure it could be counted on.
General Myers had something positive. "We've got a third military Special Forces team in with Khalili now." That team was working with the CIA's Delta team and Khalili near Bamiyan.
"So you've got four or five left to get in, right?" the president asked.
"Right."
AT THE MONDAY, November 5, NSC meeting, Wolfowitz attempted to demonstrate that they were turning up the heat. He reported that "90 percent of our sorties now are in support of the opposition" - targets called in by the Special Forces A-teams, hitting the front lines and troop concentrations of the Taliban and al Qaeda.
"Our sortie rate is up 20 to 30 percent," he said. "We're using F-16s and F-15s out of Kuwait. It's a long haul." Kuwait, which had been liberated by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War, was willing to allow offensive strikes from its territory, but it was 1,000 miles from Afghanistan.
A Middle East leader had told General Franks the U.S. didn't need to stop fighting during Ramadan, Wolfowitz reported, and that in 37 of the last 54 years there had been fighting during Ramadan - most of it Arab against Arab.
The president, of course, had already made the decision to bomb during the Muslim holiday.
But the leader had said that they should ease up on strikes during prayer time, Wolfowitz reported. That became the formula they adopted.
"In the north," the president asked, "what is the strength of the enemy?" The intelligence reports, done by sector in the country, had been all over the lot. Though he didn't say it, Tenet knew that the best the CIA could give was really a WAG - a wild assed guess.
"Are we giving the tribals an impossible task?" Bush continued. After all, Fahim in the northeast had a numerical advantage but he was not moving. Dostum, who was overwhelmingly outnumbered, was trying to move.
Wolfowitz said that the Taliban were getting reinforcements but Franks thought that had a good news side - it would create more targets.
"I want to hear more from Don about that," Bush said.
THAT AFTERNOON THE president met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Algeria is the largest country in Africa and the CIA was heavily subsidizing its intelligence service, spending millions to get their assistance in the war against al Qaeda.
The December 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressam, a low-level Algerian terrorist operative, had not only helped break up the millennium terrorist plot but also had tipped the CIA to the existence of an Algerian al Qaeda network of black Africans. The result: a doubling of the known number of al Qaeda in the world, a significant and disturbing discovery. Tenet took it as a warning that the CIA had to look at not just Arab faces but also African faces in counter-terrorist operations.
Bush promised the Algerian president that the United States would complete its mission and go home. "The biggest problem we have is an impatient press corps. They want the war over yesterday. They don't get it."
AT THE TUESDAY, November 6, noon Pentagon press briefing, Rumsfeld said that he thought it would take months to deal with the Taliban and al Qaeda.
"What has led you to come to that conclusion?" a reporter inquired.
"It is clearly an estimate," Rumsfeld replied. "I did not suggest one, two or three months; I said months rather than years. That means it could be as long as 23."
The reporters laughed.
"I've got a full range from one or two to 23. And I thought to myself when I was asked that question, I spontaneously responded to the best of my ability and said, Hmmm, I'll bet you it's months, not years. Could I be wrong? I suppose. Do I think I am? No."
More laughter.
AT THE MORNING NSC on Wednesday, November 7, Tenet reported that the CIA was still trying to get its Charlie paramilitary team in with Ismail Khan in the west.
"There seems to be progress around Mazar-e Sharif," he said, tantalizing everyone. But the full battlefield picture, as always, was troublingly unclear.
Rumsfeld said, "There are four more Special Forces teams to go in - are in the process of going in." That meant they still weren't in - nothing had changed since Saturday. "We're resupplying Dostum, Attah and Khan. We're continuing to work on the caves."
"The cave story is important," the president said. He was closely following the intelligence, including the overhead Predator video. "It highlights the problem in this war," he said, quickly adding, "But it also highlights U.S. steadfastness." Searching the cave complexes for Taliban and al Qaeda was difficult and tedious, and dangerous.
LATER THAT DAY, November 7, Tony Blair flew over on the Concorde to visit Bush. They met briefly in the Oval Office, gave a joint press conference in which they attempted to boost each other and the anti-terrorism cause, had an early dinner with aides and then went upstairs to confer alone.
Bush wanted to unburden, talk things through with a peer, another head of state. He wanted some eyeball time with his chief ally. He and Blair were in this together - both had staked their public offices, careers and reputations on the current undertaking.
The situation was not as happy as they had portrayed it publicly. Afghanistan was bogged down and questions abounded: When were they going to get the Uzbeks to agree to full basing rights? The Uzbeks were playing silly buggers with them. What about Mazar? Was Kabul in danger of a Northern Alliance takeover, leaving "Johnnie Pashtun" out in the cold? How could they detach the Pashtuns from the Taliban? What could be the inducement? More money, security, a sense that the United States and Britain were on the winning side? They needed to dress up the notion of inevitable victory.
For the first time, the Middle East situation seemed to have an impact on the two leaders' strategy for dealing with Afghanistan. For Blair, Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat still could be engaged in security and confidence-building steps with the Israelis, however small. He seemed a necessary evil. Bush increasingly viewed Arafat as just evil.
Blair flew back that night after about six hours in the United States.
"WE MIGHT TAKE Mazar in 24 to 48 hours," Tenet told skeptical colleagues at a principals' meeting on Thursday, November 8. Dostum and Attah were engaged in an envelopment of the city. "One is seven and one is 15 kilometers from the town." He said he would lean on the Pakistanis to use their tribal ties in southern Afghanistan to get the south to rise. "We don't have anything working in the south, and we have nothing to put on the table."
He had yet another piece of bad news. "The Iranians may have switched sides and gone to side with the Taliban." Iran, one of the biggest supporters of the Northern Alliance before September 11 - in conjunction with the U.S., Russia and India - was now worried that the United States might gain some kind of foothold in Afghanistan. Sensitive intelligence showed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the radical element that held real power, was shipping weapons to the Taliban, and that it was reaching out to al Qaeda. Some al Qaeda were using Iran as a transit point out of Afghanistan into places like Yemen.
The only upside was that it suggested the
Northern Alliance was closer to victory than anyone had thought.
Rumsfeld had an idea for incentives. "We've got to tell the tribal groups in the south if they throw in and help us, we will accept their having a role in the government. The test is whether they will act now against al Qaeda and the Taliban." He was suggesting a kind of amnesty program - sign up now and your past associations will be forgotten. This was necessary because all the tribes in the south had had some ties to the Taliban. To disenfranchise them from the new government would give them no incentive to help now.
"I agree," said Powell in an unusual concurrence with Rumsfeld, "that's the right test." It was the kind of practical deal that Powell liked. Purity wouldn't work. This was practical politics.
HANK WENT TO Afghanistan to assess the front lines with some of the agency's paramilitary teams. The millions of dollars in covert money the teams were spreading around was working wonders. He calculated that thousands of Taliban had been bought off. The Northern Alliance was trying to induce defections from the Taliban themselves, but the CIA could come in and offer cash. The agency's hand would often be hidden as the negotiations began - $10,000 for this sub-commander and his dozens of fighters, $50,000 for this bigger commander and his hundreds of fighters.
In one case, $50,000 was offered to a commander to defect. Let me think about it, the commander said. So the Special Forces A-team directed a J-DAM precision bomb right outside the commander's headquarters. The next day they called the commander back. How about $40,000? He accepted.
AT THE FRIDAY, November 9, NSC meeting, General Franks reported, "We're doing 90 to 120 sorties a day; 80 or 90 percent are going to support the opposition. We're focusing on Mazar." He said they were supplying five of the 10 main tribal leaders. "We're doing cold weather gear and ammunition. We assemble the packages in Texas, they're staged in Germany. It takes two days to get them into Germany, and then we distribute them two or three days thereafter." They were starting to get a reliable logistics chain.
