by Neal Bascomb
In the summer of 1959, Friedman had started a correspondence with Erwin Schüle. Schüle was the director of the West German Central Office for the Prosecution of National Socialist Criminals. Based in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart, the bureau had opened the previous December after Schüle had successfully prosecuted several Nazis in a highly publicized trial in Ulm. The trial had stirred victims to press for more investigations. Friedman had sent Schüle several files about war criminals he was targeting. He had later asked the prosecutor why he was not interested in finding the "monster who was the devil incarnate," Adolf Eichmann. Schüle had responded that he would indeed be interested in any material that Friedman had, so Friedman had sent a copy of his Eichmann file to Ludwigsburg with a request that the West German government consider posting a reward for the Nazi's capture.
On August 20, Schüle had written that he had a confidential source placing Eichmann in Kuwait. Friedman had presented the letter to his former Haganah chief, Arthur Pier (now Asher Ben-Natan and, at the time, the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense), as well as to several heads of Jewish organizations and even to the Israeli police in Tel Aviv. All of them had told him that there was nothing they could do. Nothing.
Now Friedman carried Schüle's letter in his breast pocket, keeping it always with him. He was sure that he finally had a clue as to Eichmann's whereabouts, and yet he was powerless to act on it. His wife tried to comfort him, but he was numb, debating with himself whether to forget the whole affair or go to the press with what he knew.
As he watched and listened to the people of Haifa enjoying a carefree evening, Friedman felt that he had no choice other than to go public. He strode over to the phone, dialed a contact at the newspaper Ma'ariv, and gave him a story: Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi war criminal whose sole focus was to clear Europe of Jews, was living freely in Kuwait.
The report, which he credited to the West German prosecutor, prompted a loud public outcry. Newspapers around the globe carried front-page headlines about the war criminal in Kuwait. Friedman gave scores of interviews to Israeli and foreign correspondents, describing the crimes of "history's most infamous killer" and proposing a reward of $10,000 to be set on his head. There were calls for a search to be launched as a matter of urgency. Ten days after the story was published, Friedman was invited to give a speech at a Tel Aviv rally for David Ben-Gurion and other members of his party who were up for election. Friedman implored the prime minister to "issue the orders that the same Eichmann who sent millions of Jews to the gas ovens should be found."
Meanwhile, letters poured into Friedman's documentation center. Some promised that Eichmann would never be found; others offered tips on his true location. One tip had the Nazi living as a hermit in a hilltop house in New Zealand. Among these letters, Friedman received a note posted on October 24 from a Lothar Hermann of Coronel Suárez, Argentina. Hermann explained that he had read the article about Eichmann in a local newspaper and that it was "completely incorrect. The person mentioned does not live in Kuwait on the Persian Gulf. He lives under an assumed name with his wife and four children near Buenos Aires." Hermann offered to provide "precise dates and exact material" and "was prepared to clear up this case completely, provided, however, the strictest secrecy is observed." A rapid exchange of two more letters, including discussions of a reward, convinced Friedman that this Argentine had hard facts on Eichmann's location.
Now dismissing the Kuwait lead out of hand, Friedman copied the letters from Argentina and delivered them to a prominent member of the World Jewish Congress, who promised to pass them on to people who could investigate them swiftly and properly. Friedman felt that he was on the right path.
In early December 1959, suitcase in hand, Fritz Bauer flicked off the lights in his Frankfurt office. He was headed to Israel, this time with certain proof that Adolf Eichmann was hiding in Buenos Aires. The attorney general planned on making his case firmly, and he would not return without the guarantee of a prompt operation. The Israelis needed to act.
Bauer did not dare risk leaving the country with his latest intelligence in written form, but he remembered the details well. According to his source, the fugitive Nazi had escaped from Germany in 1950 with the Catholic Church's aid, hiding in monasteries en route to Italy. There he had been given a new identity and applied for an International Committee of the Red Cross passport. He had traveled to Buenos Aires, obtained an Argentine identity card under his new pseudonym, and begun to work at a series of jobs. The first was at a company called CAPRI, run by an investment firm called the Fuldner Company out of a Buenos Aires address: 374 Avenida Cordoba. The company had dealt with converting waterpower into electricity. Eichmann had lived near the city of Tucumán while working for CAPRI. Later, he had run a laundry in the Olivos neighborhood of Buenos Aires. As of 1958, he still lived in the capital and was still involved with the Fuldner Company.
The intelligence was precise and covered a number of years, almost certainly obtained from someone who knew Eichmann well. None of this information was as important to Bauer, however, as the alias under which the source stated that Eichmann had lived throughout these years: Ricardo Klement. This matched the name to which the electricity meter at 4261 Chacabuco Street was registered. Two independent sources. One name. Klement was Eichmann. No doubt.
Bauer had resolved not to go to Isser Harel with these new details. The Mossad chief had disappointed him by shelving the first tip Bauer had sent, not to mention by relying on a blind man and his daughter to lead the investigation. Instead, Bauer had arranged a meeting with Haim Cohen, the Israeli attorney general. Bauer could not reveal the identity of his source, who was too critically placed. (To this day, it is still a state secret.) He would ask Cohen to exert as much pressure as possible on Harel to act on this information.
After the Hermann experience, Bauer suspected that Harel would demand to know the source's identity or refuse to get involved. However, the past six months had proved to Bauer that he had no option other than to go to the Israelis once again. His initial suspicion that his own government would not act effectively against fugitive Nazis such as Eichmann had been proved again and again. In June, one of his fellow prosecutors in Freiburg had issued a warrant for the arrest of Josef Mengele for his many crimes at Auschwitz. The prosecutor had a known address for Mengele in Argentina and had convinced the West German Foreign Ministry to issue an extradition request. The Argentines first denied that Mengele had ever come to the country (although they knew he had), and when his presence had been proved to them, they had informed the Foreign Ministry that his crimes had been "political" in nature and therefore that further review was needed. The extradition was still pending, giving Mengele plenty of time to escape should he ever feel threatened. Since Werner Junkers, a former high-level aide to Joaquim von Ribbentrop, was the West German ambassador in Argentina, Mengele had likely learned of the proceedings against him and that they would result in failure.
One thing Bauer knew for certain was that there was no more time for delay in catching Eichmann. Even though the Kuwait announcement may have prompted his source to come forward, Bauer feared that it might also have resulted in Eichmann's learning that he was still a target and going to ground. Bauer had since urged his close colleague Schüle, who was now aware of the Argentine investigation, to contact Friedman and reassure him that the Hesse attorney general was making every effort to track down Eichmann. Any more publicity would jeopardize the hunt.
As he headed out of the building and into a waiting car, Bauer hoped that Eichmann had not already made a run for it.
On the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, in the back of a chauffeur-driven sedan, Zvi Aharoni, the thirty-eight-year-old chief interrogator for the Shin Bet, and Isser Harel sat in silence. Aharoni was scanning the reports sent from Lothar Hermann. The Shin Bet interrogator was not surprised that he had heard nothing of the investigation in the past two years. Harel made it his practice to compartmentalize information. His agents knew only w
hat they needed to know—no more, no less. Aharoni was shocked that Harel had relied solely on the Hermanns to conduct the investigation. Aharoni had been in Buenos Aires for six weeks on another mission earlier in the year and could have pursued some of the leads himself. However, one did not question the Mossad chief.
Earlier in the day, Harel had summoned Aharoni and informed him that they were expected at the Ministry of Justice in Jerusalem for a meeting with Haim Cohen and Fritz Bauer. It was only once they were in the car that Harel had told Aharoni about Eichmann and had shown him the files. Cohen had specifically asked for Aharoni to attend the meeting. They knew each other well from several espionage and high-treason cases they had worked together and were both gifted with the same cold, logical intelligence. Both German Jews by birth, neither had kept their faith in a God that had abandoned the Jews to the Nazi barbarity.
As the sedan threaded through the pine-covered Judean Hills outside Jerusalem, Aharoni sensed that his boss was irked at being beckoned by Cohen. The Mossad chief answered only to Ben-Gurion, but he could not dismiss a call from the attorney general. Anyway, Bauer had surely come all this way for a good reason.
The car reached Jerusalem and made its way through the maze of steep streets to the Ministry of Justice on Jaffa Street. The walls of the Old City stood in the distance. They climbed to the second floor where Cohen and Bauer were waiting for them. After a brief introduction, Bauer launched straight into the new intelligence he had received confirming the Klement alias. His bushy gray eyebrows flared while he spoke. He was obviously incensed that the first Israeli investigation had dismissed the Hermanns' reports. A precious eighteen months had passed without action, and Bauer feared that Eichmann had long since moved or switched his name again.
"This is simply unbelievable!" Bauer said angrily. "Here we have the name Klement: Two completely independent sources, who are strangers to each other, mention this name. Any second-class policeman would be able to follow such a lead! Just go and ask the nearest butcher or greengrocer and you will learn all there is to know about him!"
Harel attempted to calm Bauer, assuring him that this significant new intelligence completely changed the dynamic of the investigation. Bauer remained furious. He declared that he would have no choice other than to begin extradition proceedings through official German channels if the Israelis did not act immediately. Though Harel thought that Bauer was probably bluffing, the Mossad chief replied that this would not be necessary. They wanted Eichmann found and were ready to act.
Cohen declared, "I want Zvi to go to Buenos Aires and check out this story once and for all. We can't play around with this any longer."
Harel agreed, sure now that his perception of the Hermann reports had been misguided. Aharoni reacted evenly to the decision, never one to show much emotion, though he glowed inwardly with pride to know that they had such faith in his abilities. Aharoni wanted to know where Bauer had got his information. Bauer was firm that he must keep his source's identity secret, but he insisted that the source and Hermann were unconnected. Aharoni suspected that his intelligence had come from a former SS officer who had recently left Argentina and was looking to curry favor with the West German authorities, either to join their intelligence outfits or to elude a trial for war crimes. At this point, however, it did not matter: the source did look solid. Aharoni would go to Germany to collect the intelligence documents that Bauer had gathered over the past two years. Then he would travel to Argentina. The meeting that had started so tensely ended with warm handshakes.
Aharoni felt the burden begin to weigh on him: his mission would likely be more difficult than inquiring at the local butcher in Buenos Aires, despite what Bauer had said. The fate of Eichmann rested on Aharoni's success in locating and identifying him.
On December 6, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion welcomed his Mossad chief into his office. Though equal in height to Harel, the man known as the founding father of Israel had a much more commanding presence. He had the lantern jaw and instinctive aggressiveness of a fighter and the wild white hair and curious intellect of an artist. Already in his early seventies, Ben-Gurion was nearing the end of his time as leader of the new nation, but his eyes were as bright and intelligent as when he had announced the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Harel and Ben-Gurion were very close, having relied on each other over the past decade not only for Israel's benefit but also for their own hold on its many levers of power.
Haim Cohen joined them shortly, and Harel recounted their meeting with Fritz Bauer to Ben-Gurion, explaining that the Hesse attorney general now had intelligence that identified where Eichmann lived and under what alias almost beyond any doubt. The Mossad chief had told the prime minister before about the search for the fugitive Nazi but never with the conviction that he might be found. Ben-Gurion was impressed by the courage Bauer had shown in coming to them again—this time personally—with the information. Harel advised Ben-Gurion that Bauer had warned that he would push for extradition proceedings in West Germany if Israel did not pursue his leads.
"Prevent Bauer from taking this step," Ben-Gurion said, his voice firm. "If Eichmann is there, we will capture him in order to bring him here."
Harel had already considered such an operation, knowing that it would present enormous challenges that would tax the Mossad's limited resources. A more expedient solution would be to assassinate Eichmann. His people were experienced in this method: one day the Argentine police would discover Ricardo Klement in a car crash or some other mishap, and the world would not need to know that Adolf Eichmann was dead—or that the Israelis had killed him.
Ben-Gurion was unequivocal that he wanted Eichmann taken alive, to stand trial in Israel for his crimes against the Jewish people. Cohen was apprehensive about the legality of such a move, as he had already discussed with Harel. From a purely legal perspective, West Germany had much more of a right to try Eichmann than Israel, which had not existed when the crimes were committed. Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion told the Israeli attorney general to investigate the matter further and arrive at a justification.
As for the operation itself, Ben-Gurion had complete faith in Harel, writing confidently in his diary that night, "Isser will deal with it."
Three weeks later, on Christmas Eve, those in West Germany who looked fondly on the Nazi past acted. In Cologne, two young men painted huge swastikas and JUDEN RAUS (Jews Out) across the walls of a recently constructed synagogue and on a memorial dedicated to those who had fought in the resistance against Hitler. Over the next several days, there was an outbreak of anti-Semitic attacks and demonstrations across West Germany, and police had to be stationed outside synagogues and Jewish cemeteries to prevent further desecrations. In total, 685 Jewish locations throughout the country were painted with swastikas. These were more than the isolated actions of a few hooligans, and Jewish leaders in West Germany asserted that the scene "evoked pictures that bring to mind the November days of 1938."
Chancellor Adenauer promptly broadcast on the radio that these acts were not to be tolerated, but it was plain that much more was needed to tamp down the rise of neo-Nazism. The German Reich Party, a right-wing group with Nazi sympathies, had made gains in the recent election. Membership in militant and nationalistic organizations was increasing, as was the number of newsletters and daily papers, book clubs, and discussion groups whose readers and members hated the "Bonn democracy" and aimed to "correct the accepted facts" about Hitler and German war guilt.
The attacks also highlighted the fact that numerous former Nazi Party officials held many important government posts in the new Germany. They accounted for a third of Adenauer's cabinet, a quarter of the Bundestag, and a sizable percentage of the civil service, judiciary, and Foreign Ministry. In addition, eight foreign ambassadors were former Nazis. Adenauer had stonewalled in the face of a recent campaign, largely organized by his political opponents, against the proliferation of such individuals in the government. Most notably, he had refused to fire Hans Globke, the mini
ster for refugees Theodore Oberländer (a Waffen-SS officer who had once demanded the extermination of the Slavic people), or the interior minister Gerhard Schröder (a former Nazi storm trooper leader).
Also troubling was the fact that the recent war criminal trials conducted by Erwin Schüle and Fritz Bauer had done little to change the "almost nationwide need to pull the blinds on the past," as a New York Times reporter described the mindset in West Germany. Even the country's schoolteachers were found to be incorrectly instructing their students on the nature of Hitler's regime. A ninth-grade textbook devoted only a single paragraph to the "Jewish question" during World War II. Extermination camps were not mentioned once. All of these trends drew critical notice in Israel.
Soon after the Cologne incident, the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee asked Harel about the potential of a Nazi revival. Even to these high officials, Harel could not reveal the first major blow he intended to deliver to combat this revival: the capture of Adolf Eichmann. He was more convinced than ever that Ben-Gurion was right: the fugitive's capture, and the public airing of his crimes in a trial, would remind the world of the Nazi atrocities and the need to remain vigilant against any groups who aimed to repeat them. Already the Mossad chief had tasked Aharoni with his mission to Argentina, another agent was investigating the Eichmann and Liebl families in Europe, and Harel was looking into transporting their captive covertly from Argentina when the time came.
