Encyclopedia of Russian History
Page 39
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baumann, Robert F. (1987). “Subject Nationalities in the Military Service of Imperial Russia: The Case of the Bashkirs.” Slavic Review 46: 489-502. Donnelly, Alton S. (1968). The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552-1740: A Case Study in Imperialism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Pipes, Richard E. (1950). “The First Experiment in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Bashkir Republic, 1917-1920.” Russian Review 9:303-319. Schafer, Daniel E. (2001). “Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919-1920.” In A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Era of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin. New York: Oxford University Press.
DANIEL E. SCHAFER
BASIL I
(1371-1425), grand prince of Vladimir and Moscow (from 1389).
The eldest son and successor to grand prince Dmitry Ivanovich (“Donskoi”), Basil assumed the power as the obedient servant of Khan Tokhtamysh. In 1392, when the latter was engaged in the war with emir Timur and needed financial resources, Basil visited the Horde and bought patents for the principalities of Nizhny Novgorod, Murom, Gorodets, Tarusa, and Meshchera. Using his armed force and the khan’s support, Basil I seized Nizhny Novgorod. But Suzdalian princes did not give up, and the struggle for Nizhny Novgorod was resumed in the 1410s.
In 1397 Basil attempted to annex the Dvina land (in the valley of the Northern Dvina River), a province of Great Novgorod. In order to gain the support of the inhabitants, Basil gave a special charter to this land, but his rule there did not last long. In 1498 the Novgorodians recovered their province.
In the 1390s, Basil I entered into alliance with the mighty duke of Lithuania, Vytautas (in 1391 Basil married his daughter, Sophia). The Muscovite prince allowed his ally and father-in-law to conquer Vyazma (1403) and Smolensk (1404); only when Vytautas marched on Pskov (1406) did Basil I declare war on Lithuania. However, during this war (1406-1408) no decisive battles took place. Peaceful relations with Lithuania were restored (1408), and later in his testament (1423) Basil I entrusted his minor son and heir, Basil II, to the protection of Vytautas.
After the final defeat of Tokhtamysh by Timur (1395), Basil I broke relations with the Golden Horde and stopped paying tribute. In 1408 Moscow suffered a severe blow from emir Edigey, the ruler of the Horde, who besieged the capital for three weeks, and, having taken an indemnity of three thousand rubles, withdrew, ravaging the land and leading away thousands of captives. Basil I made no attempt to face the enemy: He retired to Kostroma and waited there for the invasion to pass.
One of consequences of Edigey’s raid was that Suzdalian princes recovered Nizhny Novgorod (c. 1410), and only in 1414 did Basil I manage to recapture this city.
It is characteristic of Basil’s relations with the Tartars that he did not acknowledge the power of Edigey, who was not a Chingizid; but as soon as the legitimate khan Jelal-ad-din (son of Tokh-tamysh) seized power in the Horde (1412), Basil immediately paid him a visit and resumed the payment of tribute.
For the lack of evidence, the last decade of Basil’s I rule remains obscure. For the same reason, it is hardly possible to assess his personality. As Robert Crummey aptly remarked, Basil I “is a shadowy figure. The sources on his long reign give us little sense of his character, except to hint that he was a cautious and indecisive man” (p. 62). See also: BASIL II; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; YARLYK
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crummey, Robert O. (1987). The Formation of Muscovy, 1304-1613. London: Longman.
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Presniakov, A. E. (1970). The Formation of the Great Russian State: A Study of Russian History in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries, tr. A. E. Moorhouse. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
MIKHAIL M. KROM
BASIL II
(1415-1462), grand prince of Moscow from 1425 to 1462 (with intervals).
Basil II, third son and successor to Basil I (two elder sons of the latter died in childhood), ascended the Muscovite throne at the age of ten. Until he attained his majority, three persons shared the real power: his mother Sophia (the daughter of Vitau-tas, the grand prince of Lithuania), metropolitan Photius, and a boyar, Ivan Vsevolozhsky. In 1425 the intercession of Photius stopped the outbreak of dynastic war: When Basil’s uncle Yuri Dmitrievich, the prince of Galich and Zvenigorod, laid claim to the grand-princely throne, the metropolitan made Yuri reconcile with his nephew. Basil II also owed much to Vsevolozhsky. When in 1431 the dispute over the Muscovite throne was transferred to the Golden Horde, this boyar managed to obtain the judgment of the khan favorable to Basil II.
Basil’s first actions on his own were far less successful. In spring 1433 he could not stop his uncle Yuri’s march on Moscow, and in the battle at Klazma River on April 25 Basil was completely defeated. Yuri seized grand-princely power, and only his unexpected death on June 5, 1434, allowed Basil II to supersede this strong rival.
Having grown up in the atmosphere of dynastic war, Basil II became suspicious and ruthless: He ordered the blinding of Vsevolozhsky, suspecting him of contacts with prince Yuri’s party. In 1436, having captured his rebellious cousin Basil the Cross-Eyed, Basil II also had him blinded. Later, the same means of political elimination was applied to Basil II.
The mid-1440s were the most troublesome years in Basil’s life. On July 7, 1445, in the battle at Kamenka River (near Suzdal), the Kazan Tatars defeated his army; he was wounded and captured. Having gotten this news, his cousin Dmitry She-myaka proclaimed himself the grand prince of Moscow. Only in October 1445 was Basil II released (on condition of paying a huge ransom) and returned to Moscow. Shemyaka fled but was prompt enough to organize a broad opposition to the grand prince, spreading rumors about the commitments undertaken by Basil II in captivity. As a result of a conspiracy, in February 1446 Shemyaka occupied Moscow, and Basil II was captured in the Trinity monastery (where he went for prayers) and blinded. Though exiled to Uglich (later to Vologda), the blind prince in February 1447 managed to return to Moscow as a victor.
The causes of Basil’s II final victory are open to debate. Alexander Zimin, the author of the most detailed account of his reign (1991), maintained that Basil was “a nobody” and that the victory of the blind prince was entirely due to his loyal servicemen. This social explanation seems highly probable, but the personal role of Basil II in the events should not be neglected. Though he lacked the abilities of a military leader, his courage, persistence, and devotion to his cause must be taken into account. See also: BASIL I; BASIL III; CIVIL WAR OF 1425-1450; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; METROPOLITAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crummey, Robert O. (1987). The Formation of Muscovy 1304-1613. London: Longman. Presniakov, A. E. (1970). The Formation of the Great Russian State: A Study of Russian History in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries, tr. A. E. Moorhouse. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
MIKHAIL M. KROM
BASIL III
(1479-1533), grand prince of Moscow, sovereign of all Russia (since 1505), the eldest son of Ivan III and Sophia Paleologue.
Basil III continued the policy of his father in unifying Russian lands; under his rule, the last semi-autonomous polities, such as Pskov (1510), Ryazan (c. 1521), and Novgorod Seversk (1522), lost the remainder of their independence and were incorporated into the Russian state. Basil’s reprisals against Pskov resemble that of Ivan III against Great Novgorod: The Pskov veche (assembly) was abolished, three hundred families of townspeople were evicted from the city, and their homes were occupied by servicemen and merchants from Muscovy. The only important difference is that, unlike his father, Basil III
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did not need to resort to military force: The Pskov inhabitants bemoaned their fate but made no attempt to resist.
An Austrian diplomat, Sigismund von Herber-stein, who visited Moscow twice (in 1517 and 1526) and left a detailed and reliable account of Muscovite affairs in the reign of Basil III, noted that “in the
sway which he holds over his people, [the grand prince] surpasses the monarchs of the whole world . . .” (Herberstein, 1851, 1:30). Herberstein was especially impressed by the tight control that Basil III had over the nobility, including his own brothers. This system of permanent surveillance included special oaths of loyalty, encouraging denunciations, and inflicting political disgrace upon anyone suspected of disloyalty. Those who dared criticize the grand prince’s policy underwent harsh punishment, like Ivan Bersen-Beklemishev, who was executed in 1525.
Several factors contributed to Basil III’s ability to control the aristocratic elite. First, the composition of the elite changed dramatically during his reign due to numerous princely families from annexed Lithuanian lands who now entered Muscovite service. The growing tensions between the newcomers and hereditary Muscovite servitors precluded any possibility of united aristocratic opposition to the power of the grand prince. Second, Basil III relied on an increasing corps of state secretaries (dyaki and podyachie), and trusted upstarts, like the majordomo of Tver, Ivan Yurevich Shig-ona Podzhogin. Thus, the growth of bureaucracy and autocracy went hand in hand.
In foreign policy as well as in domestic affairs, Basil III followed in the footsteps of his father, Ivan III, though with less success. In the west, he tried to tear away from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania its frontier territories inhabited by east Slavic Orthodox populations. In two wars with Lithuania (1507-1508, 1512-1522) his only though important prize was the city of Smolensk (1514).
In the east, Basil’s major concern was to pacify or subjugate the bellicose khanate of Kazan on the Middle Volga, a splinter of the Golden Horde. In 1519 he managed to put on Kazan throne his vassal, Shah-Ali. But this achievement of Muscovite diplomacy irritated another Moslem polity, the Crimean khanate. In 1521 the khan of Crimea, Mo-hammed-Girey, invaded Russia. His unexpected raid threw the whole country into a panic. No defensive measures were taken, and the khan without hindrance reached the outskirts of Moscow. Then the Tartars withdrew, looting towns and villages on their way and carrying off thousands of captives.
Basil III married twice. His first wife, Solomo-nia, descended from the Muscovite boyar family of Saburov. When, after twenty years of conjugal life, no child was born, the grand prince forced Solomo-nia to take the veil and confined her to a convent (1525). In spite of opposition among the clergy and courtiers caused by this divorce, Basil III married again (1526); his new choice was Elena, the daughter of a Lithuanian ?migr? to Muscovy, prince Basil Glinsky. Four years later this marriage produced a long-awaited heir, son Ivan (future tsar Ivan IV the Terrible).
Basil III contributed significantly to building autocracy in Russia, but his unexpected death in December 1533 revealed the implicit weakness of this system: With a three-year-old heir on the throne, the country inevitably entered a period of political crisis. See also: CRIMEAN KHANATE; GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; IVAN III; IVAN IV; KAZAN; PALEOLOGUE, SOPHIA; SUDEBNIK OF 1497
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crummey, Robert O. (1987). The Formation of Muscovy 1304-1613. London: Longman. Herberstein, Sigismund von. (1851-1852). Notes upon Russia, tr. R. H. Major. 2 vols. London: Hakluyt Society. Vernadsky, George. (1959). Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
MIKHAIL M. KROM
BASMACHIS
The Basmachi were anti-Soviet rebels in Turkestan between the Russian Revolution and the early 1930s. The term, derived from the Turkic word basmak (to attack or raid), connotes banditry and was originally a pejorative term used by Russians. Soviet scholarship characterized the Basmachi as mere brigands and counterrevolutionaries in the pay of British imperialists. ?migr? memoirs and many scholarly works characterize the movement as a struggle for national liberation against a colonial power, although the extent to which participants overcame localism and factionalism is unclear. The Russian war in Afghanistan from 1979 to
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1989 and subsequent events have renewed interest in the Basmachi rebels and given their struggle broader resonance.
The military humiliation and massacres that accompanied Russian conquest and occupation of Central Asia from the 1860s to the 1880s were still living memories in the region as Russia moved toward the revolution. Tsarist policies enforced cotton cultivation at the expense of food crops, permitted Russians to settle on nomadic grazing land, and encouraged the building of railroads and textile mills. All this contributed to dissatisfaction and fueled several major revolts, most notably at Andijan in 1898.
Some scholars date the Basmachi revolt to 1916, when rebellion broke out in Tashkent and elsewhere in Central Asia in opposition to the first nonvoluntary conscription of Central Asians into the Russian army. Despite the imposition of martial law, summary executions, and arming of Russian settlers, this revolt still simmered when the Bolshevik revolution broke out in 1917. Russian settlers completely dominated the Tashkent Soviet and other local soviets, so that Soviet power was largely identified as Russian power and fueled continued intercommunal violence. The Soviet destruction of the Muslim-led autonomous government in Kokand (February 1918) and of the Emirate of Bukhara (September 1920) also encouraged recruitment for the Basmachi movement. At their height in 1920 through 1922, some sources claim that the rebels had twenty to thirty thousand men under arms, controlled the Ferghana valley and most of Tajikistan, and enjoyed widespread popularity among the indigenous non-Russian population.
The Basmachi rebellion was never a unified movement. Lack of organization, conflicting agendas, and internal divisions complicated efforts to coordinate military operations against Soviet forces. Some secular intellectuals joined the movement (Jadid reformers, Young Bukharans, populist socialists), though Mustafa Chokay and other prominent figures kept their distance. Islamic ulama and traditional rulers such as the Emir of Bukhara played significant roles. However, the backbone of the movement seems to have been local village and clan leaders and in many cases actual brigands who terrorized Russians and Muslims alike. The most famous participant was the mercurial Enver Pasha, former Ottoman minister of war, who joined the Basmachis in October 1921 and tried to direct it toward a pan-Turkic and panIslamic vision before his death in a skirmish with Russian forces in July 1922.
The Soviet campaign against the Basmachi was largely successful by 1924, although some groups remained active in mountainous border regions near Afghanistan until the early 1930s. The Soviets benefited from a better armed and more disciplined military force; they also learned to deploy Tatar and Central Asian soldiers so the army would not appear solely Russian. Concessions encouraged defections from Basmachi ranks: The Soviets co-opted Central Asians into state institutions, reopened closed markets, promised land reform, granted food and tax relief, relaxed anti-Islamic measures, and generally promoted the return of stability and prosperity under the New Economic Policy reforms. Eventually, Russian cultivation of good relations with Afghanistan denied the Bas-machis a cross-border refuge. See also: AFGHANSTAN, RELATIONS WITH; CENTRAL ASIA; FERGHANA VALLEY; ISLAM; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fraser, Glenda. (1987). “Basmachi.” Central Asian Survey 6(1):1-73 and 6(2):7-42. Lorenz, Richard. (1994). “Economic Bases of the Bas-machi Movement in the Farghana Valley.” In Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Marwat, Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan. (1985). The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A Study in Political Development. Peshawar: Emjay Books International. Olcott, Martha. (1981). “The Basmachi or Freeman’s Revolt in Turkestan, 1918-24.” Soviet Studies 33: 352-369. Paksoy, H. B. (1991). “‘Basmachi’: Turkistan National Liberation Movement, 1916-1930s.” In Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union 4: 5-20. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.
DANIEL E. SCHAFER
BATU
(c. 1206-1255), Mongol prince, the second son of Genghis
Khan’s eldest son Jochi.
Batu commanded the army that conquered the northeastern Rus principalities (1237-1238) and
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subsequently that conquered the southern Rus principalities and invaded eastern Europe (1240-1241). Batu was the first khan to rule in the Khanate of Qipchaq (Ulus of Jochi; desht-i-Qipchaq), which he is credited with having founded. His father, Jochi, to whom the lands had been granted “as far as Mongol hooves trod” in the western part of the Mongol Empire (i.e., west of the Irtysh River), died before ruling there. Batu is also credited with building the city of Sarai (Old Sarai, Sarai-Batu) on the Akhtuba channel of the lower Volga River.
Batu was present at the quriltai (assembly) that chose ?g?dei as qaghan (grand khan) in 1229 and most likely also at the quriltai of 1234, which planned the campaign against the Qipchaqs, as well as the quriltai of 1237, which planned the campaign against the Rus principalities and eastern Europe. Disagreements over Batu’s leadership developed during the campaigns in Rus and eastern Europe (1237-1241). G?y?g, a son of ?g?dei, and B?ri, a grandson of Chaghadai, challenged Batu’s authority, possibly on the basis of the questionable legitimacy of Batu’s father. When Qaghan ?g?dei died in 1241, Batu opposed and apparently managed to delay the elevation of G?y?g to become qaghan until 1246. Claiming ill health, Batu refused to attend any quriltais. His presence at the quriltai was needed to give legitimacy to ?g?dei’s successor because, after Chaghadai’s death in 1242, Batu was considered a senior-ranking member of the Chinghissids. When G?y?g was declared qaghan by a quriltai despite Batu’s absence (although Batu was ostensibly represented by his five brothers), he mounted a campaign against Batu but died on the way to Batu’s ulus in 1248.