by James Millar
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aygi, Gennady, ed. (1991). An Anthology of Chuvash Poetry, tr. Peter France. London: Forest Books; [S.l.]: UNESCO.
CIRCUS
R?na-Tas, Andr?s, ed. (1982). Chuvash Studies. Budapest: Akad?miai Kiad?; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Shnirelman, Viktor A. (1996). Who Gets the Past? Competition for Ancestors Among Non-Russian Intellectuals in Russia. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
DANIEL E. SCHAFER
CIMMERIANS
Cimmerians are a nomadic, Iranian-speaking peoples who occupied the North Pontic steppe zone from the Don to the Danube, with their center in the Crimea. Their culture and civilization flourished between about 1000 and 800 B.C.E. Pastoralists had inhabited the North Pontic region since approximately 4000 B.C.E., or some three thousand years prior to the advent of the Cimmerians, but the latter were the first to be mentioned by name in the written sources, and so they were sometimes (inaccurately) seen by historians as the earliest nomadic peoples of southern Russia.
It is not clear whether the term “Cimmerian” represented an ethnic group or simply designated any Iranian-speaking equestrian nomads inhabiting the North Pontic area. There is also no consensus on the origins of these peoples. However, it is most likely that the Cimmerians evolved out of the sedentary Srubnaia (“Timber-Grave”) archaeological culture of the second millennium B.C.E. after they took up a pastoral way of life in the steppe. There are reasons to believe that the Cimmerians can be connected to the Belozersk culture, which some scholars believe is derived from the late Srub-naia culture. By about 800 B.C.E., the Cimmerians were supplanted by the Scythians, a closely akin Iranian-speaking nomadic group that arrived in the area and absorbed some of the former into their tribal confederation while expelling the rest. Some Cimmerian tribes who were ejected from the North Pontic steppe zone moved southeast through Transcaucasia into Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia, which they raided for about twenty years. See also: CRIMEA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Christian, David. (1998). A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia, vol. 1: Inner Asia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
ROMAN K. KOVALEV
CIRCASSIANS See CHERKESS.
CIRCUS
Circus was first introduced in Russia in 1793 by Charles Hughes of the Royal Circus of London. Established on a permanent basis in 1853, Russian circus was dominated by foreigners in the early years, such as the Salomanskys of Berlin in Moscow and the Cinizellis of Italy in St. Petersburg. Circuses traveled around with tents, but stationary circuses were also built in largely populated areas in Russia. Stationary circuses are more profitable and can also be active during inclement weather. During Soviet times there were about seventy stationary circuses and about forty remain in Russia in the early twenty-first century.
Circus in Russia has deep roots in the rich Russian cultural traditions, but circus performances in Russia are also known for their social comedies. Circus clowns in prerevolutionary Russia created satirical skits about landowners and merchants. The famous Durov brothers, Anatoly and Vladimir, a clown pair whose underlying purpose with their social comedies was to fight the oppressive tsarist regime, mastered this form. The Durov brothers were also animal tamers who developed the well-known Durov method of humane animal care and training.
The satirical nature of the circus and its appeal as a form of mass entertainment translated well into the Soviet world of popular culture. Intellectuals attacked the circus in the wake of the 1917 Revolution and labeled it an institution of superstition, animal cruelty, and vulgarity. Others noted that the circus offered an alternative mode of presenting historical and political themes through satirical clowning. The circus was nationalized in 1919 and the Commissariat of Enlightenment created a new department for it within its theater section. During the civil war the circus was turned to revolutionary uses, and later during World War II circus performers expressed patriotic feelings by staging victorious battles and honoring Russia’s wartime allies.
The circus survived the Bolshevik cultural revolution well as circus acts already had a tradition of conveying political messages. In addition to political preaching, Soviet circus successfully mixed comedy and clowning with moralizing. During the
CIVIC UNION
Nikita Khrushchev years, popular routines addressed child upbringing, warned against foreign fashion, excessive drinking, stilyagi, and other social menaces. Circus continued to amuse Soviet citizens into the Leonid Brezhnev era, focusing on popular acts such as acrobatics, high wire, dancing bears, Cossack riders, and clowning. Clowns remained the greatest stars of the Russian circus.
Although tiring to the Soviet audience, Russian circus was conservative and continued to present internationally acclaimed ethnic variety shows well into the 1980s. With perestroika the circus abandoned the standard Soviet elements of the circus, such as folk culture, appraisal of World War II heroism, and politics. In the early twenty-first century, pop music and skits devoid of political or moral preaching draw huge crowds as the professionalism of Russian circus artists is widely acclaimed. With changing times, Russian circus has reinvented itself and continues to be a valued form of entertainment in Russia. See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hammarstrom, David Lewis. (1983). Circus Rings around Russia. Hamden, CT: Archon. Stites, Richard. (1992) Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900. New York: Cambridge University Press.
R?SA MAGN?SD?TTIR
CIVIC UNION
The Civic Union was a political movement active in 1992 and 1993, intended to represent the interests of state-owned enterprises and their managers and employees. It was a bloc of several parties and extraparliamentary organizations. One of its leaders was Vice President Alexander Rutskoy; another was Arkady Volsky, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Its activities were a reaction against the economic policies of the Yegor Gaidar government (1991-1992).
Russian governments in the Boris Yeltsin era, in accordance with mainstream Western economics, aimed at financial stabilization, specifically of the price level. The Civic Union was more interested in real stabilization: namely, stabilization of output levels. It primarily aimed to halt, and then reverse, the sharp fall in production and living standards that took place between 1989 and 1992.
Unlike the Gaidar government, the Civic Union, worried about the possible negative consequences of privatization, did not consider it a high priority, and believed that any privatization of large enterprises should adhere to the Soviet tradition of safeguarding the rights of employees.
With respect to liberalization, the Civic Union saw advantages in the partial reintroduction of some elements of the old economic mechanism (state orders, the provision of goods in kind, price controls, and wage controls). For the Gaidar team, the Civic Union’s position on this issue exposed its “reactionary essence” and made it “dangerous” for the future of Russia.
In agriculture, during the winter of 1991- 1992, the Gaidar government tried to carry out a quick decollectivization policy, ignoring the needs and interests of this remaining large-scale sector. The Civic Union, on the other hand, argued for continued financial support for large-scale agriculture (the former collective and state farms).
The Civic Union played an important role in the emergence of a democratic system in Russia by providing a constitutional channel for criticism of the unpopular economic policies of the Gaidar government. It contributed to undermining them and forcing Gaidar himself from office in December 1992. However, it failed on the whole to provide direction and leadership for government economic policy. The growing political tension of 1993 and the increased privatization of the economy led to the disappearance of the Civic Union. See also: ECONOMY, CURRENT; PRIVATIZATION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ellman, Michael. (1993). “Russia: The Economic Program of the Civic Union.” RFE/RL Research Report 2(11): 34-45. R
eddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitrii. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
MICHAEL ELLMAN
CIVIL WAR OF 1425-1450
CIVIL WAR OF 1425-1450
The Civil War of 1425-1450 was a major formative event in Russian history, the impact of which was evident well into the Soviet period. It began as a dynastic controversy, the sole major civil war in the Moscow princely line (the Danilovichi) until that time. This was only one of the ninety major civil wars in Russia between 1228 and 1462. Moscow’s other major rivals for hegemony over the East European plain (especially Tver) were constantly destroying themselves in civil wars, whereas Moscow had a single line of unchallenged rulers between 1300 and 1425. If it would be fair to say that Moscow’s ultimate triumph as East Slavic hegemon was determined already in the 1390s, then in the political sphere the civil war of 1425-1450 was almost irrelevant in the long run. In the social sphere, however, the civil war set the ball rolling toward serfdom and, by 1649, to a legally stratified, near-caste society that essentially lasted until the 1950s, when the Soviets finally issued peasants internal passports, putting an end to the serf element of collectivized agriculture. For this reason an understanding of the civil war is both interesting and important.
Muscovite grand prince Basil I died in 1425. Surviving him were his ten-year-old son, who became Basil II, and three brothers, Pyotr (d. 1428), Andrei (d. 1432), and Yuri (d. 1434). The general (but not universal) Muscovite practice had been for succession to be vertical, from father to son-a system of limited primogeniture, one of the strengths of the Danilovichi. The issue was complicated by contradictory wills. Dmitry Donskoy had willed the realm to Basil I, then to his next son Yuri-all before Basil II was born. Later, Basil I’s will of 1423 passed power to his son.
In 1425 Basil II was only a nominal ruler. Real power was in the hands of the boyars, head of the church Metropolitan Foty, and Basil’s mother, Sofia Vitovtovna (daughter of the ruler of Lithuania). This group was opposed by Basil’s uncle, Yuri Dmitrievich, appanage prince of Zvenigorod and Galich, who would have been the legitimate heir under the archaic system of lateral succession. While he lived, he was regularly raising armies in Galich in an attempt to seize the throne in Moscow. His brother Andrei, prince of Beloozero, conspired with Yuri to keep their nephew off the throne. Three years of war and plundering ended in 1428, when Yuri gave up his pretensions to the throne. Warfare continued, however, as Basil II and Yuri continued to fight over the escheated Dmitrov appanage of Peter, who died in 1428 without heirs. In 1432 the Mongol Khan gave the patent (yarlyk) to Basil, who was installed as ruler of All Rus in Moscow, which henceforth became the capital of Russia. The khan awarded Dmitrov to Yuri; Dmitrov was then seized by Basil’s troops. A temporary calm ensued.
In 1433 Basil II married Maria Yaroslavna, sister of the prince of Serpukhov-Brovsk. In an apparent gesture of clan harmony, Basil’s cousins, the sons of Yuri of Galich, Basil Yurievich (Kosoi, d. 1448) and Dmitry Yurievich Shemyaka (poisoned in 1453) attended the wedding. A third son, Dmitry Krasny (d. 1441) was absent. Basil Yurievich wore a gem-studded golden belt, which was alleged to be part of the grand princely regalia that had been stolen from Dmitry Donskoy. Sofia Vitovtovna took the belt, the keystone of subsequent Russian history, from Basil Yurievich, who then with his brother fled to their father Yuri’s estate in Galich. Yuri rounded up his army, defeated Basil II, took Moscow, and proclaimed himself grand prince. Basil rounded up an army, and Yuri surrendered Moscow without a fight. Then Yuri rounded up his forces and those of his three sons and defeated Basil II at Rostov, and Basil fled to Novgorod. Yuri took Moscow, but died. This should have ended the civil war, but it was continued by his sons, who had no “legitimate” claims to the throne whatsoever. Basil Yurievich seized the throne and was crowned. His two brothers, Dmitry Krasny and Dmitry She-myaka, opposed him and joined Basil II, and Basil Yurievich fled. He and his army looted everything along the way, as was the practice throughout the civil war. Then civil war spread throughout nearly all of northeastern Rus. In 1436 Basil Yurievich was captured and blinded, hence his nickname “Kosoi” (“squint”). Dmitry Shemyaka took over leadership of the rebels. The Mongol-Tatars joined the fray, plundering and burning everything in their wake. On July 7, 1445, they captured Basil II, and a week later they burned the Kremlin. Shemyaka wanted Basil II turned over to him, but the Tatars freed him for an enormous ransom, 200,000 silver rubles, in October. The taxes raised to pay the ransom caused further chaos and population dislocation.
This led to the third and worst period of the civil war. Shemiaka and his allies continuously fought Basil II and sacked every place they visited.
CIVIL WAR OF 1917-1922
Basil II was seized by his enemies at the Trinity Sergiev monastery and blinded (henceforth called temny-“the dark”). While this was going on, She-myaka seized Moscow and became grand prince in 1446. The treasury was looted, and the peasants, even more oppressed than they had been, fled further. Crops were destroyed by the marauding armies, and starvation ensued. Grain was scarce in Novgorod for a decade. Shemyaka, condemned as an oathbreaker by the church, was soon driven out of Moscow. He continued the war for several years in the North (Ustiug, Vologda), then fled to Novgorod, where he was poisoned by his cook, an agent of Basil II.
The Venetian diplomat, merchant, and traveler Josaphat Barbaro observed that Russia was a desert. In an attempt to assure repayment of peasant debts, a few monasteries persuaded rulers to issue laws prohibiting peasant debtors from moving at any time other than around St. George’s Day (November 26)-after the harvest, the best time to collect debts. This initiated the enserfment of the Russian peasantry. See also: BASIL I; BASIL II; BOYARS; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; KREMLIN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alef, Gustave. (1956). “A History of the Muscovite Civil War: The Reign of Vasilii II (1425-62).” Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. Hellie, Richard. (1971). The Enserfment of the Russian Peasantry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hellie, Richard. (1971). Muscovite Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Syllabus Division, 1967, 1970.
RICHARD HELLIE
CIVIL WAR OF 1917-1922
The most decisive chapter of the Russian Revolution, the civil war raged between October 1917 and 1922. The traumatic experience of civil war served as a defining moment for the new Soviet state by embedding itself into both the people’s and the state’s outlook and behavior.
The origins of the Russian civil war can be found in the discrediting of the tsarist government that took place before World War I; in the social divisions that shaped politics before and during the Revolution of 1917; and in the Bolshevik leadership’s belief in the importance of civil war, in the imminence of world revolution, and in the acceptability of applying coercion in setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat. Although historians disagree over when the civil war began, dating the event to the October Revolution of 1917 makes sense, because that is how contemporaries understood it. Moreover, armed opposition to the new Bolshevik government, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), arose immediately after October when officers of the Imperial Army, Mikhail Alexeyev, Lavr Kornilov, Anton Denikin, Alexei Kaledin, and others, formed the first coun-terforce known as the Volunteer Army, based in southern Russia.
During the civil war the Bolsheviks, or Reds (renamed “communists” in 1918), waged war against the Whites. A term used loosely to refer to all factions that battled against the Bolsheviks, the Whites were a more diverse group than the Bolshevik label of “counterrevolution” suggests. Those who represented the country’s business and landowning elite did tend to express monarchist sentiments. In addition, Cossack military units that had enjoyed self-government and other privileges likewise held conservative political views. But many White officers opposed the autocracy and even harbored reformist beliefs.
Much more complicated were the Bolsheviks’ relations with Russia’s moderate socia
lists, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), and with both parties’ numerous offshoots, who wished to establish a government that would include all socialist parties. The internecine struggle within the socialist camp persisted throughout the civil war, and flared up after the Bolsheviks routed the Whites in 1920. Fearing a White victory, the moderate socialists complicated this scenario by throwing their support behind the Reds at critical junctures. Moreover, left-wing factions within these parties allied themselves with the Bolsheviks. For instance, until mid-1918 the Bolsheviks stayed afloat in part owing to the support of the Left SRs, who broke from their parent party following the October Revolution of 1917 to join the Bolsheviks.
In some locales the Bolshevik-Left SR coalition even weathered the controversy over the Brest-Litovsk Peace with Germany, signed in March 1918, which otherwise sundered the alliance with the Left SRs, who withdrew from the Lenin
CIVIL WAR OF 1917-1922
government in protest. The peace ceded eastern Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Ukraine to Germany, as well as Transcaucasia to Turkey, in return for an end to hostilities. Ratifying the treaty sparked heated debate within the Communist Party, especially among the so-called Left Communists led by Nikolai Bukharin who backed the idea of a revolutionary war against Germany. Later, from September 1918 until October 1920, renegade Left SRs formed a new party called the Revolutionary Communists (RCs), who participated in a ruling coalition with the Bolsheviks in many Volga provinces and the Urals. The Bolshevik attitude toward the socialist groups that supported the Reds reflected the overall strength of Soviet power at any given time. When vulnerable, the Bolsheviks welcomed their socialist allies; otherwise the Bolsheviks sought to manipulate them through a process of co-optation amid repression.
