Encyclopedia of Russian History

by James Millar

  Molotov now rapidly rose in the Bolshevik party. He was elected to the Central Committee in 1921, was first secretary from 1921 to 1922, preceding Josef Stalin’s appointment as General Secretary, and continued to work in the Secretariat until 1930, having become a full member of the Politburo in 1926. During this period he became associated with Stalin, fully supporting him in his struggles against the opposition and becoming Stalin’s chief agent in agricultural policy, particularly collectivization.

  In December 1930, Molotov became chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), a post sometimes regarded as equivalent to prime minister, where he was responsible for the implementation of a planned economy and Stalinist industrialization and related economic and social polices. During the later 1930s he was fully identified with the Stalinist repressions, and for a short time in 1936 he was personally in danger for committing Stalin too openly to a pro-German foreign policy.

  From May 1939 until 1949 Molotov was foreign minister. In August 1939 he was responsible for negotiating the notorious Nazi-Soviet pact. In May 1941, shortly before the outbreak of war, Stalin replaced him as Sovnarkom chairman. Molo-tov remained as vice-chairman, and during the war he was also deputy chairman of the State Defence Committee (GKO) with special responsibility for tank production, as well as foreign minister. He was responsible for negotiating the wartime alliance with the United States and Great Britain in 1942; with Stalin he represented the USSR at the major wartime international conferences. He then headed the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco conference of 1945 that established the United Nations organization. Representing the USSR at the United Nations and at postwar foreign ministers’ conferences until his dismissal as foreign minister in 1949, he earned a reputation as a blunt, determined, and vociferous opponent of Western policies.

  After Stalin’s death, Molotov was again foreign minister, from 1953 to 1956, but his relations with Khrushchev were never good, and he was dismissed from his important government offices as a leader of the Antiparty Group in 1957. He then served as Soviet ambassador to Mongolia from 1957 to 1960, and as USSR representative to the InternaMONASTICISM tional Atomic Energy Commission in 1960 and 1961.

  Expelled from the Communist Party in 1962, Molotov lived in retirement until his death in 1986. He was reinstated in the party in 1984. His wife, Polina Semenova (also known as Zhemchuzhina), whom he had married in 1921 and with whom he had two children, also achieved high party and government positions but was incarcerated from 1949 to 1953. Molotov admitted that he had voted in the Politburo for her arrest. See also: ANTI-PARTY GROUP; BOLSHEVISM; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; REVOLUTION OF 1917; SOVNARKOM; STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Chuev, Felix. (1993). Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics, ed. Albert Resis. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Watson, Derek. (1996). Molotov and Soviet Government: Sovnarkom, 1930-41. Basingstoke, UK: CREES-Macmillan. Watson, Derek. (2002). “Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front, 1939-1942.” Europe-Asia Studies 54(1):51-86.

  DEREK WATSON

  MONASTICISM

  Monasticism organizes individuals devoted to a life of prayer based upon vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience. It has been an integral part of religious life in Russia since the conversion to Christianity in the late tenth century. Russian monasticism was characterized by the forms that existed in Byzantium, from the anchoritic or eremitical life of hermits to the cenobitic form of communal life; most monasteries, however, organized their life between these ideal types.

  The Kievan Caves monastery, founded in the mid-eleventh century by Anthony, was the first important (if not typical) institution. Anthony began as a hermit living in a cave, though his holiness soon attracted others around him. In 1062 Theodosius (d. 1074) became abbot of the growing community and introduced the Studite Rule (the classic Byzantine cenobitic rule, requiring communal eating, labor, property, and worship). Under Theodosius, the monastery upheld high standards of monastic life and participated in worldly affairs (including charity and politics). Although Theodo-sius would become a model for Russian monasti-cism-with his humility, authority, and balance of asceticism and activity-“princely monasticism” dominated Kievan Rus. Princely families founded such monasteries in or near cities, gave the communities their rule and endowments, and appointed abbots. These institutions were influential in ecclesiastical politics and as centers of learning and culture, but were not distinguished by exemplary monastic life. More than fifty monasteries existed in Rus before the Mongol invasion in 1240- though many were destroyed in its wake.

  The second half of the fourteenth century witnessed a dramatic expansion of monastic life in Russia, inspired by Sergius of Radonezh (d. 1392). Sergius began as a hermit living in the forest, but, attracting followers, he established the Trinity monastery. Sergius became abbot in 1353 and introduced the Studite rule in 1377. He combined asceticism, humility, charity, and influence in political affairs (like Theodosius), together with contemplative prayer. Inspired by Sergius’s example, a pattern emerged in which hermits settled in the forest searching for solitude; followers joined them; they established a monastery, with peasants settling nearby; and again a few monks set off into the uninhabited forest in search of solitude. Much of the Russian north was settled in this manner.

  Between 1350 and 1450 some 150 monasteries were founded, and new communities continued to proliferate into the eighteenth century. Monasteries acquired land through purchase or donation, with many becoming major landowners. They played an important role in the economy and political unification of Muscovy in the fifteenth century. By the early sixteenth century their wealth had led to a decline in monastic discipline, giving rise to two differing reform movements. Nil Sorsky (d. 1508) advocated a “skete” style of life, in which monks lived in small hermitages and supported themselves. Nil emphasized contemplative, mystical prayer (based on Byzantine Hesychasm). Joseph of Volotsk (d. 1515) organized his monastery according to the cenobitic rule (demanding strict individual poverty) and emphasized corporate liturgical prayer. Joseph also justified monastery landownership, for this enabled charity and social engagement. Traditional historiography posited an intense political conflict over monastic landowner-ship between two distinct ecclesiastical “parties” (Nil’s non-possessors and Joseph’s possessors).

  MONASTICISM

  Recent research, however, suggests that the conflict has been exaggerated. Small hermitages continued to exist into the seventeenth century, often operating independently of central church control (including resistance to Nikonian liturgical reforms). Ecclesiastical authorities mistrusted and tried to subordinate them to larger monasteries. Thus the tradition inspired by Nil Sorsky gradually died out.

  Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, the state attempted to gain control over monastic land-holding due to competition for land and the tax-exempt status of ecclesiastical property. The Law Code of 1649 forbade monasteries from acquiring new estates and established the Monastery Chancellery, which placed the administration of monastic estates under state control (until its abolition in 1677). The eighteenth century witnessed the greatest assertion of state authority over monasticism. Peter the Great initiated measures to restrict the growth of monasticism and make it more socially “useful,” and he reestablished the Monastery Chancellery from 1701 to 1720. Peter’s successors continued efforts to restrict recruitment, leading to a decline in the number of monks and nuns from 25,000 to 14,000 between 1724 and 1738. The state’s assault finally culminated in 1764 when Catherine the Great confiscated all monastic estates. Her secularization reform resulted in the closure of more than half of all monasteries (decreasing from 954 to 387) and a drastic reduction of monastic clergy (leaving fewer than six thousand by the end of the eighteenth century).

  Despite the devastating impact of secularization, monasticism experienced a remarkable revival in the nineteenth century and again played a vital role in religious life. By 1914,
the number of monasteries rose to 1,025 and the number of monastic clergy reached nearly 95,000. In part, the expansion of monasticism in the nineteenth century was due to the revival of hesychastic contemplative spirituality, inspired by the Ukrainian monk Paisy Velichkovsky (d. 1794). In addition to the repetition of the Jesus prayer and other contemplative practices, placing oneself under the guidance of a spiritual elder (starets) was integral to hesychasm. In the nineteenth century, the role of the starets expanded beyond the walls of the monastery. Famous elders such as Serafim of Sarov (d. 1833) or those of the Optina Hermitage attracted tens of thousands of laypeople, including important intellectual figures (Ivan Kireyevsky, Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy). A dramatic rise in pilgrimage to monasteries (in combination with renewed permission to acquire land) led to a significant growth in monastic wealth. Though anticlerical intellectuals frequently criticized this wealth, many larger monasteries were actively engaged in charity. In the second half of the century, the number of women joining monastic communities rose dramatically; by the century’s end, female monastics far exceeded men. In contrast to male monas-ticism (which focused on contemplative spirituality), female monasticism was particularly devoted to charitable activity (operating schools, orphanages, hospitals, etc.).

  The twentieth century, by contrast, was a succession of crises. Between 1900 and 1917, church and monastic leaders heatedly debated reform measures and the social role of monasticism. After 1917, monasteries were among the Bolshevik’s’ first targets. While most monasteries were closed by 1921, others transformed themselves into agricultural collectives and survived until collectivization (1928-1929). By 1930 all monasteries in the Soviet Union were officially closed, and former monks and nuns were frequent victims of the purges of 1937 and 1938. In the rapprochement between church and state during World War II, some monasteries were allowed to reopen (or stay open, if located in newly acquired territories). From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, eighteen monasteries and convents existed in the Soviet Union. Today the Moscow Patriarchate reports 480 functioning monasteries. See also: CAVES MONASTERY; JOSEPH VOLOTZK, ST.; KIRIL-BELOOZERO MONASTERY; MONASTERIES; NIL SORSKY, ST.; ORTHODOXY; PATRIARCHATE; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; SERGIUS, ST.; SIMONOV MONASTERY; SLOVIKI MONASTERY; TRINITY ST. SERGIUS MONASTERY

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Bolshakoff, Sergius. (1980). Russian Mystics. Kalama-zoo, MI: Cistercian Publications. Kenworthy, Scott M. (2002). “The Revival of Monasti-cism in Modern Russia: The Trinity-Sergius Lavra, 1825-1921.” Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, Waltham, MA. Meehan, Brenda. (1993). Holy Women of Russia. San Francisco: Harper Collins. Nichols, Robert L. (1985). “The Orthodox Elders (Startsy) of Imperial Russia.” Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 1:1-30. Ostrowski, Donald. (1986). “Church Polemics and Monastic Land Acquisition in Sixteenth-Century

  MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET

  Muscovy.” Slavonic and East European Review 64:355-379. Spock, Jennifer B. (1999). “The Solovki Monastery, 1460-1645: Piety and Patronage in the Early Modern Russian North.” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, New Haven, CT. Wynot, Jennifer. (2000). “Keeping the Faith: Russian Orthodox Monasticism in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939.” Ph.D. diss., Emory University, Atlanta, GA.

  SCOTT M. KENWORTHY

  MONETARY OVERHANG

  Monetary overhang consists of the liquidity that quantity-constrained consumers may accumulate in excess of the money they would accumulate if commodities were freely available in the market.

  Prices in the Soviet-type consumer goods market were in principle supposed to be set so that supply and demand would balance both in the aggregate and for each consumer good. Deficits caused by below-equilibrium prices were not a goal. But in practice many prices-particularly those for basic essentials like food, housing and many services-were set low either as a consumption subsidy or for ideological reasons. Also, because price stability was a goal, prices were not adjusted often enough to respond to changes in producer cost and consumer preferences. While there was excess supply for some goods, typically many goods were in short supply and were not freely available in the market. Consumers faced quantity constraints; they possibly accumulated money in excess of the amount they would have wished to have. This excess money or forced savings is called monetary overhang.

  The economics of monetary overhang remain contested. While the existence of short supply for individual goods is generally accepted, whether there was undersupply in the aggregate remains somewhat debatable. The existence of the gray economy and kolkhoz (open collective farm) markets, where prices were freely determined by supply and demand, might be expected to have balanced aggregate demand and supply. But perhaps such consumer goods markets were too limited in size to have the necessary effect. Also, consumers who accumulate monetary overhang might be expected to diminish their labor efforts. Thus, forced savings would lower economic growth. But perhaps that was not institutionally possible.

  Empirical research into monetary overhang is hampered both by theoretical problems and by deficient statistics. It is estimated that the share of forced savings in total Russian monetary savings increased from 9 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1989. This was largely caused by retail price subsidies, which swelled to 20 percent of state budget expenditure in the late 1980s. Undersupply caused queuing, black markets, bribery, and quality deterioration. Few consumer goods were freely available by 1991.

  Monetary overhang can also be seen as repressed inflation: In the absence of price controls, prices would rise to equilibrium levels. In principle, monetary overhang could be abolished before price liberalization by increasing consumer goods supplies, by bringing new commodities and assets to markets (for instance, through privatization), or by a confiscatory monetary reform. In practice, monetary overhang was abolished in transition economies through price liberalization, which turned repressed inflation into open inflation and destroyed the value of savings, both voluntary and forced. This was the case in Russia. The partial price liberalization of January 1992 brought about an annual inflation of 2,400 percent. Many consumers suffered badly, but price liberalization was popular overall, as the consequences of repressed inflation were well known. See also: BLACK MARKET; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; REPRESSED INFLATION; WAGES

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Easterly, William, and Cunha, Paulo Viera da. (1994). “Financing the Storm.” Economics of Transition 2:443-466. Kim, Byung-Yeon. (1999). “The Income, Savings, and Monetary Overhang of Soviet Households.” Journal of Comparative Economics 4:644-668. Kornai, J?nos. (1980). Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

  PEKKA SUTELA

  MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET

  The early Marxists expected that money would die away under socialism, made unnecessary by the

  MONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET

  Soviet kopeks and rubles. © DALLAS AND JOHN HEATON/CORBIS abolition of markets, the use of central planning based on nonmonetary units, the replacement of scarcity by abundance, and the worldwide acceptance of socialism. Since none of this came to pass, a monetary system remained, but it was a very peculiar monetary system. In contrast to a market economy, where money-based exchange is fundamental and money plays an active role, under central management money adapts itself to planned production flows and is basically passive.

  In a market economy, money has three functions: It is a means of exchange, a measure of value, and a store of value. A whole set of institutions supports these functions. In the Soviet economy, the ruble fulfilled these functions only in a limited way. The set of monetary institutions was similarly restricted.

  Money circulation was strictly divided into two spheres. In the state sector, enterprises could legally use only noncash money, in practice transfers through a state-owned banking system. Only transfers sanctioned by a corresponding plan assignment could be legally made, and it was generally impossible to use the banking system for nonsanctioned transactions. The banking system was thus an important control mechanism. Households, on the other hand, lived in a c
ash economy facing mostly fixed-price markets for labor and consumer goods. There were also legal, more or less free-priced markets such as the kolkhoz markets for foodstuffs as well as illegal, often cash-based markets. To control the economy, Soviet planners put great emphasis on maintaining this duality. By and large, they succeeded. Under perestroika, enterprises found ways to convert noncash to cash money. This contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system.

  The ruble was not a means of exchange in the state sector. It was not freely convertible to goods, except for goods allocated in the plan for each enMONETARY SYSTEM, SOVIET terprise. For households, money was the basic means of exchange, but only goods produced according to plan were legally available (with the relatively small exception of the kolkhoz markets). Because of the frequent shortages, households did not rely on money as the only means of exchange but also used such allocation mechanisms as barter, queuing, and bribery.

  As a store of value, money was useless to enterprises, but it was important for households because few other assets were available. In addition to gold and precious stones, one could invest in state bonds, but these were used to mop up excess liquidity. People had little confidence about keeping their wealth in rubles because of the recurring periods of very high inflation-during the civil war, in the early 1930s, during World War II, and af-terwards-and also because of the frequent confis-catory money reforms. As foreign currencies were almost unavailable, and possessing them was a serious crime, households used any other store of value, and lacking them, cut down their efforts to earn money. The limited convertibility of the ruble into commodities, together with periods of very high inflation and monetary reform, made money a defective measure of value.

  The Soviet Union had a monobank system consisting of a single state bank (Gosbank) that combined the functions of a central bank, a commercial bank, and a savings bank. Gosbank was not autonomous; it was a financial-control agency under the Council of Ministers. Acting as a central bank, it created narrow money (cash in circulation outside the state sector) by authorizing companies to pay wages according to accepted wage plans. Acting as a commercial bank, it issued short-term credit to companies, in accordance with the plan, for working capital. More important, it kept close track of transfers between enterprises to make sure that only transactions sanctioned by an accepted plan took place. Originally, there was a formally separate savings bank, but it was incorporated into Gosbank in 1963. It used the savings of the population to finance budget deficits. A couple of other banks existed for a short time, but like the savings bank were not independent.