by James Millar
Pallas’s studies extended beyond the limits of traditional natural history. He pondered the general processes and laws related to geology: For example, he presented a theory of the origin of mountains in intraterrestrial explosions. He also made a technically advanced study of regional variations in the Mongolian language, articulated a transformist view of the living forms, which he later abandoned, and, responding to a suggestion made by Catherine II, worked on a comparative dictionary. He also made a historical survey of land tracts discovered by the Russians in the stretches
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of ocean between Siberia and Alaska. In the journal of the Free Economic Society, established in the age of Catherine II, he published a series of articles on relations of geography to agriculture.
Most of Pallas’s studies offered no broad scientific formulations; their strength was in the richness and novelty of descriptive information. Charles Darwin referred to Pallas in four of his major works, always with the intent of adding substance to his generalizations. Georges Cuvier, by contrast, credited Pallas with the creation of “a completely new geology.” Pallas’s writings appealed to a wide audience not only because, at the time of the Enlightenment, there was a growing interest in the geographies and cultures of the world previously unexplored, but also because they were master-works of lucid and spirited prose.
Together with the great mathematician Leon-hard Euler, Pallas was a major contributor to the elevation of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences to the level of the leading European scientific institutions. See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pallas, Peter-Simon. (1802-1803). Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire. 2 vols. London: Longman and Kees. Vucinich, Alexander. (1963). Science in Russian Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
ALEXANDER VUCINICH
plored both Soviet-style socialism and western democracy and capitalism. They held tsarist autocracy as the ideal model of statehood. Much of their ideology drew on the ideas of the Black Hundreds, which organized pogroms against Jews in Tsarist Russia. This reactionary ideology contained a strong Orthodox Christian element. Alongside provisions for the recognition of the place of Orthodoxy in Russian history, Pamyat made demands for the priority of Russian citizens in all fields of life.
In 1988 Pamyat had an estimated twenty thousand members and forty branches in cities throughout the Soviet Union. It later splintered into a number of anti-Semitic and xenophobic groups. Competing factions emerged, the two most prominent being the Moscow-based National-Patriotic Front Pamyat and the National-Patriotic Movement Pamyat. This factional conflict belied an ideological symmetry; both groups emphasized the importance of Russian Orthodoxy and blamed a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy for everything from killing the tsar to “alcoholizing” the Russian population. The success of Pamyat’s xenophobic platforms sparked debates about the negative consequences of glas-nost and perestroika.
Factional disputes, crude national chauvinism and contradictory political platforms led many Russian nationalists to distance themselves from Pamyat. Pamyat and its many splinter groups were largely discredited and their influence much reduced by the time the USSR collapsed in 1991. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that Pamyat was a forerunner of post-Soviet Russian national chauvinist and neo-fascist groups. See also: NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION
PAMYAT
The Pamyat (Memory) society was established in 1978 to defend Russian cultural heritage. Pamyat came to adopt extreme rightist platforms, particularly under the direction of Dmitry Vasilyev from late 1985. It rose to prominence as the most visible and controversial Russian nationalist organization of the neformaly (informal) movement in the USSR during the late 1980s. Although not representative of all strains of Russian nationalist thought, Pamyat was representative of a broad xenophobic ideology that gained strength in the perestroika years.
At the heart of Pamyat’s platform was the defense of Russian traditions. Pamyat ideologues deBIBLIOGRAPHY Garrard, John. (1991). “A Pamyat Manifesto: Introductory Note and Translation.” Nationalities Papers 19 (2):135-145. Laqueur, Walter. (1993). Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia. New York: HarperCollins.
ZOE KNOX
PANSLAVISM
Panslavism in a general sense refers to the belief in a collective destiny for the various Slavic peoples-
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generally, but far from always, under the leadership of Russia, the largest Slavic group or nation. Thus the seventeenth-century author of Politika (Politics), Juraj Krizanic (1618-1683) is often regarded as a precursor of Panslavism because he urged the unification of all Slavs under the leadership of Russia and the Vatican. His writings were largely unknown until the nineteenth century. The Czech philologist Pavel Jozef Safarik (1795-1861) and his friend, poet Jan Kollar, regarded the Slavs historically as one nation. Safarik believed that they had once had a common language. However, despite his belief in Slavic unity, he turned against Russia following the suppression of the Polish rebellion in 1830 and 1831. The Ukrainian national bard, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), also hoped for a federation of the Slavic peoples.
In a narrower and more common usage, however, Panslavicism refers to a political movement in nineteenth-century Russia. Politically, Panslavism would not have taken the shape it did without the Russian claims of tutelage over the Slavic populations of the declining Ottoman Empire. Intellectually, however, Panslavism drew on the nationalist ideas of people such as Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), the most important representative of “Official Nationality” and especially of the Slavophiles. Slavophilism focused critically on Russia’s internal civilization and its need to return to first principles, but it bequeathed to Panslavism the idea that Russia’s civilization was superior to that of all of its European competitors. Of the early Slavophiles, Alexei Khomyakov (1804-1860) wrote a number of poems (“The Eagle”; “To Russia”), which can be considered broadly Panslav, as well as a “Letter to the Serbs” in the last year of his life, in which he demanded that religious faith be “raised to a social principle.” Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886) actually evolved from his early Slavophilism to fullblown Panslavism over the course of his journalistic career.
The advent of Alexander II and the implementation of the so-called Great Reforms began the long and complex process of opening up a public arena and eventually a public opinion in Russia. Ideas stopped being the privilege of a small number of cultivated aristocrats, and the 1870s saw a reorientation from philosophical to more practical matters, if not precisely to politics, a shift that affected both Slavophiles and Westernizers. It is against this background that one needs to view the eclipse of classical Slavophilism and the rise of Panslavism. It is plausible to date the beginning of Panslav-ism as a movement-albeit a very loose and undisciplined one-to the winter of 1857-1858, when the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee was created to support the South Slavs against the Ottoman Empire. A number of Slavophiles were involved, and the Emperor formally recognized the organization, upon the active recommendation of Alexander Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1861 Pogodin became president and Ivan Ak-sakov secretary and treasurer, and for the next fifteen years the Committee was active in education, philanthropy, and a sometimes strident advocacy journalism.
In 1867 the committee organized a remarkable Panslav Congress, which went on for months. It involved a series of lectures, an ethnographic exhibition, and a number of banquets, speeches, and other demonstrations of welcome to the eighty-one foreign visitors from the Slavic world-teachers, politicians, professors, priests, and even a few bishops. But the discussions clearly demonstrated the suspicions that many non-Russians entertained of their somewhat overbearing big brother. No Poles attended, nor did any Ukrainians from the Russian Empire. Even to the friendly Serbs the Russian demands for hegemony seemed excessive.
Panslav agitation was growing at the turn of the decade, partly due to the bell
icose Opinion on the Eastern Question (1869) by General Rostislav An-dreyevich Fadeev (1826-1884). In that same year appeared a more interesting Panslav product, Russia and Europe, by Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky (1822-1885). It charted the maturation and decay of civilizations and foresaw Russia’s Panslav Empire triumphing over the declining West. The aims of the Slavic Benevolent Committee seemed closest to fulfillment during the victorious climax to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, when Constantinople appeared within the grasp of Russian arms. Yet, despite the imperial patronage that the Committee had enjoyed for over a decade, the government drew back from the seizure of Constantinople, and then was forced by the European powers at the Congress of Berlin (1878) to minimize Russian gains. Aksakov’s subsequent tirade about lost Russian honor resulted in the permanent adjournment of the Committee. Panslav perspectives lingered, but the movement declined into political insignificance during the course of the 1880s. See also: NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; OFFICIAL NATIONALITY; SLAVOPHILES
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fadner, Frank J. (1962). Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karazin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Geyer, Dietrich. (1987). Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1860-1914. New Haven: Yale University Press. Greenfeld, Liah. (1992). Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kohn, Hans. (1953). Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame. Petrovich, Michael Boro. (1956). The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1865-1870. New York: Columbia University Press. Tuminez, Astrid. (2000). Russian Nationalism Since 1856. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Walicki, Andrzej. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought. Oxford: Clarendon.
ABBOTT GLEASON
PARIS, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF 1856
Facing an empty treasury, a new French naval ordnance that might pierce the Kronstadt walls, and possible Swedish and Prussian hostilities, Alexander II and a special Imperial Council accepted an Austrian ultimatum and agreed on January 16, 1856, to make peace on coalition terms and conclude the Crimean War. Even before Sevastopol fell (September 12, 1855), Russia had accepted three of the Anglo-French-Austrian Four Points of August 1854: guarantee of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity; general European (not exclusively Russian) protection of the Ottoman Christians; and freeing of the mouth of the Danube. The details of the third point, as well as reduction of Russian Black Sea preponderance and additional British particular conditions, completed the agreement. The incipient entente with Napoleon III, who all along had hoped to check Russian prestige without fighting for British imperial interests, was a boon to Russia.
Russia was ably represented in the Paris congress (February 25-April 14) by the experienced extraordinary ambassador and privy councillor Count Alexei F. Orlov and the career diplomat and envoy to London, Filip Brunov. They were joined at the table by some of the key statesmen in the diplomatic preliminaries of the war from Turkey, England, France, and Austria, as well as Camilio Cavour of Piedmont-Sardinia. Russia’s chief concession was to remove its naval presence from the Black Sea, but they worked out the details of its neutralization directly with the Turks, not their British allies. The affirmation of the 1841 Convention, which closed the Turkish Straits to warships in peacetime, was actually more advantageous to Russia, which lacked a fleet on one side, than to Britain, which had one on the other. Russia’s sole territorial loss was the retrocession of the southern part of Bessarabia to Ottoman Moldavia, the purpose of which was to secure the Russian withdrawal from the Danubian Delta.
In addition, the Russians agreed to the demilitarization of the land Islands in the Baltic, a provision that held until World War I. The Holy Places dispute, the diplomatic scrape which had led directly to the war preliminaries, was settled on the basis of the compromise effected in Istanbul in April 1853 by the three extraordinary ambassadors, Alexander Menshikov, Edmond de la Cour, and Stratford (Canning) de Redcliffe, before Russia’s diplomatic rupture with Turkey. The Peace Treaty was signed on March 20, 1856.
The British at first did not treat the Russians as complying and kept some forces in the Black Sea. However, the 1857 India Mutiny, due in part to Russian-supported Persian pressure on Afghanistan, led to British withdrawal and facilitated the unimpeded success of Russia’s long-standing campaign to gain full control of the Caucasus.
As some contemporary observers noted, adherence to the naval and strategic provisions of the treaty depended upon Russian weakness and coalition resolve. During the Franco-German war of 1870-1871, Alexander Gorchakov announced that Russia would no longer adhere to the “Black Sea Clauses” mandating demilitarization, and a London conference accepted this change. During the Turkish War of 1877-1878, Russia re-annexed Southern Bessarabia to the chagrin of its Romanian allies. See also: CRIMEAN WAR; NICHOLAS I; SEVASTOPOL
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baumgart, Winfried. (1981). The Peace of Paris, 1856: Studies in War, Diplomacy, and Peacemaking. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Mosse, Werner. (1963). The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-71: The Story of a Peace Settlement. London: The English Universities Press.
DAVID M. GOLDFRANK
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After the disastrous military campaigns of 1813 marked in particular by the severe defeat of Leipzig, Napoleon’s political and military power was on the decline. The emperor was unable to avoid the entry of the Allied powers in Paris on March 31, 1814, and was forced to abdicate in April 1814. On May 30, 1814, following the restoration of Louis XVIII, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the plenipotentiary of the new king, signed the first Treaty of Paris with representatives of King George III of England; of Fran?ois I, emperor of Austria; of King Frederic-William III of Prussia; and of Tsar Alexander I. This treaty, which put an end to the war between France and the Fourth Coalition and to the French hegemony in Europe, covered both territorial and geopolitical matters.
France retained its boundaries of January 1, 1792. Thus it was allowed to keep Avignon and the Comtat-Venaissin, a large part of Savoy, Mont-beliard, and Mulhouse, but had to surrender Belgium and the left bank of Rhine as well as territories annexed in Italy, Germany, Holland, and Switzerland. No indemnity was requested, and England gave back all the French colonies except for Malta, Tobago, St. Lucia in the Antilles, and the Isle of France in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Allied powers had to withdraw from French territory. Last, the treaty included secret clauses that ceded the territory of Venetia to Austria and the port of Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia.
On the political level, the treaty called for a general congress to be held at Vienna to settle all questions about boundaries and sovereignty and to confirm the decisions taken by the Allied powers: Switzerland was to be independent, Holland was to be united under the House of Orange, Germany was to become a federation of independent states, and Italy was to be composed of sovereign states.
The relative leniency of the treaty was largely due to the diplomatic ability of Talleyrand; yet, despite its moderation, the document was badly received by the French public opinion and it contributed to the discredit of the Bourbons.
At the time the treaty was signed, Napoleon I was prisoner on the island of Elba and separated from his family. He escaped from the island and landed on March 1, 1815, at Golfe Juan with nine hundred faithful soldiers. He tried to take advantage of his strong popularity to drive Louis XVIII off the throne and restore his own personal power. But that attempt lasted only one hundred days and collapsed with the catastrophic defeat at Waterloo on June 18, 1815. Napoleon had to abdicate again and was sent to the island of Sainte-H?l?ne, where he died on May 5, 1821.
Following this final abdication, a new treaty was signed in Paris on November 20, 1815. It was
much tougher than the previous one; the cost of the one hundred days was high. France was confined to its former boundaries of 1790. It was authorized to keep Avignon and the Comtat-Venaissin, Montb?liard and Mulhouse, but lost the duchy of Bouillon and the German fortresses of Philippeville and Marienbourg given to the Netherlands, Sar-relouis and Sarrebruck attributed to Prussia, Landau given to Bavaria, the area of Gex attached to Switzerland, and a large part of Savoy given to the king of Piedmont. Regarding the colonies, the loss of Malta, St. Lucia, Tobago, and of the Isle of France was confirmed. A financial cost was added to this territorial cost: the French state had to pay an indemnity of 700 million francs and to undergo in its northeast frontier areas a military occupation. This occupation was limited to five years and 150,000 men but had to be paid by the French budget.
Despite its severity, the second Treaty of Paris was faithfully respected by King Louis XVIII; this respect allowed France to get rid of the foreign occupation as early as 1818-two years earlier than expected-and to play again at that date a significant role in the international relations. See also: ALEXANDER I; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; NAPOLEAN I
