by James Millar
east-west paths. Beginning in the eleventh century, salt was hauled from Halych in Galicia-Volhynia to Kiev. Later, the importance of the salt of Galicia-Volhynia to not only the Kievan Rus, but also the Teutonic Knights of the Baltic coast, brought a reemphasis of the north-south Baltic-Black Sea trade west of the Crimea. Galicia-Volhynia’s power and influence, based on the salt trade, lasted well into the second century of Mongol-Tatar domination of the rest of Russia (1237-1387).
The Mongol Yoke (1237-1556) isolated the Russians from the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the High Gothic period, among other major changes in the West. Because they survived on tribute paid by their Russian subjects and the customs duties paid by those involved in international trade, the Mongols permitted merchants the use of the north-south trade routes, this time between the Baltic, Novgorod, and Muscovy (in the north) and the Arabic Middle East and the Black Sea (in the south). They even encouraged the revival of the Crimean ports, which were then under the leadership of Italian merchants from Venice, Pisa, and Genoa; cities with Greek names then became Italian.
POST-MONGOL TRADE
Ivan the Terrible’s defeat of the Astrakhan Tatars in 1556 largely sealed the fate of the former Golden [or Kypchak] Horde. The Volga trade route was now in Muscovy possession all the way to Central Asia, from which the tsar could import horses, which would serve in his Swedish campaigns. Ivan also sought trade with Great Britain: in the second half of the sixteenth century, he established commerce between the White Sea port of Arkhangelsk (logs and lumber) and Hull in eastern England (finished products).
An unlikely servant of Tsar Ivan was a cossack named Yermak, who raided the Volga riverboats laden with horses from Central Asia. Yermak and his minions would later defeat the Siberian Tatars and claim Western Siberia in the name of the tsar in the 1580s. This event opened Siberia and the Russian Far East to Russian expansion and trade.
First using the river and portage method, cos-sacks and merchants traversed Siberia from west to east, reaching the Pacific coast within a century. Along the way, they traded trinkets to the natives for valuable furs. The Russian quest for fur led them to Alaska, down the North American Pacific coast to San Francisco (Fort Ross), and even to Hawaii. Later, coach transportation was used on the bone-jarring Great Siberian Tract. Between 1891 and 1916, Russian laborers built the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is still the only transcontinental thoroughfare in the country. Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, a trade route flourished between Russia and China at the border crossing of Kyakhta. Chinese tea, silks, furs, and luxuries were imported in exchange for Russian raw materials.
SOVIET TRADE POLICY
For much of the period that it existed, the Soviet Union was an island that strove for self-sufficiency while remaining insulated from the rest of the world. Like that of imperial Russia, Soviet foreign trade was limited in total value, in quantity of commodities exchanged, and in number of trading partners. Between 1917 and 1991, Soviet trade with other socialist countries never fell below 67 percent. By the late 1980s, trade with the developed world was approximately 22 percent, with the balance going to developing countries.
Throughout the Soviet period, military strategists sought to expand the Soviet navy, which by extension included the merchant marine. An especially important goal was the development of a northern sea route through the use of heavy reinforced-ultimately atomic-icebreakers. By the 1980s, such icebreakers had successfully negotiated the Soviet Union’s vulnerable Arctic coast between Murmansk and the Bering Strait.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia’s foreign trade was more open than ever before, but, as in the distant past, its own exports continued to be raw materials or crudely processed finished goods, while its imports consisted of quality finished products. Major trading partners include China, Germany, the United States, and Japan. See also: EXPLORATION; FOREIGN TRADE; GEOGRAPHY; TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brigham, Lawson W. (1991). The Soviet Maritime Arctic. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Gibson, James R. (1969). Feeding the Russian Fur Trade. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Magocsi, Paul Robert. (1985). Ukraine: A Historical Atlas. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
VICTOR L. MOTE
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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667
TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667
The Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667 governed domestic and foreign trade in seventeenth-century Russia, and streamlined a highly complex and confusing system of some seventy different internal customs duties that added to transportation costs and created ample opportunity for corruption and cheating. Subjecting all goods and merchants to a uniform and consistent set of customs duties promoted efficiency by making long-distance trade more profitable and predictable. The statutes also became key elements in the implementation of a mercantilist agenda designed to promote the interests of domestic merchants.
The commercial code (Torgovy ustav) of October 1653 was adopted in direct response to an August 1653 petition by leading Russian merchants against transit duties and for a unified rate of customs duty. The code combined a uniform internal rate with an overall increase in imposts. It further adopted uniform measures of weight and length throughout the country. A basic 5 percent impost was levied on sold goods, with the exception of salt (double the rate), furs, fish, and horses (old duties applied). No duties were levied on foreign currency sold to the government at a fixed rate. A special duty of 2.5 percent was applied to goods offered exclusively in border towns for export. Under the 1653 code, foreign merchants were required to pay a 6 percent duty in the Russian interior, in addition to a 2 percent transit duty. However, exports from Arkhangel’sk were taxed at only 2 percent. A related 1654 decree (Ustavnaya gramota) abolished transit duties on noble and church lands.
The dual agendas of mercantilism and protectionism culminated in the New Commercial Code (Novotorgovy ustav) of 1667, again in an apparent response to a petition by Muscovite merchants. The New Commercial Code was apparently primarily authored by Afanasy Lavrentevich Ordin-Nashchokin, G. Dokhturov, and L. Golosov, and signed by ninety Russian merchants. The statute consists of a preamble, ninety-four main articles, and a seven-article appendix, Ustav torgovle, governing foreign trade. The introduction of the New Commercial Code spells out the leading principles of the government’s commercial policy and constitutes the most elaborate expression of mercantilist ambitions in seventeenth-century Russian policy making. In addition to increasing government revenues, the statute sought to support domestic merchants by organizing facilities for credit and by promoting companies combining large-and small-scale merchants in an attempt to reduce the influence of foreign traders. However, the practical importance of these pronouncements remained marginal at best.
The new statute significantly increased the tax burden facing foreign merchants and made a further attempt to confine them to border cities through both restricted access to the interior and prohibitive transit duties. The New Commercial Code designated Arkhangel’sk, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Putivl’, and Astrakhan’ as “border towns” beyond which foreigners could operate only with special permission. Foreign specie receipts were to be maximized not only through higher tax rates, even on unsold goods, but also through a compulsory system of exacting those payments in foreign specie at a rigged exchange rate. The basic impost was increased to 5 percent on weighed goods and 4 percent on unweighed goods. An additional 9 percent was levied on transit by foreigners into the Russian interior. A sales tax of 6 percent, imposed in the towns of the interior, took the overall duty facing foreigners to an unprecedented 20-21 percent. Exacting the duty in foreign silver coin at a rigged rate yielded the crown two rubles in pure profit for every seven rubles collected. Emulating Western practices, the New Commercial Code imposed quality controls on import and export goods alike, although this measure appears to have been implemented with mixed success at best. Slightly prefe
rential treatment was given to Asian merchants in the interior.
The immediate impact of the New Commercial Code was negative. Customs receipts declined, and tensions between Westerners and hostile gost (privileged merchant) administrators increased, as confiscations of goods as “contraband” multiplied. The concessions to Russia’s elite merchants may in fact have been based on unrealistically rosy expectations at a time when a commercial treaty with Persia was set to ensure an increase in silk trade, while a peace treaty with Poland put an end to prolonged warfare in the West. A period of protectionism under Fyodor Alexeyevich’s reign severely limited the right of Western merchants to operate in the Russian interior and sought to change the terms of trade at Arkhangel’sk in favor of Russians. This policy was only relaxed in the 1680s when Peter I’s government finally conceded some key demands of Western merchants. The more hostile business environment at Arkhangel’sk not only deterred
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TRADE UNIONS
Western merchants but also contributed to a general diversion of Russian trade to the Baltic. The New Commercial Code remained in force, with minor modifications, until the adoption of the 1755 customs code. See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST; FOREIGN TRADE; GOSTI; MERCHANTS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burton, Audrey. (1997). The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History, 1550-1702. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press. Bushkovitch, Paul. (1980). The Merchants of Moscow, 1580-1650. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dukes, Paul. (1990). The Making of Russian Absolutism, 1613-1801, 2nd ed. London: Longman.
JARMO T. KOTILAINE
TRADE UNIONS
The trade union movement in Russia had its origins in the strike movements of the nineteenth century. Labor organizations, originally modeled on village institutions, spontaneously formed around particular grievances, but proved temporary in nature. More permanent labor representation in the form of delegates, starostas, eventually took hold at the factory, local, and industry levels. By the late nineteenth century local broad-based organizations gave way to associations by industry or occupation, along with the adoption of more institutionalized negotiation methods between labor and capital.
Trade unions first gained legal recognition after the Revolution of 1905. Unions adopted principles of class identity (membership being restricted to workers) and independence from state institutions and political parties. During the period immediately following the Revolution, attempts to establish central labor organizations produced both soviets of workers’ delegates and trade union councils, which sought to unite extant unions and provide support for new ones. Unions remained relatively weak, with union activity declining significantly during World War I in response to governmental restrictions.
The period from 1917 to 1920 saw the reemer-gence of the old trade unions in competition with autonomous factory-level worker councils. Unions
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eventually secured power over the councils, but only as they underwent their own transformation. As a result, three features were to characterize trade unions throughout the Soviet period: branch unionism, union subordination to both the state and Bolshevik Party, and the assumption of dual functions on the part of all unions. This meant that every employee in a particular industry or branch of the economy belonged to one union and that trade unions as state organizations were to fulfill a twin purpose: to mobilize workers to meet production targets and to defend workers’ rights, as defined by the state, against arbitrary managerial actions. The particular methods employed by unions shifted over time, with emphasis on discipline and punishment in the 1930s giving way to positive incentives and greater job protection rights by the 1950s.
At the enterprise level, union activity was integrated into a larger triangular relationship, known as the union-management-party troika. The union worked chiefly with management to increase labor productivity. Its control over the distribution of nonwage benefits to the workforce ensured labor cooperation, while its control over the grievance process and its mandatory participation in all personnel decisions provided the means to defend workers’ legal rights. Simultaneously, the union coordinated efforts with party officials to direct the cultural life of the factory. In this capacity, the union acted as a transmission belt between party and society, orientating the workforce to the goals of the state.
At the national level, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) was the supreme agency within a complex trade union bureaucracy. In its role as administrator, it maintained control over two parallel hierarchical structures, one based on branch-level union committees, with the central committee of each union as the leading institution, and an all-union hierarchy organized geographically, with the republican all-union councils as the governing bodies. The primary union agency, the factory-level committee, was responsible to both groups. Union resources came from three critical sources: membership dues, the national social insurance fund, and considerable property holdings associated with the social and welfare benefits distributed to the workforce.
The post-Soviet period has been marked by two important developments: the plurality of trade union organizations and the declining power of unions in general. Alternative trade unions, orgaENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS
nized along occupational and professional lines, have challenged the monopoly of the traditional union bureaucracy, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the successor to AUCCTU. Although FNPR remains by far the dominant institution, the alternative unions function as catalysts for organizational change. In addition, trade unions have lost considerable power, deepening their subordination in practice to management and the state. Declining union membership and the loss of income and important administrative duties have undermined the traditional base of union power. See also: TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ashwin, Sarah, and Clarke, Simon. (2003). Russian Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Transition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press. Ruble, Blair. (1981). Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Turin, S. P. (1968). From Peter the Great to Lenin: A History of the Russian Labour Movement with Special Reference to Trade Unionism. New York: A. M. Kelley Press.
CAROL CLARK
TRANSCAUCASIAN FEDERATIONS
Federalism would be a rational enterprise for the three states that occupy Transcaucasia. The Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani peoples have always been interconnected by trade, transport, and even culture, despite religious differences. Under the Russian Empire, the three peoples were incorporated into a Caucasian administrative region. After the 1917 February revolution, the Transcaucasian leaders tried to maintain political and economic unity through the formation of regional Transcaucasian Soviets, a Transcaucasian Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), and finally, a few days before the October Revolution, by a Transcaucasian Committee of Public Safety.
After the October Revolution, an anti-Bolshevik coalition of Transcaucasian leaders formed a Transcaucasian Commissariat. This was the first attempt to create a proper federal structure, though the vertical and horizontal divisions of authority were unclear. The Commissariat, which governed alongside a Transcaucasian Seim (parliament), was divided within itself by the war with Turkey and Germany. It collapsed after five months, in April 1918.
Newly independent Transcaucasian states were formed, but were soon overthrown by the Red Army. The independent Georgian republic was the last to fall, in February 1921. Soviet power, with its emphasis on large, efficient territorial units and class solidarity, reestablished unified Transcaucasian organizations, such as the Transcaucasian Economic Bureau. In March 1922, despite resistance from regional leaders, and the Georgians in particular, Moscow established a Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSRZ) in February 1922. Its supreme organ was a plenipotentiary conference of Transcaucasian representatives. In Decem
ber 1922 this loose federation of republics was transformed into a single federated republic, or the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (ZSFSR). The new federation was highly centralized, and the republics were given only six commissariats (ministries). The remainder were given to the federal Transcaucasian government. The Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee (ZtsIK) was the executive organ of the federation and, along with the Transcaucasian Council of People’s Commissariats (Sovnarkom), could overrule the republics on almost any issue. The Transcaucasian republics were subject to dual authority, from the Transcaucasian central organs and from Moscow. However, the real power was in the unitary Communist Party, an organization hostile to the idea of federation.
In 1936 the Stalin constitution dismantled the ZSFSR and established separate union republics in Transcaucasia. Administratively, they were now directly subordinate to Moscow, with no intermediate Transcaucasian administration. However, within the republics, the autonomous republican or regional status of a number of national minorities was retained. Azerbaijan included the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Region and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan. Georgia incorporated three separate administrative units: the South Os-etian Autonomous Region and the Abkhazian and Ach’aran Autonomous republics. Although Azerbaijan and Georgia were never described or operated as federations, they resembled them administratively. There was a division of power which devolved considerable social and cultural authority to the national minority governments within the
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union republics. This remained the case until the breakup of the USSR, itself a quasi-federation, in December 1991.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Transcau-casian states reclaimed their independence; Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war over Nagorno-Karabagh. This war, and intense competition over scarce resources, made the concept of a new Trans-caucasian Federation unrealized, although there were half-hearted discussions and calls from the new leaders for a common Caucasian Home or Forum of Caucasian Peoples. President Shevardnadze of Georgia spoke of a federation within Georgia to end the country’s interethnic problems. However, despite encouragement from Western powers for more Transcaucasian cooperation, there is no significant Transcaucasian political movement calling for federation today. See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASIA; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS
