After the game against Torino, Galliani spoke with Silvio Berlusconi, the owner, and they decided to change coach, immediately focusing on me as their preferred replacement and obviously hoping that I hadn’t already signed with Parma. This particular courtship would have to be speedy. Galliani quickly called me and I told him that I was going to sign for Parma the next day.
It was on Monday, when I was on my way to sign a contract with the officials in Parma, that Galliani called me. I had a deal with Parma in place and, only three days before, I had shaken the hand of the club president, Calisto Tanzi.
‘Did you sign a contract with Parma?’ Galliani asked.
‘No, not yet, but I’m on my way now,’ I said.
‘I’m going to your house,’ said Galliani.
‘What for?’
‘I spoke with Berlusconi and we agree that you have to come here, to Milan. We are ready for you.’ And so I switched off my telephone.
Naturally, as soon as I signed the contract for Milan I switched the telephone back on. I needed it to call Tanzi at Parma. I told him, ‘Sorry, but Milan is my family. I played there and I am so sorry for this – I hope that you can understand,’ and he said to me, ‘I understand everything.’ Even after fifteen years I’m still not sure if Tanzi was serious. He was indeed the big boss: he was the founder and major shareholder of the Parmalat corporation, which almost wholly owned Parma FC, and he was later indicted and convicted for one of Europe’s largest bankruptcies. I had to be pragmatic. Loyalty and integrity have limits; how loyal would Parma have been to me if the season started badly? And Milan was family, which must always be the first loyalty.
I arrived in Milan in November 2001 and it immediately felt like I was home. The team was another matter, however, as it was not so good. Coming home isn’t always easy and the first six months were tough. In the transfer market we managed to get Clarence Seedorf and Alessandro Nesta, outstanding players. Nesta was twenty-seven, in his prime, and he cost a lot of money. Initially, the general director was not able to convince Berlusconi to pay such an amount for the player as Berlusconi had some financial problems with his company. He didn’t want to risk the judgement of public opinion and be seen to be overspending – especially not for a player like Nesta, a defender. Nesta was going to cost €30 million, but even at that price I knew I had to convince Berlusconi that he was vital for us. The constraints on running an organization are not always on public view and, while managers work under the gaze of the public, that gaze cannot always penetrate to see the real reasons for certain actions.
I considered Nesta so vital to the team that I decided to try with Berlusconi myself. He was in Denmark at the time and I told him, ‘President, everyone wants to win the Champions League, but if you don’t buy Nesta, we won’t win it. Give me Nesta and I will give you the Champions League.’ In the end it was a great deal for both of us. He bought Nesta and I gave him the Champions League. Later, we would deliver another Champions League and another final, semi-final, quarter-final – it was a fantastic period for the club.
My leadership arc at Milan was the longest of my career so far – eight years – and the length of my tenure gave me the opportunity to change the players over time, to gradually transform the team in my own vision. The biggest changes came at the beginning, as a matter of necessity because the squad was not good enough. We could only finish in fourth place in my first season, the last Champions League position, which meant going into the qualifying rounds at the beginning of the following season. However, as I had only joined in November and had not had a full season and preseason, we did well to finish fourth. The next season Seedorf and Nesta arrived, along with others, such as Rivaldo. We already had Rui Costa, and these four players were key for me because I knew that, after Capello and his successors, the president wanted to change the style of the team a little bit. Capello’s teams were really well organized, but maybe they didn’t deliver the level or style that the president wanted. It would not be the last time I was to be tasked with changing a team’s style to suit the owners and the fans.
With all of these new players joining, we had another difficulty, which was how to keep so many incredible players content. Not everyone could play every game, but that is exactly what talented players want to do. In midfield we would eventually have to accommodate Kaká, Gennaro Gattuso, Rui Costa, Andrea Pirlo, Seedorf and Rivaldo and up front we had Crespo, Andriy Shevchenko, Jon Dahl Tomasson and Filippo Inzaghi. The challenge was to keep them all happy while also thinking about developing the team. The atmosphere at Milan was good, which is incredibly important, and the players knew that they were in a fantastic team playing for a great club, so they became more willing to accept they wouldn’t feature in every game. Of course, there were difficulties, but they were dealt with individually.
Early in my first full season we had a Champions League game and Rivaldo, who hadn’t had a full preseason or preparation for the match, was put on the bench. I tried to explain to him that he was going to play three days later, but he said, ‘Rivaldo has never been on the bench.’
I told him, ‘OK, there’s always a first time, and now is the right time to be the first one.’
‘No, no,’ he said to me. ‘Rivaldo doesn’t go on the bench.’
I said, ‘Rivaldo, you have to go on the bench.’ He just got up and went home.
It is difficult for the truly special players to understand why they cannot play, even when they are only 80 per cent fit. They are great because they want to play every game, fit or injured. This is part of what makes a champion’s personality. The club spoke to him, spoke with his agent, and he came back and went on the bench for the match against Modena, a small game. Only then did I speak with him again. I said, ‘Listen, it’s for you, not for us. You don’t have to be worried because it can happen today, it can happen in the next game and it can happen to any player. We have a lot of games and it means you can be more fresh when you play in the next match.’
Up until this period, Milan had not been enjoying much success, but it was coming. We were building towards it. We won the Champions League in 2003 and success cemented the belief among the players that they were at a great club. They understood that sometimes they would play and sometimes they would not. It became easier to manage the big players because all the players were big.
Another challenge at a big club like Milan is managing the competition among players. In the beginning Christian Abbiati was the number one goalkeeper and Dida the number two. So, Dida had to wait. Luckily for him – and unluckily for his rival – Abbiati broke his rib and faced a spell out of the side. Dida stepped up in his absence, so that when Abbiati returned from injury I had to tell him that Dida had done well and would continue to play at number one. He took it well and stayed as number two for a while, until he was eventually moved on. This is the way at the big clubs. You have to wait for your chance and then take it. And, when you do take it, you have to know that you will always be challenged. There is no room for complacency at a big club and it is important for the players to know that, if they do well when they get the chance, they will get their opportunity in the team; Abbiati knew this well and was fully professional.
We had great times at Milan, winning two Champions Leagues and the Scudetto – the Serie A title – and I was at home with my football family, but eventually the relationship cooled and we both became a little tired. Eight years is a long time and Berlusconi wanted to change something. I did too. I wanted to try a new experience outside the country.
I had previously had a contract with Real Madrid all lined up, but I told the Spanish club, ‘I leave Milan only if they want me to leave. I am ready to come to Madrid, but only if Milan allow me to go.’ I even had a clause inserted that stated, ‘This contract will become valid only once AC Milan gives its consent.’ When I told Galliani about my opportunity he said, ‘No, no, no – stay. You must stay.’ So I did. Galliani had shown great faith in me, as had Madrid when they pursued me. Nothing i
s as important as being loved and valued.
The next year it was Chelsea and I had the same conversation with them: ‘I’m going to speak with Milan and if Milan want me to stay, I stay.’ When I spoke to Galliani this time, he was honest and said, ‘It could be an idea.’ It was time.
Exporting Success
Chelsea Boy
Chelsea initially courted me during two meetings in May 2008, in Geneva and Paris. The manager’s position was soon to become vacant, as José Mourinho’s replacement, Avram Grant, was due to be replaced himself. The need for the meetings to be clandestine affairs meant that this courtship took on a slightly comical turn, not least because the notion that any meetings between two people such as Roman Abramovich and me could be kept secret was immediately undermined within a couple of hours of the Paris meeting, when Adriano Galliani called me to ask how it had gone. I lost out on the job that time because the owner chose Luiz Felipe Scolari before me, supposedly because of my poor English.
Scolari proved to be not so effective for Chelsea and was sacked in early 2009. Guus Hiddink was hired as an emergency replacement until the end of the season and so suddenly I was back in the equation. The whole interview process was repeated, with further ‘secret’ meetings with Abramovich and his staff. In February 2009 Chelsea’s director of football operations, Mike Forde, spent a series of meetings over a six-week period with me and my assistant, Bruno Demichelis. Unusually, for me, these discussions covered such issues as Chelsea’s vision, the club’s operating model, key strategic objectives, the use of data, performance modelling, managing the big players and the conditions I believed I needed to be successful at Chelsea. Mike questioned me in great depth about all these matters and more.
This courtship was very intense and unlike any I’d experienced with other clubs. In March I agreed to join, beginning my duties in June, and, after I signed, Mike gave me a great deal of help to understand the staff structure, the special features of the Premier League, Chelsea’s recruitment policy and the expectations of the owner – though these had already been made very clear to me. I was taken to Holland, with Bruno, for an intense week-long course in English, solid days from eight in the morning until eight in the evening. If the language had been an issue the last time, I was determined that it would not be so this time; I like to be known as a good student so I studied hard. Soon after I started my duties, I held my first press conference at Chelsea and spoke English in front of over 200 journalists. I was nervous, of course, but very pleased.
The dressing room at Chelsea had many strong characters and I’m sure my own career success helped me at the beginning. When you join a club after winning two Champions Leagues, you tend to command a lot of respect from the players – but only at the beginning. This honeymoon period with the players never lasts long because immediately after that, they are looking at you and asking, ‘What can this guy do for me?’
I didn’t change the style of the training. The players felt comfortable with it as it was, so it seemed right to keep it. We did change the style of the play, though, and that helped in a different way because the players had to concentrate and learn, which always motivates the best of them. Of course, just as I would see later with Real Madrid, we had to change the way we played because the owner wanted something different about the style. On one of the first occasions I met Abramovich he told me, ‘I want to find a manager that gives my team an identity, because when I watch Chelsea I’m not able to find an identity. When I see Barcelona or Manchester United, I find an identity in the team – when I watch Chelsea I cannot find an identity.’ So we changed the style of play – we played with more possession. What better way to control possession than with a player like Milan’s Andrea Pirlo? We tried to sign him, but it was not possible, so in the beginning I played with Michael Essien in this position, who adapted and became one of the best in that position.
The beginning of my time at Chelsea was glorious. I took charge of the team for a preseason tour to the US and we won every game. My ideas, thoughts and approach seemed to be well received by the players. We started the season proper very well, with the team winning fourteen of the first sixteen games in all competitions. However, even then there were signs that the relationship with the owner might be difficult. During that great run of games, we lost 3–1 to Wigan. It was just a blip, to my mind, something that happens in football, but Abramovich came to the training ground the next morning to demand answers. I tried to listen and not respond impulsively, but maybe I should have had some answers ready for him and been more prepared. I should have recognized this as my first red flag. It was a new type of relationship for me with an owner – even Berlusconi had not been so demanding.
When December came around we were in the top two in the Premier League and had won our Champions League group. We then drew Inter Milan – and, of course, José Mourinho – in the last sixteen of the Champions League and the pressure and expectation began immediately, even though the games were over two months away. We started 2010 playing strongly in the FA Cup, but in February two thunderbolts hit me that would seriously affect my relationship with Abramovich. First, we were beaten 4–2 at home by Manchester City, which was bad because we were outfought and tactically outthought. He called a 9 a.m. meeting the next day to ask what had happened. Abramovich is never happy with these ‘thunderbolt’ defeats – defeats that he believes should not happen to Chelsea. The second, and worse, thunderbolt was our away defeat to Inter in the first leg of our Champions League tie.
When we lost to Inter again in the second leg, 1–0 at home, I was challenged publicly by the media for the first time. The honeymoon period was well and truly over. The next day Abramovich addressed the group, demanding answers. This was another episode which taught me how to deal with this different kind of president; again, I chose not to meet aggression with aggression, it is not my way. I like to think through difficult times, address the problems coolly and with reason. When Mourinho’s Inter went on to win the competition – an ambition he was not able to fulfil when he was at Chelsea – it was not good for me. Perhaps this was the beginning of the end, a big red flag.
We were out of the Champions League but I challenged the players to achieve a new goal – to win the League and FA Cup double for the first time in Chelsea’s history. I put up a chart that signposted our way to the achievement, telling them that in the twentieth century only four teams had won the double, and in the twenty-first century only one, and that we would be the first for eight years, since Arsenal in 2002. This became our new mission.
This is where building strong relationships comes into play. The players knew that the owner was on my case and they felt that they had let me down. They began playing for me; they felt that they owed me and they responded brilliantly.
We went on to win a lot of games, many of them by big margins – we scored a lot of goals – and, on the last day of the season, we beat Wigan 8–0 to win the League. A week later we won the FA Cup final against Portsmouth to complete the double. Unusually, I was not offered an extension to my three-year contract after the final. In fact, it was not even discussed. All of which suggested another red flag to me.
There were more worrying signs to come. There were no major new players brought in over the summer and several of the older players, such as Michael Ballack, were not offered new contracts. I was asked to promote five young academy graduate players into the twenty-five-man squad, which I did. We won the first game of the new season 6–0, but I was still summoned to Abramovich’s house that night to receive a ‘dressing down’, as they say in England, for the performance. Another red flag – and only one game into the season.
We continued the strong start and we were top until we had a bad November. We lost to Liverpool, 2–0, and my assistant Ray Wilkins was fired days later. Another lesson learned. I could have fought harder, but I knew that it was a done deal. Michael Emenalo, the club’s head of opposition scouting, was made assistant manager and I had to introduce him to th
e squad. The English players in particular were not happy with the way things had been done.
I was surprised when the club changed Wilkins. It was not discussed with me first. In my first year at the club Ray was, of course, important because of the language – he spoke Italian – and he was a good reference for the players. In my second year in the job, although I certainly didn’t want to, I could do without him. The club had made the decision – Ray was already gone. When Abramovich decided to make Emenalo the assistant manager – my assistant – I told the club that I didn’t need another assistant. I already had Paul Clement and Bruno Demichelis, and between us we had everything covered.
I didn’t have any personal problem with Emenalo, but he was not comfortable in his new role. He was not used to being an assistant manager – his experience was in scouting – but the club put him there anyway. He was certainly not comfortable in front of the players, because they knew him from his time in a certain role, not in his new position.
In January the club made two marquee signings – Fernando Torres from Liverpool and David Luiz from Benfica – which lifted spirits, but not for long. Sadly, Torres was not at his best after a period of injury at Liverpool. In April we played Manchester United in the Champions League quarter-finals, with the feeling that we would have to win to save our season. The night before the second leg, Abramovich addressed the players, telling them they had to win or there would be huge changes to the team. He told me individually that if we lost then I was not to bother coming back to work. I wasn’t sure if he was serious. We lost and I did go back to work, though I felt like a dead man walking. Again, I suppose I could have confronted the owner, but it seemed pointless.
Quiet Leadership: Winning Hearts, Minds and Matches Page 3
