By economic solution we mean the solution to the problem which will provide the best return on our capital investment. And, of course, produce the product according to specifications and of the desired quality. And the expression, the most effective use of the manual and mechanical elements, is meant to convey that hand operations do not necessarily disappear entirely when a process or an operation is mechanized.
While the completely automatic factory is an interesting possibility, there continues to be a good deal of immediate practical work to be done in reducing production costs, building better machines, improving factory layouts, and designing better factories—and in all these areas the Manufacturing Staff is making major contributions.
The Technical Center
The General Motors Technical Center, which was completed in 1956, is noted for its architectural elegance and breathtaking vistas; and there is no doubt that Eliel and Eero Saarinen, who designed it, created something unique. It is located on a 900-acre site northeast of Detroit, about twelve miles from the General Motors Building. At the center of the site is a twenty-two acre artificial lake surrounded on three sides by clusters of buildings. On the north side are the Research Laboratories. To the east are the Manufacturing Staff and the Engineering Staff buildings. To the south are the Styling Staff buildings, including a distinctive domed auditorium in which fairly sizable groups can gather for showings of the staff's work. Altogether, the Technical Center now has twenty-seven buildings, which house some 5000 scientists, engineers, designers, and other specialists. Wooded areas to the south and west help to seal the center from other real-estate developments and preserve its distinctive, rather "campus-like" atmosphere.
But of course the primary function of the Technical Center, as of all General Motors' facilities, is to get work done; and perhaps its real greatness resides in the fact that it is wonderfully functional as well as elegant. To understand why it has been a valuable investment for the corporation, easily worth the $125 million that has been put into it, the reader should know something of its origin.
The inadequacy of our previous facilities was obvious even before the end of World War II. Our different staff operations were then scattered all over the Detroit area, in a wide variety of rather makeshift quarters. I was especially struck by the unhappy situation of the Styling Staff, whose fabricating shops were located in an old Fisher Body building several miles from the staff headquarters. This building was adjacent to some heavy engineering work we were doing, especially on diesel engines, and Mr. Earl's men were oppressed by the noise. In any case, they did not have enough room.
During the war, the different staffs began to formulate plans for their facilities in the postwar era. From a consideration of this problem in relation to research and engineering, there began to emerge the idea of setting aside and developing one area for all the technical staffs. This implied some organizational changes, of course. I discussed these changes, and first proposed something like a new staff center, in a letter to Mr. Kettering, dated March 29, 1944:
My dear Ket:
I have been thinking about certain Corporation problems as affecting the long term position of our affairs and I would like to ask your point of view, if I may, on one of these problems as I see it.
I am not going to present an argument to you as to the importance of technological progress. We both recognize that as the keystone of our future position. In our Research activities down through the years, we had a marvelous balance between the scientific side and the engineering side . . . what I'm wondering about is, whether this marvelous balance that we have, can and will be maintained ... if I were to venture an opinion, I would be inclined to think that ten to twenty years from now, General Motors Research would be much more in the scientific area than it is now ... By the "scientific area" I . . . [mean] problems that were related directly [to our areas of interest], or perhaps indirectly, but not in any sense of the word what we normally term engineering in character.
Now I have in mind the point that you have always raised with me, in which I have agreed; viz., the difficulty involved and the importance of shortening the time when Research developments are incorporated in an engineering sense, in our products . . .
In an attempt to accelerate engineering progress in our products, down through the years I have tried several different approaches; first, to charge the Engineering Department of the Division with the development of a certain forward device, like the synchro-mesh transmission, for instance . . . Subsequent to that, we have, as you know, set up Product [Study] Groups under the direction of the general head of the Engineering Staff ... In that way we can carry our engineering development to the point of its practicability, after which it can be dealt with in an engineering or production way, as circumstances may justify . . .
I believe we should set up in the Corporation in the staff of the Vice President in charge of Engineering ... a properly accredited central engineering activity to deal with the car as a whole . . .
I would visualize the physical development of this activity to consist of a set-up close to, but outside, the City of Detroit. The Proving Ground (Note 14-3.) ... is probably too far away for contact ... I believe that such a set-up . . . would serve to reduce the time element in bringing into our products, advanced research work . . .
. . . Nothing need be done here to in any way change the combined engineering and scientific areas in which the Research ... is now dealing . . . and if in future years the trend of our research work should be more in the scientific area, then we would have a set-up that would make up for the delinquency . . .
Mr. Kettering responded to this suggestion with a plan for expanding the research facilities and moving all of them except the machine-tool and model shop to a new location. He sent this proposal to O. E. Hunt, who forwarded it to me. On April 13, 1944, I sent Mr. Hunt a letter making these points, among others:
First: I think we all agree . . . that . . . whatever it might cost would be inconsequential compared with what we will get out of it . . . after all, the necessity of additional facilities is what I might refer to as an end necessity ... we can only sell ... a product that is sound, desirable and advanced, technically.
Second: I am convinced that we need additional facilities for Research [and] . . . that the present facilities are not only inadequate but poorly located for the result that we must have. I am absolutely against spending more money for the same type of thing, where we are . . . Therefore, I believe that the project is sound and desirable so far as establishing an entirely new location where the operating conditions will be more in line ... as we look forward into tomorrow.
I concluded the letter by proposing an amendment to Mr. Kettering's plan, and suggested:
Let's set up what we would call—
GENERAL MOTORS TECHNICAL CENTER
. . . The center to which I have referred would comprise an expanded Research activity as defined by Mr. Kettering; and Engineering activity which would comprise Harley Earl's body design, cor[r] elated with the broadened product activity such as we are now conducting in Detroit . . .
By the end of 1944 this proposal had advanced to the point where I felt able to take it to the Administration Committee for discussion and approval. I quote from the minutes of the meeting of that committee for December 13, 1944:
Mr. Sloan advised the group that plans are being formulated to establish, in the vicinity of Detroit, a technical center in line with the corporation's policy of improving its technological position. He stated that the plans are in a tentative stage and complete data will be submitted at a later date. It is proposed that the center shall house the present activities carried on by the research division and the art and color section; and also provide facilities for engineering research of a character comparable to present product studies carried on by the central office engineering staff that are neither research activities presently carried on by the research division nor the individual engineering work carried on by the various divis
ional engineering groups.
In response to an inquiry from the chairman, those present expressed themselves as being enthusiastically in favor of the proposed technical center.
There remained the sizable question of where the center should be situated. After some discussion it was agreed that the center should be outside of highly congested areas, near a railroad, twenty five to thirty minutes from the General Motors Building, and adjacent to residential areas. It was also agreed that each activity should retain its individual identity. By the middle of December 1944 a suitable section of land meeting the various requirements had been located at the present site and we proceeded to option most of the West Half of Section 9, Warren Township, northeast of Detroit. All concerned agreed on the desirability of this location.
There also remained a question about the architectural and aesthetic standards we should aim at. Harley Earl had contended from the beginning that we should engage an architect of stature, and aim for a center that would be distinctive. Several others felt that any emphasis on high aesthetic standards might be detrimental to the practical operations of the center, and so they wanted General Motors itself to design and plan the project. At about the time this argument was in progress, I happened to visit the Ethyl Corporation laboratories in Detroit, which had just been completed. These handsome facilities made an excellent impression on me, and so I inclined to Mr. Earl's point of view more than I might have otherwise.
Among those who expressed some concern about the effects of an aesthetically oriented center was Mr. Lammot du Pont. He felt, quite properly, that he would not be fulfilling his responsibilities as a director unless he was satisfied on certain points. I wrote to him on May 8, 1945, arguing the advantages of retaining an outside architect, and on May 17 he replied that he was satisfied on the point. His letter said, in part:
The whole layout and the description of its preparation gave me the impression that the matter of aesthetic treatment, or as I would style it, "dressing up the place," had been an important factor from the beginning. I questioned whether the matter of appearance was of any importance in a project of this kind, the sole object being to get technical results. It was with this thought in mind that, in offering my remarks, I started out with the layout, which had been made by an architectural firm, whereas according to my line of thought, it would have been more appropriate to have had the layout made by an engineering firm or General Motors engineers.
I gather from your letter that it is not the intention to allow the appearances to interfere with the technical possibilities or to add substantially to the cost of the project. With those two assurances, my only remaining question with respect to the project would be answered.
We asked Mr. Earl himself to find the right architect for the center. He visited a number of leading architectural schools, and sought out the opinions of others who were knowledgeable in the field; and he found, in the end, that virtually everyone made the same recommendation. The selection of the Saarinens was not a difficult choice.
By July 1945 we had the architects' preliminary plans, an elaborate scale model, and artists' renderings of various buildings. On July 24 we announced the project publicly, and it received wide and favorable comment in the press. By October the property had been rough-graded and entirely fenced in. The project was then delayed by the great postwar strike, running from the fall of 1945 through March 1946, and by the fact that, in the booming postwar market, we found we needed expanded production facilities more than any other kind of building—even the Technical Center. Construction was resumed in 1949 and the Technical Center opened formally in 1956. I am satisfied that the decision to provide this aesthetically distinctive and functional center for our technical talents was a sound and desirable one.
Chapter 15 - Styling
The prominence of styling in the automobile market in recent years is the outcome of the evolution of the annual model and the high state of the art of automotive engineering. Styling, as an organized staff activity, was first undertaken in the automobile industry by General Motors in the late 1920s. Since 1928 styling and engineering in the corporation have evolved together in a continuous interaction that brought about the modern General Motors style.
Throughout the first three decades of the industry, until the late twenties, the engineer dominated the whole design of the car. O. E. Hunt in a letter to me summed up this early background:
Even comfort, initially, was a secondary matter, and appearance, economy, etc., got scant, if any, attention . . . Engineering was the all-absorbing activity and the engineer was usually the dominant personality, often to the point of unreasonable insistence on having his ideas as to the design followed to the letter regardless of manufacturing feasibility or ease of maintenance in point of time or money. Even advertising and the sales effort voiced largely the engineer's convictions as to desirable motor car features and characteristics . . .
We came into the 1920s with two kinds of engineers—one in product and the other in production—in a certain relation of tension, which necessarily affected the design of the automobile. The production engineer's problems in creating techniques for mass production often caused him to want to hold up design changes in the product. They were headaches to him. But by the mid-twenties, the product engineer had begun to feel the influence of the sales people. He then began to yield to market considerations, though still largely in terms of purely engineering design. In the course of time the product engineer raised the state of his art so high that he produced not only a superb creation but also a mature one, so far as the present type of gasoline-powered car is concerned. Now he devotes much of his skill to solving the problems created by the stylist. The consumer recognizes this today by taking for granted the varied engineering excellence of all competitive makes of cars, and so Ins shopping is strongly influenced by variations in style. Automobile design is not, of course, pure fashion, but it is not too much to say that the 'laws" of the Paris dressmakers have come to be a factor in the automobile industry—and woe to the company which ignores them.
As a producer, General Motors is in harmony with this trend of the industry and of consumer desire. At the close of World War II we made the projection that for an indefinite period the principal attractions of the product would be appearance, automatic transmissions, and high-compression engines, in that order; and that has been the case.
The degree to which styling changes should be made in any one model run presents a particularly delicate problem. The changes in the new model should be so novel and attractive as to create demand for the new value and, so to speak, create a certain amount of dissatisfaction with past models as compared with the new one, and yet the current and old models must still be capable of giving satisfaction to the vast used-car market. Each line of General Motors cars produced should preserve a distinction of appearance, so that one knows on sight a Chevrolet, a Pontiac, an Oldsmobile, a Buick, or a Cadillac. The design must be competitive in its market. Great skill and artistry are needed to fulfill these complex styling requirements. General Motors has a Styling Staff of over 1400 employees engaged in this function. They have a very large responsibility for the success of the product.
Mass production necessarily imposes certain limitations on styling. The enormous cost of bringing new models to market—in some years it has amounted to more than $600 million—makes it imperative to weigh the cost of each suggested change. General Motors reduces the cost of retooling for new designs to some extent through the common use of major structural parts of a basic body concept. Tooling costs also are reduced by trying to limit major design changes to two or three-year intervals.
The stylists' control of design is qualified by several factors. They interact with the car divisions, the Fisher Body Division, and the staff engineers; and their work must be co-ordinated with the over-all decisions of the Engineering Policy Group. Although in the past, new designs were subordinated to engineering limitations set by the car-producing divisions, today they ar
e evaluated more from the standpoint of their potential eve appeal. Engineering and production have adapted to the requirements of styling as styling adapted to mass production.
In the early automobile in the United States there was a certain relationship between the various parts that was adhered to by almost every car maker for many years. The radiator, for example, had to be in line with the front axle and the rear seat had to be directly above the rear axle, a relationship winch was responsible for the height of the cars of the period. Inevitably, these fixed relationships between the axles and die body of the old car meant that the car had to be high. However, this did not matter much during the period when the industry principally was building open cars—that is, until the mid-twenties.
A fairly satisfactory design had been evolved for the motorcar when it was an open car. In 1919, when 90 per cent of the cars manufactured were touring cars or roadsters, the touring car had a clean, uncluttered look. Body surfaces were smooth; doors were flush, and the hood had been raised and lengthened until it was the most prominent feature. It was a product of the period of motorcar history when the car was used mostly for sport and pleasure rather than for everyday travel and business. The main problem was, of course, the weather. For twenty years we protected ourselves with a variety of rubber coats, hats, lap robes, and other makeshift things. For some reason or other, it took us a long time to realize that the way to keep dry in a motorcar was to keep the weather out of the car. With the closed car came styling as we know it today.
My Years With General Motors Page 32
