Lemaigre-Dubreuil offered to contact Giraud on Murphy’s behalf. With Murphy’s agreement, they met in Lyon and started to discuss the conditions under which Giraud might take on the leadership of the French North African army, working alongside the US and British forces. Giraud wanted the troops to land simultaneously in North Africa and on the French Mediterranean coast, but Eisenhower did not have sufficient troops to engage in such an operation. Giraud was forced to accept that the Allies would only land in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. On 17 July 1942, Eisenhower formally invited General Giraud to become head of the French army in North Africa; just over a week later President Roosevelt informed Winston Churchill of his plans to land in French North Africa. He summoned his military advisers to the White House on 30 July to tell them of his decision to defer plans for a cross-channel invasion in favour of Operation Torch, the Allied landings in French North Africa. On 13 August 1942, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in North Africa.
In early October 1942, Robert Murphy asked d’Astier to arrange a meeting between a group of French representatives and eight members of the US armed forces. The US contingent was headed by General Mark Clark, representing Eisenhower. The meeting took place in secret on 22 October in a villa on an isolated beach, eighty kilometres west of Algeria near a town called Cherchell. The Americans were brought to the Algerian coastline by a British submarine and taken ashore in a small boat. The French side included General Charles Mast, Giraud’s personal representative; Colonel Jousse, head of the Algerian Resistance; a journalist named Jean Rigault, who wrote the minutes of the meeting; senior officers of the French navy and air force; and, lastly, d’Astier himself and a couple of trusted colleagues.
They discussed the help that the French army and Resistance groups could give their US allies as they landed in Algeria and Morocco, as well as the military plans drawn up by Eisenhower and the difficulties American and British troops might encounter from some of the French armed forces loyal to Pétain.
The lengthy discussions were interrupted by a security alert at 4.00 a.m. when two local police officers out on patrol were seen checking the surrounding area. To avoid an international incident, the eight American officers had to scramble back into the waiting British submarine.
Over the next two weeks the plans agreed at Cherchell were put into action as d’Astier prepared, following General Clark’s request, to take control of Algiers for six hours on the day of the landings, which was thought to be sufficient time for the Allied troops to land on the beaches at the port of Sidi Ferruch.
On the night of 7 November, d’Astier’s Resistance groups, headed by José Aboulker, successfully took control of the radio-transmitting stations at Mogador, cutting off most military communication networks. D’Astier’s groups took over the marine and air forces headquarters of Algeria and arrested several high-ranking French army officers. They were determined to prevent the French forces loyal to Vichy from opening fire on the Allies as the landings took place.
Before General Giraud had even landed in Algeria, he was mysteriously heard to make a radio broadcast rallying the French army and civilians to support him. Meanwhile, d’Astier was faced with an unexpected problem: out of the blue Admiral Darlan had arrived in Algiers in a private capacity because his son was in hospital, seriously ill with polio. D’Astier and Colonel Chrétien (the latter was responsible for the French intelligence services in North Africa) went to see General Juin, head of the French North African troops, and informed him that Eisenhower had agreed that General Giraud was to take control of the French armed forces, that US and British troops were about to land in North Africa. He asked Juin to try to convince Darlan not to stand in their way and instead to join them. Darlan refused to accept the situation without Pétain’s full support, leaving Murphy and d’Astier fearful that the French armed forces would rally under Darlan.
D’Astier decided to take pre-emptive action; he placed Darlan under arrest. That night a British Royal Navy warship attempted to put ashore one hundred men but was shot at with canon fire by French soldiers, forcing the British to give up their planned landing. The Resistance forces had tried without success to take the Algiers airport of Blida; it remained in the hands of the Vichy French. Everywhere else in Algiers, the landings were delayed but ultimately successful, though in Oran and Morocco the French troops resisted and approximately 2,000 casualties were reported.
Conscious that the French armed forces were still loyal to Admiral Darlan, d’Astier’s position was no longer tenable: he was forced to release Darlan. Murphy decided there was no other option but to recognise Darlan as the legal head of the French armed forces representing Pétain and to negotiate with him.
But the military advances were not over yet. Early on 8 November, a group of British and American commandos managed to capture the gun emplacements guarding the Eastern side of the Algerian bay; using these as their base, 25,000 US soldiers landed on the beaches of Sidi Ferruch, twenty miles west of Algiers, along with 7,000 British troops further west of Castiglione. Once Darlan learnt of the successful landings, he had no option but to negotiate a ceasefire as the US forces took control of Algiers. It had been a significant undertaking, with major consequences for the outcome of the war. Operation Torch ‘was the first indication that the Allies could turn the tables on Hitler. Over 100,000 American and British troops and 100 ships took part in the invasion, which involved a massive parachute drop and five simultaneous amphibious landings along nearly 1,000 miles of the North African coastline.’10
Henri d’Astier de la Vigerie’s dream had come true: the Allies had landed in North Africa and the French army would now fight alongside the Allies with Giraud as their head. Yet Darlan – and Vichy – were still in overall command of the French army and of French North Africa. What was to be done about Darlan?
16
Arrest
In December 1942, the political situation in French North Africa could be described, with understatement, as difficult to understand. Instead of appointing Giraud, as per the Cherchell agreement, Robert Murphy and Eisenhower formally recognised Admiral Darlan as overall Commander-in-Chief for North Africa. Giraud in turn also agreed to accept Darlan’s overall authority. It is possible that Murphy – still concerned by the hugely pro-Vichy North African population along with Darlan’s arrival and three Vichy-appointed Governor Generals in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria – thought it ultimately safer to deal with Darlan than with Giraud.
Henri d’Astier, meanwhile, believed that General Giraud had let the French and his Resistance fighters down because, having accepted command of the French forces in North Africa, he then made way for Darlan and accepted reduced responsibility for the Tunisian campaign. Darlan’s politically shrewd tactics had paid off, and despite the Allied landings, he refused to make any further decisions without Pétain’s consent.
D’Astier felt that overall power and control of Algeria should lie with the team who had supported and helped the Allies land in Algeria and Morocco. The French army, however, was deeply divided; many supported Darlan while others were unsure who to champion.
At that time many in North Africa did not want General de Gaulle taking control of Algeria and Morocco and refused to recognise him as a possible leader. In turn de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, was not prepared to accept the pre-eminence of Giraud, while Giraud himself, although acceding to Darlan as head of the armed forces, was angry at the US turnaround. Many within d’Astier’s Resistance group saw Darlan as a traitor, especially those who had risked their lives to help the Allied landings.
The plan to assassinate Admiral Darlan is thought to have begun within a group of young Resistance fighters. Initially d’Astier and his deputy l’abbé Cordier rejected the prospect, knowing that the US would not look kindly upon the political assassination by a group of Gaullist supporters of a leader they had recognised. Instead they hoped to persuade Darlan to resign, leaving the territory without governance
and thus enabling them to invoke emergency measures under the Loi Tréveneuc of 1872. Their intention was to appoint Henri d’Orléans, Count of Paris and pretender to the French throne, as head of a provisional French North African government. The Gaullist d’Orléans had the support of the republicans, the press, the Catholic clergy, the Masons, the Jews and even the head of the Algerian armed forces and the representatives of the general councils of the North Africa territories.
On 9 December 1942, the Count of Paris travelled from Morocco to Algiers; d’Astier’s plan, once he arrived, was to have the Murphy/Darlan agreement declared void, clearing the way for the Count of Paris to be declared head of the Provisional Algerian government. D’Astier had some authority by this point; in the provisional government that had been set up in the wake of the Allied landings, he had been appointed joint Minister of the Interior. For his plan to happen, however, Darlan had to resign. He had no intention of doing so.
On 19 December 1942, Air Force General François d’Astier, Henri’s brother, arrived in Algiers from London to meet Giraud, Darlan and some Gaullist supporters. De Gaulle insisted that if Darlan did not resign to be replaced by a Gaullist, perhaps the Count of Paris, it would leave France in a potentially dangerous political situation. He believed that if a fascist leader such as Admiral Darlan was still in power when France was ultimately liberated, the French Resistance might side with the Russians.
The popularity of the French Communist party had been a longstanding concern for the establishment and it was widely thought that the French were more likely to support the Communists if a Vichy leader was still in power in North Africa. François d’Astier gave Darlan one last chance to resign; he refused. It has been claimed that François d’Astier had received clear instructions from General de Gaulle to assassinate Darlan if he refused. Records show that François d’Astier arrived in Algiers with US$80,000 – it has been argued that the funds were intended to be used to arrange for Darlan’s assassination.* Henri d’Astier, meanwhile, was still trying to convince Eisenhower to accept his plan to position the Count of Paris as head of the Provisional government. Roosevelt, who had never liked de Gaulle and preferred to deal with Giraud, refused to agree to the plan.
On 23 December 1942, a resistance activist named Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle, described by writer Charles Williams as one of many ‘hotheaded young Gaullist paramilitaries’, announced to l’abbé Cordier that he intended to assassinate Darlan. De la Chapelle was a member of the Corps Franc, a monarchist and ardent anti-Vichyiste: after the night of the US landings, when French troops had opened fire on the Americans, he and his friends felt betrayed by Darlan and subsequently regarded him as a traitor.
The following day, driven by Jean Bernard d’Astier (Henri’s son), de la Chapelle arrived at Darlan’s headquarters at the Summer Palace, where he shot and fatally wounded Darlan. De la Chapelle’s plan was to escape to Morocco immediately afterwards, but he was caught and arrested. The next day, at noon, he was tried and executed.†
Following Darlan’s death, Robert Murphy confirmed that President Roosevelt had refused to accept the Count of Paris as head of the Provisional government. As Roosevelt did not support de Gaulle, Giraud was appointed military Commander-in-chief of North Africa.
Politically, Giraud was regarded – possibly unfairly – by the Gaullists as nothing more than Darlan’s successor, as he was still surrounded by Pétain’s North African governor generals. Public opinion was, moreover, starting to shift in favour of de Gaulle, with many feeling that Giraud was marginalising members of the Resistance. Giraud was determined to hold on to power, and the Americans remained firmly opposed to the prospect of de Gaulle taking control in Algeria.
Seventeen Gaullist activists were arrested on 30 December, some of whom had helped with Operation Torch. Giraud’s explanation for these arrests was that, following Darlan’s murder, he was concerned more attempted assassinations would follow.
On 10 January 1943, Henri d’Astier and l’abbé Cordier were formally arrested and charged with plotting against the State and of being accomplices in the murder of Darlan.
Ten days later, Marcel Peyrouton, who in 1940 as Minister of the Interior had signed a decree stripping the Algerian Jews of their French citizenship, was appointed Governor General of Algeria at Roosevelt’s request.
In February 1943, the seventeen political Gaullist prisoners were released, but d’Astier and Cordier were held for a further nine months, possibly because Giraud feared they would build up support for de Gaulle, thereby undermining his authority. On 25 February 1943, Algiers became the capital of Free France and the provisional government of the French Republic began to establish itself.
The Times reported on 1 January 1943 that: ‘To the British, and apparently to the American peoples, the whole affair appears on first hearing to be wildly confusing. How is it that pro-Allied Frenchmen can be arrested?’
The mystery surrounding Darlan’s assassination may never be solved, especially while the French intelligence records remain closed. A large percentage of the British Intelligence records were destroyed. There is no doubt that Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle shot him, but was he acting alone or under instruction? Many believe SOE were ultimately responsible for Darlan’s murder.
* Gandy, La jeunesse et la Résistance, page 70. The official reason for François d’Astier travelling with such funds was to support the ongoing Gaullist campaign in the region.
† Gandy, La jeunesse et la Résistance, pages 72–3. On page 77, Gandy explains that de la Chapelle was subsequently exonerated in December 1945 by the Court of Appeals in Algiers. A room in the Court of Appeals was named La Chambre Bonnier de la Chapelle in his memory.
17
Escape
A few months before the Allied landings, d’Astier had recruited into his group a twenty-two-year-old named Jacques Sauvage, who had been working as a double agent for the French and the Algerian section of the German intelligence services, the Abwehr. Sauvage was later described as the most daring of the Orion Resistance agents. In the autumn of 1942, Sauvage was instructed by the Abwehr to travel to Paris and advise the Parisian collaborators of the impending military activities in the Mediterranean. Granted an ausweiss by the German authorities, he reached Paris in late October 1942. His other mission, per d’Astier’s request, was to find Alain and warn him of the dangers lying ahead.
After the North Africa landings in November 1942 and the defeats in Russia, the terms of the armistice between France and Germany were declared void by the Wehrmacht, who subsequently occupied the Free Zone and therefore the whole of the country. As the progress of the war changed, the Wehrmacht became ever more aggressive, increasing their indiscriminate searches and ID checks on young men in particular.
After arriving in Paris, Jacques found Alain through the underground movement and he agreed to work with the group as an Orion agent. Despite the many trips he carried out between Algiers and Paris throughout 1942 and 1943, his Orion colleagues never understood how he was able to deceive the Abwehr so successfully while still remaining loyal to France. But it was clear he was a brilliant double agent; he watched and listened carefully to everything around him, no matter how trivial. He was only twenty-two years old in late 1943 when the French security services decided to move him out of danger to Morocco, where he joined the French army.
Conscious of the heightened danger in Paris, Alain and Biaggi set up stricter security rules for their agents: retracing one’s steps was forbidden, and all members were under strict instruction not to allow themselves to be followed – or if they were, to avoid their own homes and to make all possible attempts to lose their assailant. They were warned about the possibility of concierges acting as informers, spying on their movements, and they were told to keep well away from their friends, an order which must have been very difficult for a group of young twenty-somethings. They had to be more careful about the new friends they made, questioning rigorously the integrity and honesty of any new m
ember they wanted to recruit. They were told never to meet openly in bars or restaurants unless there was an emergency. With the exception of Alain and Andrée, no member of the group was ever aware of the existence of more than two other members – so that if one of them was picked up by the Gestapo they would be unable to betray the group.
Towards the end of 1942, Alain was worried. He had not heard from d’Astier for some time and had no instructions as to how the group was to move forward. With no radio transmitters, they were unable to contact him directly. After much thought, he and Noël Le Clercq decided to leave France in search of d’Astier in North Africa. As Alain put it: ‘We must leave France and head for Algeria where we will get a better picture of what is going on.’11
Although she was taking great risks at work and for Orion, Andrée was still just a young girl at heart, and one who couldn’t help feeling frustrated at times. On 24th October she wrote:
Well guess what, dear diary? Yesterday morning I had the honour of a visit from Rohrbach.
I was seriously surprised. He told me he had been trying to find me yesterday but because I was not around he gave up. He said he was looking for someone’s file and decided he wanted to catch up with me. He invited me to dinner and I replied, ‘Yes, I would like to accept your invitation but do call me on Thursday to reconfirm.’ By saying this I thought he could get out of it if he is only trying to be polite.
I am dying of boredom. Rohrbach certainly picked the right moment. If I had a boyfriend I would never go out with him.
It was not a great success. She updated her entry the following day:
By the way, dear diary, dinner with Rohrbach was seriously boring. After dinner we went to the pictures. Luckily he did not make a pass at me, which is just as well because I have decided I do not like him.
Andrée's War Page 14
