Muhammad bin Thani’s time for consideration was over. If he wanted an alliance with Faisal bin Turki, it was now or never. The Sheikh of Bahrain’s own brother was resident in Bida and would soon be asking why Jassim had undertaken only a few preliminary skirmishes. The situation was more critical than many in Doha realised. Concerned that Bahrain might fall, the British were planning for the total annihilation of Doha in a bid to stop its use by Faisal as a base for operations. The only people in town who knew of this development were Muhammad and Jassim. They were told by a suspicious Ali bin Khalifa that Bahrain would assist the Royal Navy in razing Doha to the ground should any hint of disloyalty to Bahrain manifest itself. More pressure was exerted on Doha’s chief with news that Abu Dhabi, now led by Sheikh Said bin Tahnun, wanted to prevent Faisal from entering Doha at all costs and was sending ships and men to aid in its defence.
Just two days before Faisal’s arrival, Sheikh Ali bin Khalifa returned to Bida with the intention of overseeing the town’s defences and pressing as many men into service as possible. Before he could begin, however, Ali was called to a meeting with Muhammad bin Thani. What was said must have shaken him to the core. Ali was told that Bida, Doha and Fuwairit would not resist Faisal’s army, and that, on the contrary, a message of welcome had already been sent to the Wahhabi emir. As they spoke, Al Thani tribesmen were busy removing Khalifa sympathisers from the Burj al-Mah, the most strategic fort that controlled entry into Bida and access to its wells. It was also the fort where Ali was resident. Muhammad had made his decision and there was no going back. He felt certain that now was the moment to end Bahraini intimidation. He would use Wahhabi strength to counter the British–Bahraini alliance. After making his intentions clear, Muhammad bin Thani demonstrated his chivalrous nature, assuring Ali he was not a prisoner and was free to leave, advising him to do so before Faisal arrived. He permitted Hamdan bin Tahnun of Abu Dhabi to return home too.
Faisal was pleased to find his army welcomed into Doha, though he was angered by Muhammad’s decision to let Ali go. Nevertheless, the first stage of his plan had succeeded without so much as a shot being fired. Mubarak bin Abdullah had also kept his promise, reporting that he was busy gathering vessels to transport the invasion force. Preparations seemed to be proceeding well. The mood was not as cheerful in Bahrain. News of Muhammad bin Thani’s decision to abandon his usual caution went down very poorly. Muhammad bin Khalifa decided upon a naval blockade of Doha and looked to the British for support in preventing a possible secondary attack from Qais. Just to be safe, he also matched the offer of 10,000 German crowns a year for Abdullah’s descendants if they agreed to stay away. He even suggested to Hennell that Bahrain become a British protectorate once Faisal and his new allies had been defeated. Hennell was unimpressed by the offer, decided against shelling Doha once Faisal had entered it and initially seemed resigned to the fact that Bahrain would fall. Such a scenario seemed likely before one Colonel Justin Sheil involved himself in affairs.
Sheil is a fascinating character. An Irishman born near Water-ford and educated at Stonyhurst, he served in the Bengal Infantry and was present at the siege of Bhurtpore in 1826. Promoted up through the ranks, he was described by his friends as ‘sensible and well-informed’ with a temper that was ‘mild and conciliatory’. Some credited him, apocryphally, I believe, with ending torture in Persia, inducing the Shah to abandon his predilection for cutting off prisoners’ heads as an afternoon indulgence, but only after their eyes had been gouged out. Sheil’s other acquaintances weren’t quite so admiring. The Right Honourable Member for Poole in England, H. D. Seymour, described the colonel in very different terms at the House of Commons. ‘He is a bully, and his policy is a bullying policy.’ Whatever the truth, Sheil was of the opinion that any Qatari–Wahhabi attack on Bahrain would benefit only the Ottoman Empire. His foresight was truly remarkable, and the Horse Guards military command was convinced. The British insisted something had to be done. Muhammad bin Khalifa needed to be saved.
Hennell sent a short, polite letter to Muhammad bin Thani which began with the promising words: ‘It is not the intention of the British Government to interfere in the quarrel.’ But the sting, as so often is the case, was in the tail. ‘You cannot be permitted to place your maritime resources at the disposal of a foreign power, and therefore you are interdicted, under pain of incurring the severe displeasure of the British Government, from employing your vessels for the invasion of Bahrain.’ Hennell was saying, in effect, that Faisal was welcome to invade the island of Bahrain, just so long as he didn’t use any ships to get there. Hennell also sent HMS Tigris to prevent any troopships from leaving Qais, though some had managed to slip out of port before her arrival.
Meanwhile, Muhammad bin Khalifa was intent on mounting a strong defence. Disappointed at the British decision not to flatten Doha, he took matters into his own hands and ordered the blockade of Qatif. His plan was to prevent any ship sailing that could possibly be used to transport Faisal’s army to the Bahraini coast. Smarting from the Doha debacle, Ali bin Khalifa was happy to take command of eleven warships and 800 armed men. He had no sooner arrived at Qatif in July when he came upon eighteen transport ships that had sailed from Qais before the British blockade had begun. Fortune smiled on Bahrain; the ships that Ali destroyed were carrying a very important cargo.
In 410 BC, a Spartan admiral, Mindarus, had suffered a terrible defeat near Cyzicus at the hands of three great Athenian strategists. In one of the most laconic military messages of all time, the surviving Spartan warriors sent the following dispatch back to their HQ. ‘Ships lost. Mindarus dead. Men starving. Don’t know what to do.’ This was one of those moments. Faisal was about to learn that he had just lost three of his key allies in one day – both candidates for governing Bahrain, Mubarak bin Abdullah and Rashid bin Abdullah were dead. Additionally, Bashir, the son of Rahma bin Jabir, had followed his father’s example and died fighting a Bahraini fleet, along with all his 150 men. The news was a major setback, and Faisal and Muhammad bin Thani were going to have to revise their strategy. They couldn’t get the army to Bahrain; the invasion had been defeated before it had even started.
Meanwhile, Muhammad bin Khalifa’s position was improving by leaps and bounds. Two British naval squadrons had taken up positions in Bahrain’s defence, one near Muharraq and the other patrolling Qatar’s eastern shores. No private shipowner would be willing to transport Faisal’s men for fear of losing his vessels. With Qatif’s port out of the equation and the invasion thwarted, Faisal was now prepared to consider Ali bin Khalifa’s original offer of tribute and arrears. But the situation had changed. Muhammad bin Khalifa and his brother were happy to let Faisal simmer in Doha’s summer heat; they were in no hurry to talk. On 20 July, the Wahhabi emir suggested negotiations aboard Ali’s baghla and sent Ahmad al-Sudairi, chief of al-Hasa, as his representative. As Ahmad’s boat drew near and his men called for permission to come aboard, Ali called back: ‘If you are agreeable to ask nothing, come aboard, but if you want anything, then don’t.’ Ultimately, over the course of a few days, Ahmad prevailed on Ali to accept that while Bahrain enjoyed naval superiority, there was no way it could force Faisal’s departure from Qatar either. Thus it was that, on 25 July, Ali agreed to pay Faisal 4,000 German crowns in tribute annually and not harass Muhammad bin Thani’s people and business, but only on certain conditions. First, Ali insisted on taking up residence in Bida should he choose, and that the few remaining descendants of the late Sheikh Abdullah return to Qais, never again to receive Wahhabi support.
Sheikh Muhammad bin Thani encouraged Faisal to accept the deal. The promise of Bahraini tribute would suggest Qatar was under Faisal’s protection. Only Rashid bin Faddal, the chief of Wakra, was unhappy with the talks’ outcome and led his people into a voluntary exile in Fars. Once the agreement was signed, the British withdrew their ships and Doha’s pearling fleet was, in theory, allowed to get back to what it did best. But in practice Muhammad bin Khalifa was keen to exact reve
nge on the Al Thani; sending ships to disrupt the pearl harvest, he imposed a crippling economic embargo that wasn’t lifted until November 1852. The loss of revenue from two pearling seasons was tough on Muhammad, but he was pleased to have retained his position of authority over Bida, Doha and Fuwairit. He had survived a close encounter to fight another day.
Wahhabi–Bahraini relations remained poor. By 1859, Muhammad bin Khalifa had stopped payment of any tribute and even incited some Qatari tribes to take a much more hostile attitude towards Faisal bin Turki. He, angered by the loss of income, made preparations at Dammam for a second attempt on Bahrain. Britain threatened to sail in support of the Al Khalifa, promising to sink any warship or transport that left the Hasawi coast. Al-Sudairi wrote a letter of complaint to the newly appointed British Resident, Kemball, expressing his belief that both Bahrain and Qatar were Wahhabi client states. ‘Know that Bahrain used to give tribute to Emir Faisal and to his father before him for ages past, long before the Sirkar [English East India Company] came to these parts. In like manner the Qatar people are also subjects of bin Saud and used to pay him tribute.’
In truth, Britain’s patience with Muhammad bin Khalifa was being sorely tested. The Indian Rebellion of 1857, mysteriously still referred to as a ‘mutiny’ in various textbooks, had shaken the empire considerably. There were no longer the ready resources to sail to Bahrain’s defence each and every time Muhammad bin Khalifa chose not to fulfil his own agreements. Recognising there was nothing to be done against Faisal bin Turki, Britain moved on 31 May 1861 to make Bahrain part of the Trucial system. London recognised the independence of Bahrain and Sheikh Muhammad agreed to ‘abstain from all maritime aggressions of every description, from the prosecution of war, piracy and slavery by sea’. Now Britain was responsible for the protection of Bahrain, Faisal’s dream of taking the island was over.
Bahrain’s new status, however, also meant that the Al Khalifa had no right to use its considerable naval power over Qatar. Muhammad bin Thani was free of Bahraini naval hostility. Though his plan had gone wrong, the outcome was much the same. Muhammad was free of Bahraini harassment and had established himself as the foremost leader in Qatar during a short-lived Wahhabi occupation. Qatar was another step closer to independence. The Al Thani had gained some valuable political experience and Jassim was now in a position to take a much more important role in his father’s administration.
6
JASSIM’S ASCENDANCY
JASSIM’S FATHER enjoyed good health throughout his exceptionally long life. Born around 1800, Muhammad kept his experienced grip on day-to-day politics throughout the 1860s. It was clear to most, however, that he had become increasingly dependent on his son. This was a gradual change that had begun a decade earlier, but not one born of a father’s faith in his son; there was no sacred concept of primogeniture in the Gulf. Rather, Jassim’s ascendancy came through his remarkable strength of character. He had been tried and tested by his forebear with difficult and dangerous tasks from his early twenties, an apprenticeship for power. In 1851, for example, when Faisal bin Turki’s army was approaching Doha with unknown intent, Muhammad had sent his 25-year-old son on a secret mission to meet up with Jabir bin Nasir, chief of the pro-Bahraini Naim. Muhammad wanted to ascertain their plans in the face of impending Wahhabi invasion.
This was an extremely delicate matter that might easily have ended badly, for the Naim were no friend to Jassim or his pro-Wahhabi sentiments. Yet into their camp he rode with just a couple of companions and sat with his rivals to talk, returning a couple of days later with their counsel. Faisal should be permitted entry to Doha, they suggested, as he was too strong to oppose. Barely a week later, Muhammad bin Thani ignored this advice and once more sent out his son, this time with a few hundred men, on a mission to delay the advance of the Wahhabi Emir, Qatar’s answer to Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator. Jassim’s success, both personal and collective, bought Muhammad the time to draw up plans for a Wahhabi invasion of Bahrain and the installation of a new Al Khalifa leader.
The relationship between Jassim and his father was very close, as we’ll see from his poetry shortly. At the political level, however, they could often be diametrically opposed. Towards the end of the 1860s, Muhammad began to favour forming an alliance with the British. Much to Jassim’s irritation, he would often write letters expressing friendship to the Political Resident and worry if no reply was received. ‘My deputy arrived, but brought no letter from you; I trust the cause of your not writing is good … you have every cause to be pleased with our behaviour.’ And when a reply was forthcoming, diplomatic protocol appeared to have blurred into embarrassed patronising, such as in Colonel Lewis Pelly’s letter of 1870: ‘You are not a British subject but an Arab Chieftain in friendly communication with Her Majesty’s Indian Government. Continue to conduct your affairs peacefully and with common sense and you will always find me ready to befriend you.’
The men of Doha would have witnessed Al Thani disharmony most clearly in the extraordinary events of 1871. Four Ottoman flags were brought to Doha from Kuwait. Jassim raised one above his own home, while his father, just 300 yards down the road, chose not to change the flag above his. Father and son would pray in different mosques as soon as the town had two, Muhammad leading prayers at the bigger jami’ in Bida, while his son prayed in a masjid on the outskirts of town. As the historian Frederick Anscombe hints in his book The Ottoman Gulf, however, there are signs that Muhammad and Jassim could play a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine, in which one might claim he didn’t agree with the other, fend off political pressure and maintain harmony within and without Qatar.
The reasons for this discord over policy were well known. Jassim was not at all impressed by the British, though his hostility mellowed with age. It was no accident he had left Bida to go hunting when the British spy Palgrave arrived in 1863. Britain’s constant support for Bahrain at that time was a major source of frustration. In any case, he was naturally wary of a Christian nation that had destroyed Qatari towns, imposing its power over a sea that had been the property of none. But the government of India believed Jassim ‘mattered’ in the region’s politics. Thus, a complaining Palgrave was required to fumble his way through the desert and impose his unappreciative company on a Jassim whose Bedouin culture required he receive all guests.
There is a wonderful scene a few years after Palgrave’s visit when Jassim’s strained-but-loving relationship with his father manifests itself in front of the British political agent Mirza Abed Kasim. Mirza had sailed to Doha in June 1870 to deliver a letter from the Political Resident concerning compensation payments owed Bahrain. Muhammad read the letter and was busy assuring the emissary he would personally resolve the issue to British satisfaction when his son entered. Mirza relates: ‘[Jassim’s] father handed him the Resident’s letter; after he read it he said: “Know all of you that this territory belongs to bin Saud, and the prosperity of the people comes from his favour. We will pay nothing to anyone whatsoever.” … I replied I had no business with him, and was addressing the old man, Muhammad bin Thani, and would receive my answer from him only.’ You can almost feel the tension as Jassim, no doubt incandescent with rage at Mirza’s response, gave salaams to his father and left. Checking that their conversation was again private, Muhammad then told the agent in a low voice: ‘Don’t worry about him, you have to deal with me, and I will arrange affairs with you,’ and Mirza returned to the gunboat Clyde.
Perhaps the most obvious of the differences between father and son was the manner of their dress. Unlike his father, Jassim chose to wear the clothes of the Najd. He felt an affinity to the region and its religious values. Throughout his life, Jassim maintained relations with many of its scholars, most famously Sheikh Abdullah Al Shaikh, whom Jassim often consulted. Throughout his life, he would send charitable donations to him for distribution among the region’s orphans, widows and poor. He paid for books to be copied and distributed, establishing numerous awqaf, religious endowments whose assets
were managed by a charitable trust. Despite Muhammad bin Thani’s many achievements, the biggest of which was yet to come in 1868, I believe it was Jassim who felt more keenly that attachment to his ancient ancestor, Mi’daad bin Musharraf, one-time governor of the great Jabrin oasis in central Arabia, where you can still find the Mi’daad remembered in place names and charitable trusts as far away as Riyadh.
Post-treaty problems
Not so very long after the ink had dried on the 1861 Perpetual Truce of Peace and Friendship, the Royal Navy shelled Wahhabi fortifications in Dammam. Their intention was to ram home a message that ensured no misinterpretation: Bahrain was under British protection. Faisal bin Turki’s son, Abdullah, was also warned to drop any plans he might still harbour for Khalifa subjugation. Though he had lost hope of invading, nonetheless Abdullah maintained that annual tribute should continue, and promptly sought to garner more support from various dissatisfied factions in Bahrain. This was problematic. Britain ruled the waves but was in no position to enforce its rule on land. By February 1862, the new Political Resident, Captain James Felix Jones, despaired of forcing Faisal to drop his claim and urged his son and Muhammad bin Khalifa to negotiate a settlement.
The request fell on deaf ears; relations between all three parties worsened. Faisal even doubled his demand to 8,000 German crowns a year. The British government in India turned to Muhammad bin Thani to head the talks, a role in which he enjoyed little success. As the impasse continued, British frustration with Muhammad bin Khalifa grew, though he seemed blissfully unaware, even poking fun at Abdullah behind the protection of British warships. Contacting the Porte in Istanbul, the Sheikh of Bahrain alluded to the theoretical status of Faisal bin Turki as an Ottoman client, and offered to buy out Wahhabi ‘rights’ to govern the entire coast from Qatif to Muscat for one million dollars.
Jassim the Leader: Founder of Qatar Page 9
