by Nina Ansary
While minor criticism of the state was tolerated during Rafsanjani’s tenure, demonstrations against the government in the early 1990s were severely repressed.12 And yet opposition to the official ideology mounted. The moderate changes initiated under Rafsanjani were not sufficient to assuage the dissatisfaction with the new Islamic Republic among a number of factions. In the decade following the revolution, rising social tensions and criticism of the Islamic regime stimulated a rudimentary alliance between disillusioned supporters of the revolution and marginalized secular and religious women.13
The interconnection between church and state that had been the dominant order for centuries—with only a brief interruption during the Pahlavi regime—was being challenged once again.
KHATAMI’S REFORMS
Disparity between the progressive and conservative visions of an Islamic state that surfaced during Rasfanjani’s term continued to give rise to ideological conflict. Reform-minded constituencies opposed to traditionalist policies led to the ascendency of Mohammad Khatami, who served as Iran’s president from 1997 to 2005. A moderate cleric whose reformist policies would displace the previous conservative agenda, Khatami had served as Iran’s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (1982-1986 and 1989-1992).
President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005).
The reform movement ushered in by Khatami resulted in the modification of numerous patriarchal decrees, thereby diminishing repressive measures, including those pertaining to family law, education, and employment.14 Not only were a number of reformist politicians and Islamist women appointed to positions of authority, but the Center for Women’s Participation (Markaz-e Mosharekat-e Zanan) was created as an extension of the president’s office in order to raise awareness and improve women’s rights.
Among the accomplished women appointed to office were Zahra Shojaie as Advisor on Women’s Affairs, Massomeh Ebtekar as Head of the Environmental Protection Organization, Dr. Jamileh Kadivar as Special Advisor on Press Affairs, Dr. Zahra Rahnavard as Chancellor of Al Zahra University, and Khatami’s wife, Zohreh Sadeghi, as head of a newly-conceived committee for addressing the deficient conditions of rural women.15
The appointment of Dr. Ata‘llah Mohajerani, husband of Dr. Jamileh Kadivar, as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, fostered greater autonomy in the media and the arts, substantially accelerating the dissemination of controversial literary and cinematic works. Previously affiliated with Rafsanjani’s Construction Party, Dr. Mohajerani’s official liberal stance of “tolerance and laxity” (tasahol va tasameh) was the basis for a directive that sustained a dynamic women’s press, already set in motion by Khatami in his capacity as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance under Rafsanjani.16
Avant-garde filmmakers, including Tahmineh Milani (Two Women, 1999), Rakhshan Bani Etemad (The May Lady, 1997), and Samira Makhmalbaf (The Apple, 1998), along with progressive female journalists at various women’s publications, reflected the growing artistic and social forces challenging Iran’s suffocating patriarchal atmosphere.17
New organizations and publications employed a more tolerant rhetoric, asserting the need for a “radical re-thinking of law, policy, and constitution.” The formation of more than six hundred nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contributed to the integration of women from divergent backgrounds,18 and this ambitious undertaking elevated the consciousness of the female population, who began to participate in a variety of reformist groups engaging in gender debate and resolution.19
Although these forms of expression began to penetrate Iranian society, persistent interventions by the Council of Guardians and the Supreme Leader disrupted the progressive platform, which as early as 1998 was threatened with laws forbidding the use of non-Sharia standards for advocating women’s rights.20
By April of 2000, such assaults, symbolic of the ongoing political schism, led to the closure of over thirty reformist publications and the arrest and imprisonment of numerous defiant journalists. The attempt to repeal such severe rulings by a parliament controlled by reformists merely exacerbated tensions, prompting Ayatollah Khamenei to release the following statement:
If the enemies infiltrate our press, this will be a big danger to the country’s security and the people’s religious beliefs. I do not deem it right to keep silent.… There are 10 to 15 papers writing as if they are from one center, undermining Islamic and revolutionary principles, insulting constitutional bodies, creating tension and discord in society.… Unfortunately, the same enemy who wants to overthrow the regime has found a base in the country.21
In the same year, the coerced resignation of Minister of Culture Mohajerani amidst allegations of a “permissive stance” further solidified the crackdown.22 These attacks were especially disconcerting for Khatami’s female constituency, who, along with the country’s youth, had been drawn into a pledge of “religious democracy.”23 Furthermore, except for Zahra Shojaie, who held cabinet rank as the president’s advisor, the obvious absence of women in ministerial positions after Khatami had vowed “he would make no distinction between men and women when it came to assigning [cabinet] posts” only appeared to validate claims of the Islamic Republic’s deceptions.24
Although for many, Khatami’s election may have culminated in unrealized promises, his more lenient and unconventional policies were incompatible with the antiquated ideology of a conservative leadership. Despite Khatami’s popularity and his landslide victory, he was routinely handicapped by the power elite, whose members denounced his constituency as “diseased people.”25 For example, when Khatami initiated the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which was approved by a parliamentary majority, it was overruled by the Council of Guardians on the grounds that it “conflicted with several principles of the Constitution, including inheritance and divorce laws, the veil, and polygamy.”26 Given the severity of such impediments, it is likely that Khatami felt it necessary to proceed with caution, despite his campaign assurances, rather than take the risks inherent in making full-blown concessions to a “radical” agenda.
Nonetheless, Khatami’s numerous moderate reforms partially account for an invigorated social platform whose influence continues to reverberate in Iran today. And historians acknowledge that by accepting the election of Khatami, Iran’s conservative leadership “miscalculated the potential for the reform movement to garner popular support.”27 Author Ali Ansari estimates that “much to everyone’s astonishment, the appeal of the modest intellectual proved infectious,” while sociologist Asef Bayat confirms that “Khatami’s discourse of civil society, democracy, transparency, and rule of law, which were quite absent in the 1980s, became the dominant concept.”28
For women in particular, Khatami’s moderate yet enlightened perspective was indeed inspiring. Encouraged by the more open political climate, many were empowered to actively strive for and advocate a more liberated existence. The Khatami administration’s “move to allow greater freedom of expression to the press changed the face of media in Iran,” effectively throwing open the floodgates for a thriving women’s rights movement that to this day refuses to surrender, despite the barricades erected by powerful patriarchal forces.29
A UNIQUE BRAND OF FEMINISM
The seeds of a women’s liberation crusade sown over a century ago in Iran blossomed into a unique brand of feminism during a most unexpected era. As the reformist platform gained increasing support during the Khatami era, a distinctive feminist movement was born. Energized by a new spirit of tolerance within the country and by an eclectic variety of post-revolutionary women’s publications, women began to identify with a growing movement that defined itself under the banner of various labels, including “women’s rights advocacy,” “Islamic feminism,” “secular feminism,” and “indigenous feminism.”30
In its broadest definition, feminism refers to the array of movements and ideologies “advocating women’s rights on the grounds of sexual equality,”31 and it has come to b
e regarded by many scholars as harmonious with an interpretation enabling “women to maintain their religious beliefs while promoting a more egalitarian Islam.”32 Today, “Islamic feminism,” a term initiated by female expatriates, flourishes as the predominant paradigm within Iran among both devout and secular women who seek equality within the bounds of religious scriptures.33 Islamic feminism aims to dismantle the dominant gender precepts—that is, those passages in the Koran that justify the denigration of Iranian women and are then objectified in divine law.34
Scholars have debated the compatibility of the essentially Western ideology known as feminism with the formulation of an indigenous definition that is based only partially on that ideology. This new brand of feminism, which seeks to break the bonds of tradition through reinterpretation of Koranic passages, has been both simultaneously praised and criticized by scholars in Iran and abroad. Writers including Nayereh Tohidi, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Haleh Afshar, Valentine Moghadam, and Ziba Mir-Hosseini support the objective of Islamic feminism: the alteration of misogynist formulations within sacred manuscripts. They applaud this new directive for “expanding legal, literary and gender consciousness,” thus authorizing a woman’s right to ijtihad (independent reasoning) with respect to religious interpretation.35 For women to actively pursue the authority to alter what has historically been regarded as divinely ordained in the Koran is extremely significant, particularly for religious women. Endorsement by prominent female writers of a revisionist approach to religious scripture not only aims to diminish clerical authority but “to recapture both the purity and vitality of Islam that existed at its inception.”36
At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum are scholars Haideh Moghissi, Hammed Shahidian, and Sharzad Mojab, who assert that Islamic feminism is essentially “a compromise with patriarchy.”37 This group believes that a “religion based on hierarchy” is insufficient, particularly in its neglect of broader social issues, including sexuality and personal autonomy.38 For example, Shahidian maintains:
If feminism is a movement to abolish patriarchy, to protect human beings from being prisoners of fixed identities, to contribute towards a society in which individuals can fashion their lives free from economic, political, social and cultural constraints, then Islamic feminism proves considerably inadequate.39
Nonetheless, other historians assessing “women’s responses to patriarchy” acknowledge that educated Muslim women, along with their secular counterparts and enlightened intellectuals, have been a significant force in constructing many of the early arguments concerning Islam, gender, and equality.40 The rise of this new discourse has been instrumental in emphasizing that there is “no inherent or logical link between patriarchy and Islamic ideals.”41 Over the last two decades, the many voices in the vanguard of Iran’s Islamic feminist movement have included the following women:
♦Zahra Rahnavard: Former Chancellor of Al Zahra University; wife of former reformist prime minister and presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi:
“Getting rid of discrimination and demanding equal rights with men is the number one priority for women in Tehran.”42
♦Dr. Jamileh Kadivar: Professor and founding member of the Association of Iranian Female Journalists:
“The interpretation of Islamic laws and regulations by the members of the Council of Guardians and some Islamic jurists has in practice disqualified women from running for presidential elections. Similar interpretations have been used to argue against women becoming deputy presidents, cabinet ministers and local governors. I argue that some male conservative institutions have taken on the role of the official interpreters of the constitution and the shariah; however, these interpretations are being contested by women and through the changing political environment in Iran.”43
♦Parvin Ardalan: Journalist and cofounder of the One Million Signatures Campaign:
“Islamic laws are not fixed. Since the revolution, some articles have been changed; it is possible. Many laws are political rather than religious and it is up to the government if they want to change them.…”44
♦Faezeh Hashemi: Founder of the magazine Zan (Woman); former member of parliament and head of the Women’s Sports Federation; daughter of former President Rafsanjani:
“Some customs in our society have been imposed, and an imposed custom is without value and cannot persist. Therefore, when I do not believe in that custom and I do not believe them to be logical or I do not value them to be beneficial to society, especially to girls and women, I do not see it necessary to follow them.”45
♦Azam Taleghani: Former member of parliament; founder of the publication Payam-e Hajar (Hajar’s Message); daughter of Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani:
“People are united in wanting to keep an Islamic Republic, but if the Islamic Republic doesn’t evolve and does not give priority to the will of the people, what remains of [the republic] to be kept?”46
♦Mehrangiz Kar: Attorney and human rights activist:
“Today both religious and nonreligious women are bent on regaining their individual identity and freedom. Those who adhere to the principle of a religious government are striving to unearth feminist concepts in Islamic texts. And those who are advocates of the separation of religion and state parade their feminine identity using Western symbols and social attitudes. They also tirelessly fight to keep their lives private and out of sight of governmental agents. Overall, these two groups of women have inched closer to their ultimate goals throughout the years. They criticize the current situation and claim their rights.”47
♦Shahla Lahiji: Founder of Roshangaran Press:
“I can remember a book published by Roshangaran entitled Women in Pursuit of Emancipation for which I had to modify the introduction six times to obtain paper from the ministry [Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance], which had its reservations about the book. It would give me the paper [to print and publish the book] only if I changed some points in the book that it had not agreed with. Over one long year we published only one book. It was a difficult beginning. What encouraged me to continue was my belief that a principal duty of a publisher was to discover young voices that expressed what was new in society.”48
♦Shirin Ebadi: Nobel Laureate and prominent attorney:
“Getting to understand Islam well and encouraging women to learn different interpretations of Islam is important. So when governments tell women “this is Islam,” they will be wellequipped to counter their arguments.”49
♦Shahla Sherkat: Founder and editor in chief of Zanan:
“I do not believe in the division of women. Calling this reformist, and that secular and this religious or conservative, for example, does not help. We have complex and interrelated problems and it is best for us that no divisions are made. We are all trying to focus on the goals that aim towards consolidating women’s rights. In the future when we resolve these problems we will have enough time to divide ourselves into numerous groups. I think the reason behind our strength and the fact that our movement is effective and has a bigger impact is because we have a variety of different views without being divided.”50
And there have been a number of influential male supporters of this new movement as well, including Abdolkarim Soroush, Professor and nonclerical religious intellectual, about whom we will learn more in the following chapter:
“Our comprehension of religion is scientifically, socially, and culturally constructed, and hence open to interpretation.”51
These powerful voices are blending with those of many likeminded women and men to express a new truth: the antidote to the poison of patriarchy and factionalism lies in a humane, moderate Islam that can evolve and adapt to a changing world. Proponents of Iran’s new indigenous feminism are demanding that ambiguous Koranic passages are no longer to be misconstrued in order to define and constrain women as subordinate and inferior.
A theology-based rejection of unequal status according to gender came to the forefront during Khatami’s presidency and continues to challe
nge institutionalized codes of conduct in contemporary Islamic society. And as we will discover, a range of post-revolutionary women’s publications, from the distinctly conservative to the strikingly progressive, reflect the nuances of this unique brand of feminism.52
WOMEN’S MAGAZINES OF THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA
Among the well-known women’s publications of this era, a select few upheld the sanctity of immutable religious laws, while the majority became forceful advocates for change. Studies of women’s magazines from this period reveal various approaches to both promoting and denouncing the patriarchal status quo within Iran. The publications advocating for women’s rights represent an intellectual tour de force, disseminating a woman-centered discourse grounded in the moral and spiritual dimensions of divine doctrine.53
Feminist scholar Valentine Moghadam believes that “women’s continuous exposure to ideological challenges undermined efforts to redomesticate and privatize them, and because these women were ideologically correct, they could not be accused of gharbzadegi (westoxication).”54
The ideological challenges to which Moghadam refers are reflected in the following magazines: Payam-e Hajar (Hajar’s Message), Hoquq-e Zanan (Women’s Rights), Jens-e Dovom (The Second Sex), Zan (Woman), Farzaneh (Wise), and Zanan (Women). These groundbreaking publications embarked on a campaign to conceptualize alternative interpretations of Iran’s enforced religious dogma.
Payam-e Hajar (Hajar’s Message)
The weekly Payam-e Hajar (1980–2000), named after the Prophet Abraham’s wife and launched by Azam Taleghani, became a success virtually overnight by adopting a moderate position—denouncing both the “westoxicated” woman and the traditional Muslim woman of the official ideology.55 A political prisoner during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi for her anti-regime activities, and a member of the first revolutionary parliament, Taleghani was among the initial wave of disenchanted Islamist women who began advocating equal rights by challenging the outdated scriptures.56 As the official journal of the Islamic Women’s Institution (Mo‘assesseh-ye Eslami-ye Zanan-e Irani), for which Taleghani served as director, Payam-e Hajar openly contested the premise of many patriarchal laws in Iranian society. In one of her editorials, Taleghani argued that while the law recognizes a man’s right to “take up to four wives as long as he is able to treat them all equally, the very fact that the infallible Prophet Muhammad was in principle unable to perform this task would make it highly inconceivable for the ordinary man to do so either.”57 In 2000, Payam-e Hajar was officially shut down for unspecified reasons.58
