by Peter Brune
It was to take some three months before General Bennett was allotted an area command: in mid-April 1941, the then GOC Malaya Command, General Bond, told him that until his force consisted of at least two brigades, it would come under the command of General Murray-Lyon’s 11th Indian Division; and, in early May, he was told that this role would probably be undertaken in the far north of Malaya—perhaps even as a part of a movement into Siam to counter possible Japanese landings there (Operation Matador). Bennett, suspecting that both he and his HQ would be left out of such an operation, then registered a strong protest with Bond, who decided to recommend to his successor, General Percival, that Bennett be given an Indian brigade and responsibility for the defence of Johore. When Percival arrived on 16 May Bennett’s worst fears were realised. At the end of that month, Percival told him that his 22nd Brigade would be kept in reserve, and as such, liable to be deployed in any area but most likely at Kedah in the north. However, on 19 June, Bennett received the news that his 27th Brigade—at the time still training in Bathurst—was to be sent to him. It arrived in Malaya in mid-August. And that decision had only been made after the British Government had requested that the remaining two brigades of the 8th Division be sent to Malaya. That British request had been refused by the Australian War Cabinet and the arrival of the 27th Brigade was therefore a compromise. At the end of August 1941, Bennett assumed command of the defence of Johore with the 22nd and 27th Brigades under command.
The most pressing challenge facing General Bennett and Brigadier Taylor on their arrival in Malaya was the immediate training of the 22nd Brigade and, later, the 27th. Although the 22nd Brigade’s 2/18th, 2/19th and 2/20th Battalions had completed their unit training in open country in Australia and had also undertaken a number of brigade exercises there, the terrain and vegetation found in Malaya presented new challenges. As Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Stewart and his Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had discovered, the best method of acquiring these skills was to confront the new environment, assess its unique characteristics and then undertake rigorous training to operate within them.
Both Bennett and Taylor—to the credit of both—quickly realised that Malaya’s environment offered restricted fields of fire; that defence in depth of roads and rubber plantation dirt tracks was all-important; that all-round protection of a perimeter was vital; and that in the closed environment of jungle and rubber the section and platoon commander’s ability to exercise command would be essential to success. The subsequent training of Taylor’s 22nd Brigade and, later, the 27th Brigade was based on these considerations. Lieutenant Jim Howard, 2/19th Battalion carriers, recalled:
When you get down to it, your section corporal is the last person in authority that sees the enemy. He controls ten men who directly have a responsibility for disposing of the enemy, rendering him neutral, shooting, killing or wounding him. And good section commanders are vital. If he [the platoon commander] has briefed his section commanders adequately, they can possibly carry on.4
The unit diaries of the 22nd Brigade provide ample testimony to the disciplined and varied syllabus that was applied to the Australians’ effort to overcome these challenges. Apart from standard weapons training, fire and movement, and extensive practice in reconnaissance and fighting patrols, the emphasis was upon control of a section, platoon and company in rubber plantations, villages and at defiles with carrier support; navigation by compass reading; river crossings and section and platoon movement by night and day and over extensive distances; village fighting in both attack and defence; and exercises over a number of days to acclimatise to the environment.5 And as Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart and his Argylls had also discovered, the Australians’ enthusiasm for the task met with a studied indifference from both the British military and the civilian population.
Lionel Wigmore, in The Japanese Thrust, has quoted one 22nd Brigade officer:
. . . its early preparations for jungle training received little encouragement from Malaya Command, ‘and they assured us that if we were not drowned in the seasonal rains, we would be decimated by malaria’. Training manuals were ‘pompous, heavy, often platitudinous and other wise equivocal’, and accordingly, ‘everyone had completely different tactical conceptions or else none at all’.6
And the Australians’ attitude to labour in the tropics was also unorthodox:
On one occasion a ship arrived at Port Swettenham with 800 tons of frozen meat and many motor vehicles for the AIF. The Australian officers in charge, keen to get the unloading done swiftly, worked the native wharf labourers hard for six hours until they were wilting, whereupon Australian troops who had been sent for took over, despite the fact that it was not considered desirable politically or medically to employ white men as labourers in Malaya. These moved cargo at three times the rate achieved by the poorly-nourished coolies, and emptied the ship in record time.7
By December 1941, the Australian 22nd and 27th Brigades had had the opportunity to acclimatise to service in the tropics and had, to a large measure, examined the problems of training to fight in a Malayan war.
Very early after his arrival in Malaya, Major-General Gordon Bennett had realised that movement and communication were going to constitute major challenges to any force operating on the Malay Peninsula. His diary for the period confirms this.
Lionel Wigmore:
The 22nd Brigade took part in March in a ‘Far Eastern Defence Exercise’, staged by Malaya Command, and aimed at testing all stages of transition from peace to war by the civil authorities and Services. On the theoretical assumption that an enemy had landed at Mersing, where the 12th Indian Brigade was stationed, the Australian brigade was to move from the Seremban–Port Dickson area via Kluang to help repel the invaders. This necessitated a movement by road and rail over a distance of about 150 miles.8
Major-General Bennett and Brigadier Taylor had never got on. Bennett’s biographer has left us none the wiser as to the cause of this antipathy, other than to assert that ‘Bennett would never have selected Taylor as one of his brigadiers’.9 The trouble began almost immediately. On Sunday 9 March 1941, Bennett noted in his diary:
Decided to sleep at H.Q. tonight. Rang Taylor re details of exercise. He wants 3 hours to move his men. Told him it was too long. At 10 pm told Taylor to stand by train & M.T. [motor transport] ready to move at moments [sic] notice. Night disturbed with constant stream of messages—slept at office. Everything ready for move tomorrow.10
Bennett wrote one diary entry for Monday 10 and Tuesday 11 March:
Exercise going as per plan. Messages rather slow in coming through from Malaya Cmd. At 9.30, men still waiting for order to move. At about 11 order to move arrived. MT moved 1st party at 1230 & last . . . at 3.30. Train parties left 12.45, 1315, 1345 . . .
Trains arrd [sic arrived] well on time 1730, 1750, 1830 M.T. started arriving 2000 hrs with bulk at 0700 & 20 Bn group 0400. The last group were, in my opinion, started too late. Had words with Taylor. He resents receiving orders & does his best to thwart me. He states that he was well equipped mentally for his post, that I knew nothing & that the last war was useless experience. The humour is that he has been a Bde Cmd for less than 2 years.
He was to move 1 bn etc [sic] by M.T. at 0700 . . . He wants to start them at 0500 . . .11
Bennett’s diary then claims that Taylor was placing his transport personnel under unnecessary strain by moving them too early. He then alludes to the reason for the complete shambles that followed:
He upset the show by a wrong map reading and Situation report. This prevented his move. He wanted to walk out of the exercise with his Bde to ‘do a bit of housekeeping’ I ordered his move at 1100. I went to Kulung [sic] & found his unit not yet started at 1200 hrs. Told him all about it.12
Taylor maintained that 8th Division HQ had not sent the code for deciphering the map references. He further stated that:
Div Comdr arrived in a towering rage, wanted to know why column was not on move . . . ordered me to move the column whether it was
ready or not. I tried to point out that it was far better for the advanced guard to move complete with its commander and not for me to send it off into the blue. He would not listen and ordered me again to move it. I refused on the ground that such an action on my part would only cause chaos. I was then told that either I or he would go back to Aust over this and it would not be him . . .
I was perfectly polite all the time and did not even raise my voice. I wonder what he will be like in action.13
Lodge in The Fall of General Gordon Bennett has stated that ‘Taylor seemed largely unperturbed by the affair, which reflected his unflappable character’.14 One wonders whether the term ‘unflappable’ might be used to describe a brigadier who tells his divisional commander that he is ‘well equipped mentally for his post, that I [Bennett] knew nothing & that the last war was useless experience’. True, this is Bennett’s recollection of the confrontation. But worse was to follow. It seems that both soldiers saw the need for some form of reconciliation. After the altercation both men approached Lieutenant-Colonel Thyer to mediate. The two then exchanged civil letters, and on 14 March, Taylor drove down to see Bennett at Kuala Lumpur. Lodge cites Taylor as referring to their meeting after dinner as a ‘ding dong go’.15
In his diary, Bennett stated that:
Recd letter from Taylor. He is to dine here tonight.
Taylor still endeavouring to control show—far from respectful—inclined to bluff. After long discussion he agreed to ‘play’. . . Decided to restrict his activities to cmd 22 Inf Bde only. Kent Hughes joined in the discussion helpfully.16
Lodge neglects to mention Bennett’s last sentence above: ‘Kent Hughes joined in the discussion helpfully.’ In a letter to Gavin Long on 18 June 1953, Kent Hughes—not cited by Lodge—gives us an insight into the ‘unflappable’ Brigadier Taylor and his behaviour at the post-dinner meeting on 14 March 1941:
This Far Eastern defence exercise was the cause of the clash between the G.O.C. and the Brigadier . . . I was present at the subsequent interview between the G.O.C. and the Brigadier in what I remember as one of the nastiest evenings I have ever spent. The Brigadier flatly refused to obey the G.O.Cs. orders on the grounds that he was in charge of the Brigade group and the A.I.F. Headquarters had no business to be in Malaya in his opinion. The difference was not patched up. Colonel Rourke, a friend of Brigadier Taylor’s and an enemy of the G.O.C., splashed some paint over the scarred surface . . . The quarrel did not ‘emphasise a fundamental difference in the character and outlook of the two men’ [Lionel Wigmore’s interpretation in a draft of the Official History]. The G.O.C. was too kind-hearted. If any Brigadier had refused to obey my orders he would have been home by the next boat, S.N.L.R. [Services No Longer Required]. Brigadier Taylor remained a disturbing element in the A.I.F. Malaya both before, during and after active operations.17
Taylor and Bennett have recorded their interpretation(s) of that meeting. It would seem extraordinary that Lodge has not cited a third person’s account—from one who was present.
Brigadier Taylor certainly disobeyed direct orders from his superior during the exercise. To not adhere to an established timetable for movement of such a significant sized force during an exercise constituted poor command; to then speak to one’s superior officer in the manner in which he did would seem gross insubordination; to then seek to heal the wounds as both men did, and to then behave in the manner in which Kent Hughes describes that meeting, would seem to be far, far from ‘unflappable’ behaviour from Brigadier Taylor. Lodge’s failure to even mention, let alone take account of Kent Hughes’s evidence, seriously distorts his treatment of the conflict between Taylor and his superior officer.
On 20 March 1941, ‘Bennett was informed by Army Headquarters that his whole divisional headquarters was to join him, and also a field park company, stores depot, reserve motor transport company and convalescent depot.’18 On 6 April, the senior officers of the 8th Division Headquarters Staff arrived from Australia. Colonels Rourke and Broadbent were among them.
Much has been made of Bennett’s supposed negative relationship with both the Staff Corps officers on his 8th Division Staff and his rapport with the English officers both on Malaya Command and in British combat formations. However, it would appear far more than a coincidence that the real friction between some members of the 8th Division HQ Staff and Bennett occurred with the arrival of Rourke and Broadbent. According to Bennett’s diary—and not cited by Lodge—the general was well satisfied with his staff prior to the arrival of Rourke and Broadbent. On Friday 7 March 1941, Bennett stated that: ‘Staffs learning much, gaining practical experience. Still behind what I call War Tempo.’19 In other words, although it is hardly surprising that Bennett would see his staff as being ‘behind war tempo’, he was quite content with their progress. On Saturday 5 April 1941, Bennett wrote that: ‘Everything cleaned up at office. In retrospection, have had a satisfactory time since arrival—good team work . . . Everyone kept me in the picture. This is the result of constant pressure on my part. I hope this continues in future.’20 Nor, it seems, was Bennett prejudiced against his new Staff Corps arrivals enjoying a brief sojourn in Singapore. On 4 April 1941, Bennett’s diary records that: ‘Broadbent rang from Singapore & asked if his party might stay on another 24 hours—excuse—to complete matters given them by Northcott. I agreed—except for Head. Of course, it seemed unnecessary for Rourke & Derham to stay too. Still, it is natural to want to look around.’21
The ‘trouble’ at 8th Division HQ began with the arrival of Rourke, Broadbent and, to a lesser degree, Colonel Derham (the senior medical officer). While enjoying their extra day’s stay in Singapore, Rourke and Broadbent were visited by Taylor, who stayed overnight. When they arrived at 8th Division HQ, Bennett discussed the Taylor situation. On Tuesday 8 April, Bennett wrote that:
Discussed my problem with Rourke & Broadbent. Both agree that I have been over tolerant & see no alternative to suspending Taylor. Have decided to do so on grounds that he is temperamentally unfitted for cmd. I have given Rourke permission to see Taylor to let him know what is coming. If Taylor adopts a repentant attitude, then I may reconsider my attitude. Rourke leaves today & will return this evening.22
Bennett’s term, ‘permission to see Taylor’, would seem to indicate that the initiative for this meeting was Rourke’s. Colonel Rourke had lunch with Brigadier Taylor at Seremban. Taylor then decided to visit Bennett at Kuala Lumpur that evening. Rourke’s ‘initiative’ for his meeting with Taylor may well have been driven by their time in Singapore before Rourke and Broadbent arrived at 8th Division HQ. Bennett’s diary:
Taylor has just rung to ask if I would see him. He will be here 5.30 or 6.—at residence . . .
Saw Taylor—Broadbent present. Taylor very humble & assured full support etc. Regretted his recent action. Stood firm & said I must be quite satisfied this time & could take no more risks. He gave every assurance. Told him I would hold over my letter to Melb till after Easter and then see him to confirm his attitude. I still doubt if he can alter a temperament that it has taken many years to develop. Rourke later came home & gave his opinion that Taylor wd [sic] be straight in future.23
After the meeting, Taylor wrote that:
The Gen. appears to believe all rumours and looks for ulterior motives in everything I do and say. [I] gave way to the extent of saying that I had been foolish and would like to remain in comd of Bde. He finally said he would hold letter up for [a] week. Col. Broadbent was present at interview. I have two very good friends in Rourke and Broadbent.24
Two points should be made regarding the Bennett–Taylor incident during and shortly after the ‘Far Eastern Defence Exercise’. The first is that both soldiers sought a resolution to the conflict for the sake of their careers. Had Bennett sent Taylor home, the latter would have been in a position to severely undermine Bennett’s already precarious position within the Australian Army—Bennett already had enough enemies in Australia. But at 50 years of age, had Taylor been sent home, he woul
d almost certainly have missed another AIF brigade command. Neither man would have gained a lot had Bennett’s letter been sent. In the end a cease-fire was called. On Tuesday 15 April 1941, the two had tea together. Bennett later wrote in his diary that: ‘Told Taylor had decided to allow the trouble to die. He asked that I forget everything & start a fresh. I agreed.’25 It was an uneasy truce that would survive until the last days before the capitulation on Singapore Island. Secondly, however, it also appears that Rourke and Broadbent used the incident to destabilise both Bennett and his 8th Division HQ.
Lodge has selectively quoted Sturdee’s assessment of Bennett prior to Bennett’s command of the 8th Division; he has not cited Kent Hughes’s direct and repeated evidence as to Rourke and Broadbent’s disloyalty upon hearing of Bennett’s posting to the division; he has not cited Kent Hughes’s first-hand evidence as to Taylor’s behaviour after the Far Eastern Defence Exercise; he has neglected to quote Bennett’s contentment with his staff before the arrival of Rourke and Broadbent; and, in the absence of the just mentioned evidence, he then uses a number of Bennett’s diary entries to attempt to portray a general who is solely responsible for any disharmony in 8th Division HQ. Furthermore, Lodge implies that Bennett was obsessed by the notion that Rourke and Broadbent were being disloyal to him, or conducting a ‘whispering campaign’. In the context of the above, the reader is left to judge Bennett’s diary entries:
