by Peter Brune
By the speedy acquisition of such an enormous empire, the Japanese believed that the cost of winning it back for the Allies would be so prolonged, and therefore so costly in human life and material, that a prolonged fight would be totally unpalatable. They believed that in the long term the Allies would not have the stomach for such a fight and would negotiate. It was also anticipated—not without some confidence in November 1941—that Germany would triumph against the Soviet Union, finally defeat or at least further isolate Britain in Europe, and thereby confine the Japanese fight in the Pacific to isolationist America and an exhausted and unaided China.
The naval plan to destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and shield the landings in South-East Asia was devised by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. After having studied at Harvard and having been posted as a naval attaché to the United States, he was under no illusion as to the long-term war potential of that nation. According to Admiral Toyoda, Yamamoto had stated that the Imperial Navy could: ‘carry through for one year, some way; but after that I don’t know’.22
At no time did the Japanese have any intention of invading Hawaii. But Yamamoto’s study, training initiatives and profound belief in the potential of naval aviation as a means of inflicting long-term damage on an enemy fleet inspired his planning. And the striking British carrier success against the Italian Navy at Taranto barely a year before added substance to that planning. Vice-Admiral Nagumo, Commander-in-Chief 1st Air Fleet, was to command the carrier attack upon Pearl Harbor. Vice-Admiral Kondo, commander of Second Air Fleet, was to command the Southern Area Fleet which was responsible for operations against the Philippines and Malaya. The carrier attacks upon Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines and Malaya were timed for 8 December 1941 (or for operations east of the international date line 7 December).
Japan’s Southern Army HQ (General Terauchi) was established at Saigon in late 1941. Each of Southern Army’s four objectives was allotted to an army group: Fourteenth Army was to be responsible for the capture of the Philippines; Fifteenth Army was to take Thailand and Burma; Sixteenth Army was to overrun the Dutch East Indies; and Twenty-fifth Army was to capture Malaya.
On 15 November 1941, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita was appointed to command the Twenty-fifth Army. Yamashita had had a most impressive career. Born in 1885 in a remote village on the island of Shikoku, he had entered cadet school in Hiroshima at fifteen; had attended the Central Military Academy in Tokyo; at 32 years of age, he had graduated from the War College; he had been a military attaché in Switzerland and Vienna; in 1936 he had been Chief of Military Affairs at Imperial HQ; and had seen service in Korea and China as a divisional commander. He was a tall, thickset soldier with a shaven head, thick neck and swaggering stance. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji described him variously as ‘of dignified appearance’, and a man ‘who had a keen insight into human nature [which] created a level of morale which spurred men forward on scores of battlefields and in many campaigns’.23
To those Allied soldiers and strategists who had studied the potential for war in the Far East, the German invasion of Holland and Belgium on 10 May 1940, followed by the fall of France on 22 June, must have confirmed that all of their predictions were coming to pass. With two of the major colonial powers defeated and occupied by Germany, and Britain on its knees, a roller-coaster ride to war in South-East Asia had begun. In September 1940, Japan had been granted bases in Indo-China; later that month Germany, Japan and Italy had signed the Tripartite Pact.
In late June 1941, the Germans had invaded Russia, and within a mere 32 days of that momentous event, the Japanese had felt confident enough to land troops in southern Indo-China. Two days later the Americans froze their assets in the United States.
At an Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941, the Japanese decided that diplomatic efforts must continue to stop the Americans supplying aid to China; that the British and Americans must agree to no further build-up of their forces in the Far East; that they should allow Japan a free hand in Indo-China; and, most importantly, allow them the acquisition of raw materials. If the western powers did not comply with these demands, the Japanese were prepared to go to war by the end of October. After negotiations between Admiral Nomura and the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, reached a deadlock on 2 October, Prime Minister Konoye—who had advocated peace—resigned and was replaced by General Tojo, who now held the posts of Prime Minister, Minister for War and Minister of Home Affairs. The Japanese militarists now held almost total power. At an Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941, the Japanese determined that unless their conditions were met by 25 November, they would go to war.
While these events were unfolding in Japan, further muddled thought occurred in Singapore. In September, Duff Cooper, who had been the Minister for Information in the UK, arrived in Singapore as a Minister of State to ‘investigate the situation in the Far East, and to inquire into the feasibility of setting up an authority to deal on the spot with political questions which were then being referred to the British Cabinet for decision’.24 Cooper chaired a meeting on 29 September. Those present were: Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham; Vice-Admiral Layton; Sir Shenton Thomas; Sir Earle Page (the Australian Minister of Commerce, who was on his way to London); the British Minister to Thailand, Josiah Crosby; and the British Ambassador to China, Sir Archibald Kerr. The conclusions reached at this conference could not have been more misguided: Japan’s attention was upon Russia; it would be most wary of war against the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands East Indies; and, incredibly, the conference decided that the Japanese would not attempt an invasion of Malaya during the north-east monsoon. Surely such thoughts made absolutely no allowance for the fact that the vital factor governing Japanese strategy was composed of two words: raw materials.
The die had been cast, and cast over years of poor planning, low-priority funding and resourcing, and constant changes of leadership in Singapore across the three services. Most of all, interservice conflict had retarded common purpose and policy for the best use of those scant resources to defend Malaya and Singapore.
In December 1941, the Japanese were about to attack at three landing points already forecast; as predicted years ago and by no shortage of observers, they were also about to attack ‘before the flag falls’;25 they would surely land at around this time, during the north-east monsoon; they would have the initiative; they were attacking—through the predicted backdoor of Malaya—a naval base without a navy; they were to fight against a British Empire air force grievously depleted in both number and quality of planes and pilots; and they were to be met by a largely under strength, ill-trained, dispersed, and therefore ill-prepared Empire army. And surely, when another Dunkirk, another Greece and another Crete had come to pass, there would be the now familiar talk of ‘glorious withdrawals’ and ‘brave stands’.
War was imminent. To those soldiers and strategists who had for years been predicting this scenario, it must have felt as if they were part of a selected, exclusive playhouse audience, where the actors were playing out a humiliating but all-too-familiar tragedy and the characters striding that stage were in fact themselves. And all that could now be done was to watch, to sit there transfixed, paralysed in both thought and action.
PART II
THE CAMPAIGN
. . . in the cleverest way
Our opponents are even more feeble than the Chinese Army . . .
Victory is certain, and the only problem is how
to win in the cleverest way.
Colonel Tsuji, Chief of Operations and Planning Staff,
25th Japanese Army
8
AN UNPLEASANT SURPRISE
The British and Dutch had reasoned that the most likely Japanese approach to an invasion of Malaya was through the South China Sea. Accordingly, the Dutch Naval Air Service assumed responsibility for reconnaissance patrols in a roughly rectangular area from Singapore, northward to Kuantan, eastward to Natuna Island, to Kuching in
Sarawak and back to Singapore. Three Catalina flying boats based at Seletar airfield on Singapore Island undertook this task. The RAF was responsible for an area from Kota Bharu, north-east to Cape Cambodia, south-east to Natuna Island, due west to Kuantan and then back to Kota Bharu. They employed their three available Catalina flying boats—also based at Seletar—to provide an overlap between the Dutch and British reconnaissance areas, while the RAAF was made responsible for the remainder of the British section.
The Australians were to fly their patrols using two squadrons of Hudsons. Number 1 Squadron was based at Kota Bharu, where it had served since August 1941, while No. 8 was deployed at Sembawang. The joint Dutch and British air reconnaissance plan relied upon the principle that an enemy invasion fleet might be detected whilst still ‘beyond night steaming range of the coast’,1 which would allow for bombing and torpedo missions against it that might either cause it significant damage at sea and force it to turn away, or severely maul it at its landing points. Douglas Gillison:
To provide for coordinated action, three degrees of readiness were laid down by General Headquarters: the third degree of readiness was the then existing war state of the command; the second—to be assumed if the international situation deteriorated so far that it was justified—required all units to be ready to operate at short notice; the first would call for readiness for immediate operations with all units prepared for enemy air attack without warning.2
No. 8 Squadron RAAF was to move from Sembawang to Kuantan to complete the concentration for the RAAF reconnaissance duties once the second state of readiness had been reached. On 1 December 1941, that degree of alert was given, but it took—because of a lack of air transport—until 4 December before eight Hudsons flew in and the squadron advance party arrived by road. Four aircraft had remained behind at Sembawang, while much equipment and the ground staff were still travelling north by sea.
In early August 1941, Winston Churchill had sailed to Newfoundland on board the Prince of Wales to meet with President Roosevelt. The Atlantic Charter was the end result of their meeting. But during their deliberations the subject of the Far East was also raised. It was decided that both the US and Britain would take a tougher stance against Japan. Upon his return to Washington Roosevelt was to hand the Japanese Ambassador the following warning: ‘Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-West Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.’3
Churchill returned to London on 19 August. Six days later he sent a minute to the First Sea Lord advocating the formation of an Eastern Fleet. He envisaged ‘a deterrent squadron in the Indian Ocean’ which would consist of the ‘smallest number of the best ships’.4 Churchill believed that such a fleet ‘might show itself in the triangle Aden–Singapore–Simonstown’ (a naval base near Cape Town) and that such a fleet would ‘exert a paralysing effect upon Japanese naval action’.5 The proposed squadron was to consist primarily of a modern, fast battleship (he suggested the Duke of York), an aircraft carrier and an old but fast battle cruiser.
The Admiralty were at odds with Churchill’s assessment. G. Hermon Gill, in Australia in the War of 1939–1945: Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942:
[The Admiralty] proposed to send to the Indian Ocean between mid-September 1941 and the end of January 1942 the battleships Nelson and Rodney and the four ‘R’ class ships Revenge, Royal Sovereign, Ramillies and Resolution (the ‘R’s’ being ships of about 2,500 miles endurance at 20 knots in smooth water), and the battle cruiser Renown. The aircraft carrier Hermes was already there, and it was proposed to send there Ark Royal in April 1942, and Indomitable in an emergency.6
It was believed that this force should perform four roles: it could be used in the Indian Ocean as troop convoy escorts; it would discourage the Japanese from deploying raiders in the Indian Ocean; these ships would be relatively free from enemy aircraft and submarine attack; and, eventually, they would become a part of the long-term plan for an Eastern Fleet of seven battleships, one aircraft carrier, ten cruisers and around 24 destroyers. The Admiralty argued that the Prime Minister’s proposal of the ‘smallest number of the best ships’—including only one battleship—would not be in any position to effectively counter an enemy fleet sailing south which they estimated might contain at least four battleships.
Churchill yet again dismissed the notion that the Japanese would invade Malaya, and preferred instead to attempt to counter potential Japanese raids in the Indian Ocean against British trade routes. In the end, Churchill’s political expediency—bolstered by the British War Cabinet, Singapore, the Australian Government and the British Foreign Office—far outweighed professional advice. In late October the Admiralty agreed to the aircraft carrier Indomitable, the battleship Prince of Wales, and the battle cruiser Repulse being sent to Singapore. After 2 December 1941, the Eastern Fleet was to consist of the above-named three ships and the destroyers HMS Revenge, Electra, Express, Jupiter, Encounter and HMAS Vampire. It was to be codenamed Force Z after its arrival in Singapore. But on 3 November 1941, the Indomitable ran aground while sailing into Jamaica and had to be docked for repairs. Nor was HMS Revenge destined to serve from Singapore, but, after convoy work to the United Kingdom, would eventually sail to Bombay and finally arrive at Trincomalee (Ceylon) on 13 December 1941.
On 24 October at Greenock in Scotland, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips raised his flag aboard HMS Prince ofWales as Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet—a posting that was to make him the senior naval commander in the Far East. Phillips had had a most distinguished and rapid rise in the Royal Navy. Only five foot two inches in height and known as ‘Tom Thumb’ to subordinates, he was recognised as having a sharp wit and a rigid belief in both himself and the power of capital ships. His confident and forceful nature caused Churchill to refer to him as ‘the Cocksparrow’, while Admiral Somerville christened him ‘the Pocket Napoleon’. Phillips was 53 years of age when appointed to command the Eastern Fleet. G. Hermon Gill:
He was an officer of considerable destroyer experience afloat (he was commodore (D) [Deputy Director] and later Rear-Admiral (D) Home Fleet Flotillas from April 1938 to May 1939) and he had been in closest possible touch with the naval side of the war at sea. But he had no actual experience of that war, especially as it was being fought under the conditions imposed by naval aviation. Only three days elapsed between his relief at the Admiralty after a period of years there as Director of Plans and Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, and his hoisting of his flag in Prince of Wales.7
In fairness to Phillips, no admiral at that time had had extensive experience of being attacked by land-based or fleet-based aircraft whilst at sea. Most theorists (and certainly Phillips) believed that the bombing of capital ships from high altitudes was extremely difficult, and that, while torpedo assaults on capital ships were possible (such as had occurred at Taranto), such an attack had been made against ships anchored in port. The potential of the Indomitable’s 60 aircraft—including a number of Hurricanes—critically important for the dual roles of a self-contained air screen for his fleet and as a potent strike force, had been lost in Jamaica.
Admiral Phillips sailed to Colombo on the Prince of Wales before leaving by air for Singapore. The arrival of the Prince of Wales, Repulse and four destroyers at Keppel Harbour at Singapore on 2 December 1941 caused an unrestrained euphoria amongst the local population. Against an inspiring background of the massive guns of the Island, poised to devastate any approaching enemy fleet, and with brass band anthems and a sea of glamorous white uniforms lined up on the decks, Singapore seemed secure. After all, here was the long-awaited fleet, complete with the latest British capital ship which was less than a year old. To the uneducated, the size and composition of that fleet was lost in a proud tradition of past glory, and in a racist perception of an enemy whose ships and seamanship must surely be inferior to the greatness of the Royal Navy. While the press in Singapore
had a field day, the ships were met at the naval base by Singapore’s who’s who: Sir Brooke-Popham, General Percival, Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, Duff and Lady Diana Cooper, Sir Shenton and Lady Thomas, and a whole host of other civilian and military dignitaries. Phillips entertained them on board the Prince of Wales, during which time Percival renewed acquaintances with his host and the captains of the Prince of Wales (Captain Leach) and the Repulse (Captain Tennant). Percival and Phillips had known each other during their time at the War Office, and Percival knew Leach and Tennant during their service at the Greenwich Staff College.
If the arrival of the two capital ships had caused a local sensation, then the Admiralty was more circumspect: it contacted Phillips on 1 December suggesting that his ships leave Singapore, believing that the Japanese might find the presence of those vessels far more of a concern if they were at sea, and their location therefore harder to determine. Repulse sailed on 5 December bound for Darwin and screened by the destroyers Vampire and Tenedos, while Prince of Wales remained temporarily in dry dock. Number 453 Squadron RAF was assigned to Phillip’s Eastern Fleet to provide fighter cover along the eastern Malay coast. By 8 December 1941, the squadron was to have one flight at Kota Bharu and another at Kuantan.8
At 5.30 am on 4 December 1941, nineteen Japanese transports with around 24 600 troops on board, and escorted by Rear-Admiral Kurita’s 7th Cruiser Squadron, sailed from Samah Harbour, Hainan Island. Skirting the Indo-Chinese coast to avoid detection, they initially sailed southwards, and then north-west, heading to a point in the Gulf of Siam designated ‘Point G’. Here they were to rendezvous with a further convoy of seven transports which were to leave Saigon on 5 December. From ‘Point G’, sixteen ships were to sail for Singora and Patani in Thailand, three to Kota Bharu and the seven ships of the Saigon convoy to the Kra Isthmus. General Yamashita and his 25th Army HQ staff sailed aboard the 10 000-ton transport Ryujo Maru with the intention of landing at Singora shortly after the first wave of troops.
