by Peter Brune
The varying amounts of money and valuables which entered Changi upon, and soon after capitulation, have been discussed. There was also, it seems, an amount of money which came in through ‘official channels’. A tracking of the 8th Division Pay Corps through its Unit Diary in the days leading up to the capitulation is instructive:
10. 2. 42.
At 0700 hrs, instructed by A.A.& Q.M.G. that the Unit must be prepared to move on foot by 0900 hours. One 30 cwt. truck was placed at the Staff Paymaster’s disposal for shifting the records. Records taken were the W.F. 3A’s, unposted media as far as possible, General Ledger, Journals, two typewriters, Cash Books, Advances Register and as far as possible, to ascertain all unauthorised Remittances of cash and undrawn pay. Complete stocks of Australian Stamps burnt (£8,050).
Staff proceeded to Balmoral House, Steven’s Road.
12.2.42.
Majors Ferguson and Terry (O.C. 2. E.) found accommodation for both units on the 4th Floor of the Cathay Building, and by 1300 hrs the move was completed with 2 days’ [sic] rations . . .
The Field Cash Office and Depot Cash were also in the Cathay Building. Command Pay Office was not functioning but the Field Cash Office were adjusting a number of advances and making a few payments.
13.2.42.
Rations very light—Capt. Watt obtained sufficient food for Pay and Echelon for 24 hours. Communicated with the A.Q. Admin. H.Q. who informed me that he could not supply rations and that we would have to fend for ourselves. . . .
Cable dispatched to the Chief Finance Officer that the Office was not functioning.
14.2.42.
. . .
The Hongkong [sic] and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Singapore, had ceased to function on the previous Wednesday, and the money held by the Div. Paymaster could not be banked [author’s italics].15
On the same day (14 February), Warrant Officer K. Browne of Command Pay, noted:
I wandered through into the small inside room where the card school was in progress. The boys were having quite a lot of fun. Snowy was in charge, as usual when there was any gambling. The game was in full swing, money was plentiful. The boys forgot their worries for a while. I ambled around for a yarn with he [sic] and his boys, the Field Cash Office was still operating, they were paying in fine style. I did not draw anything as I still had a few dollars. [author’s italics] They had no news.16
The Pay Corps Unit Diary:
15.2.42.
Was told to disarm by 3rd Indian Corps at 1600 hours—contacted H.Q. A.I.F. and was told to stand fast. H.Q. A.I.F. advised me at 2000 hrs. that the Force would capitulate at 2030 hrs. and that transport would report to me at 2030 hrs. to transfer Pay Office and 2nd Echelon to Tanglin barracks where the A.I.F was to congregate. Arrived at Tanglin 2200 hrs.17
Colonel Wilfred Kent Hughes recorded that the AIF Pay Command ‘was still functioning when I was ordered to embark for Japan . . .’18 [17 July 1942]. During an interview with the author, Private John Boehm, 2/29th Battalion produced his pay book to verify a withdrawal of $5 (Malay) on 25 February 1942, in Changi.19 Although we do not know the amount of money, or the role of AIF HQ in its use, or the frequency of withdrawals transacted by Pay Command in Changi, in view of the evidence cited above a substantial amount of cash must have been taken in.
The first mention of funds made in Thompson’s diary is for 11 April 1942, when he recorded that $27 000 was ‘in hand to expend on food’, and two days later a ‘local purchase party [was] endeavouring to obtain additional vegetables’.20 Another method of funding further purchases in April was the purchase of ‘$3900 worth of vegetables . . . from cash paid into soldiers’ pay books’.21 The statement seems to imply a buying of vegetables from existing cash held by units and/or individuals, which was ‘honoured’ by payments credited to pay books. On 30 May, Thompson would record that ‘nearly all cash expended on supplementary rations’ and that the decision had been made to ‘keep $8000 for hospital purchases.’22 The same day Thompson also recorded that a central canteen was to be started which would buy goods and sell them to units. When, on 6 June 1942, the Japanese agreed to pay Changi officers 25 cents per day, NCOs 15 cents per day and other ranks 10 cents, Malaya Command—the AIF had no say—had the opportunity to levy set rates from all pay, run a canteen and thereby attempt to supplement rations, purchase medicines, create a cash reserve and generally improve the lot of all Changi inmates. The first pay ‘to all ranks’ occurred on 13 June.23
The problem of overcrowding in Changi was almost immediately eased from February and throughout the following fifteen months, when the Japanese employed POWs as work parties on Singapore Island, followed by the departure of forces to the Thai–Burma Railway and Borneo. By May 1943, Changi’s population dwindled to around 2000.
An intriguing character now re-enters our story. Two of Major Alan Thompson’s diary entries for July 1942 were:
18 [July]. JAPAN PARTY. All senior officers of rank of Colonel and above ordered to stand by ready to move. Engineer Officers also included in party.
21 [July]. APPOINTMENTS Lt Col Galleghan assumed command of remaining force as from 21 July 1942, Staff Officers to assist ‘G’ [Operations] Major Wyett, ‘A’ [Administration] Major Head, ‘Q’ [Quartermaster] Major Thompson. A.I.F to be completely re-organized to enable it to perform any role it may be called upon to do. Conferences twice weekly. Lt Col Glyn White to be [sic] act as liaison Officer with I.J.A.24
The reader will recall the distinguished part played by Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan and his 2/30th Battalion during the fighting in Malaya (particularly the ambush at Gemas), and the controversy surrounding his subsequent ‘relinquishing’ of that command on Singapore Island. In the time leading up to Galleghan’s command of Changi, he had been in charge of the AIF’s ‘Base Depot Group’, and had later commanded a work party to Mount Pleasant Estate near the MacRitchie Reservoir and then Caldicott Camp.25
Before leaving with the other senior officers for Formosa, Major-General Callaghan met with Galleghan on a number of occasions. With an eye to the future and a concern about how posterity should see the British/Australian relationship during the campaign, Callaghan left his successor with some clear orders. Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan:
The following is a record of my conversations with Maj-Gen Callighan [sic] on taking over comd of AIF. They were recorded in a personal notebook as they occurred.
19 July 42—
Policy:- There has been too much criticism of the British—make every endeavour to stop this.
Lt-Col Kappe is to remain at Singapore or return to Singapore to meet Gen Callighan [sic] and Gen Percival to go into the war diaries etc. Col Kappe to continue to prepare AIF narrative of the campaign in Malaya.
Should there be any returnees to Australia prior to Gen Callighan’s [sic] return no statements regarding the campaign and/or Brig Taylor are to be made.
If any orders are given regarding the return of War Diaries to Australia the following statement by the GOC was to be repeated—‘I have arranged to meet Gen Percival here after the war and go into the details of records. They cannot be completed because there are no records of the Army Comd’s conferences, orders and instructions and until such details are received from the Army Comd all AIF records are incomplete. Should you be pressed to return the diaries and other records you are to arrange with Col Kappe to return duplicates.’26
Galleghan’s style of command has been discussed. In Changi his authoritarian manner would continue. Discipline was to be tightened, and, as had been the case from the raising of his 2/30th Battalion through to the end of the Malayan Campaign, he would display an utter determination to ride roughshod over any circumstance or individual whom he deemed to be obstructive. Such a style of leadership can have the advantage of swift, decisive actions and positive outcomes—unless the commander is wrong. Further, when a commander of this type encounters others who possess a similar ‘strength of personality’, the
confrontation can become both acrimonious and destructive. As events in Changi unfolded, there would be a number of such incidents.
One of Galleghan’s first decisions was identified by Thompson on 19 July 1942. The AIF was ‘to be completely re-organized to enable it to perform any role it may be called upon to do’. ‘Any role,’ really referred to ‘Black Jack’s’ determination to have elements of his Changi command ready to stage an uprising, or support in any way a future British invasion of Singapore. As early as August 1942 (a month after he had assumed command), unarmed combat classes were organised; area commanders were ordered to supply the names of majors and captains who ‘were physically fit for field officer duty’; an officer training syllabus was designed; and, to further facilitate his plan, officers might be required to swap formations in order to structure the ‘force’.27
Essentially, the troops chosen were the 27th Brigade—Galleghan’s old brigade—and its commander was to be Lieutenant-Colonel Kappe. To many in Changi this concept was little more than an absurd determination to preserve a parade ground polish and strict regimental behaviour. Warrant-Officer 2 Bert Mettam, 2/29th Battalion: ‘There were some that had thoughts that we could rise up and run over the top of the garrison troops . . . where the hell we were going to get the arms from I don’t know.’28 Private Gus Halloran, 2/19th Battalion, was blunter:
. . . when ‘Black Jack’ became part of it, [he staged] a march past in a review order. The 30th Battalion trained, and everyone was wearing their boots out . . . but as with officers, he said it was good for morale.
I was aware that . . . the purported reason for having parades of this sort and also for the unarmed combat . . . we’d rise and throw off our shackles. And everyone thought, ‘Crap!’29
This issue seems almost trivial when examined in isolation—certain commanders and units ‘playing soldiers’. The point is that when a certain force was later raised for the Thai–Burma Railway, this philosophy, this structure, and it will be seen, the selection of officers to administer command of it, would have tragic consequences.
In the administration of Changi, Major-General Callaghan and from July 1942, Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan, faced three challenges (other than the Japanese): pilfering, gambling and, most importantly, the black market. ‘Discipline’ is a loose term in its Changi context. We have discussed the at times pompous behaviour of a number of 8th Division HQ and reinforcement officers when they created, and appeared to relish, their undeserved privileges. The discipline of troops, or lack of it, will be examined in the context of these three challenges.
Pilfering began almost immediately in Changi. As early as 28 February 1942, Thompson would record that: ‘Morale low—pilfering continues—coconut trees and papaya trees receiving special attention. Slackness in obeying Camp Orders.’30 Coconuts and papaya trees are one thing, but clothing is another. On 9 April, the Japanese granted permission for Major Alan Thompson and a party to go into Singapore and pack and transport the AIF clothing supplies at the Base Kit Store—and personal trunks, kitbags and clothing—back to Changi for storage and use for all personnel in the AIF. In other words, from this time on all clothing was to be pooled and issued to members of the AIF for the greater good, and only personal possessions were to be returned to individuals.
The party found that the Base Kit Store had been looted and was in a state of ‘disorder’. In some measure, this was understandable, given the already described level of looting that had gone on between the capitulation and the arrival of Japanese troops in Singapore on 17 February. After the Japanese provided vehicles to transport clothing and personal effects back to Changi, pilfering on a large scale began—during the packing, in transit and after arrival.
Colonel Wilfred Kent Hughes’s Changi diary:
13 April 1942:
Boots & clothing arriving in large lorry loads but no chance of stopping the thieving . . .
21 April 1942:
Long conference this morning. Went strolling in the afternoon & had another row over pinching clothing from trailers. 2 offs [officers] 1 NCO and 1 man under arrest. Stealing has become the general accepted practice now & will take a lot of stopping. Neither officers nor NCOs seem interested. Somebody will have their throat cut shortly. One man found his own watch—a present from his wife being auctioned recently . . . put the Black Market cigarette king under arrest this evening.31
On 26 April, when another thirteen loaded lorries arrived at the Changi Kit Store Kent Hughes reported that, ‘the result was a flock of crows round the carcase & four of them under arrest’.32 In his diary entry for 24 May 1942, Provost Captain Alf Menz recorded a more personal experience of such pilfering:
I have received information that the cigarette case that was given me by the Unit at Dubbo Xmas 1940, the gold mounted riding crop given me by the Corps Provost Coy at Broadmeadows Vic the same year and my Elgin gold wrist watch have been in possession of a man in this camp who has gone away with ‘A’ Force. His name is_________2/29 Bn alias__________my informant was NX 30243 Moore R.J. 2/19 Bn. All these articles were stolen from my trunk, I hope to see my friend . . . again one day.33
Menz was not destined to meet either his ‘friend’ or the informant—the former died as a member of A Force in Burma, and the latter died in Borneo during the infamous Sandakan death marches.34 The theft of clothing in Changi for both an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ market would remain a serious issue for the remainder of the war, and the sale of clothing by individuals to raise funds on the Thai–Burma Railway will also assume significant proportions. But the two most alarming Changi forms of pilfering would be of rice from Changi’s already limited stocks, and priceless drugs from Roberts Barracks.
On 11 August 1942, the 8th Division Diary recorded that ‘there is evidence that rice is being stolen and sold at the kampong outside the wire. An investigation is being carried out.’35 Two days previously, Captain Menz and his provosts were called in to investigate. Menz’s diary for 9 August:
Have just received information that some men in the camp are selling rice to Chinese in the Kampongs. By heavens we are going to do our damnest to stop that, we have almost got arrangements completed with the Japs for an increase in quantity & variety of rations and we don’t want the show busted by a few miserable selfish thieving individuals. to [sic] sell or exchange the rice they first have to steal it thereby robbing their mates and if the Japs discover this business going on we will find ourselves on short rations and will lose all chance of an increase. Am going to stop up all night on the job.36
Two days later, on 11 August, Menz came to a staggering conclusion:
. . . apropos the rice business. So far have had no luck & I can see now that the job is not going to be easy. Have waited up two nights now and I find that on both occasions the culprits have been warned. The only indication given that I was taking any action last night was given at a conference yesterday of Area Comds & Staff Officers. I have my suspicions of a Staff Officer, by golly if I can fit him as being in any way connected with the business I’ll push it hard. Everything comes to those that wait. I’ll keep at them & maybe land some big fish one day (or night).37
On the 14th Menz wrote that: ‘Have had no success with the rice merchants although have lost a lot of sleep . . .’38 And the next day the 8th Division HQ would record: ‘Rice stealing. No further evidence was available on the matter at last conference.’39 It is of more than passing interest to mention that Thompson’s diary has constant references to the need for ‘saluting’ by the POWs of Changi, but that the above innocuous reference marks the apparent end of a far from determined investigation of those suspected of trading rice from the store in Changi.
On 28 December 1942, Menz encountered a further ‘interesting’ occurrence. His diary entry stated for that day: ‘. . . had to start M.P. patrols day & night today, not very popular with the men who have to do it, but orders are orders’. And two days later: ‘My four men who were on patrol last night failed to return for breakfas
t this morning. Later found that they had been picked up by Japs . . .’40 Corporal Warwick was one of Menz’s four-man patrol and later wrote a report of the incident:
2 a.m. Mounted Duty Area picket. Proceeded on area patrol in pairs. 3.30 Met at Con Depot as prearranged.
3.45 proceeded all together down the hill path to Con Depot gate . . . North West Boundary. Whilst about 30 feet from wire was challenged by Jap. Jap blew alarm on whistle. 4 more Japs appeared. Were ordered outside of wire. Taken to Japs guard house; could not speak English and no information was exchanged. 5 a.m. one platoon of Japs marched us to Indian Camp where we were put in compound. 10 a.m. escort arrived to take us to Jap Headquarters. Interviewed . . . first question was why did you try and escape to Singapore. Explained we had no intention of escaping and detailed hours of duty, area of patrol and purpose. Jap accused one man of being outside of wire. Replied no man outside of wire and that Jap came into wire to bring us out. We immediately produced the passes . . . Capt explained Japs knew nothing of patrol and did not recognise passes as such.41
The four men were then taken to the Indian Camp and placed in a compound. Corporal Warwick:
. . . 31st Dec 1942 saw Major Wyett proceeding to AIF Area and he shouted it wont be long [sic]. 21st January sent written and verbal message to Capt Menz per Cpl G. Sawyers [one of the party of four Provosts] who was hospitalized. 27 February were released from Indian Camp and allowed to proceed to our own area without guard. On return we reported to Capt. Menz O.C.
