by Mark Lane
7. Here it should be pointed out that Epstein’s competence in research has been greatly exaggerated. Some illustrations are given in the Fletcher Knebel article. As a further specimen, Epstein’s book refers (pp. 93-5) to a cropped-down picture of a heavy-set man taken in Mexico City, saying that the Central Intelligence Agency gave it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 18 November 1963, and that the Bureau in turn forwarded it to its Dallas office. Actually, affidavits I the published Warren material (vol. XI, pp. 468-70) show that CIA turned the picture over to the FBI on 22 November 1963. (As a matter of interest, Mark Lane’s Rush to Judgment claims that the photo was furnished by CIA on the morning of 22 November; the fact is that the FBI flew the photo directly from Mexico City to Dallas immediately after Oswald’s arrest, before Oswald’s picture had been published, on the chance it might be Oswald. The reason the photo was cropped was that the background revealed the place where it was taken.) Another example: where Epstein reports (p. 41) that a Secret Service interview report was even withheld from the National Archives, this is untrue; an Archives staff member told one of our officers that Epstein came there and asked for the memorandum. He was told that it was there, but was classified. Indeed, the Archives then notified the Secret Service that there had been a request for the document, and the Secret Service declassified it. But by that time, Epstein (whose preface gives the impression of prolonged archival research) had chosen to finish his searches in the Archives, which had only lasted two days, and had left town. Yet Epstein charges that the Commission was over-hasty in its work.
8. Aside from such failures in research, Epstein and other intellectual critics show symptoms of some of the love of theorizing and lack of common sense and experience displayed by Richard H. Popkin, the author of The Second Oswald. Because Oswald was reported to have been seen in different places at the same time, a phenomenon not surprising in a sensational case where thousands of real or alleged witnesses were interviewed, Popkin, a professor of philosophy, theorizes that there actually were two Oswalds. At this point, theorizing becomes sort of logico-mathematical game; an exercise in permutations and combinations; as Commission attorney Arlen Specter re marked; “Why not make it three Oswalds? Why stop at two?” Nevertheless, aside from his book, Popkin has been able to publish a summary of his views in The New York Review of Books, and there has been replay in the French Nouvel Observateur, in Moscow’s New Times, and in Baku’s Vyshka. Popkin makes a sensational accusation indirectly, saying that “Western European critics” see Kennedy’s assassination as part of a subtle conspiracy attributable to “perhaps even (in rumors I have heard) Kennedy’s successor.” One Barbara Garson has made the same point in another way by her parody of Shakespeare’s “Macbeth” entitled “MacBird,” with what is obviously President Kennedy (Ken O Dunc) in the role of Duncan, and President Johnson (MacBird) in the role of Macbeth. Miss Garson makes no effort to prove her point; she merely insinuates it. Probable the indirect form of accusation is due to fear of a libel suit.
9. Other books are yet to appear. William Manchester’s not-yet-published The Death of a President is at this writing being purged of material personally objectionable to Mrs. Kennedy. There are hopeful signs: Jacob Cohen is writing a book which will appear in 1967 under the title Honest Verdict, defending the Commission report, and one of the Commission attorneys, Wesley J. Liebeler, is also reportedly writing a book, setting forth both sides. Bur further criticism will no doubt appear; as the Washington Post has pointed out editorially, the recent death of Jack Ruby will probably lead to speculation that he was “silenced” by a conspiracy.
10. The likelihood of further criticism is enhanced by the circumstance that Communist propagandists seem recently to have stepped up their own campaign to discredit the Warren Commission. As already noted, Moscow’s New Times reprinted parts of an article by Richard Popkin (21 and 28 September 1966 issues), and it also gave the Swiss edition of Joesten’s latest work an extended, laudatory review in its number for 26 October. (In view of this publicity and the Communist background of Joesten and his American publisher, together with Joesten’s insistence on pinning the blame on such favorite Communist targets as H.L. Hunt, the FBI and CIA, there seems reason to suspect that Joesten’s book and its exploitation are part of a planned Soviet propaganda operation.) Tass, reporting on 5 November on the deposit of autopsy photographs in the National Archives, said that the refusal to give wide public access to them, the disappearance of a number of documents, and the mysterious death of more than 10 people, all make many Americans believe Kennedy was killed as the result of a conspiracy. The radio transmitters of Prague and Warsaw used the anniversary of the assassination to attack the Warren report. The Bulgarian press conducted a campaign on the subject in the second half of October; a Greek Communist newspaper, Avgi, placed the blame on CIA on 20 November. Significantly, the start of this stepped-up campaign coincided with a Soviet demand that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow stop distributing the Russian-language edition of the Warren report; Newsweek commented (12 September) that the Soviets apparently “did not want mere facts to get in their way.”
CIA DOCUMENT III
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT: Review of Book—Rush to Judgment by Mark Lane
1. I reviewed the attached proof copy of the above book per your request. It represents a recapitulation of Lane’s theories regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, and alleged shortcomings of the Warren Commission, which he has expressed publicly over the past few years. Like J. Epstein, author of Inquest, Lane is guilty of the same fault he charges to the Warren Commission—a rush to judgment.
2. CIA first comes into focus on page 302. Lane imputes something sinister in the fact that this Agency received a copious requirement regarding Jack Ruby from the Commission on 24 February 1964 and seemingly never got around to answering it until 15 September 1964 (the Commission’s 13 page memorandum, a follow-up query by J. Lee Rankin and this Agency’s reply, appear in volume XXVI of the Commission Report, pages 466-467). Lane conveniently ignores paragraph two of the CIA reply which specifically directs the Commission’s attention to an “earlier” answer. In addition, almost the entire memorandum was clearly outside our jurisdiction. I discussed this matter with (name redacted) who was involved intimately in making the necessary name checks and providing an answer. I also remember the situation quite will. Within two weeks of the original request, Mr. Rankin’s office was advised telephonically that the major tracing had been completed and that we had no “information on Jack Ruby or his activities”; furthermore, that the CIA had “no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald ever knew each other, were associated, or might have been connected in any manner.” According to (redacted) this is the exact wording used during the telephone conversation and later reported in paragraph two of our formal reply. The Commission also was advised at that time that the remaining names appearing in the Commission’s memorandum were being checked, and that an answer would be submitted upon completion of the task. This was a large undertaking, particularly since this Staff was being pressed for other types of assistance by the Commission. Mr. Rankin’s follow-up letter also was answered by phone. We reiterated the above conclusions and added that we had just completed the rest of the name tracing in depth and were in the process of preparing an answer. Because of the complexity of the task, several drafts were attempted and rejected before the final version was sent to the Commission.
3. On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who later claimed the photograph to be that of Jack Ruby. A discussion of the incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the Commission’s Report (VOL. XI, p. 469; VOL XVI, p. 638.) Lane asserts that the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on 27 September 1963, an
d that it was furnished to the FBI on the morning of 22 November. As in the case of Epstein, Lane is incorrect regarding the date and place the photograph was taken, and the date it was furnished to the FBI (Epstein says we gave it to the FBI on 18 November). Lane acknowledges that the picture is not that of Jack Ruby or Lee Harvey Oswald. He says that the CIA originally thought the man was Oswald, but was mistaken. He then twits the Commission, the FBI, and the CIA for being unable to locate the unknown individual, asserting that “it is unfortunate that the full resources of the United States intelligence agencies were unable to locate the man whose picture had been taken by the CIA.”
4. On page 373, Lane takes exception to the Commission’s statement that “it had access to the full CIA file on Oswald.” Lane states, that at least on one occasion, the CIA refused to permit one of its photographs to be displayed to the Commission unless the background had been removed. Lane was referring to the aforementioned photograph of the unknown individual which was cropped to protect the source and to delete the background.
Now we have Holland’s response. In a letter to The Nation, he stated that I “make much of a CIA document that sounds very sinister— until you actually read it and put it into context. The document was written in April 1967, the height of the bout of madness otherwise known as the Garrison investigation.” He added that “the CIA was very concerned about having such allegations gain widespread acceptance.”
In the January 4, 1967, CIA background survey of books concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, the names of several authors are listed, including Joachim Joesten, Leo Sauvage, Harold Weisberg, Penn Jones, Jr., Richard H. Popkin and me. There is no reference to Jim Garrison or Clay Shaw in that dispatch.
The April 1967 document makes no mention of Jim Garrison or his investigation into the facts surrounding the assassination and does not even mention the name Clay Shaw. It is devoted entirely to authors who independently wrote books, including those who wrote books before Jim Garrison even began his investigation, and it gives specific instructions to its assets about how those books should be reviewed. It mentions Joachim Joesten, who was published even before Rush to Judgment was, and suggests the specific language that should be used by book reviewers.
The August 2, 1966, memorandum is a review of Rush to Judgment with the names of the recipients deleted. It neither mentions Jim Garrison nor his investigation.
Subsequently, The New York Times published an op-ed column by Holland about the assassination of President Kennedy. The Times also failed to inform its readers that Holland was a CIA asset. The article by Holland presented allegations that were entirely false. I sent a letter to The New York Times that it did not publish. It follows:
To the Editor:
Either I have grown too mellow in my later years or The New York Times has improved in significant ways. I subscribe and daily rush to the editorial page and the Op-Ed page for views about the war, our justice system and to read Frank Rich, among others. Perhaps that is why I was so disappointed to see that on the anniversary of President Kennedy’s assassination you published an article by Max Holland and a television photographer, stating that Oswald was the lone assassin. You should have identified Mr. Holland for your readers. He is the official writer for the CIA on the question of the assassination and his articles, almost exclusively, comprise the CIA position. To see Mr. Holland and the JFK assassination, his specific defense of the CIA and his defamation of those who do not share the views of the CIA, click on to the official CIA website as follows—cia.gov + Max Holland. Of course, just because Mr. Holland is the voice for the CIA on this question, an agency, according to traditional national polls, which more American believe to have been involved in the assassination than believe that Oswald acted alone, is no reason to reject his odd views. The fact that he is demonstrably wrong is the reason. In the article (“J.F.K.’s Death, Re-Framed,” Op-Ed, Nov. 22), only the title appears to be accurate. Holland cites only one eyewitness and states of him that Amos L. Euins, “a ninth grader,” spoke to the Dallas County sheriff and that, according to Holland, “No one’s recollection about the first shot was more precise [than Euins’].” Here are some facts Mr. Holland failed to report to your readers:
Amos L. Euins, a 15-year-old boy, said on November 22 that he saw a man in the window of the Book Depository with a rifle. James Underwood, assistant news director at KRLD-TV in Dallas testified that he heard Euins tell a motorcycle officer he “had seen a colored man lean out of the window upstairs and he had a rifle. Underwood said that he interviewed Euins on the spot, asking the boy if the man he saw had been “white or black.” Euins replied, “It was a colored man.” “Are you sure it was a colored man?” Underwood asked. Euins answered, “Yes, sir.” After Euins had described the man in the building as a Negro to both a motorcycle policeman and a newsman, he was taken to the Dallas Sheriff’s office, where an affidavit was prepared for him. That affidavit stated that the man he saw was a “white man.” Before Euins testified, according to his mother, the family received threatening telephone calls. When he appeared before the Warren Commission, Euins said that he had not told the Sheriff’s office that the man in the window was white: They must have made a mistake, because I told them I could see a white spot on his head.” However, he was willing to alter his original statement, and he told the Commission, that he no longer knew whether the man was white or black.”
Of course, Mr. Holland knew the facts set forth above. They were published in 1966 in Rush to Judgment, at page 281. In the book each assertion was cited to documents published by the Warren Commission or testimony before the Commission. For those few words quoted above there were thirteen citations to the official government record, citations 147 through 159. That book was not a well kept secret. It was The New York Times best selling book. And of course, the CIA, and agency that had reviewed Rush to Judgment, even before its publication date (and could cite no errors but offered many suggestions to the news media about how to discredit me and suppress the book) was familiar with the text. Euins’ testimony has been available in Volume II, pages 201-210 of the 26 volumes published by the Warren Commission more than four decades ago. It is now relevant to review the testimony of the young man Holland claims to have had a “precise” recollection of the events. He was interrogated by Arlen Specter, an innovative creator of the Magic Bullet Theory which was adopted by the Warren Commission, is central to its findings. It asserts that only three shots were fired. If another shot was fired there could have been no lone assassin. Earl Warren was present during the sworn interview. Specter asked Euins: “The question I have for you is where were you when the fourth shot was fired.” Euins told Specter where he had been. Specter (not yet the father of the only three shots were fired theory), continued: “You were still at point B when he fired the fourth time?” and later “Did you see him pull the gun (sick) back in the window after the fourth shot?” Specter asked Euins to describe the man who had fired four shots. “I wouldn’t know how to describe him, because all I could see was the spot (on his head) and his hand.” When Specter asked if the man was “slender or fat,” Euins replied, “I didn’t get to see him.” Euins is the only eye-witness referred to by Holland in his op-ed piece. If Euins was the “precise” witness Holland said he was then perhaps four shots had been fired. If so the Commission, Specter and the CIA and Holland (if I am not being redundant) were again proven to be inaccurate. The first officer to talk to Euins was Sergeant D.V. Harkness of the Dallas Police Department. The Warren Commission conceded that Sgt. Harkness “radioed to headquarters at 12:36 pm that I have a witness that says it came from the fifth floor of the Texas School Depository” (Warren Commission Report, page 64). The CIA, Holland and the Warren Commission contend that all shots were fired from the sixth floor. Efforts by the defenders of the official view to explain away discrepancy after discrepancy do not enhance their credibility and tend to encourage the serious doubts of almost all of the American people.
MARK LANE
Former member of the New York State Legislature
Practicing attorney for 56 years
and author of several books on contemporary legal issues
I believe that Holland’s writing has betrayed two characteristics. He is close to the CIA, and he writes recklessly without adequate concern for the facts. The relatively recent statement by Holland that Clay Shaw died “prematurely” struck me as being odd. Premature is defined as “occurring before the assigned time.” I decided to look into the premature death of Clay Shaw.
When Clay Shaw died on August 15, 1974, there were unsubstantiated rumors about the cause, as there have been about so many matters related to the assassination of the president. I had written almost half a century ago that when reasonable people understand that their government has not told them the truth about a serious matter affecting their lives, it provides a fertile field for imagination. For that reason when I wrote Rush to Judgment, each assertion was warranted by a reference to the unquestioned source and I engaged in no speculation. Yet I also know that a rumor without a substantial basis in fact may be true although it certainly may not be relied upon.
Shaw, it was said, had undergone radiation treatment for brain cancer, had become delirious and had refused to take medication. His lawyer, Edward F. Wegman, had arranged for a “sitter” to be with him and had given strict instructions to the sitter to contact him at once if Shaw died. This information and all that follows is based upon the official ten-page New Orleans Police Department Report dated August 28, 1974. It is now available on the Internet.
