Unnamed Battle – Metellus defeats Jugurtha for a second time.
Bocchus allies with Jugurtha, who also raises an army of Gaetulians.
107 Consuls: L. Cassius Longinus and C. Marius.
Triumph of Q. Servilius Caepio for his campaign in Spain.
Marius replaces Metellus as commander in Numidia by popular vote.
Battle of River Hebrus – Roman victory over the Scordisci in Thrace End of the Scordiscian Wars.
Unnamed Battle – Roman army led by Cassius defeated and massacred in Gaul by the Tigurini.
Marius and Jugurtha clash near Cirta.
106 Consuls: Q. Servilius Caepio and C. Atilius Serranus.
Triumph of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus for victories over Jugurtha.
Triumph of M. Minucius Rufus for his defeat of the Scordisci.
Romans begin to subdue southern Gaul, recapturing Tolossa.
105 Consuls: P. Rutilius Rufus and Cn. Mallius Maximus.
First Battle of Cirta – Stalemate.
Second Battle of Cirta – Armies of Jugurtha and Bocchus defeated by Marius.
Unnamed Battle – Roman army in Spain slaughtered by the Lusitanians.
Battle of Arausio – Roman armies of Servilius Caepio and Mallius Maximus defeated and slaughtered by the Cimbri.
Jugurtha captured by Bocchus and handed over to Sulla.
End of the Jugurthine War.
104 Consuls: C. Marius (II) and C. Flavius Fimbria.
Triumph of C. Marius for his defeat of Jugurtha.
Slave revolts in Italy and Sicily.
Start of the Second Servile War in Sicily.
103 Consuls: C. Marius (III) and L. Aurelius Orestes.
First tribunate of L. Appuleius Saturninus.
Battle of Triocala – Lucullus defeats the slave army in Sicily.
102 Consuls: C. Marius (IV) and Q. Lutatius Catulus.
Battle of Aquae Sextiae – Teutones and Ambrones defeated by Marius.
101 Consuls: C. Marius (V) and M. Aquillius.
Battle of Raudian Plain (Vercellae) – Cimbri defeated by Marius and Catulus.
End of the Northern Wars.
Unnamed Battle – Aquilius defeats the slave army in Sicily and ends the Second Servile War.
100 Consuls: C. Marius (VI) and L. Valerius Flaccus.
Triumphs of Marius and Catulus for victories over the Cimbri.
Triumph of Antonius for victory over the pirates.
Second tribunate of L. Appuleius Saturninus.
Exile of Metellus Numidicus.
Insurrection and murder of Saturninus and Glaucia.
Note on Roman Names
All Roman names in the following text will be given in their traditional form, including the abbreviated first name. Below is a list of the Roman first names referred to in the text and their abbreviations.
A. Aulus.
Ap. Appius
C. Gaius or Caius
L. Lucius
M. Marcus
P. Publius
Q. Quintus
Ser. Servius
Sp. Spurius
T. Titus
Ti. Tiberius
Rome in Crisis?
Chapter 1
Rome in Crisis? (146–120BC)
Before we assess the period in question, we need to understand the background to the crisis that faced Rome in what is now referred to as the late second century BC. Here we have a fundamental problem, namely the loss of a good narrative source for events after 167 BC (when our surviving books of Livy end1. Furthermore, the year 146 BC has tended to form a watershed in Roman Republican history, being the year that saw Rome defeat and destroy Carthage in the Third Punic War and annex Greece in the Achaean War. With the destruction of Carthage and the annexation of Macedon and Greece, our focus tends to shift towards domestic politics, aided by the survival of Appian’s work on the Civil Wars (detailing events from 133 BC) and Plutarch’s biographies of a number of prominent individuals from this period. However, this shift of focus to the domestic situation after 146 BC can also be found in a strand of Roman thought, best explained by Sallust:
“But when our country had grown great through toil and the practice of justice, when great kings had been vanquished in war, savage tribes and mighty peoples subdued by force of arms, when Carthage, Rome’s rival for power had been destroyed, every land and sea lay open to her.”2
Thus for Sallust, and many writers and historians who have followed him, after 146 Rome lay unchallenged and our attention should focus on domestic issues, along with narratives of decline (see Appendix V). Yet when we actually look at the period between 146 and the outbreak of the Jugurthine and Northern Wars, we see that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the period was one of near constant warfare, albeit of a different manner, but one which saw Roman imperialism develop in many new and interesting ways.
Roman Warfare and Imperialism (c.146–120 BC)
i) Spain
The Viriathic or Lusitanian War (155–138 BC)
The Second Celtiberian War (153–151 BC)
The Numantine War (Third Celtiberian War) (143–133 BC)
Although the year 146 saw an end to Rome’s conflicts in the east (Greece) and the south (Africa), in the west (Spain) it was a different matter. Roman imperialism and warfare in Spain had always been of a different nature to that in the south or east. The Romans fought not a united people or country, but a vast array of races and tribes in a region that was only unified by its unique geography (a vast isthmus jutting out into the seas and cut off from mainland Europe by the Pyrenees). Although Rome had taken possession of the Mediterranean coastline from Carthage, annexing the interior was a different matter, and turned into a two hundred year process of annexation and assimilation, which was not completed until the time of Augustus. The nature of this warfare famously led Polybius to state that whilst wars in Greece or Asia were decided decisively by one or two battles, in Spain the warfare was continuous, and by implication less suited to the Roman style of warfare.3 Throughout the second century the Roman military effort in Spain was one of near-constant low-level warfare against the various native tribes and towns, punctuated by the occasional large-scale conflicts against a particular people, which we refer to as the wars, though the period between them could hardly be called peace, at least not in our understanding of the word.
As the Romans advanced northwards and westward from their coastal possessions, they encountered a number of hostile peoples; two of the most implacable of which were the Lusitanians and the Celtiberian peoples. Despite the fact that 184 BC saw two Roman commanders celebrate triumphs over both peoples, by the 150s BC, both once again rose to fight against the Roman occupation of their regions.4 Both wars highlighted the problems that Roman military forces faced with barbarian armies, with Appian detailing a number of Roman reversals in battle.5 The Lusitanian War saw the rise of Viriathus, who became one of Spain’s great rebel leaders and a noted opponent of the Romans. Throughout the 140s Viriathus waged a successful war against the Romans, inflicting a number of defeats on them. It must be admitted that he was aided by the fact that Rome’s most experienced commanders and seasoned troops were fighting in North Africa and Greece during this period, showing the dangers of Roman military overstretch; fighting no fewer than four major wars at the same time, two of which were in Spain.6
Following the success in Africa and Greece, Rome was able to devote more manpower and its finest commanders to the Spanish Wars. However, events soon soured when a fresh conflict arose with the Celtiberians, who, although initially pacified, rose up once more, stirred up by both Viriathus’ success against the Romans and aid provided by him. Throughout the 140s Viriathus managed to inflict a series of defeat on the Romans. The war against Viriathus reached a peak in 141/140 under the Roman commander Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus (the consul of 142).
As part of his preparations he even contacted the King of Numidia (Micipsa, see next chapter), which saw a number of Africa
n elephants deployed against the Lusitanians. In 141, Servilianus managed to defeat Viriathus and drive him back into Lusitania, bringing the region back under Roman control.7 Unfortunately for Servilianus however, his pursuit of Viriathus was turned into an ambush and the Romans were soundly defeated.8 Having pinned the Roman forces against a cliff, Viriathus then sought to bring the war to a conclusion by seeking a treaty with Rome.
With little option Servilianus agreed and Viriathus became a ‘friend and ally of the Roman people’, with his people’s title to their lands confirmed, all of which capped a remarkable reversal in Rome’s fortunes. However, the new commander of the war, Q. Servilius Caepio, the brother of Servilianus, saw the peace as a dishonourable one and immediately set about undermining it, apparently with senatorial backing.9 War was soon re-declared and Viriathus, outnumbered and betrayed, embarked upon a guerrilla war against the Romans, proving impossible to either defeat or capture (much as Jugurtha himself would be some thirty years later). To end the war Caepio turned once again to underhand tactics and bribed two envoys sent by Viriathus to negotiate terms. Upon their return to Viriathus’ camp, they murdered him during the night as he slept. Thus Rome achieved through treachery and murder what they could not on the battlefield (again a foretaste of the Jugurthine War). Without Viriathus, the Lusitanians were soon pacified.
The fragments of Diodorus preserve an excellent eulogy to the man:
By common consent he was a most valiant fighter in battle and a most able and forward thinking general; most important of all, throughout his entire career as a general he commanded the devotion of his troops to a degree unequalled by anyone.
The proofs of his abilities are manifest; for in the eleven years that he commanded the Lusitanians, his troops not only remained free of dissension but were all but invincible, whereas after his death the confederacy of the Lusitanians disintegrated once it was deprived of his leadership.10
The Third Celtiberian War, or Numantine War as it is also known, also proved to be an embarrassment to Rome, though for different reasons. Instead of throwing up a charismatic figurehead, it spawned an infamous siege centred on the town of Numantia in Spain. The town itself was high in the mountains surrounded by woodland and two rivers, with only one clear access road. Sieges in 142 by Q. Caecilius Metellus ‘Macedonicus’ (see Appendix IV) and Q. Pompeius in 141–140 BC, both failed.11 The latter suffered such heavy casualties that he negotiated a secret peace treaty with the inhabitants for a cessation of hostilities.
Again such a treaty was greeted with contempt by the Senate and the war continued under a fresh commander, M. Popillius Laenas (the consul of 139), though he met with similar failure. He in turn was replaced by C. Hostilius Mancinus (the consul of 137), who not only continued his predecessors’ records of failure but managed to get his entire army trapped and surrounded in their own camp. The army was only saved from annihilation by a treaty of surrender, partly negotiated by a young Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (see below). Naturally, upon his return to Rome, the Senate refused to ratify the treaty and actually had Mancinus sent back to the Numantines bound and naked.12
To date the siege of Numantia had being continuing intermittently for six years, longer than it had taken to besiege Carthage, and had done nothing but expose a series of incompetent Roman commanders and humiliate the reputation of the Roman army.
In 135 BC, sensing a chance for further glory, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus), the conqueror of Carthage, entered the fray. Offering himself to the people as the solution to the crisis, he had the tribunes suspend the laws regarding second consulships (his first being in 147 BC) and was not only elected as consul for 134 BC, but had the tribunes pass a law giving him command against the Numantines.13 Such a process was to have resonance when we consider the career of C. Marius later on (see chapter seven).
The parallels continue as Scipio raised a fresh force of men to take with him to Spain. Appian states that this was due to the limited amount of manpower available at the time, though this is much debated (see below and Appendix III).14 He recruited a number of his own clients into service as well as contingents from client kings and allies abroad, including a force of Numidians led by their prince Jugurtha.15 He then joined up with the existing forces in Spain, amongst whom was a certain C. Marius. Appian details the exhaustive preparations made by Scipio for the siege and the detail of the siege itself, which included the creation of a wall around the city.16 Under his clear leadership and with the Numantines suffering from exhaustion, the city fell to Scipio in 133 BC, bringing him more plaudits and glory. The surrender of the inhabitants was followed by the destruction of the city, taking his personal tally of destroyed cities to two: Carthage and Numantia. The fall of Numantia brought an end to a turbulent period of Roman warfare in Spain, which had resulted in a number of reversals and humiliations. It also saw the rise of a charismatic rebel leader who continued to elude Rome and a Roman general who used the situation for his own advantage, overturning established practice.
ii) Macedon and Illyria
Macedonian Revolt (143 BC)
Scordiscian War (c.141–130s BC)
For the campaigns in the east in this period we have little more than fragmentary notices, yet the annexation of Macedon proved to be problematic for several reasons. Firstly, although the pretender Andriscus had been defeated and Macedon annexed in 148 BC, another rebellion soon broke out, this time in 143 BC, led by a man claiming to be Philip VI, a son of Perseus. This pretender soon gathered an army of slaves, numbering 16,000, but was defeated by the quaestor L. Tremellius Scrofa.17
Nevertheless, it does show how tenuous a grasp Rome had on the newly conquered Macedon. As well as internal threats from Macedon there were numerous fresh external threats. By annexing Macedon, Rome now had a massive exposure to the tribes of Central Europe, and a responsibility to defend Macedon’s borders (such as they were).
One of the key threats to Rome’s new province came from the tribe of the Scordisci, who will be detailed more later on (see Chapter 3). Rome’s first contact with the Scordisci apparently came in a war in Dalmatia in 156 BC, when Rome defeated an invasion of Illyria, though the details of the Scordiscian involvement are obscure.18 However, by 141 we find references to a Scordiscian invasion of Macedon and Rome being defeated in battle by them; the Periochae of Livy called it a disaster.19 Interestingly, there is a note in Appian stating that an unknown Roman commander name Cornelius met with a disaster against some unidentified Pannonians at roughly the same period. He goes on to say that the disaster was so great that the peoples of Italy feared for their safety (expecting a resulting invasion), however fanciful that may sound.20 The two events have been linked by a historian who argues that the ‘Pannonians’ were the Scordisci and that they invaded Macedon from the 140s through to the 130s.21 Again we have few details of these wars, but in 135, a praetor M. Cosconius is recorded to have defeated the Scordisci over the border in Thrace itself. We still find him in Macedon in 133 indicating the length and severity of the campaign.
The history of Roman involvement in Illyria was much like that of Spain, a near-constant series of small-scale wars with the tribes of the region to establish Roman authority. In 135 BC, we find one of the consuls of 135, Ser. Fulvius Flaccus, defeating the Vardaei tribe, who had raided the region under Roman suzerainty.22 Roman armies can again be found being deployed in Illyria, when in 129 BC, one of the consuls, C. Sempronius Tuditanus, fought against a tribe known as the Iapudes. Though we only have two references to the campaign, it is clear that Sempronius was defeated by the Illyrian tribe, though the situation was rescued by one of his legates, D. Iunius Brutus, and the Iapudes were ultimately defeated. Sempronius then returned to Rome to celebrate an (ill-deserved) triumph.23
iii) Sicily
The First Servile War (135–132 BC)
A new and unusual threat arose in this period, in what had been one of the oldest provinces of Rome’s empire, namely Sicily. The threat was a full-scale slave
uprising on a scale that had never been seen before, so much so that it is often refered to as the First Servile War. Slave revolts had been a common enough occurrence, but had always been sporadic and localized and never posed a serious military threat. We will never perhaps understand what sparked off such an uprising, but factors such as charismatic leadership, geography and an unusual harshness of treatment have all been raised as factors.24
Whilst we have no full narrative account of the conflict, there is a lengthy fragment of Diodorus which preserves a number of details. The rebellion began around the town of Enna, in central Sicily and was led by a Syrian slave named Eunus, who apparently had something of a mystical air to him:
he was an Apamean by birth and had an aptitude for magic and the working of wonders. He claimed to foretell the future, by divine command, through dreams and because of his talents deceived many.25
The Crisis of Rome Page 2
