The Crisis of Rome

by Gareth Sampson

  Eunus belonged to a Sicilian named Damophilus, who was especially cruel to his slaves, which was the initial spark. The original rebellion centred on just 400 slaves, but they successfully managed to attack the town of Enna, slaughtering the freeborn inhabitants, an action which soon brought fresh recruits and spawned a number of other revolts on the island. Soon Eunus had an army of 6,000. A second revolt led by a slave named Cleon was equally successful, raising a force of 5,000 slaves, all of whom fell under the overall command of Eunus, who proclaimed himself a king in the Seleucid Syrian manner, taking the title of ‘Antiochus, king of the slaves’ and even minting his own coins.26 What further marks this revolt out, and what turned it into a war, was its being the first (recorded) conscious attempt by a slave force to fashion and conduct itself in military style and attempt to take and hold territory of their own.

  Given the importance of Sicily to Rome, it being the main domestic provider of grain, the staple food product of the populace, a Roman army was soon dispatched to deal with this threat under the command of L. (Plautius) Hypsaeus. However, given that he had only a force of 8,000 Sicilian troops at his command, it is not that surprising that he was soon defeated.27 He was followed by the consul of 134, C. Fulvius Flaccus, who met with no greater success, though the details are unclear.28

  Given that the war was taking place at the same time as that in Numantia, and that Scipio decided/was forced to raise his own additional forces, it begs the question how able Rome was to contend with an additional war in its own core territories.

  The first notable Roman progress came under a consul of 133 BC, L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who captured the town of Murgantia and attacked Enna itself.29 He was succeeded by a consul of 132 BC, P. Rupilius, who stormed and retook the towns of Tauromenium and Enna, the key slave strongholds, killing over 20,000 of the slave army, finally bringing the war to an end.30 Of the ringleaders, Cleon had been killed in combat and Eunus fled but was eventually captured by the Romans, dying in captivity.31

  The war is notable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the first time that a slave rebellion had taken on all the trappings of a full-blown military campaign. It came at a time when Roman forces were already overstretched, with wars in Spain and Asia ongoing. Furthermore, it appeared to spark off widespread, though short-lived, slave rebellions across Rome’s empire. Orosius mentions outbreaks in Italy itself, at Minturnae and Sinuesa, while both he and Diodorus mention rebellions in Attica, all of which required military action.32 A further rebellion was crushed by the inhabitants of Delos.33 The vital importance of the grain from Sicily would also have had an important domestic effect in Rome, especially for the urban populace, and it is not a coincidence that this war formed the backdrop for the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus.

  iv) Asia Minor

  The Asiatic War (132–129 BC)

  It is all too easy to fall into a narrative of imperial decline, but the next two theatres of war actually reversed this trend and saw Rome expand into new regions, both of which were to have crucial consequences in the future. The first one concerns Asia Minor and the famous so called ‘inheritance’ of the Kingdom of Pergamum. Pergamum had been one of Rome’s closest allies in Asia Minor, initially borne out of a desire to counterbalance Seleucid power in the region. This alliance took an unusual twist in 133 BC when the King of Pergamum, Attalus III, died without a clear successor. A will was found, now supported by epigraphic evidence, which named the Roman People as his inheritors.34 The whole incident is more known for its involvement with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who attempted to lay claim to the kingdom’s wealth to fund his land distribution policy (see below) than the details of its annexation and wider foreign policy issues.

  Initially, we have the issue of just what Attalus had in mind when he made such a bequest or what the Senate’s initial thoughts were towards this unique situation. It is clear that Attalus wished his old allies to protect his people from what was certain to be the avaricious desire of Pergamum’s Asiatic neighbours, including Pontus and Bithynia. We can perhaps also detect a certain maliciousness from the grave towards his kingdom’s enemies, by permanently shackling them with Rome’s presence in the region. The scope of his intentions are another problem though, as the remaining fragments of the will appear to relate only to the city of Pergamum itself, not the rest of the kingdom.35

  An equally interesting question is whether Rome initially intended to annex the region and establish a permanent foothold in Asia Minor, bringing them into close contact with the near-permanently feuding kingdoms of the region or merely take an income from the king’s property and leave the region autonomous. As was usual in such cases, the Senate established a five-man commission to go to Pergamum, assess the situation and report their findings.36 The only member of the commission we know of was P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the man so closely involved in the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, in a clear attempt to get him out of the city and calm tensions. This policy worked only too well when Scipio died whilst at Pergamum of what were reported to be unknown causes, though foul play cannot be ruled out.37

  What was initially a benign situation erupted into a full-scale armed insurrection, when a royal pretender to the vacant throne, by the name of Aristonicus, rose up to claim the throne aided by the lower strata of Pergamum’s social order, thus mixing up internal class struggle and external intervention.38 The commission, without an army, initially had to rely upon the armies of Pergamum’s neighbours, all Roman allies to one degree or another. These included Nicomedes II of Bithynia, Ariarathes V of Cappodocia, who died during the rebellion, and Mithridates V of Pontus. Although Aristonicus was driven back into the interior of the kingdom, consular armies had to be sent out in 131 and 130. The commander of the 130 campaign, P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus (consul of 131 BC) made some initial headway but was attacked as he was leaving the province, defeated and executed by Aristonicus near Leucae.39 However, Mucianus was succeeded by M. Perperna (consul of 130) who defeated Aristonicus in battle and forced his surrender.40 He died, a prisoner in Rome, soon afterwards.

  One of the consuls of 129 (M. Aquilius) now had the job of organizing a settlement in the region, aided by a new ten-man commission. The fertile plains formed the new Roman province of Asia, whilst the mountainous inland regions were divided up between Pergamum’s neighbours, as both an expedient method of getting rid of areas that would be hard to administer and rewarding their earlier assistance, though the process did stir up jealousies amongst the claimants, notably Bithynia and Pontus. Rome, however, took the prize, the coastal cities of Asia Minor, which soon proved to be one of Rome’s richest provinces. Whatever their original intentions, the rebellion of Aristonicus and the hard fought campaigns of 132–130 turned the Senate’s policy towards annexation, at least of the richer parts of the region. Thus Asia became the first province Rome had taken since 146 BC and added greatly to the wealth flowing into Rome’s coffers. It did, however, tie Rome more closely with the feuding kingdoms of Asia Minor, which would ultimately lead to the Mithridatic Wars.41 Nevertheless, in the short term it was a military and imperial success.

  v) Gaul

  The Gallic War (125–120 BC)

  Whilst the phrase ‘Gallic War’ has become synonymous with the campaigns of C. Iulius Caesar in the first century, it was in the 120s BC that Rome made its first concerted effort to control Gaul, at least its southern region. Until this point, Rome had no formal control of the region between her provinces in Spain and Italy itself, relying on allies such as the city of Massilia (Marseille) to keep the route free. However, strategic necessity dictated that sooner or later the Romans would need to secure that vital route for themselves. The danger lay in becoming too entangled with the seemingly borderless region of Gaul and the vast network of tribes that lay within it.

  As is usual with this period, we have no narrative history for the campaigns, merely a few fragmentary references to it. Nevertheless it represented a major Roman campaign in itself and set
Rome towards the acquisition of new territories. The war began when Rome’s old ally of Massilia sent an appeal for assistance against the Gallic tribe of the Salluvii, whose territory surrounded their city. One of the consuls of 125, M. Fulvius Flaccus was dispatched42 and not only defeated the Salluvii, but also the Ligurians and the Vocontii as well, though we do not know how they became involved in the conflict.43 For this Fulvius celebrated a triumph on his return in 123 BC.

  The celebrations proved to be premature as one of the consuls of 124 BC (C. Sextius Calvinus) can be found fighting the same enemies during the next few years as well.44 During the course of another victorious campaign, Calvinus founded the town of Aquae Sextiae (see Chapter 9). Once again a triumph was celebrated over the Ligurians, Salluvii and Vocontii, this time in 122 BC. Such campaigns were a standard part of Rome’ northern defensive system, and had been conducted against the same enemies in 154 BC.45

  However, on this occasion the war escalated, when the Salluvian king (Toutomotulus) fled to the neighbouring tribe, the Allobroges, probably the leading tribal power in the region.46 Again, Rome dispatched a consul, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who defeated the Allobroges near the town of Vindalium. Yet it appears that the anti-Roman feeling merely spread and we find one of the consuls of 121, Q. Fabius Maximus ‘Allobrogicus’, fighting an alliance of the Allobroges and the Arverni. The battle (at an unnamed location) took place on what now equates to the 8th August 121 BC, and saw 30,000 Romans facing an army in excess of 125,000 (which is the total number given for the Gallic dead, if we are to believe Livy’s compiler47. This victory brought the war to an end, with both tribes surrendering and Bituitus, the Arvernian king, going to Rome to make peace and surrender in person (where he and his son were held as hostages). Both Domitius and Fabius returned to Rome in 120 and both celebrated triumphs for their victories.

  Clearly these campaigns were major ones, four consuls taking the field and the war ending with a massive battle against an alliance of two of the most powerful Gallic tribes. The war has an incredibly-low profile today, due to the few surviving sources that mention it and the fact that it took place at the same time as the tribunate of Caius Gracchus in Rome.48 Nevertheless, this should not obscure its significance. In total, the Romans defeated some five Gallic tribes, including two of the regional powers, the Allobroges and the Arverni.49 Furthermore, the Romans then established a permanent presence in the region, founding the town of Narbo in 118 BC, and carving out the embryonic province of Transalpine Gaul, formally connecting Spain to Italy for the first time.50 This connection was cemented by the construction of the Via Domitia.51 From a logistical point of view, securing a land connection between Spain and Italy, rather than relying on the declining power of Massilia, makes good sense. From a military point of view, defeating the leading powers of southern Gaul and ensuring their loyalty to Rome would not only secure this route, but also eased any pressure on Rome’s Alpine borders. However, as soon became clear, it did link Roman interests and holdings more openly to the varying balances of power in the Gallic region, a danger that they would not resolve until the time of Caesar.

  vi) Other Campaigns of the Period

  Two other campaigns in this period are worth mentioning, though we only have scant references to them. Firstly, in 123 BC, one of the consuls, Q. Caecilius Metellus ‘Baliaricus’ (see Appendix IV), having been given command against the pirates inhabiting the Balearic Islands, invaded and annexed the islands for Rome, establishing two citizen colonies on Majorca (Palma and Pollentia), formed from Roman colonists in Spain. Florus preserves a brief account of the campaign.52 This annexation merely cemented Rome’s dominance of the western Mediterranean, securing vital sea routes to Spain, but also continued the trend of an increasing Roman empire.

  A second and less glorious campaign took place within Italy itself when in 125 BC the Italian town of Fregellae rose up in revolt against Roman control, stirred up over the issue of acquiring Roman citizenship. On its own, the revolt stood little or no chance of success and a praetor (L. Opimius) soon took the town by storm and destroyed it.53 Nevertheless, it was a sign that, even in Italy, Roman supremacy could be challenged.

  Summary

  Thus the events of the period 146–120 BC do not appear to meet the impression which we find in Sallust, namely that after Carthage had been defeated Rome lay unchallenged. With the more clear-cut wars against Macedon and Carthage won, we can see that Rome became entangled in a number of conflicts with tribes who bordered Roman territory. Although on a map both Spain and Illyria were Roman territories, the tribes of the regions had other ideas. In both the Viriathic and Numantine Wars, Rome tasted defeat and setback, with repercussions at Rome. Policing Illyria and Macedon brought Rome in contact with the numerous central European tribes, none of whom respected Rome’s territorial borders, such as they were. Furthermore, the period saw the first full-scale slave war break out in Sicily, as well as the revolt of an Italian city.

  Nevertheless, the period also saw Rome make some major steps forward in expanding her empire, in both Asia Minor and Gaul, both of which would lead Rome into future conflicts. Of the two, it is clear that the Gallic War of 125–120 was a major war, where Rome faced and defeated an alliance of the leading Gallic tribes of the region and took the strategic view that it was necessary to annex the coastal region of southern Gaul. If anything, in both this annexation of the coast of Asia Minor and, to a lesser degree, the Balearic Islands, we can see the development of a more strategic view to Rome’s actions. Both Transalpine Gaul and the Balearics secured vital routes to Spain, whilst Asia gave them vastly-increased revenue and established a firm Roman presence on the far side of the Aegean, securing the route to Greece.

  Thus, we have evidence for Roman successes and failures in this period, all of which are essential background for covering the main period in question (120–100 BC) as well as when looking at the more well known domestic situation.

  Roman Domestic Politics (146–111 BC)

  At the same time as the events detailed above, Roman domestic politics entered an unprecedented upheaval, spilling over into bloodshed on the streets of Rome itself. Although this topic has been the subject of perhaps more scholarly effort than any other in Roman Republican history, and falls outside the remit of this work, several key themes do need highlighting, notably around the issue of military recruitment and the highly-vexatious manpower question.

  Just as the year 146 BC acts as an unwanted cut off point in Roman foreign affairs, the year 133 BC has the same effect in Roman domestic politics. However, the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was not the first time that issues of land and military recruitment had been raised on the domestic stage.

  Pre-Gracchan Tensions & Scipio Aemilianus

  As Taylor showed so well in her groundbreaking article,54 tensions in Rome over military issues were common throughout this period, with repeated clashes between the tribunate and the rest of the Senatorial oligarchy.55 The two most obvious examples of this came in 151 and 138 BC, when on both occasions tribunes had the consuls actually imprisoned during disputes over the military levy for the wars in Spain.56 Had we books of Livy which covered the period 167–133 BC then we would no doubt uncover a number of other such clashes between the two offices. Thus the issue of continued military service appeared to be weighing heavily on the citizen population, who got the tribunes to vent their frustrations at the increasing burden.

  It is during this period that we also hear of a proposed a law by a C. Laelius57 concerning the ownership of the ager publicus (public land), an issue at the heart of Ti. Gracchus’ measures in 133 BC and which plays a central role in the debate over manpower issues (see Appendix III). This unknown measure was dropped by Laelius after encountering strong Senatorial opposition, for which he received the cognomen of sapiens (the wise). It is also note-worthy that Plutarch makes a point of introducing Laelius as being an ally of Scipio Aemilianus, who plays an important role in these proceedings.58

  A
t the same time as these events, a number of tribunes also passed measures which affected Rome’s electoral and judicial systems. The initial and main measure came in 139 with the lex Gabinia, introducing secret ballot for elections, which went some way to reducing the nobility’s control over their clients’ voting.59 This was followed in 137 BC by a lex Cassia which extended the principle of secret ballots to all judicial trials, except treason.60

  As well as these tribunician measures, we also have the figure of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, twice consul and destroyer of Carthage and Numantia. As well as his noted military accomplishments it is instructive to review the methods he used in domestic politics. It is interesting to note that for both of his consulships (147 and 134 BC) he utilised tribunes to clear any constitutional objections raised to his election. In 148 unnamed or ‘anonymous’ tribunes threatened to remove the Senate’s supervision of the consular elections unless they allowed Scipio to stand (being below the minimum age). When this tactic did not meet with success, these tribunes then repealed the law on age restrictions, restoring them after Scipio had been elected.61 In 135 BC, Scipio again faced a bar on being elected consul, as a law prevented repeated consulships within a decade. Once again Scipio turned to the tried and trusted use of tribunes and had the law repealed for his election and then reinstated.62

  On this occasion though, Scipio went far further than anyone had gone before, and had ‘anonymous’ tribunes pass a law granting him command in Spain against the Numantines. Such an act was unprecedented (though it would be repeated often in later times), utilizing the tribunes to have the assembly grant him an overseas command, which lay, by the power of custom and practice, in the hands of the Senate. Given that such practices are more normally associated with the various key figures of the late Republic, notably C. Marius himself, it is fascinating to find their origins in this period, especially given the connections between Scipio and Marius.