For Marius, there were two possible routes open to him: conduct further military campaigns or cement his position as an elder statesman in Rome (not forgetting that Marius was now in his late fifties). With the threat from the northwest successfully dealt with, there were a number of other possible campaigns. Actions were still proceeding against the slaves in Sicily and the pirates in Cilicia (see Appendix II), but neither were wars of comparable standing to the one that Marius had successfully concluded, and by 100, both were in their final stages. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 9) the Cimbric invasion of Spain had left a number of tribes in revolt and loosened Roman control there. Yet again, this would require a long-drawn-out campaign of submission and was hardly a ‘grand campaign’. Another possibility has always been raised by commentators on this period, focussed on the figure of Mithridates VI of Pontus. Plutarch gives us details of a meeting between Marius and Mithridates in Asia in 98 BC, which he states was down to Marius’ attempts to provoke Mithridates into war with Rome.456
For Plutarch, Marius was looking to restore his prominence by another great campaign against a dangerous enemy. The clear problem with this is that Plutarch is clearly looking forward to the threat that Mithradates became, rather than the minor player he was in 98 BC, nothing more than a lowly, minor eastern client king. Therefore, once again, such a campaign would have been beneath him at the time. The Jugurthine and Northern Wars had seen Marius become the greatest commander of his day, a saviour of Rome and made him immensely wealthy. In 100 BC there was little challenge left for him on the battlefield.
The one clear challenge that was in front of him lay in Rome itself and the Senatorial aristocracy. This may seem an odd statement considering he had been consul for five years in a row (104–100 BC), yet he had been away from Rome for the majority of the period from 107 onwards. As pointed out above, Marius had considerable resources to call on in Rome, both from the Senatorial order, the equestrians and the people. Yet, he will forever be associated with the second and third tumultuous tribunates of L. Appuleius Saturninus and his associates.
Marius and Saturninus: Conspiracy or Convenience?
Marius’ association with Saturninus went back to 103 BC, when he used him to assist in his re-election as consul (see Chapter 9). Saturninus, however, is far from a one-dimensional figure, as we know a good deal about his own political career. In 104, he had been the quaestor in charge of the grain supply. During the crisis caused by the Second Servile War (see Appendix II), grain supplies naturally began to be tightened with an accompanying price rise. M. Aemilius Scaurus saw this as an opportunity and got the Senate to appoint him as a special commissioner to deal with the problem.457 This naturally humiliated Saturninus, who used this anger to run as tribune for 103 BC.
During 103 BC we know of actions he took for himself and on behalf of Marius.458 For Marius there was the aforementioned re-election ploy, whilst there was also a measure to establish colonies in Africa for Marius’ veterans. Acting on his own behalf, he was possibly involved in establishing a special court to try treason cases with an equestrian jury and involved in the exile of Cn. Mallius, the commander of Roman forces at Arausio. The following year Metellus Numidicus, one of two Metellan censors that year, attempted to have Saturninus and his ally C. Servilius Glaucia, who had himself been a troublesome tribune, excluded from the Senate. However, a disagreement between the two censors prevented this. Although the attempt failed it merely increased the pairs’ enmity with the Metelli. Both Saturninus and Glaucia succeeded in gaining election for the year 100, Saturninus as a tribune once more (his second) and Glaucia as a praetor.
Plutarch sees both these men being elected as a clear case of Marius engineering allies in key magistracies, as the three men conducting some secret arrangement for the year to come.459 Yet we must stop and ask ourselves why Marius would need to solely rely on these two men, when he must have had huge resources at his call. His patronage would have been able to ensure as many tribunes or praetors as he needed would either be loyal allies before their election or secure their services for their year of office. Indeed, he had secured his own consulship with a compliant colleague. Yet we must also remember Velleius’ view on the whole episode takes the opposite position and makes no mention of a connection between the men.460
Clearly, Marius has used Saturninus before, and they did have a mutual enemy in the form of Metellus Numidicus. However, even if he did support Saturninus’ and Glaucia’s election they would probably have been one of many such men he sponsored into useful political positions in this year. Saturninus paid him back by passing more laws establishing veteran colonies, this time in Sicily, Achaea and Macedonia, and more controversially a law confiscating land that had been occupied by the Cimbri in Gaul. Although a controversial land grab in itself, Saturninus added a unique clause to the law, requiring all Senators to swear to uphold it on pain of exile. Although a unique innovation in its own right and one designed to guard against the law’s repeal, it also put Saturninus’ (and Marius’) old enemy, Metellus Numidicus, in a bind. If he swore to it then he would be supporting a man he clearly and publicly opposed, thus undermining him; if he failed to swear then he would be exiled. In Metellus’ case he chose a comfortable exile and became a martyr.
Yet we must never make the mistake of assuming that Saturninus was only ever a tool of Marius. Saturninus’ previous tribunate had shown him both working for Marius and pursuing his own agenda. He would simply have been one of many agents used by Marius, albeit a prominent one. Both he and Glaucia went further in their legislative programme and here the differences between these men and Marius began to show. Saturninus proposed a law setting a low price for grain for the city’s populace, always a sure-fire populist measure, especially given the shortage caused by the Servile War. It was passed using violence in the Forum and the overriding of his colleagues’ vetoes. Worse came when both men sought re-election for 99 BC, Saturninus for a second consecutive tribunate (always a provocative issue), while Glaucia sought the consulship (which was illegal given that he was a serving praetor). Saturninus secured his election along with a number of allies, whilst Glaucia’s election proved to be more troublesome. With one place filled (by M. Antonius), it apparently came down to Glaucia and a Memmius for the second one. Here our accounts vary slightly, though only with regard to motive rather than outcome, which was that during the election Memmius was attacked and murdered.
Appian states that Saturninus and Glaucia ordered him to be beaten up by an armed gang they had with them, whilst not directly stating that they intended to kill him. Orosius, however, states that Saturninus did order Memmius’ death and sent a P. Mettius to club him to death with an ‘unshapely bludgeon’. Interestingly, Plutarch omits all mention of Memmius’ death and has Marius being forced to take up arms against Saturninus by a coalition of the Senate and Equestrian order who wanted to put an end to Saturninus’ sedition (again with no mention of Glaucia either).461
We do not know Marius’ view of Saturninus and Glaucia’ activities during the year that were not focussed on his needs, which seem to have simply been the veteran colonies and the land in Gaul. Certainly, the exile of Metellus was a bonus, but there was enough enmity between Metellus and Saturninus to explain its origins; it certainly did not have to come from Marius himself and was such a crude method that bellies what had been an adept political touch. In the case of the elections, it was a different matter. In fact, Marius would have been far more interested in getting his own adherents into positions for the following year, which was the first in six that he would not be consul himself. It has long been argued that the M. Antonius who was easily elected as consul in 99, ahead of Glaucia, was a Marian client.462
War in Rome
What happened after the murder of Memmius is again contested, with both Appian and Orosius providing accounts, again from different standpoints. In Appian, the urban plebs apparently turned on Saturninus for the lawlessness of his activities in Rome and next day gathere
d together and attacked him, forcing Saturninus to defend himself with a force of rural plebs463. Following clashes between the two groups on the streets of Rome, Saturninus and his followers then seized the Capitol, though this could have been out of a need for a defensive position from the urban plebs. It was then that the Senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum (which suspended day-to-day rights). It is only at this point that Marius became involved against his former ally and took a force of armed veterans and besieged the Capitol, cutting off its water supply, and arranged for the surrender of Saturninus, Glaucia and their followers, with promises of safe conduct. This point is agreed with by Plutarch. Marius then apparently placed them in protective custody in a building used by the Senate, but they were murdered by a lynch mob, by an angry crowd of urban plebs. In Appian this was achieved by the mob ripping off roof tiles and stoning Saturninus and his colleagues to death in an open court yard. Plutarch does not specify the manner of his death. Thus, for Appian and Plutarch, Marius was reluctant to act against his former allies and tried to save them, failing miserably.464
Orosius, however, preserves an interesting alternative to these accounts:
The consul Marius, adapting his genius to the occasion, allied himself with the cause of the patriots (Senate), and calmed the aroused plebeians by addressing them with soothing words. Saturninus, after daring to commit these infamous deeds, held a meeting at his own house and there was acclaimed king by some and general by others. Marius divided the plebeians into maniples and then stationed the other consul and a garrison on the hill, while he barricaded the gates. The battle took place in the Forum. Marius drove Saturninus from the Forum to refuge on the Capitol. Marius then cut the pipes which furnished that place with water. Thereupon a savage battle took place at the entrance to the Capitol. Many around Saufeius and Saturninus were slain. Saturninus cried out loudly and called to the people to witness Marius was the cause of all their difficulties. Marius next forced Saturninus, Saufeius and Labienus to flee for refuge in the Senate House, where some Roman knights [equestrians] broke down the doors and killed them. C. Glaucia was dragged from the home of Claudius and killed. Furius, the tribune of the plebs, decreed that the property of all these men should be confiscated. Cn. Dolabella, the brother of Saturninus, while fleeing with L. Giganius through the Forum Holitorium was put to death.465
Thus Orosius, despite the fact that he is the latest of our sources, provides an account that differs from the ones found in Appian and Plutarch in some important ways. Rather than being forced into acting against Saturninus and almost a passive bystander, here he is the instigator of action against Saturninus. In the hours after the murder of Memmius he swung into action, mobilizing the urban plebs, raising a military force and defending the city. In this account, the timescale is compressed, and the mobilization, garrisoning and defence of the gates could have taken through the day and the night and thus battle commenced next morning, which ties into Appian’s timescale. This also ties into Appian’s account of the urban plebs attacking Saturninus; what he omits is that Marius was leading them.
This whole account also ties in with Velleius statement (mentioned earlier) about Marius’ sixth consulship:
He must not, however, be deprived of the glory of this consulship, for during this term as consul, he restrained by arms the mad acts of Servilius Glaucia and Appuleius Saturninus, who were shattering the constitution by continuing in office, and were breaking up the elections with armed violence and bloodshed, and caused these dangerous men to be put to death in the Curia Hostilia.466
Thus the accounts found in Velleius and Orosius present Marius the opportunist, who saw a chance to save Rome once more, this time on its very streets. Saturninus was defeated in one battle, forced to seek refuge then flushed out and hunted down. Once again, Marius’ swift action had saved the state, at least that is how he would have seen and likely portrayed it. He also removed a man who had become an obstacle to his own political manoeuvrings and one who could be a severe embarrassment if he were given the chance to detail the two men’s past associations. Thus for Marius, Saturninus’ death wiped the slate clean.
Marius and the Decade of Shadows
For the decade that follows the deaths of Saturninus and Glaucia, we have almost no sources, with the few surviving sources all eager to pass onto the next tumult in Roman politics, centred on the tribunate of M. Livius Drusus in 91 BC. This makes the 90s BC one of the least documented in the late Republic, truly a decade of shadows. Once again, Plutarch provides us with a stereotypical portrayal of Marius in this decade, a man who’s power has been destroyed, increasingly seen as a relic of a previous age, spending his old age (he was now in his sixties), reliving past glories.
In no case is this decline in power better illustrated than in the recall of Metellus Numidicus, which is detailed in Plutarch thus:
When a decree was introduced recalling Metellus from exile, Marius opposed it strongly both by word and deed, but finding his efforts in vain, at last desisted, and after the people had enthusiastically adopted the measure, unable to endure the sight of Metellus returning, he set sail for Cappodocia and Galatia.467
Thus we have the image of an increasingly irrelevant man, powerless in Rome and determined to conjure up one last foreign war (against Mithridates). Plutarch’s other major note on Marius in this period involves an argument with his former deputy, Sulla, when at some point in the nineties, Bocchus commemorated the capture of Jugurtha with a set of statues on the Capitol depicting the handover to Sulla.468 Naturally, we are told that this benefited Sulla and angered Marius, as it would. Thus Plutarch builds up a picture of Marius, embittered, desperate for more glory, and a rival of Sulla, all of which tie in nicely to the events of 88 BC that triggered off Rome’s First Civil War.
Yet, Appian and Orosius preserve an interesting note on Marius in the nineties. In 99 BC, shortly after Saturninus’ death, a move was indeed made to recall Metellus Numidicus from exile, by two tribunes, Q. Pompeius Rufus and M. Porcius Cato.469
This was vetoed by one of their colleagues, P. Furius, who we are informed was working with (being sponsored by) Marius, though he already had a grudge against Metellus Numidicus himself.470 Here we have an interesting problem: Metellus was indeed recalled in 98 BC, with ease, according to Plutarch, yet this recall was easily blocked a year earlier. Clearly, something had changed. If Marius and his supporters were strong enough to prevent this in 99 then why were they not in 98? Two factors spring to mind. Firstly, one of the consuls of 98 was a Metellus Nepos (yet another relative, but interestingly the only Metellan consul of this decade). Secondly, we are informed that Marius was out of Rome, in the east this year.471 Whilst Plutarch places the decision to recall Metellus’ before Marius left, it is entirely possible that it was engineered after he left Rome. It is also possible that Marius negotiated with the Metellans to allow his return as a quid proquo for his mission to the east. Ultimately, as is usual in these cases, we will never know, but what is clear is that Plutarch’s image of a broken Marius can be challenged.
Analysing Marius and the rest of the decade is a difficult task and one that does not need to take place here. Marius himself held no further office in the 90s, but we need draw no clear inference from that, as Marius could easily have been working behind the scenes to place his own supporters in key positions. It is interesting that of the censors of 97 (M. Antonius and L. Valerius Flaccus), one was a colleague, and as Plutarch put it ‘servant’, of Marius and the other followed him as consul in 99 BC. Furthermore, aside from the consul of 98, there were no other Metellan consuls in this period and the Metelli seem to be a waning power in this period. Interestingly, the late 90s saw two consuls from the Iulii Caesares family (both related to Marius) in 91 and 90 BC. At the end of the day, all what can be argued, though, is that we must avoid taking the Plutarchian image of a broken Marius at face value. The man that had claimed six consulships in eight years and amassed all the money and glory he had would not easily fade
from the political scene.
Appendix II
The Other Wars of the Period 104–100 BC
As well as the two wars described in the main body of this work, towards the end of the period in question there were several other campaigns that occurred that merely added to the Roman military burden and increased the level of the crisis. These two other campaigns were the Second Servile War in Sicily and a campaign against the pirates of the eastern Mediterranean.
The Second Servile War (104–101 BC)
In 104 BC, Rome was at one of the lowest ebbs it had been at for over a century. Although the war in Africa had been won, the catastrophic defeat at Arausio in 105 had left Italy vulnerable to the northern tribes and many considered it defenceless. It is perhaps no coincidence then, that this year saw a number of outbreaks of slave revolts in Italy and the outbreak of a Second Servile War, once again in Sicily. Diodorus provides detail of a number of smaller isolated slave revolts in Italy during 104 BC, as well as one more serious. This one was actually led by a Roman landowner, T. Minucius or Ti. Vettius,472 who armed his slaves, apparently proclaimed himself king and rose up in revolt. He created an army of slaves and established a fortified position around Capua as a base for his revolt. The situation so worried the Senate that they dispatched one of the praetors, L. Licinius Lucullus with a force of 4,000 infantry and 400 cavalry to defeat him. Upon Lucullus’ arrival in the region, Minucius/Vettius took a position on top of a hill with a force of 3,500 and was able to beat Lucullus off. In the end, Lucullus only succeeded by arranging for one of Minucius/Vettius’ subordinates to betray him on promise of a pardon. The rebellion petered out and Minucius/Vettius and the majority of his followers committed suicide. This bizarre episode perhaps reflects the weakness of the Roman position on the home-front following the defeat at Arausio and the (thought to be) impending Cimbric invasion.
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