Burr spent summer and fall electioneering. Not only did his uncle accompany him on his trip through New England; Theodosia joined him as well. He met with the governor of Rhode Island, Arthur Fenner, who convinced him that his state would give some of its electoral votes to Jefferson. This information proved wrong, but it revealed the infectious optimism shared by many Republicans after the successful campaign in New York. Early on, New Jersey appeared likely to vote Republican. In September, the chairman of the Jersey Republican meeting, Major General Joseph Bloomfield, gave a rousing address to supporters, published in the Aurora, that celebrated the ticket of Jefferson and Burr; this included praise for Burr’s “great talents, his republican principles, and solicitude to preserve the independence of his county.” He was to be considered “inferior to no man in America.”80
Yet New Jersey, like Rhode Island, proved a disappointment. Burr was particularly troubled by the result in Rhode Island, and penned apologetic letters to Vice President Jefferson and John Taylor of Caroline, making sure his Virginia allies knew that he had not intentionally misled them.81
In fact, except for the rout of the Federalists in New York, most states followed predictable patterns. Jefferson and Burr swept the South and West; Maryland split its votes. New England went Federalist, and Pennsylvania gave 8 votes to the Republicans, 7 to the administration ticket. The whole process took until the end of November, at which point three candidates, Adams, Jefferson, and Burr had 65 votes each. Pinckney trailed them by just 1 vote. The entire election now fell on South Carolina, which did not convene its legislature until early December, and several of the electors still appeared undecided.82
Initially, Hamilton had hoped that the Carolinas would put Pinckney in the presidential chair: if the electors divided their votes between Jefferson and Pinckney in South Carolina, and Pinckney got a few votes from North Carolina, it might have happened that way. But by December, acting impetuously, Hamilton made any kind of Federalist victory impossible. (In the process, he destroyed his credibility within his own party.) The low point came in October, when he published a vicious pamphlet entitled Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq., President of the United States. It appears that he had originally intended to distribute his attack on Adams covertly in South Carolina, hoping to sway the state’s electors at the last minute. But his plan backfired when knowledge of the pamphlet’s existence escaped his immediate circle: an industrious Republican, most likely John Beckley, got his hands on a copy of the diatribe, and published extracts in several prominent Republican newspapers. Hamilton was then compelled to release it nationally.83
So South Carolina was just as crucial a contest as that which had taken place in New York earlier. Although the Republicans had won the assembly election there as well, signs pointed to new problems: some of the electors hinted that they would not vote a straight party ticket. It was rumored that these men had approached General Pinckney with a secret deal for a Jefferson-Pinckney ticket. Next, it was said, Pinckney weighed and rejected this proposition. Could the South Carolina Republicans hold together? At this moment, anyway, they seemed willing to break with their northern allies and put two southerners at the head of the federal government.84
Given these tensions, the local Charleston newspaper, edited by Peter Freneau, published a strong endorsement of Burr, urging electors not to simply vote for Pinckney because he “happens to belong to your own state!” This article provided a detailed and laudatory biography of Burr; it celebrated the “Manhattan company” for freeing the “long enslaved . . . poorer class of citizens,” and praised Burr’s qualifications for office. He was both a man of the Enlightenment and a man of action:
Endowed with a mind vast, liberal and comprehensive, America owes [owns] not a citizen more fitted than col. Burr, to be placed at the head of her government. With an energy and decision of character peculiar to himself, while other men are debating, he resolves; and while they resolve, he acts.
The article was signed “A Rice Planter.” It may have been the work of Joseph Alston, soon to be Burr’s son-in-law—or maybe Joseph’s father, William Alston, who was one of the most prominent planters in South Carolina. Whoever wrote the article knew Burr personally. But the article revealed something more: a conscious effort was underway to fashion Burr into a more attractive candidate and sell him to southern voters. It was his character—described here in more masculine words than were typically associated with Jefferson himself—that ostensibly raised Burr’s stature and warranted trust. Personal style mattered nearly as much as party affiliation; both were being used to overcome sectional prejudices at this critical moment.85
In the middle of December, when the votes of South Carolina went to Jefferson and Burr, the final tally still could not be made. The results in Kentucky and Tennessee were not yet known. Conflicting news spread: one report said that Burr would gain 4 votes in Kentucky and Jefferson only 3; another source had it on “good authority” that Jefferson had won by 1 vote. Supposedly, Kentucky elector Major Scott held the election in his hands. Either he had voted for Jefferson and Pinckney because of a “personal dislike to Mr. Burr,” or he was heard “to say, nay to swear, that he would not vote for Mr. Jefferson upon any account.” The country waited and wondered.86
In the midst of all the confusion, Jefferson sent Burr a curious letter. He wrote from Washington—the center of the storm—informing his running mate that the Republicans had won. His information was incomplete: he had heard that three friendly states were expected to drop 1 vote for Burr, but that would still leave Burr with 4 or 5 more votes than Adams. Jefferson went on to repeat the recent rumor that some “highflying” Federalists planned to subvert the election, if it turned out that the two Republicans had an equal number of votes. If this were the case, the Federalists could put off the final decision (in the House of Representatives) past the scheduled March 4, 1801, inauguration date.87
Jefferson dreaded a tie. He wrote with hesitation. He flattered Burr, regretting the “chasm” in his plans if events made it such that Burr would not be able to serve in his cabinet. His cabinet? What was the presumptive president saying to his future vice president? Perhaps he was reflecting on the unimportance of the vice presidency, the position he himself still occupied. Or perhaps he was preparing Burr for electoral defeat, assuring him that he would not be overlooked if somehow Adams still ended up with more votes. It is also possible that Jefferson was simply trying to prod Burr into agreeing not to compete with him, if the election did in fact end in a tie.88
Jefferson was covering all possibilities. He did not wish to alienate Burr (or his New York supporters). He adroitly appealed to Burr’s sense of decorum and propriety, insisting that he took no part in “dropping votes intentionally”—he stayed apart from this activity out of a sense of “decency.” And he observed that, as vice president, Burr would be an integral part of his administration.89
A week later, Burr answered. There was no need to worry, he assured Jefferson, “if the Votes should come out alike for us.” He spoke for himself as well as his “personal friends,” who were “perfectly informed of my wishes on the subject and can never think of diverting a single vote from you.” Significantly, he agreed to “cheerfully abandon the office of vice president if it shall be thought that I can be more useful in any active station.” And he concluded his letter with a promise: “my whole time and attention shall be unceasingly employed to render your Administration grateful and honorable to our country and to yourself.” Jefferson had his concession, and a solid declaration of loyalty.90
When the results were known, Jefferson had 73 electoral votes; Burr 73; Adams 65; Pinckney 64; Jay 1. The election would have to be decided in the House of Representatives. Many southerners were furious when they learned of the tie; one angry Republican wrote James Madison that the Virginians had erred in being “too honest” rather than ensuring victory to their favorite.91
The election tie created an unimaginable dilemma. Symbolizing the ironic conjoining of the two names, the Aurora reported that upon the news of the Republican victory, a woman in Newport, Rhode Island, gave birth to twins. To honor the occasion, the two infants were christened on Christmas Day, “the eldest Thomas Jefferson, the younger Aaron Burr.” The tie made Jefferson and Burr political “twins,” bound by fate. Unlike the Newport twins, they were not joined by any “involuntary attachment”; they could not read each other’s minds. Jefferson and Burr responded to the crisis differently, receiving dissimilar reports (some accurate, some grossly distorted). Neither candidate had complete control over the outcome. Both had to depend on others to carry out their “wishes,” as Burr confided to Jefferson. Yet even news entrusted to “personal friends” might be manipulated or misconstrued. So, in addition to the “highflying” Federalists, Republicans also had to battle what Burr called “phantoms,” owing in large measure to sectional distrust that threatened to divide the party.92
Northern and southern Republicans had been held together by a tenuous compact since the beginning of the campaign. Burr had joined the Republican ticket with one clear stipulation. In agreeing to run for vice president in May, he had conveyed serious misgivings to James Nicholson. As Nicholson explained it, Burr was unwilling to seek national office without southern concurrence, recalling 1796, “in which he was certainly ill used by Virg[ini]a & no[rth] Carolina.” Their wasted votes for George Clinton and Samuel Adams had only embarrassed Burr. He insisted on party loyalty this time, asking “if assurances can be given that the southern states will act fairly.” On the same day, Hannah Gallatin echoed her father’s warning: “Burr says he has no confidence in the Virginians; they once deceived him, and they are not to be trusted.”93
Burr voiced his concerns directly in a letter to the Virginian John Taylor of Caroline on October 23. “After what happened in the last election (et tu Brute!),” he railed, “it is most obvious that I should not choose to be trifled with.” Over and over, he had made plain what he expected from southerners; he refused to be humiliated a second time. He had spelled out his code of ethics and honor in writing to Jefferson on the success of the earlier New York elections, and expected the same rules to apply to the national campaign: there should be “no indecency, no unfairness, no personal abuse,” he insisted at that time. That was Burr, in 1800.94
Nonetheless, the threat of betrayal loomed over the entire election. Over the next two months, Republicans confronted a variety of Federalist plots, some real, others imagined, and all requiring a response. It became impossible to know what the truth was, or whose word could be trusted. There were temptations to make backroom deals, and that dealmaking, unfortunately, was in the hands of middlemen like Samuel Smith—proxies for the candidates—whose motives were unclear.
“I SHALL ACT IN DEFIANCE OF ALL TIMID TEMPORIZING PROJECTS”
Even before the votes were officially counted on February 11, it was clear to everyone in Washington that Jefferson and Burr had tied for the presidency. And it was just as obvious that election guidelines no longer matched political practice. The Constitution made no allowances for a two-party system or for any party at all: it simply dictated that the person with the most electoral votes became president, and the second place finisher was awarded the vice presidency. If a tie occurred, the House was to “immediately” choose between the candidates, voting not as individuals, but as state delegations—each state had 1 vote. A majority (nine states at this time) was needed to confirm the House’s choice.
Partisanship seriously compromised what should have been a straightforward procedure. The election could not be resolved without Federalist cooperation, and this gave them the upper hand in any negotiations. Theodore Sedgwick reported as much to Hamilton, observing that the tie “rendered the Jacobins in the House more civil in their attentions than I have ever known them.” Given the current composition of the legislature, Jefferson could muster at most eight states, one shy of the required majority.95
By voting for Burr, Federalists quickly realized that they could bar Jefferson from the presidency. If they failed to convince a few Republicans to switch sides, they could simply refuse to elect any president at all, opening the door for an interregnum (and Federalist) government to conduct the nation’s business until another election was held. The Constitution was ambiguous; it did not list the precise steps to be followed if no one was elected. Rumors spread that the Federalists aimed to pass a law allowing for the president pro-tem of the Senate, secretary of state, or the chief justice of the Supreme Court to act as chief executive while the government was in limbo. New York senator Gouverneur Morris informed Hamilton that a serious effort was underway to “cast about” for a successor. The possibilities seemed endless. One writer to the Washington Federalist proposed that if neither Jefferson nor Burr was elected, then Adams and Jefferson should be left in charge as if the election had never taken place.96
The Republicans found themselves in an unenviable position. They could wait and see what the Federalists might do, or they could try to counteract, or even preempt, them. The first step was to try to persuade certain Federalists of the hopelessness of their scheme. In December 1800, when Burr wrote to Jefferson, he sent a similar letter to Samuel Smith, asking his “proxy” to declare his sentiments to others in Washington. He made it a strict point of honor: “every Man who knows me ought to know that I should utterly disclaim all competition,” and to the conniving House members he was specific: “Be assured that the federal party can entertain no wish for such an exchange.” Smith’s publication of Burr’s renunciation did little to curb Federalist machinations. Burr had no choice in the affair, some of them dared to argue, because he had a duty to comply with the will of the people (which was now embodied in the House vote). Others scoffed at his disavowal, dismissing it as a ploy that cleverly disguised his actual ambition.97
Second-guessing Burr was nothing new. Even before the election tie, cynical Federalists had convinced themselves that Burr was capable of changing sides. Some hoped that he would “see the light,” realizing that the Virginians would never truly embrace him. Others thought he was “on the market,” ready to sell his talents to whichever party had the best chance of winning.98
Many Federalists arrogantly assumed, as Robert Troup did, that they knew Burr’s motives better than he did. Senator Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina took this kind of self-serving reasoning to a new level during the election crisis. To his colleagues in the House, he presented himself as “an intimate friend of Mr. Burr.” He advised his fellow Federalists to support Burr fully, requiring no assurances as to the policies to be pursued in a Burr administration. On December 24, Harper sent Burr a curious letter, urging him to do nothing; he warned him not to acknowledge “overtures” from members of the House, and to “keep the game perfectly in [his] hand.” He even told Burr not to answer his letter. Burr’s actual intentions apparently mattered little to the overconfident Harper.99
While some Federalists pretended to know his views, and others thought Burr would feel obliged to work with them, many, like Massachusetts congressman Harrison Gray Otis, gloated over the chance to “sow” among the Republicans the “seeds of a mortal division.” Voting for Burr would humiliate Jefferson. Initially, Hamilton agreed, confiding to Adams’s secretary of the treasury, Oliver Wolcott, that it might prove useful to “lure” Burr into a compromising situation that would ultimately prove difficult for him, that is, to “lay the foundation of dissention between two chiefs.” But for those Federalists who seriously considered putting Burr in the presidential chair, a darker plot emerged: that of converting the imposter president into a puppet prince. Federalists could lose the election and yet be the power behind the throne, taking advantage of the fact that Burr would be a weak leader without popular support. Theodore Sedgwick told his son that Burr “will not be able to administer the government without the aid of the federalists
& this aid he cannot obtain unless his administration is federal.” Between Sedgwick and Harper, there was no rational perspective as to what Burr himself might have thought.100
In defense of Burr, Federalists made two arguments. The first was simply that they should vote for him because he was not Jefferson; that is, he did not strike them as a deist, a theorist, or a democrat, and most important, he was not a Virginian. The second argument in favor of Burr was that he impressed many Federalists as a “vigorous practical man,” who combined “courage” with “generosity,” as Gouverneur Morris described the view of his House colleagues. Here again, Burr’s appeal was his military record and his balance of masculine traits.101 One article in the Washington Federalist celebrated him as a man of action, with a “strong and comprehensive mind,” who was “neither timid nor wavering” but “firm, intrepid and energetic.” As one who never “shrank from the post of danger,” he was “equally fitted for service in the field, and in the public counsels.” Burr’s well-defined masculinity was preferred to Jefferson’s effete pose as a draftsman:
[Burr] never penned a declaration of independence, I admit;—but he has done much more—he has engraved that declaration in capitals with the point of his sword: It is yet legible on the walls of Quebeck. He fought for that independency, for which Mr. Jefferson only wrote. He has gallantly exposed his life in support of that declaration and for the protection of its penn-man; He has been liberal of his blood, while Mr. Jefferson has only hazarded his ink.
Burr had the guts to take the field in order to protect weaker men like Jefferson who sat scribbling at their desks. Burr was an officer and a gentleman who possessed “urbanity of manners,” whereas the Virginian was but a “cool, dark, designing theorist.” According to the Federalist definition of right to rule, Burr easily bested the Republican standard-bearer.102
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