26. ASMAE, AISS, b. 35, “Udienza dal Cardinale Segretario di Stato—Venerdì 1 giugno 1934,” “Udienza da S.E. il Capo del governo—Lunedì 4 giugno 1934,” “Udienza dal Cardinale Pacelli—Martedì 5 giugno 1935.” The Goebbels passage is taken from his novel Michael (Steigmann-Gall 2003, pp. 20–21). Faulhaber’s report is quoted in Wolf 2010, pp. 162–63. On June 15, the day of the meeting of the two dictators, De Vecchi met with Pacelli to reassure him that Mussolini would be forcefully raising the pope’s points. ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 361, ff. 32/33, “L’Ambasciatore d’Italia,” 15 giugno 1934.
27. Mussolini was also concerned about the German-speaking population of Italy’s Alto Adige region, which Italy had acquired following the First World War, and whose allegiances were in doubt.
28. DDI, series 7, vol. 14, n. 112, “Colloqui fra il capo del governo,. Mussolini, e il cancelliere federale austriaco Dollfuss, Riccione,” 19–20 agosto 1933; Lamb 1997, pp. 100–1.
29. DDI, series 7, vol. 14, n. 246, “Appunto,” 3 ottobre 1933.
30. Kershaw 1999, p. 282. On the political uses of Mussolini’s body, see Luzzatto’s (1998) excellent book.
31. Rauscher 2004, pp. 193–94.
32. De Felice (1974, p. 494) disputes the common view that Mussolini’s German was too weak to understand Hitler, quoting Hitler’s Italian translator: “The Duce usually spoke German, with a heavy accent, very slowly, carefully articulating every syllable, and it was clear that he spoke it willingly.”
33. Milza 2000, pp. 694–96.
34. De Felice 1974, p. 505.
35. ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 361, ff.52/53, “L’Ambasciatore d’Italia,” 6 luglio 1934.
36. DDI, series 7, vol. 15, n. 469, “Colloquio fra il Capo del Governo … e … De Vecchi,” 2 luglio 1934.
37. ASMAE, AISS, b. 35, Mussolini a De Vecchi, 22 giugno 1934.
38. Lamb 1997, pp. 106–7.
39. ACS, MCPG, b.158, “Riservato, da fonte Vaticana,” Roma, 26 luglio 1934.
40. Ventresca 2013, p. 85.
41. Quoted in Fattorini 2007, p. 110n8. According to Orsenigo, the bishops voiced no objection to Hitler’s claim. Duce 2006, pp. 32–33, based on Orsenigo’s March 7, 1933 report to Pacelli. The bishop of Osnabrück said that at the meeting Hitler spoke “not a word against the church, only appreciation for the bishops.” The themes used by the Nazis to vilify the Jews (Herf 2006, pp. 37–41) were largely the same as those pushed by the Vatican’s unofficial journal La Civiltà cattolica. From the 1920s, Hitler and his sidekick Joseph Goebbels had warned of a Jewish conspiracy against Western civilization and of Jewish control of high finance, the press, and Bolshevism. It was all aimed at reducing Christians to the Jews’ servants.
42. ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, ff. 14r–19r. See also Hubert Wolf’s (2010, pp. 184–90) discussion of the case.
43. Wolf 2010, p. 190.
44. “Anti-Semitic struggle has assumed an official government character. Intervention Representative of Holy See would be equivalent to a protest against a government law.” ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, f. 5r. And a few days later: “Unfortunately the anti-Semitic principle has been accepted and sanctioned by the entire government, and this fact will unfortunately remain as an ignoble stain on the very first pages of the history that German National Socialism—not without its merits—is writing!” ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, 6r–6v, 11 aprile 1933.
45. The remarkable correspondence between Ambassador Vittorio Cerruti and Mussolini at the end of March and early April 1933 records these frenetic attempts. ASMAE, Gab., b. 668. The Duce’s telegram to Cerruti is reproduced in DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 327, Mussolini a Cerruti, 30 marzo 1933. The telegram containing the Duce’s message to Hitler is found in the ASMAE file, labeled “absolute precedence, personal for His Excellency Cerruti.” Cerruti’s wife, whom he met in Vienna, was Hungarian and, although she does not discuss it in her memoir, was apparently from a Jewish family. Cerruti 1953. Pacelli knew that the Duce was voicing this criticism, as did, most likely, the pope himself.
46. ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, f. 5r, Orsenigo a Pacelli, 9 aprile 1933. The (undated) note regarding Mussolini’s protest is at AESG, pos. 643, fasc.158, f. 8r. Mussolini met with Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, in late April. Weizmann described the campaign of Nazi persecution of the Jews in these early weeks of Hitler’s rule, and told of his plan to try to get permission to have large numbers of Germany’s Jews migrate to Palestine. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 480, “Colloqui fra il capo del governo … Mussolini e Chaim Weizmann,” 26 aprile 1933. The next month an Italian envoy to Germany reported back to Mussolini that the Nazi leaders were beginning to have second thoughts about their anti-Semitic campaign, given the bad publicity it was generating. “Thus,” he wrote, “the Duce, whose thought I clearly laid out to Hitler both in the past and recently, is beginning to be shown to have been right.” If, as he thought likely, Hitler was about to soften the restrictions on the Jews, the Jews would have Mussolini to thank. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 595, Renzetti a Chiavolini, Berlino, 14 maggio 1933.
Remarkably, in reaction to Mussolini’s pleas, Franz von Papen, German vice chancellor, meeting with the Duce in Rome on April 10, assured him that he recognized “that the campaign against the Jews was an error.” Mussolini also took advantage of the meeting to stress the importance for the new Nazi regime of maintaining good relations with the Holy See. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 401, “Colloquio fra il Capo del Governo e Ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, e il Vice Cancelliere del Reich, Papen,” Roma, 10 aprile 1933. The next day both von Papen and Hermann Göring, Hitler’s henchman and president of the Reichs tag, met with the pope at the Vatican. We have no account of what was said; L’Osservatore romano simply reported that the meetings had taken place, offering no comment or explanation. “Nostre informazioni,” OR, 13 aprile 1933, p. 1.
47. Neither the Vatican nor the German bishops’ organization protested the Nuremberg Laws; nor did they voice any opposition to the renewed Nazi campaign to demonize the Jews. Wolf 2010, p. 217.
48. Taking up this theme at the 1935 Nuremberg Rally, Joseph Goebbels spoke of the Jews’ secret plan for “international Jewish world domination.” Herf 2006, pp. 41–42.
49. Ledóchowski addressed the letter to Pacelli, hoping he would convince the pope of the need for the encyclical. At the time, the Nazi government was mounting a highly publicized trial of Jesuits, charging them with illegally exporting funds abroad, but strikingly, the Jesuit leader was defending Hitler. In July, in talking to Pignatti, Ledóchowski blamed Goebbels and Rosenberg—noted enemies of the Catholic Church—for the problems, telling the Italian ambassador that he thought it very possible that Hitler did not approve of the campaign against the religious orders that was then under way. ASMAE, APG, b. 33, fasc. 1, Pignatti al ministero degli affari esteri, “Processi antireligiosi in Germania,” 14 luglio 1936.
50. Ferdinand Lassalle was one of the founders of the socialist movement in mid-nineteenth-century Germany.
51. Fattorini 2007, pp. 64–69.
52. How to explain the apparent contradiction of Jews controlling both capitalism and Communism? The Jesuit journal’s answer was that both grew out of “a materialistic economic conception of the world, of Jewish-Puritan origin.” But something more nefarious was at work, for despite all appearances, socialism was but a tool that the Jews used as “an arm and a means of destruction that favors the designs of international finance.”
53. “La questione giudaica,” CC 1936 IV, pp. 37–46.
54. CC 1936 IV, pp. 83–85.
55. Herf (2006, pp. 95–96) cites the important work of Pinkus 1988 on this topic. See also AJC 1939, pp. 56–59. Members of the USSR government organs are listed in The Statesman’s Year Book for 1935 and for 1938. As Hitler was railing against the Jewish-Communist threat in late 1936, La Civilità cattolica recommended to its readers Alfredo Rosmanini’s Ebrei, cristianesimo, fascismo (Jews, Christianity, Fascism), praising this influentia
l anti-Semitic, Fascist diatribe as “written with sincerity and the warmth of faith.” It “can do good among the people.” “A collection of articles and essays on the communist, atheist, destructive danger,” its enthusiastic review began, “in which Judaism plays a large role, and on the merits of Fascism in defending religion and social order.” It went on: “We note that the influence of not a few Jews, as exploiters, is well known.” Here the journal added a reference to its own recent article on the subject. CC 1936 IV, p. 252. Calimani (2007, p. 235) terms the Rosmanini book the first intensely anti-Semitic book to come out of the Fascist regime’s anti-Semitic campaign.
CHAPTER 16: CROSSING THE BORDER
1. The French ambassador, François Charles-Roux, reported on February 15, 1935, that Dalla Torre told him of the pope’s concern about a possible invasion. Charles-Roux at the time did not think Mussolini would be so rash as to launch one. DDF, series 1, vol. 9, n. 226.
2. When Mussolini sent two army divisions to Somaliland in March, blessed by various Italian cardinals on their departure, the French chargé d’affaires to the Vatican reported that the blessings occasioned much comment. DDF, series 1, vol. 9, n. 400, Truelle à Laval. On the military buildup, see Del Boca 2010, pp. 90–92.
3. ACS, MCPG, b. 172, Zanetti, 25 giugno 1935.
4. Bosworth 2011, p. 171.
5. Tardini 1988, p. 332; C. Wingfield, Annual Report 1934, January 12, 1935, R 402/402/22, in Hachey 1972, pp. 287–88, sections 138–40.
6. ACS, MCPG, b. 172, Zanetti, 19 giugno 1935.
7. McCormick 1957, pp. 69–76.
8. DDF, series 1, vol. 11, n. 348, Charles-Roux à Laval, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 24 juillet 1935. Months earlier, in February, Dalla Torre, the editor of L’Osservatore romano, had been telling the French ambassador about the pope’s worries concerning Mussolini’s plans for a war in Ethiopia. DDF, series 1, vol. 9, n. 226, Charles-Roux à Laval, 15 février 1935. Chargé d’affaires Talamo reported in late June on the Avvenire article, which he said reflected Vatican attitudes toward the Ethiopian situation. DDI, series 8, vol. 1, n. 450, Talamo a Mussolini, 27 giugno 1935.
9. Ceci 2008, p. 297; Ceci 2010, p. 43. Ceci 2010 offers an excellent analysis of the evolution of the pope’s position in the Ethiopian war.
10. “He is very friendly and obliging,” the British envoy to the Vatican wrote some time later in a capsule description of Pizzardo, “but very much overworked and not of first class ability.” R5802/5802/22, FCRSE, pt. 14, p. 155, Osborne to Halifax, June 21, 1938.
11. Talamo learned the news from Augusto Ciriaci, national Catholic Action head, who rushed to tell him early that morning, in an effort at damage control. Since Cesare De Vecchi had been appointed minister of education earlier that year, Talamo was serving as acting ambassador.
12. Tardini 1988, p. 385.
13. Ibid., pp. 385–86.
14. The Times of London called attention to the pope’s remarks that “a war of conquest, an offensive, unjust war, [would be] unspeakably horrible.” “Views of the Pope on Abyssinia,” Times, September 2, 1935, p. 11. The Washington Post the same day carried a front-page article titled “Pontiff Plans Plea to Il Duce to Avert War,” curiously highlighting the key role that Tacchi Venturi was to play in bringing the pope’s message to Mussolini. The following day the paper devoted an editorial to the pope’s plea for peace, attributing a highly dubious quote to Tacchi Venturi. “Pope to Emperor,” WP, September 3, 1935, p. 8.
15. ASMAE, AISS, b. 56, fasc. 1, sf. 1b, Pignatti a Mussolini, 30 agosto 1935.
16. Verdier’s account is in Papin 1977, p. 63.
17. Ibid., pp. 56, 62.
18. Bosworth 2002, pp. 304–5.
19. MAEI, vol. 266, 269–71, Charles-Roux à président du conseil, 17 septembre 1932. However, he drew the line at receiving the Fascist children in their black shirts and military uniforms, for the sight of children dressed for war repelled him. De Rossi dell’Arno 1954, p. 46.
20. “Per la celebrazione del decennale in Italia,” OR, 3 novembre 1932, p. 1; discussed in MAEI, vol. 266, 294–97, Charles-Roux à président du conseil, 3 novembre 1932. The article has a curious backstory. Giuseppe Dalla Torre, the paper’s editor and perhaps the only layman who felt free to visit the pope while dressed informally, apparently refused a request from the secretary of state office to write the tribute. Agostino 1991, p. 153. Mussolini was long convinced, with good reason, that Dalla Torre was hostile to him. Charles-Roux relied on Dalla Torre for inside word on the pope’s views, and during the Ethiopian crisis, Dalla Torre expressed his opinion that both of the pope’s emissaries to Mussolini, Borgongini and Tacchi Venturi, were in the Duce’s pocket and filtering out much of the pope’s criticism in attempting to win the Duce’s favor. DDF, series 2, vol. 1, n. 107, Charles-Roux à Flandrin, ministre des affaires etrangères, 27 janvier 1936. Knowing of Augusto Ciriaci’s enthusiasm for the regime, Pacelli turned to him to draft the piece. Ciriaci did so. Then Pius XI added much of his own, finalizing the article. ASMAE, AISS, b. 21, fasc. 8, De Vecchi a Mussolini. Not everyone in the Church appreciated the panegyric to Mussolini, including some of Dalla Torre’s colleagues on the Osservatore romano staff. What was next? they asked. Would L’Osservatore romano be replacing its emblem of the papal tiara with the Fascist fasces? ASMAE, AISS, b. 21, f. 8, Città del Vaticano, 3 novembre 1932.
21. ASMAE, AISS, b. 56, fasc.1, sf. 1c, Pacelli a Mussolini, 14 settembre 1935. According to an informant’s report, the pope sent Tacchi Venturi on a secret mission to England to lobby local Catholics to support the Italian government in the face of strong British opposition to Mussolini’s war plans. But no evidence has yet been found to suggest that this trip ever took place. ACS, DAGR, b. 1320, informatore n. 52, Roma, 12 settembre 1935.
22. ASV, AESS, pos. 430a, fasc. 352, ff. 49, 20 settembre 1935.
23. ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 1, ff. 156r–159r. At his meeting on September 27 with Charles-Roux, the pope repeated his fears that disaster could befall Italy and Mussolini if the Duce were to go ahead with his planned invasion. He had offered to meet with Mussolini secretly to discuss how he might help negotiate a way out of the war, he told the French ambassador, but Mussolini had declined. DDF, series 1, vol. 12, n. 254, Charles-Roux à Laval, 27 septembre 1935.
24. Quoted in Milza 2000, p. 724.
25. ACS, CR, b. 68, Tacchi Venturi a Mussolini, 3 ottobre 1935.
26. DDF, series 1, vol. 12, n. 412, Charles-Roux à Laval, 10 octobre 1935 (footnote 1).
27. Pacelli’s original envelope and letter to the king are found not in the royal archives in London but in the Vatican archives. That fact tells the story. A handwritten note on the Vatican file explains: “Letter signed by Cardinal Pacelli to the king of England 3 October 1931. Note: The letter was first accepted, and then sent back by the British Legation.” ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. I, ff. 201r–208r. The British prime minister viewed the pope’s attempt to communicate directly with the king on a matter of foreign policy to be a breach of diplomatic protocol.
28. Del Boca 2010, pp. 104–7.
29. Federico 2003, p. 590.
30. ACS, MCPG, b. 159, 1 febbraio 1935. On leaving his post, De Vecchi was honored by the pope, who presented him with a gold medal and rich praise. CC 1935 I, pp. 423–24, 647. According to an informant, the pope was fond of De Vecchi, and it was he who told the Vatican daily to print a laudatory article about the departing ambassador. ACS, MCPG, b. 159, informatore, Roma, 5 febbraio 1935. Back in 1932 Cardinal Pacelli was already hearing rumors that De Vecchi would be replaced and began speculating about who his replacement would be. He made clear that he thought De Vecchi a rather mediocre sort. MAEI, vol. 266, 250–54, Charles-Roux au président du conseil, 25 juillet 1932.
31. ASV, AESI, pos. 985, fasc. 658, ff. 23r–27r. On Pignatti’s diplomatic experience, see Casella 2010, p. 185n1. Rumors about who De Vecchi’s replacement would be had swirled around Rome. Many of the most illustrious names of the regime were mentioned, from
Federzoni to Alfredo Rocco to Mussolini’s son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano. Before naming Pignatti, Mussolini had sought the pope’s approval. The pope in turn had contacted Monsignor Luigi Maglione, his nuncio to France, who assured him that the count was a good choice, a practicing Catholic, a fine father, intelligent, modest, and upright. ACS, MI, PP, b. 168, informatori, relazioni, 3 marzo, 22 marzo, 27 marzo.
32. In short, concluded the new ambassador, “the Holy Father spoke like a good Italian.” ASMAE, APSS, b. 25, fasc. 2, 13 ottobre 1935; Casella 2010, p. 189.
33. H. Montgomery, Annual Report 1935, January 9, 1936, R 217/217/22, in Hachey 1927, pp. 322–23, sections 161–64; MAESS, vol. 37, 188–89, Charles-Roux, télégramme, Affaires étrangères, 17 décembre 1935.
34. Garzonio 1996; Rumi 1996, pp. 38–39; De Vecchi 1983, p. 219.
35. The informant cautioned that the archbishop’s behavior was opportunistic rather than ideological, adding, “it is best not to trust too much as the priest will be fascist only as long as things go in his favor.” ACS, MI, FP “Schuster,” informatore n. 52, Milano, 3 gennaio 1935.
36. Saresella 1990, p. 460.
37. Ceci 2010, pp. 86–87.
38. Quoted in Baudrillart 1996, pp. 193–94 (5 mai 1936).
39. At an October 24 meeting—diplomatic efforts to prevent the economic sanctions having failed—Mussolini told Tacchi Venturi that the pope’s hopes for French intercession to help mediate the dispute were misplaced. Tell the pope, said the Duce, that our friendship with France is finished. Only Nazi Germany remained Italy’s friend. “Who would have thought,” Mussolini added, “that our friends of twenty years ago … would have become our enemies, and we would have to become friends with our enemies of that time.… God knows what’s going to happen.” ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 2, ff. 80r–80v, “Udienza col Capo del Governo,” 24 ottobre 1935, P.T.V.
40. DDI, series 8, vol. 2, n. 664, Pignatti a Mussolini, 19 novembre 1935.
The Pope and Mussolini Page 51
