15. Pignatti conveyed the message; his memo does not directly cite Pacelli as the source but implies it: “the Holy See does not want any comments in the Italian press to emphasize that this letter reflects Vatican opposition to Nazism.” ASMAE, APSS, b. 35, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Appunto.”
16. Pignatti said that Pacelli, whom he saw often, did “not want a break in relations and has been cheered up lately, after having seen that the other side has also hesitated to push the fight to the next level.” ASMAE, AISS, b. 67, fasc. 9, Pignatti a Ciano, “Le tre Encicliche Pasquali,” 1 aprile 1937. The Italian chargé d’affaires analyzed the German reaction to the encyclical in a memo sent the next day to Ciano. DDI, series 8, vol. 6, n. 388, Magistrati a Ciano, Berlino, 2 aprile 1937. On April 17 Ciano reported to the Italian ambassador in Berlin on Cardinal Pacelli’s comments about not wanting Hitler to see the encyclical as an attack on Nazism; he attached a copy of Pignatti’s report detailing his conversation with Pacelli. Ciano remarked that the German bishops had pressured the pope into preparing the encyclical and the pope had gone ahead with it “without worrying about the consequences.” Mussolini and his son-in-law were most worried about the consequences that a papal repudiation of the Nazis would have on their own plans to bring Italy ever closer to the Third Reich. But they remained convinced that the pope approved of Mussolini and could be counted on to resist those in the Church outside Italy who wanted him to denounce Fascism along with Nazism. As Pignatti put it, “I have it from an authoritative source that some advisers of the Pontiff would have liked the papal document to strike at all totalitarian regimes. Pius XI rejected these suggestions.”
“The Cardinal Secretary of State,” Pignatti reported in the letter that Ciano sent on to Berlin, “did not expressly ask me for an intervention in Berlin by Your Excellency, but he did not conceal from me the great wish that the Holy See be helped in this moment to avoid a rupture and facilitate an accommodation.” Ciano then came to the point, telling his ambassador in Berlin: “I pray that Your Excellency will want to weigh the opportunity of taking action with this Government in the sense and within the limits suggested by the Cardinal Secretary of State.” ASMAE, APG, b. 38, Ciano a Regia Ambasciata, Berlino, telegramma in partenza n. 740, 7 aprile 1937. In reporting a role for the Duce in urging Hitler not to risk a break with the Vatican in the wake of the encyclical, the Boston Globe strangely reported that Tacchi Venturi “carried the Italian Premier’s appeal for moderation to Hitler.” “Duce Aids Nazi in Vatican Row,” BG, April 16, 1937, p. 11. Chenaux (2005) offers extensive evidence to show that Cardinal Pacelli in this period “never stopped hammering with the same message,” namely, that Mit brennender Sorge did not entail a condemnation of the Nazi state or the Nazi Party as such, and that “the search for a modus vivendi with the regime remained the primary goal of the Holy See’s policies toward Germany” (p. 264). On April 30 Pacelli sent a long letter to Bergen rejecting the hostile interpretation the German government had given the encyclical. DGFP, series D, vol. 1b, n. 649.
17. DGFP, series D, vol. 1b, n. 650, “Memorandum by the Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath,” Rome, May 4, 1937.
18. “Conversation between the Duce and Herr Frank, Palazzo Venezia,” September 23, 1936, quoted in Muggeridge 1948, pp. 47–48.
19. “Mundelein Rips into Hitler for Church Attacks,” CDT, May 19, 1937, p. 7.
20. Mundelein was born and raised in New York City, his father from a family of German origin, his mother Irish American. He had been appointed archbishop of Chicago in 1914, when he was only forty-two. He had traveled to Rome in 1924 to take his cardinal’s hat and on other occasions as well. Mundelein was well known to the pope, who was pleased by the financial support he continued to bring with him from Chicago. Mundelein also had a personal relationship with Franklin Roosevelt, whom he had publicly supported from the time he became president in 1933. In 1934, on his way to Rome, Mundelein visited the president in Hyde Park. He continued to visit Roosevelt regularly over the next years. The president saw Mundelein—the only American cardinal outside the northeast—as important to his effort to attract Catholic support. Kantowicz 1983, pp. 220–36.
21. This is the version of Mundelein’s remarks communicated by the German foreign ministry to the German embassy to the Holy See. DGFP, series D, vol. 1c, n. 652, 21 maggio 1937. Pacelli requested an explanation of his speech. Mundelein responded, writing to the Vatican delegate in Washington: “This time, being provoked by the daily repetitions in the press of the so-called morality trials in Germany … I just hurriedly wrote what was on my mind and gave it to the priests just as I wrote it.” Quoted in Trisco 2012, p. 159. The trials had started in 1935 but were suspended for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games; Hitler ordered them resumed on April 7, 1937, and by the time of Mundelein’s speech, they were getting massive publicity in Germany. Hundreds of Catholic priests and members of religious orders were put on trial, accused of having “unnatural sexual relations” or luring children into sexual acts. Front-page newspaper headlines warned of “moral degeneracy” in the Catholic clergy and of “corrupters of youth clad in cassocks.” The priests and monks were vilified for exploiting their priestly relationship with children to engage in “unnatural fornication.” Given the German government’s efforts to end the hold the Catholic Church had on education and youth activity in Catholic areas, the campaign was a propaganda bonanza for the Nazis. German foreign ministry to the German embassy to the Holy See, DGFP, series D, vol. 1b, n. 642, 7 aprile 1937; Trisco 2012, p. 153; Micheler 2005, pp. 113–14. Historians have almost uniformly presented these trials as evidence of the Nazi regime’s persecution of the Catholic Church and of Nazi homophobia. Micheler 2005, p. 113. They were certainly both, but the extent to which the alleged behavior had some basis in fact has not been systematically examined.
22. DGFP, series D, vol. 1c, n. 655, Bergen to the German foreign minister, Vatican, May 25, 1937; ibid., n. 657, Bergen to the German foreign minister, Vatican, May 26, 1937; ibid., n. 658, Neurath to the German embassy to the Holy See, May 27, 1937.
Two weeks before Cardinal Mundelein’s speech, Chicago’s Italian consul general had visited him. In their amicable conversation, the archbishop expressed “his admiration for the Duce and for Fascism, asserting that Italy today is a country that the Church can truly count on.” In response to the consul’s question, Mundelein acknowledged that some American Catholic priests had succumbed to anti-Fascist propaganda, but he assured him they were not numerous. ASMAE, APSS, b. 35, “Visita del R. Console Generale in Chicago al Cardinale Mundelein,” telespresso 215383, 8 maggio 1937.
23. Pacelli shared these thoughts with the French cardinal Baudrillart. Bauldrillart 1996, p. 476 (7 avril 1937).
24. “Pope’s Voice Fails As Health Wanes,” NYT, May 19, 1937, p. 9; “Pope Has Setback On 80th Birthday,” NYT, June 1, 1937, p. 25. An informant, referring to the pope’s continued ill health, characterized him as “more irritable and surly than ever.” ACS, MCPG, b. 172, fasc. 23, informatore, 15 maggio 1937.
25. Baudrillart 1996 p. 536 (21 juin 1937).
26. Mussolini’s remarks were made to Tacchi Venturi. ARSI, TV, b. 25, fasc. 1950, Tacchi Venturi a Pizzardo, 31 maggio 1937.
27. Fattorini 2007, p. 95. The previous December Pacelli had sent the Vatican’s sympathies to Franco, expressing his hope for the Generalissimo’s “rapid and total” victory. Ibid., p. 96.
28. Carlo Rosselli’s brother Nello was also killed in the attack, having had the misfortune of visiting his brother at the time the assassins struck. Mussolini most likely knew and approved of the murder plan, although no proof has yet been found. In discussing the case, while admitting that the Duce probably did give his approval, De Felice (1981, pp. 420–21) raises the possibility that he may have learned about it only after the fact. This seems unlikely. On the three murders, see Mack Smith 1983, p. 8.
29. “In Rome, people are convinced that [Pizzardo’s] rather predominant role will end on the pope’s
death. He is a prodigious worker, but he is not, they say, up to his role either by intelligence or by outlook.” With the ailing pope in Castel Gandolfo, a police informant reported, Pizzardo “remains the true padrone” in the Vatican. ACS, MCPG, b. 172.
30. He particularly wanted the last sentence strengthened. Pizzardo should drop the word noteworthy in describing the absence of cases of friction over the past several years between the Vatican and the Fascist regime: there were no cases of friction at all, noteworthy or not. The second change he wanted was to replace “there has often been even a fruitful collaboration between the two [the Vatican and Mussolini]” with “it has been usual for the two authorities to proceed upon the ground of a fruitful collaboration.”
31. The magazine was The Tablet, and its author, Father Hilary Carpenter, was the Dominican prior of Blackfriars Monastery in Oxford. ASV, AESS, pos. 555, fasc. 588, 3r, ff. 5r, 23r–43r. This file also includes the letter from Carpenter bowing to the higher ecclesiastical request and saying he would send in a retraction of his anti-Fascist views. The August 7 issue of The Tablet carried the abbot’s retraction. “I am informed authoritatively that I have been mistaken in bracketing Fascism and Nazism with relation to the Church, as though both merited the same condemnation … since the Concordat of 1931 [sic] not only have there been no cases of friction between the ecclesiastical authority and the Italian government, but for the most part the two authorities have proceeded along the lines of a fruitful collaboration.… I beg to be allowed to state my unqualified acceptance of the above information.” Quoted in Chadwick 1986, pp. 12–13.
32. The volcanic and not entirely stable Fontanges had followed Charles de Chambrun, the French ambassador to Italy, to the Gare du Nord in Paris. There she took out a revolver and shot at him twice. Fortunately, her skills as an assassin were inferior to her other talents, and she wounded him only lightly. Tronel 2007; De Felice 1974, p. 303n1.
33. Magda Fontanges, “My Love Affair with Mussolini,” Liberty, August 17, 1940, part 2, p. 40. It refers to April 1936.
34. Quoted in De Felice 1981, p. 276n41. In 1927, writing to his sister, Mussolini told her he was practically on an all-liquid diet, due to his stomach problems, but added, “as I have never been one to have a weakness for the sin of gluttony, abstinence leaves me indifferent.” E. Mussolini 1957, p. 121. Just how much flesh Mussolini gave to the devil is a matter of some debate among his later biographers, or at least those who speculate on a subject that the less prurient may ignore. At one extreme, Nicholas Farrell, in his 2000 biography, Mussolini: A New Life (cited by Baima Bollone 2007, pp. 118–19), estimated that the Duce had sex with five thousand women, which indeed seems high even for a stallion or someone not otherwise employed. Other estimates seem suspiciously precise, one by Duilio Susmel (as reported by Cannistraro and Sullivan 1993, p. 602n) totting up 169 lovers.
35. The local parish priest, having heard of the distinguished visitor’s arrival, hurried to the beachfront scene. Mussolini’s first thought was that the man of the cloth would disapprove of what he found, and hastened to assure him that their dancing was innocuous. But the priest had something else on his mind: he invited the Duce to visit his church, where he pointed out the sad state of the organ. The priest beamed as the generous dictator handed him a wad of cash to pay for the much-needed repairs. Bottai 2001, pp. 119–20 (4 settembre 1937).
CHAPTER 20: VIVA IL DUCE!
1. “No one gets to Rome without or against Berlin, or to Berlin against Rome!” proclaimed the Duce (Rauscher 2004, p. 224). Mussolini quoted these remarks himself during his German trip. DGFP, series C, vol. 6b, n. 568, Hassell to Weizsäcker, October 7, 1937.
2. Hitler’s comments to Ciano were made on October 24. Kershaw 2000, p. 25.
3. Milza 2000, p. 754.
4. Caviglia 2009, pp. 204–5.
5. Rauscher 2004, p. 226.
6. On September 17 Pignatti met with Cardinal Pacelli, who asked him to urge Mussolini to try to persuade Hitler to improve the German government’s relations with the Catholic Church. ASMAE, APG, b. 47, Pignatti a Ciano, “S. Sede e Reich,” 17 settembre 1937. That word of this got out can be seen in the headline of the page-two story in the CDT on September 23, “Duce to Be Pope’s Envoy to Hitler on Church Strife.”
7. “If the Holy See has hoped for a result from Mussolini’s trip to Germany that would be favorable to it as well, the Vatican will have to bury this hope, for Mussolini has avoided broaching the subject of our relations with the Vatican in any form.” DGFP, series D, vol. 1d, n. 682.
8. Baudrillart 1996, pp. 624–5 (1 octobre 1937).
9. ASMAE, APSS, b. 34, Pignatti a regio ministero degli affari esteri, telespresso, 4 ottobre 1937. Pignatti quotes from M. Barbera’s article in CC, quaderno 2095. The pope’s own relations with the Duce continued to be good. Among the signs of their collaboration was the start of the huge construction project outside St. Peter’s Square. Announced by Mussolini the previous year as a way of commemorating the Lateran Accords, the work would demolish the densely populated buildings, alleys, and churches that were packed between two narrow streets running from the Tiber to St. Peter’s. These would be replaced with a broad boulevard, named via della Conciliazione. Work had begun on the construction only after the pope gave his approval, and the pope went to inspect the work shortly after Mussolini’s return from Germany. Insolera 1976, pp. 130–31; Painter 2005, pp. 68–70.
10. Pizzardo delivered the pope’s message to the Italian chargé d’affaires, who, in relaying the message to Ciano, added another worry: “Italy runs the risk of seeing a pope elected having sentiments very different from those of Pope Ratti.” DDI, series 8, vol. 7, n. 424, Venturini a Ciano, 12 ottobre 1937. Ciano had the text of this memo sent to the Italian ambassador in Germany. ASMAE, APG, “S. Sede Reich e Fascismo,” 14 ottobre 1937.
11. In late December Pignatti, while waiting with Charles-Roux outside the pope’s library for their annual papal New Year’s audience, told him that the pope was still “furious” with Mussolini for his visit to Berlin. DDF, series 2, vol. 7, n. 393, Charles-Roux à Delbos, 29 décembre 1937.
12. Tisserant made the comments to the French ambassador. DDF, series 2, vol. 7, n. 393, Charles-Roux à Delbos, ministre des affaires étrangères, 29 décembre 1937.
13. This was reported in the Italian press as well. The Italian nuncio archives have a clipping, “Un discorso di Pio XI al Sacro Collegio,” from the December 25, 1937 edition of Il Popolo di Roma, ASV, ANI, b. 24, fasc. 14, f. 20r. A few days later, meeting with the Italian ambassador, the pope, looking as if he had lost more weight but as mentally sharp as ever, found time in their five-minute Christmas greeting to tell him that “nothing good could be expected from Germany.” ASMAE, AISS, b. 115, Pignatti a Ciano, 28 dicembre 1937.
14. DDF, series 2, vol. 7, n. 374, Charles-Roux à Delbos, 20 décembre 1937; Baudrillart 1996, p. 703 (28 décembre 1937).
15. Baudrillart 1996, p. 731 (17 janvier 1938). The Spanish ambassador shared the opinion of Ernst von Weizsäcker, head of the German foreign office: “Pacelli presents no real counterweight to Pius XI, because he is completely devoid of will and character.” Rhodes 1974, pp. 222–23.
16. De Felice 1974, p. 299; De Felice 1981, p. 280; Deakin 2000; Innocenti 1992, p. 169.
17. “We are on the eve of war with France and with England,” Buffarini told him. “The regime needs to ensure that the nation is united. Therefore it cannot stand by while young Catholics say that the alliance with the Germans is unnatural.” ASV, ANI, pos. 24, fasc. 14, ff. 6r–11r. Borgongini a Pacelli, 31 dicembre 1937.
18. Ciano added that Mussolini was also upset about signs of a warming in relations between the Vatican and the French government, which had been under the control of a popular front of Socialists and Communists since 1936; Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy viewed it as an implacable enemy. In Spain, Ciano told the nuncio, German planes and men were fighting alongside Italians “for the cause of the Catholic religion against that
of red Spain,” which, he said, was being armed by the French government. Borgongini replied by reminding Ciano that the Italian government’s 1929 Conciliation with the Church had benefited the government “not a little, especially in the Ethiopian war, and above all in contributing to Italian prestige abroad.” Ciano did not dispute him and agreed to talk to the Duce the next day and see what could be done. Borgongini offered to see the Duce himself if it would be helpful, but Ciano dismissed the idea. Mussolini found it more profitable to deal with Tacchi Venturi, something both Ciano and Borgongini knew, but was left unsaid. ASV, ANI, pos. 24, fasc. 14, ff. 53r–58r., Borgongini a Pacelli, 4 gennaio 1938.
19. A follow-up letter, sent a week later, warned the priests that should they not attend, their absence might be “misinterpreted.” The two letters of invitation, on the stationery of the “National Competition of Grain and Farms Among Priests,” are found in the Vatican files at ASV, AESI, pos. 1044, fasc. 722, ff. 60r–61r and 48r–48v.
20. ASV, AESI, pos. 1044, fasc. 722, f. 45r, Francesco Niccoli, vescovo di Colle, a Mons. Domenico Tardini, Sostituito per gli Affari Ordinari, Segreteria di Stato, 16 dicembre 1937.
21. Before making a final decision, the pope wanted to check with the archbishop of Udine, who was billed as the main speaker at the event; the pope wanted to find out how he had agreed to play such a prominent role. Pacelli relayed the pope’s request to Rossi, adding that, in past years, bishops had been taking part in such patriotic demonstrations without any problem. The correspondence between Cardinal Rossi and Pacelli is found in ASV, AESI, pos. 1044, fasc. 722, ff. 52r, 56r, 57r, 63r–64r. “The news is true,” replied Archbishop Nogara. But “before I agreed to participate and give the address, I contacted Mons. Pizzardo (now Cardinal)”—Pizzardo had been made a cardinal just the previous month—“who spoke of it with the Holy Father.… He received his consent.” Nogara added, with a hint of concern, “I hope it does not cause any complications.” Ibid., p. 70r. Presumably Pizzardo had asked for the pope’s approval, the pope had given it, and then, such was the state of his mind on some days, he had forgotten about it.
The Pope and Mussolini Page 54
