Stalker training
As part of movement training, the art of the stalker was taught, whether it was walking in such a way as to minimize sound underfoot and retaining balance or learning to crawl on hands and knees without dragging the rifle or getting it dirty or crawling on the stomach. Stalking was an art in itself and was a lot more complicated than it sounds. If the stalker does not know the ground thoroughly, he is in danger of becoming the prey. The students were taught how to map and plan the ground and use the compass to work out their current position and route.
LEE - ENFIELD NO.4 MK I
Country of Origin United Kingdom
Caliber .303in (7.7mm)
Overall length 1129mm (44.45in)
Barrel length 640mm (25.2in)
Weight 4.11kg (9lb)
SHORT MAGAZINE LEE-ENFIELD (SMLE) MK III
Country of Origin United Kingdom
Caliber .303in (7.7mm)
Overall length 1130mm (44.5in)
Barrel length 635mm (25in)
Weight 4kg (8.8lb)
Early model sniper camouflage suits, dating from 1941. In a training exercise somewhere in England, a scout sniper helps his observer into his camouflage gear, ready for a demonstration of counter sniper tactics.
The students were taught how to build hides for longer periods and in such a way as to provide maximum protection in difficult weather conditions and to provide the opportunity for storage of backup equipment and a certain level of movement. The snipers were taught to observe as a hunter would observe, where the slightest movement is of significance. Training in the outdoors has the effect of heightening the senses, which are often dulled by comfortable urban living. Such skills came more naturally to those snipers who had a rural background and were used to hunting game. Related to this was the knowledge of and sensitivity to animal life. Animals could sometimes give clues to an enemy sniper’s position by their movements or warning cries and the sniper had to be aware of not startling animals or birds and give away his own position.
MONTE CASSINO
Before D-Day, however, came the Italian campaign. The Allies had fought their way through North Africa, taken Sicily in July 1943 and made various landings in Italy, including at Anzio and Salerno from September. The campaign in Italy proved to be both painful and slow and was already being overshadowed by planning for the bigger invasion of France from England–Operation “Overlord.”
There were many problems to be faced in Italy. Apart from the dogged German resistance, the landscape with high mountains and defiles was difficult to traverse with armored vehicles and seemed to have been designed for the benefit of defenders. The campaign soon developed into a battle of attrition. Snipers tend to thrive in attrtitional warfare. Whether it was in the steep defiles or narrow roads filled with obstructions or in towns turned to rubble, the sniper could all too easily rule and create confusion.
The Allies were held up on the so-called Winter Line in October 1943, the western part of which was called the Gustav Line, which hinged on the almost impregnable strongpoint of Monte Cassino. It was vital for the Allies to overcome German resistance before they could successfully move on to Rome. The hold-up extended to May 1944 when twelve Allied divisions attacked six German divisions along the Gustav Line, including the slopes of Monte Cassino. When the attack went in at dawn on May 11, however, the results were not encouraging.
FALLSCHIRMJÄGER SNIPERS
Among the troops who took advantage of the rubble-strewn mountain-top at Monte Cassino were German Fallschirmjäger snipers of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Division.
The word “Fallschirmjäger” in German literally means “parachute hunter.” Due to their tenacity and effectiveness, and their characteristic camouflage uniform, Allied troops came to know them as the “Green Devils.” The Fallschirmjäger were first officially created in 1936 as the concept of parachute troops rapidly developed. In the opening scenes of World War II, the Fallschirmjäger proved to be stunningly effective, their most famous operation being the capture of the “impregnable” Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael in May 1940. They later played a significant role in the capture of Crete from the British in 1941.
A German Fallschirmjäger aims a FG42 selective fire automatic rifle, which was developed specifically for use by the paratroopers. Here the sharpshooter uses the flip-up front post iron sight and folding rear dioptre sight. The weapon could also be fitted with a ZFG42 or ZF4 telescopic sight.
For sheer tenacity, staying power and fighting skill, however, the defense of Monte Cassino stands as one of the greatest battles fought by this famous unit. Refusing to occupy the Benedictine abbey itself, they nevertheless kept the Allied armies at bay for months on end, exacting a heavy toll on any unit that attempted to oust them.
A typical Fallschirmjäger company would consist of a headquarters unit of one officer and thirty-five men and three rifle platoons of one officer and thirty-eight enlisted men divided into three squads of twelve to thirteen men. The weaponry carried by the Fallschirmjäger would typically consist of the FG42 assault rifle (known as the Fallschirmjägergewehr 42). This was an advanced design, which helped to inspire the design of the modern assault rifle. They were also equipped with MP44/43 assault rifles, MG34 or MG42 machine-guns and Gewehr 33/40 sniper rifles. The Gewehr 33/40 was based on a Czech bolt-action rifle design, which in turn employed a Mauser-type action.
The FG42 could also be adapted for sniping duties. The Fallschirmjäger also used the Gewehr 43/K43, which was a specialist sniper rifle fitted with Zielfernrohr 43 telescopic sights with 4x magnification. It had an effective range of 800m (874 yards) with a scope.
Snipers on the mountain
Tasked with capturing the sixth-century hill-top abbey of Monte Cassino, the Polish II Corps were almost decimated. The abbey became a focus for the battle and, despite the fact that the abbey was not occupied by the Germans (the local German commander was a Catholic), a decision was made by the Allies to bomb it. By bombing the monastery, the Allies turned a historic monument into a heap of rubble, which provided the Germans with first-class defenses and which became a haven for snipers.
Operation “Diadem,” launched by the British General Alexander, was the final attempt to push the Germans off the mountain. It included the British XIII Corps, Americans, Free French forces as well as Polish and New Zealand forces. The Americans suffered about 3681 casualties while overall the British lost about 4400. The Poles lost 1100. Despite the fact that this was Italy in spring and not Russia in winter, the conditions were extremely unpleasant, including rain, mud, cold and even snow. The rain during 1943/44 was some of the heaviest ever recorded in Italy. A Canadian soldier observed:
The face of the opposing mountain mass was honeycombed with German gun positions. Their observers sat up there in fortified emplacements with field glasses and telescopic sights, where they could watch every movement our attacking force made. At the base and on the flat area just across the river from us were machine-gun positions expertly camouflaged and fortified. They had zeroed in all their guns on various terrain features in front of them so their fire was very accurate. The Germans always did this careful artillery registration as they retired or pulled back.
The sniping was not all one-way in Italy. British snipers were also positioned to watch movements in No Man’s Land and to harass German sentries. Captain Shore relates one such incident:
One unit had advanced to the Senio River and was holding a sector in which improvement of positions was made during the hours of darkness. The forward platoon of the unit was in and around a cluster of smallish houses about 200 yards [183m] from the bank of the river. From the roof of one of these houses there was a good clear view of the top of the bank held by the Hun. Snipers watching this bank observed that the Germans changed their sentries every even hour with monotonous regularity. At first the Hun was cautious and our snipers withstood the temptation to shoot hoping that targets would become more favourable when the Jerries had lost some of
their caution. Later in the day the hoped-for happened, and at 1200 hours six of the enemy could be seen from the waist upwards.
There were four of our snipers on duty and having set their plan of execution ready they each selected a Hun and fired. Three out of the four Huns aimed at fell, and shortly afterwards their bodies were carefully dragged from the top of the bank by their comrades concealed below. At the 1400 hours relief the sentries were again very cautious and the snipers did not get in a single shot. But at 1600 hours two more Huns were sent to their particular Valhalla. It was a long and tedious day for the snipers with only two volleys. But it was a good day’s work, five Germans having been accounted for without loss to our men.
A Canadian sniper prepares himself for a shot armed with a Lee-Enfield No.4 Mk I rifle. Many No.4 rifles were modified for sniper use by the addition of a wooden cheek piece and telescopic sight mounts designed to fit a No. 32 3.5x telescopic sight.
D-DAY
With everything planned for an assault on the coast of Normandy, there was only one hitch–the weather. Meteorological experts had, however, indicated that there might be a break in the weather on June 6, 1944. The decision was made to go in. So began the largest seaborne invasion of all time.
Roughly divided between the U.S. First Army to the west and the British Second Army, including Canadian forces, to the east, the assault beaches were codenamed, from west to east, Utah and Omaha for the Americans and Gold, Juno and Sword for the British and Canadians. Although the weather conditions to some extent played into Allied hands due to the element of surprise–the Germans did not believe anyone would be crazy enough to launch an invasion in such adverse conditions–it had the effect of disrupting Allied paratroop drops and bombing missions aimed at neutralizing beach defenses, notably those on Omaha Beach.
SPRINGFIELD MODEL 1903
Having noted the effectiveness of the Mauser design of rifles, the United States set up the Springfield Armory in 1900 to develop the Springfield bolt-action rifle based on the Mauser bolt design. This rifle would be standard issue to American forces during World War I. Between the wars, the Springfield was replaced by the semi-automatic M1 Garand rifle but it remained in service as a sniper rifle, where rate of fire was not an issue. The specialized sniper version of the rifle, which later came to be manufactured by Remington, was the M1903A4. These rifles were fitted with an adapted pistol grip on the stock and carried a 330 2.2x magnification telescopic sight.
Country of Origin United States
Caliber 7.62mm (0.3in)
Overall length 1140mm (44.9in)
Barrel length 610mm (24in)
Weight 3.9kg (8.65lbs)
Confused and disoriented as the Germans may have been about where and when the attack was coming, the shores of Omaha Beach were full of gun, machine-gun and sniper hides. The beach was strewn with obstacles, including barbed wire and mines. Some of the snipers were lodged in tunnels, others were concealed in woods and some were concealed in trees.
Snipers on the beaches
Once the seasick infantry had landed, they were still about 183m (200 yards) from the shore due to the sandbars. Some were up to their necks in water as they tried to wade in and by the time they reached the real shore they were barely able to do more than shuffle due to the weight of their waterlogged equipment and clothing. The 116th Regimental Combat Team of the battle-hardened U.S. 1st Infantry Division landed three of their boats too far west. These happened to include the vital headquarters and beachmaster groups. German snipers kept this group pinned down so that they could not move out for hours. The area, known as Dog Green, continued to be a lethal spot for anyone unlucky enough to land in it. Later on, two companies of U.S. Rangers landed on the edge of the Dog Green area. Although they eventually managed to reach the relative safety of the seawall, they lost half of their men to snipers and other enemy fire.
The main cause of casualties on Omaha Beach were the machine-gun nests. These were carefully sited and mutually protected so that an attack on one would attract fire from another, not to mention sniper fire. American units became mixed and lost their direction due to the loss of officers, which would have been targeted by the snipers. The snipers also had the advantage of a series of interlocking tunnels so that they could disappear and reappear at will. As the Americans eventually began to move inland, they found snipers positioned in village houses, which meant they had to conduct laborious house clearances. Companies B and C of 2nd Battalion Regimental Combat Team were held up for several hours as they tried to clear snipers from woods near Colleville. The German snipers positioned themselves so that they had a good view of any gates or openings in the hedgerows.
U.S. ARMY SNIPER TRAINING
American forces, having been equipped with the Springfield Model 1903 sniping rifle, were later issued the M1 Garand C with an M81 telescopic sight. The Garand had its faults, among which was a noisy ejection of the clip when the last round had been fired. This would spell almost certain death for a sniper and care had to be taken not to fire the last round.
Apart from a short course in Camp Perry, Ohio, there was not much in the way of sniper training for the American forces, but they learned quickly once they had been on the receiving end of German sniper tactics. The Americans noted how the Germans could cause mayhem by picking off a few selected targets, whether they be officers or key personnel or drivers of vehicles in key positions, such as in a convoy. Shooting the drivers of the first and last vehicles in a convoy could cause mayhem. In due course, the Americans began to give the Germans a taste of their own medicine, as U.S. Army Sergeant John Fulcher recounted:
U.S. soldiers take cover from a German sniper in a town in northern France following the Normandy landings, July 1944. A single sniper could hold up much larger units for many hours if not quickly located and dealt with.
We snipers adopted a tactic the Nazis sometimes used. Slipping from our lines before daylight, we located a hill or ridge within range of a road or trail inside enemy territory, divided it into sectors for each two-man team–sniper and spotter–and then settled down to wait for whatever came along …
I spotted troops coming at the end of the road where it hazed into the horizon. I nudged my partner and nodded in their direction. … Through binoculars, I could tell they were green replacements. Their uniforms were still a crisp gray green; their jackboots kicking up little spurts of dust still shone. They left a cloud of dust hanging in their wake.
As cool as could be, I cross-haired the officer and shot him through the belly. He looked momentarily surprised. He plopped down on his butt in the middle of the road. The report of the shot reached him as he fell over onto his back. He was dead by the time I brought my rifle down out of recoil and picked him up again in my scope. His legs were drumming on the road, but he was dead. His body just didn’t know it yet.
The other krauts were so green they didn’t know enough to scatter for cover until my partner got in his licks by knocking down one more. Even then, they behaved more like quail than combat troops. They hid in the drainage ditches and in some shell craters, their heads bobbing up. … I figured I could have drilled two or three more, but I held my fire. It wouldn’t do to be pinpointed, even by green troops. …
“Get around the sniper and machine gunner and wipe him out … If you allow your unit to bunch up behind a hedgerow and wait for hours you are only playing into Jerry’s hand. He will move round where he can enfilade you or drop artillery or mortar fire on you … It is time to get over the jitters and fight like hell.”
Colonel Canham, U.S. 115th Infantry Regiment
The company reorganized without making any attempt to find us. … As soon as the Germans swept around a distant bend in the road, they were greeted by the twin Crack! Crack! of two more rifle shots as they entered another Yank team’s sector.
This professionalism was not always matched by other rookie GI snipers who all too often were inadequately camouflaged or loosed off too many shots from the same loc
ation, thus giving away their positions. The Americans learned fast, however, and by the time of the D-Day invasion in 1944 they were able to field an elite band of snipers.
A U.S. infantryman tries to tempt a sniper to fire and reveal his position in the Normandy bocage, the network of small fields and thick hedgerows that proved to be a sniper’s haven. Units could be held down for hours by a single sniper.
The problems had not ended for American forces still coming through the beaches because where German emplacements and resistance had supposedly been snuffed out, snipers then reappeared to occupy the same positions. As American engineers continued to try to remove obstacles on the beach, they were continually harassed by sniper fire.
The snipers of Point du Hoc
One of the key actions of U.S. forces on June 6, 1944–D-Day–was an assault on German gun positions on the Point du Hoc, about 6km (4 miles) west of Omaha Beach and to the east of Utah Beach. The guns, 155mm (6.1in) howitzers, threatened both Utah and Omaha beaches as well as transport and attack craft for a considerable distance out to sea.
The attack was to be carried out by the 2nd Ranger Battalion commanded by Lt.-Colonel James E. Rudder and the follow up was by 5th Ranger Battalion commanded by Lt.-Colonel Max F. Schneider. The U.S. Rangers were named after Rogers’ Rangers, a group of eighteenth-century colonial militia. Commanded initially by William Darby, they had been created to form a similar force to the British Commandos, with whom they carried out training in Scotland. Tasked with attacking the key German batteries at Point du Hoc, the Rangers trained with scaling ladders on cliffs at the Isle of Wight. Three companies of 2nd Rangers were to carry out the initial assault, while the rest of the force would follow through and push inland.
Sniper in Action Page 7
