Basic military training is not to show a silhouette, for example on a ridge or other skyline or in a window or doorway. The sniper needs to be aware of their environment and wear suitable clothing. As British paratroopers moved from the fields around Arnhem into the town itself during Operation “Market Garden,” Major John Frost is said to have commented on their green camouflage and foliage in their helmets. The U.S. Marines have worked both on urban camouflage and on equipment such as specialized boots and knee and elbow guards to optimize movement in urban terrain. A sure giveaway in an otherwise blank environment is movement and/or sound. The smallest movement of a branch or sound of a snapping twig could provide the essential clue to give away a sniper’s position.
Credited with 109 confirmed kills, Staff Sergeant Waldron served in the U.S. Army’s 9th Infantry Division. Born in New York, he had initially joined the U.S. Navy but left in 1965. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1968 and was attached to Company B, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division. This division was part of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) that operated in the Mekong Valley. Like most U.S. Army snipers, he carried the new M21 rifle with the Redfield/ Leatherwood 3-9x Adjustable Ranging Telescope (ART) sight.
Waterborne sniper
Waldron was often in a somewhat unusual position for a sniper, and an army sniper at that, as he often operated from a moving boat on a river. This might have caused an ordinary sniper to put a few shots wide but Waldron was no ordinary sniper. Riding on a Tango boat on the Mekong River one afternoon, an enemy sniper started to pepper the boat with long-range shots. Waldron identified the sniper in a coconut tree about 900m (984 yards) away. The only problem was that he was on a moving boat. Waldron took careful aim and fired. After that, the enemy sniper was in no position to fire at anything.
Waldron served with the 9th Infantry Division, which was the only major U.S. Army unit to be deployed to the Mekong Delta. As part of the MRF (Mobile Riverine Force), elements of the 9th Division operated aboard Navy-crewed “Tango Boats” in the waterways of the Delta, which was a difficult combat environment at the best of times.
Various expedients were tried to cope with the delta environment, including the experimental “Pinkeye” boats that swept rivers for enemy personnel at night. These boats were fitted with a powerful searchlight covered by a pink filter. This created light conditions highly suitable for the use of low-light or “starlight” scopes by snipers. Two to four snipers were stationed aboard the boat to engage enemy personnel illuminated by the light. The snipers could engage directly or use tracer rounds to indicate a target for a ship-board 105mm (4.1in) howitzer firing “beehive” anti-personnel rounds.
Controversial combat record
The 9th Infantry Division began training snipers late in 1968, at about the same time that Waldron enlisted. He was not a teenage recruit but was in his mid 30s, and had served with the Navy from 1956 to 1965. He was given the rank of sergeant, equivalent to his navy rank. Perhaps because of his experience, Waldron was selected for in-country sniper training soon after he deployed to Vietnam in 1968. The division began to be withdrawn in the summer of 1969, giving Waldron just a few months to prove his effectiveness.
Sniper in the shadows: Adelbert C. Waldron makes use of simple camouflage through which he aims his M21 rifle. Top snipers such as Waldron had a natural talent for fieldcraft as well as marksmanship.
A sniper and spotter of B Company, 4th Marine Division work together on Operation “Nanking Scotland II” in October 1968.
There is some controversy surrounding Waldron and his record, and details are hard to establish. It is alleged that he did not pass sniper training before beginning his active career, though whether or not this is the case really matters less than the results he achieved.
There are those who dispute these results, too. Waldron is sometimes cited with 113 confirmed kills. This arises from an offhand remark by Colonel Mitchell WerBell, who was asked how many kills Waldron had made and could not remember exactly. He mistakenly stated 113 rather than the officially recorded 109, and this erroneous figure found its way into common use.
However, 109 kills is still an incredible number and this figure, too, has been challenged. The 9th Infantry Division has been accused of exaggerating its body count for various reasons, notably because the number of weapons recovered from the combat area did not tally with the claimed enemy casualties. It has been claimed that, in order to make its sniper training program seem more effective, the 9th Division would add the kills scored by a sniper’s accompanying security element to his own tally.
The truth of this is hard to discern, but personnel from the 9th Infantry Division who were interviewed spoke highly of Waldron’s effectiveness as a sniper and a combat soldier. At least some of his actions have been independently corroborated, so it is probable that he was indeed an extremely skilled sniper whose reputation may have been used by others to further their agenda.
Highly effective sniper
Waldron is officially credited with 109 kills, of which 82 were made in the first five months of his deployment. For his actions he was awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star and two Distinguished Service Crosses for his service in Vietnam. This included his exploits aboard Tango Boats and also in a more conventional sniping environment.
Waldron favored a suppressed rifle, making it difficult for hostiles to determine where a shot had come from. He often shot from relatively short distances, averaging about 400 meters (440 yards). He also made extensive use of a “starlight” low-light sight, which was at that time an emerging technology but which is today a standard piece of kit. His M21 rifle was also a relatively new weapon, but went on to become the standard U.S. sniping rifle until 1988.
One official report of Waldron’s exploits describes the effectiveness of the night sight/suppressor combination in the right hands. Waldron and his spotter had set up a hide a little south of Ben Tre, in an area that his company had swept that day. This was a fairly common way to cover a sniper deployment; the sniper team would accompany a patrol and then quietly drop out of sight, remaining behind to ambush any hostiles who came along afterwards. Waldron’s position covered a paddy field close to a wooded area, and in due course a small patrol of five Viet Cong insurgents appeared from the woods. Waldron shot one of them, causing the others to take cover. Apparently unable to determine where the threat originated or if it still existed, the enemy patrol resumed movement after a few minutes. As they left cover, the Viet Cong were engaged; all four were shot and killed. About half an hour later, another small patrol appeared. All four members of this group were also eliminated.
This action illustrates a different aspect of sniping. Rather than making long shots, Waldron picked off enemy personnel at fairly close ranges, making multiple kills in a single engagement. His use of a suppressed rifle was instrumental in concealing his location and the electronically conferred ability to see in the dark was certainly useful, but in the end it came down to a man and his rifle.
Later life
After leaving the army in 1970 Waldron worked as a marksmanship instructor for a private security organization and gradually faded into obscurity. He seems never to have been tempted to write a book or give interviews, so many aspects of his career remain vague or controversial. There is enough hard evidence, however, to suggest that whatever the exact truth may be, Adelbert Waldron was a highly effective sniper.
U.S. FIGHTBACK
After suffering so much at the hands of Vietnamese snipers, the Americans realized they needed their own snipers to counter the large number of VC/NVA snipers and in this sort of warfare snipers were an essential fighting arm.
There was only one problem. Neither the Army nor the Marines had an identifiable, up-to-date sniper rifle, short of rummaging around in stores for veteran World War II and Korean War weapons. As so often before, whether it be the U.S. armed forces or the British, it was not just the authorities that took the initiative in resolving the problems
but also committed individuals.
The development of automatic rifles such as the M16 had led to a somewhat loose approach to marksmanship. It was thought better to spray an area with bullets, as if soaking it with a hose, than aim at individual targets. This was fair enough if under pressure of an attack at close range from large numbers of the enemy but it was of little use for accurate shooting at selected targets of opportunity. There was also a problem when the enemy were well out of range and were taking accurate shots at U.S. servicemen. Spraying bullets back wildly had little effect. As has been seen so often before, whether in the trenches of France or Belgium or the Normandy bocage, the sniper has an uncanny ability to take control of the situation.
A U.S. Marine aims his telescopically sighted M16 rifle on the training range. The M16 entered U.S. Army service in South Vietnam in 1963, replacing the M14 as the standard U.S. rifle of the Vietnam War by 1969.
New sight
Once the Army in Vietnam had woken up to the fact that their sniping tactics needed to change, Captain Jim Leatherwood set about designing a suitable telescopic sight. He came up with the Leatherwood ART 1 telescopic sight which had an ingenious adjustment to cope with the problem of bullet drop. The scope was fitted to an M14 rifle and the combination was officially approved as the XM21 system. By the end of 1969, the new system was being fielded in some quantity. The Army also instituted a formal training program and soon properly qualified snipers with a highly accurate weapon began to make an impact on the enemy in Vietnam.
The U.S. Marines were also aware that sniping needed to be taken out of the closet and dusted off. Captain Robert A. Russell established a school for the Marines 3rd Division in Vietnam while Captain Jim Land established an equivalent school for the 1st Marines. Soon sniper platoons were officially designated by the authorities and were formalized as three squads of five two-man teams with a squad leader, a senior NCO, armorer and officer, amounting to one officer and thirty-five enlisted men.
Now all they needed was a rifle. The Army had already selected the M21. The Marines tested this along with the Winchester Model 70 and the M16, which was chambered for the smaller 5.56mm (0.223in) bullet. In the event, the Marines found that none of these suited their particular requirements. After lengthy testing, they selected the Remington Model 40x, the target version of the Remington Model 700 bolt-action rifle. The rifle was fitted with a Redfield Accu-Range 3x9 magnification scope which had advanced moisture resistance.
Now that both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps had both trained snipers and highly accurate tools of the trade, it was time for the VC/NVA to keep their heads down.
CHUCK MAWHINNEY (1949–)
Chuck Mawhinney served in the U.S. Marine Corps and his record of 103 confirmed kills puts him in the same stratosphere as Hathcock and Waldron. Mawhinney had been a hunter in his youth and, like many good snipers, had an instinctive feel for the natural environment, the effects of sound and movement and of how weather conditions would affect a shot. Having been recognized as a marksman in his early days as a Marine, he moved to Camp Pendleton for sniper training.
M40A1 RIFLE
The M40A1 was a modified version of the Remington 700 Model 40x magnification bolt-action rifle, which was the target variant of the Remington 700. This rifle was selected by the U.S. Marine Corps as their sniper rifle of choice for the Vietnam War and in due course it received further modifications by U.S. Marine Corps armorers at Quantico. The M40A1 featured a fibreglass stock and a Unertl 10x magnification telescopic sight, and had an effective range of 800m (875 yards). The M40A1 proved to be an extremely accurate and reliable weapon and is still preferred by some users over the later version of the rifle, the A3.
Country of Origin United States
Caliber 7.62mm (0.3in)
Overall length 1117mm (43.97in)
Barrel length 610mm (24in)
Weight 6.57kg (14.48lbs)
A U.S. Marine Corps scout/sniper surveys some open paddy fields as part of his reconnaissance duties somewhere in Vietnam. He appears to be armed with a M40A1 sniper rifle.
Mawhinney was posted to Vietnam in 1968 and proceeded to notch up a significant number of kills. Apart from 103 confirmed kills, there were 216 additional probable kills.
Headshots
On one occasion, he spotted a platoon of NVA soldiers crossing a stream. Using an M14 rifle, he killed sixteen of them with head shots. This was an extraordinary feat, in view of the fact that he was not even using his more accurate bolt-action sniper rifle. Mawhinney disappeared into relative obscurity after the war but his achievement came to light after the publication of a book that included some of his exploits.
Mawhinney might not have ever become a sniper but for his love of hunting. The connection is not the obvious one; he had planned to join the Navy but was offered a deal by a Marine Corps recruiter. If he joined the Marines, as his father had done, he could defer enlistment until after the hunting season. This was too good to pass up, so Chuck Mawhinney became a Marine and, soon afterward, deployed to Vietnam to hunt men rather than beasts.
Mawhinney arrived in-country in 1968, just after the Tet Offensive, and was thrust into a period of very heavy fighting. Over the next 16 months he achieved a record of over 100 confirmed kills and 216 “probables.” At the time, the U.S. military required confirmation of a kill by an officer or by examination of the body. This was often not possible in a fluid combat environment, with the result that Mawhinney’s incredible sequence of sixteen headshots–though witnessed by other soldiers–were listed only as probables since the bodies floated away downriver.
Mawhinney, like other snipers, had to come to terms with his profession. His philosophy held that by taking a few lives he saved many more. This is undoubtedly correct–the morale effect and disruption caused by a successful sniper will always weaken the enemy’s ability to fight and thus hasten the end of the conflict. With one exception–a North Vietnamese Army paymaster–everyone Mawhinney shot was holding a weapon. This was his rule: anyone with a weapon was fair game.
Sniper mentor
One of Mawhinney’s duties as a sniper was to train others. An experienced sniper was partnered up with a rookie–who might be a graduate of sniper training but who was not yet proved in combat–as his observer. Under Mawhinney’s guidance a succession of young observers were coached in fieldcraft and the realities of combat sniping until he felt that they were ready for their first shot.
Mawhinney offered his trainees guidance as they prepared themselves to face the challenge of taking their first life. He stressed that this was an enemy who would kill both the sniper and his observer given the chance, and that botching the job could be fatal for the sniper or for someone else.
On one occasion Mawhinney did fail to kill an enemy. Spotting a rifle-armed man at about 300 meters (330 yards) distance, he aimed and fired what should have been an easy shot. To his astonishment the target did not go down but instead took off running. Mawhinney fired several more times, but he could not hit his target.
The man got away as a result, Mawhinney discovered later, of his scope being earlier adjusted by an armorer who had failed to tell him of the change. It was not disappointment at failing to hit his target that bothered the sniper; it was the question of how many of his fellow soldiers that rifleman killed because Mawhinney failed to stop him.
First kill
The new sniper’s first kill was carefully selected as what Mawhinney called a “confidence shot”–an easy shot from a fairly short range. This was usually at a distance of around 300 meters (330 yards). Once the new sniper was ready to function alone, he would receive his own rookie observer and both he and Mawhinney would become the senior members of two new partnerships.
Mawhinney had to be ruthless and be willing to kill, but wherever possible he did not leave his victims to suffer needlessly. He often put a second shot into a fatally injured target to end his misery. He also tried to preserve the lives of his own colleagues. Realizing th
at a competitive “kill-board” set up by a platoon leader was prompting the more reckless snipers to take needless risks in order to get ahead in the kill count, Mawhinney insisted that the offending board be taken down and the competition scrapped.
Withdrawal and discharge
Mawhinney became disillusioned with the war in Vietnam, and realized that there was little prospect of winning with the current strategy. Despite this he extended his tour twice, reasoning that he could keep more young Americans alive if he remained in the field. However, he was eventually suspected of suffering from combat stress and sent home to become an instructor.
Snipers are usually incredibly self-disciplined but they also tend to be highly individualistic. Mawhinney was no exception; he did not take well to the parade-ground atmosphere of a training camp and left the army to take a job with the United States Forest Service.
For many years Mawhinney was a forgotten figure, which he preferred. However, eventually his story emerged and he was forced to admit publicly that he was indeed a sniper who had killed dozens of men. Examination of military records established his reputation as one of the top-scoring snipers of all time, a distinction that he never wanted. To him, sniping was simply a job that had to be done whatever he felt about it, and he had given his best.
U.S. Army specialist marksman Joh Rice uses the scope of his M14 rifle to scan a section of high ground in this photo taken sometime in 1970.
EXIT STRATEGY
By March 29, 1973, the last U.S. military units had left Vietnam and all that was left was the final wrangling between North and South Vietnamese forces and the remaining U.S. advisers. Whatever the arguments for the strategy of the war in Vietnam, the sniper had proved his worth and was now established as a permanent and vital part of the fighting arms of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.
Sniper in Action Page 12
